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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
October 9 Conference
List 1, Sheet 1
No. 81-185 ASY
Simopoulos (doctor/criminal defendant)

v.
Virginia

~ from

~for

Va S Ct
the ct)

State/Criminal Timely (w/ext)
SUMMARY:

Appt argues that (1) the Va abortion statutP.s

shift to the defendant the burden of establishing a medical
necessity for an abortion, (2) his conviction violated due
process because the prosecution presented no evidence that appt's
acts caused the destruction or expulsion of the fetus,

(3) Va's

mandatory
hospitalization
requirement for second trimester
.
.
.
abortions is unconstitutional, and (4) on the facts of this cose
CFR o.fritD~I. r fj,,,~~.{: ~· a;;l)~t-Mal!('(" IS. t;fl'or,...,ot~, S'"ee IS~Uf5
Stl.f-R" t-tf·~es ~ 8-I:L
~L
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the mandatory hospitalization requirement is unconstitutional
because the only available hospital required minors seeking
second trimester abortions to have parental consent.
FACTS and DECISIONS BELOW:

Appt is a licensed gynecologist.

P.M., who was 17 and five and one-half months pregnant, came to
appt and requested an abortion .

-

In his clinic, appt injected
.

saline solution into P.M.'s amniotic cavity.

She went to a motel

room and two days later expelled the fetus.
Appt was indicted under Va. Code §18.2-71 for performing a
second trimester abortion outside a hospital.
and appealed to the Va S Ct.

He was convicted

The Va S Ct rejected each of the

contentions appt places before this Court.
Appt argued that the indictment was defective because the
state did not assume the burden of proving lack of a medical
necessity for the abortion.

In appt's view, shifting the burden

of proof to the defendant violated United States v. Vuitch, 402
U.S. 62 (1971).

The Va S Ct pointed out that §18.2-71 makes no

mention of medical necessity when defining an illegal abortion.
Medical necessity is established as a defense in a later section,
§18.2-74.1.

Unlike this case, in Vuitch medical necessity was

part of the enacting clause.

Here, once the defendant invokes

the medical necessity defense, the state has the burden of
negating medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, in this case the evidence clearly showed an absence
of medical necessity.

Appt testified that his patient was

depressed and that he was concerned about suicide.

...

But the
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patient testified she was merely scared, and appt's own
handwritten notes described her conditions as "normal."
The Va S Ct also found that there was sufficient evidence
that appt had destroyed the fetus.

Appt acknowledged that he

administered saline solution to terminate the pregnancy, and his
patient testified that appt told her that the fetus was
destroyed.
dead.

A medical examiner reported that the fetus was born

The court concluded that, in the absence of evidence of

any other causative factor, the evidence was sufficient to show
that the saline solution injection destroyed the fetus.
Appt's challenge to the hospital requirement, §18.2-73, was
also unpersuasive, according to the Va S Ct.

In Roe v. Wade, 410

U.S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized that the state's interest
in the mother's health becomes compelling at approximately the
end of the first trimester.

The Court specifically stated:

"Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are
requirements ... as to the facility in which the procedure is to
be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a
clinic .... "

Id. at 163.

In Doe v. Bolton, 410

u.s.

179 (1973),

the Court struck down the Georgia hospitalization requirement
because it included the first trimester and the evidence was
insufficient to show that the requirement was reasonably related
to maternal health.
Applying these principles, the Va S Ct found sufficient

-----------

evidence to support the second trimester hospitalization
requirement.

Appt's expert witnesses testified that a second-

trimester out-patient saline injection was a reasonably safe
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medical procedure and explained that abortion patients could
suffer from the disdain of hospital staff members.

One expert

cited a study that 65 percent of saline injection patients
required no hospitalization after expelling the fetus, and
another testified that complication rates are about the same
whether the injection is given inside or outside a hospital.
At the same time, though, on cross-examination the experts
conceded that complications could develop.

One acknowledged that

major problems could arise if the solution entered the
bloodstream too fast and bleeding occurred.

Another admitted

that saline injections entail risks which may require observation
of the patient, including headache, vomiting, and on rare
occasions abrupt swelling of the uterus.

The same expert agreed

that saline injections can result in extensive hemorrhaging,
although hemorrhaging occurs for the most part only during labor.
Thus, from the time the solution is injected until the fetus
is expelled, the patient is exposed to certain risks, "some
minor, others major, none precisely predictable."

J.S. App 18a.

The hospitalization requirement is reasonably related to the
state's interest in protecting the mother's health.

~or

is the hospitalization requirement unreasonable as

applied to Virginia.

This case is unlike Margaret S. v. Edwards,

488 F. Supp. 181 (ED La 1980), in which no Louisiana hospital
performed second-trimester abortions, and Planned Parenthood
Ass'n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679 (WD Mo 1980),
in which only one Missouri hospital did so.

Two northern
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Virginia hospitals and 24 hospitals in the rest of Virginia
provided abortion services in 1977.
Even if access to abortion services was inconvenient or
conditioned on parental consent, those difficulties were not
created by the state.

Section 18.2-75 permits hospitals to place

certain restrictions on abortion services or to refuse to perform
abortions altogether, but it does not require them to do so.

See

Harris v. McRae, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 2688 (1980) (state need not
remove obstacles to abortions which it did not create).

Statutes

are presumptively constitutional, and appt failed to carry his
burden to overcome that presumption.
Appt's conviction was thus affirmed.
CONTENTIONS:

Appt takes issue with the VaS Ct's rulings

(1) Burden of Proof for Medical Necessity.

In Vuitch, 402

u.s. at 71, the Court stated that "the burden is on the
prosecution to plead and prove that an abortion was not
'necessary for the preservation of the mother's life or health.'"
The result in this case should not be different simply because of
the location of the maternal health exception in the statutory
scheme.
(2) Proof of Causation.

The prosecution presented no proof

of whether a saline injection caused the fetus' demise and failed
to demonstrate that there were no intervening causes during the
two days while the patient was in the motel.

Medical experts

testified that not all saline injections cause a fetus to be
expelled.

When the Va S Ct observed that there was no proof of

another causative factor, it missed the point; the critical fact
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is that there was no proof that the saline injection was the
causative factor.
{3) Mandatory Hospitalization.

Appt's experts testified

that a second-trimester out-patient saline injection is an
acceptable medical practice.

The prosecution produced no

evidence and no witnesses to counter this testimony.

co~rts

have decl areo a

unconstitutional.

se~o-;d t"rim;;t;; h~l

Some lower

requirement

See Margaret S. v. Edwards, supra; Wolfe v.

Stumbo, No. C80-0285 L{A)

{WD Ky Dec. 3, 1980) {not yet reported).

Gary-Northwest v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894 {ND Ind 1980),
aff'd
__.... mem., 451

u.s.

{1981), is not controlling.

In that

decision, the DC upheld a mandatory hospitalization requirement
for second trimester abortions, and this Court affirmed.

But

Gary-Northwest was complicated by procedural issues; it was an
attempt to reopen the denial of a preliminary injunction five
years earlier.

In addition, the statute in Gary-Northwest

defined hospital to include ambulatory out-patient surgical
centers, whereas the Virgnia statute is more restrictive.

Nor

did Gary-Northwest present the argument that mandatory
hospitalization is an unconstitutional delegation of power to
hospitals, which can decide whether or not to perform abortions
and on what conditions.

Gary-Northwest was only a decision that

the DC did not abuse its discretion in denying a preliminary
injunction.
The

v~

s c:_ erred when it relied upon a presumption of

constitutionality.
statutes.

\~

Strict scrutiny is applicable to abortion }
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{4) Mandatory Hospitalization in Virginia.
Virginia hospitals perform any abortions.

Only two in northern

Virginia permit any second trimester abortions.
require minors to have parental consent.

Only twenty-six

Both of those

If the state

conditioned abortions on parental consent, it would violate
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428

u.s. 52 {1976).

Here, the

state is responsible for the parental consent requirement because
it authorized hospitals to impose the requirement under the
conscience clause, §18.2-75.

In effect, the state has permitted

the denial of abortions to all minors who are afraid to obtain
parental consent.
DISCUSSION:
This issue

is ~

{1) Burden of Proof for Medical Necessity.
a substantial federal question.

Vuitch is not

directly controlling, because it dealt with the construction of
the D.C. abortion statute.

Moreover, the VaS Ct adequately

distinguished Vuitch when it pointed out that lack of medical
necessity is not part of the offense.

Medical necessity is an

exception to the abortion offense, set forth in a section
subsequent to the definition of the crime.
York, 432

See Patterson v. New

u.s. 197 {1977).

Furthermore, the Va S Ct did not hold that the defendant
bears the burden of proof.

It only held that the defendant bears

the burden of production: the Va S Ct stated that the prosecution
has the burden of negating the maternal health necessity
exception beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant "invokes"
the defense.

J

S App lOa.
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In addition, in this case the prosecution proved lack of
medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The patient

testified that she was only scared, and appt•s own notes
characterized her condition
{2} Proof of Causation.
federal question.

a~ rmal.

Nor is this issue a substantial

The patient testified that she took no drugs

during her stay in the motel other than an analgesic which appt
had prescribed.

It was undisputed that appt had injected saline

solution into the amniotic cavity.

This evidence was sufficient

to establish a connection between the destruction of the fetus
and the saline injection.
Appt notes that his experts testified that saline injections
do not always cause a fetus to be expelled.

But appt was not

indicted for causing the fetus to be expelled.
for causing the fetus to be destroyed.
{3} Mandatory Hospitalization.

He was indicted

See J S App lla.

At the outset, it should be

underscored that neither appt nor the VaS Ct give appt•s
evidence its full due.

In Simopoulos v. Virginia State Board of

Medicine, 644 F.2d 321 {CA4 1981}, the CA4 rejected on abstention
grounds appt•s attempt to prevent the Board from suspending his
right to practice medicine.

In the course of his opinion, 644

F.2d at 332 {Butzner, J., concurring and dissenting}, Judge
Butzner spelled out the evidence appt presented at trial:
[Appt] presented as witnesses the chairman of the
department of obstetrics and gynecology at the Albert
Einstein College of Medicine, an associate clinical
professor in obstetrics and gynecology at George
Washington University, and a Virginia physician who
specializes in obstetrics and gynecology. These
witnesses testified that the procedure followed by the
doctor is acceptable medical practice in an outpatient

1

-
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facility, and they stated that the doctor's clinic was
well equipped for such practice. One of the witnesses
added that even when treatments to induce a second
trimester abortion are administered at a Virginia
hospital, where he had served as chairman of the
department of obstetrics and gynecology, the patients
are frequently allowed to leave the hospital before
they abort. The state presented no witness to
contradict this testimony.

/

.

The lower courts have reached vary1ng results on the
constitutionality of second trimester hospitalization
requirements.

,-

See Margaret S., 4BB F. Supp. at 194-96

(hospitalization requirement unconstitutional because no
Louisiana hospitals perform second trimester abortions and
because D & E method is as safe as childbirth up to eighteenth
week); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, 4B3 F. Supp. at
6B6-B7 (D & E procedure safest second trimester abortion method
and hospitalization requirement invalid because only one western
Missouri hospital will perform it) ; Akron Center for
Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1215 (ND
Ohio 1979) (refusing on the basis of plaintiff's evidence to
abandon Roe v. Wade language that state may regulate after first
trimester); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1317-lB (ND Ill
197B) (citing Roe v. Wade and upholding hospitalization
requirement) •
In a recent decision, the CAB vacated the DC holding in
Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City.

Planned Parenthood

Ass'n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, Nos. B0-1130 & B0-1530 (CAB
July 15, 19Bl) (slip op.).

The CAB accepted the DC's premise that

a second trimester hospitalization requirement could be rendered

·'

- 10 invalid by improved abortion procedures.

But the CAS remanded

for further factual findings to determine whether the
hospitalization requirement in fact discouraged D & E abortions
and whether nonhospitalized D & E abortions are considrably more
dangerous than hospital procedures.

Slip op. at 8-14.

In Gary-Northwest, the DC rejected a challenge to a
hospitalization requirement as applied to the D & E procedure,
and this Court affirmed.

49 U.S.L.W.

3806. ~~stices

Brennan,

Marshall, and Blackmun would have noted probable jurisdiction.
It is difficult to discern whether the Gary-Northwest affirmance
governs this appeal.

The DC rested its constitutional argument

on the Roe v. Wade language that hospitalization during the
second trimester is permissible.

The DC upheld the

hospitalization requirement by finding that it furthered maternal
health.

496 F. Supp. at 901-02.

But at the same time, the DC

stated that even if the plaintiffs prevailed on their legal
theory that a safer abortion procedure could require alteration
of Roe v. Wade, they would still lose because they had presented
insufficient proof of safety to justify a preliminary injunction.
Id. at 902-03.
If the Gary-Northwest affirmance amounted to a holding that
second trimester hospitalization requirements are

~

se

constitutional, this issue is not now a substantial federal
question.

But if the affirmance rested on the quantum of the

Gary-Northwest appt's proof, the Court should at least call for a
response.

The state in this case presented no evidence other

than what it elicited on cross-examination, and appt's evidence

- 11 tended to show that saline injections could be performed safely
outside hospitals.
It should be noted, however, that this case is not an ideal
one to review the hospitalization requirement.

As Gary-Northwest

illustrates, most of the challenges to the hospitalization
requirement have been based on the newly-developed D & E method.
The saline injection method is not as safe as the D & E
procedure, and the saline injection method existed when Roe v.
Wade was decided.

See Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City,

483 F. Supp. at 686 n. 13.
(4) Mandatory Hospitalization in Virginia.

The only two

northern Virginia hospitals that perform second trimester
abortions require minors to have parental consent.

According to

appt, the hospitalization requirement combined with the practice
of the only two available hospitals amounts to an invasion of a
minor's privacy in violation of Danforth.
virtually identical argument.

One DC has accepted a

Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas

City, 483 F. Supp. at 687 (second trimester hospitalization
requirement falls because no hospital in Missouri will admit
minor without parental consent).
reversed by the CAS.

But the DC was subsequently

Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City,

slip op. at 5-8 (constitutionality depends upon health-based
rationale for state's requirement, not on the actions of private
entities).
A variation on this argument was rejected by the DC in GaryNorthwest.

See 496 F. Supp. at 896-7 (only one Indiana hospital

performed nontherapeutic second trimester abortions).

..

The DC,
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like the Va. S. Ct., cited language in Harris ,v. McRae that the
government need not remove obstacles that it did not create.
Again, if this Court meant to endorse all the reasoning of GaryNorthwest when it affirmed, there is no need to give this aspect
of this case close attention.
However, the Court may have rested the Gary-Northwest
affirmance on the DC's decision not to grant a preliminary
injunction because of the plaintiffs' proof.

If so, then it

cannot be said that this issue is insubstantial.
McRae language may govern.

The Harris v.

On the other hand, the state may not

have responsibility for a poor woman's indigency and at the same
time have responsibility for parental consent requirements when
it mandates hospitalization and then permits hospitals to require
parental consent.

Also, this aspect of the appeal is not

hindered by the problems of proof surrounding the safety of the
saline injection method, as is appt's general challenge to the
hospitalization requirement.

Given the ambiguity of the Gary-Northwest affirmance, call
for a response.

.I

Of course, there 1s no response.
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

RE:

ABORTION CASES

Attached is my record of today's conference
votes on the several issues in the three abortion cases.
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CASE

S irrop?ulos v.
Virginia
No. 81-185

s.ct. va.

Planned
Parenthood

v.
Ashcroft
No. 81-1255
CAS
Ashcroft

v.
Planned
Parenthood
No. 81-1623

Akron v.
Akron Ctr
for Reproductive
Health
No. 81-746
CA6

ISSUE/REGUIRMENl'

IECISIOO l3ELCM

VOI'E

Failure to allege
or prove lack of
maternal necessity

Defendant must
raise necessity
defensively; State
must disprove it.

Failure to prove
causation

State proved
causation.

Hospitalization
in 2d trimester

Requirement
held valid

Parental Consent
(i) Should Court
abstain?
(ii) Merits

Hospitalization
in 2d trimester
(i) Hospitals require
parental consent
to admit minors

~

Nl).

-o

Statute given construction consistent
with Bellotti II.

~

~

l.ij.fl I Trl1, II !Jfs,JfJ..

- '1

~B .. iffj r)tift) Llc0J.Sf-

_3

(Stl~J t.JHf(. 1 SoC

Hospitalization
requirement
not invalidated on thisbasis.
Invalid.

Second physician
for fetus after
viability

Invalid.

Attorneys fees

Awarded in full to PP
for work in 1255&1623.

Parental Notifification

($1?t..;J t.F'~ Wl/tZ;~

A-/( -s-

Invalidated after
remand

Pathologist must
examine tissue
samples

Parental Consent
(i) Jurisdiction
(ii) Merits

A-/6- '-f

LAl61 8t2LJJ 1M; l..rf'; V)/~.51,
tl~~ .. ,J p~

_£ f?J...J ~ LFf?. t. lf!/< 1 "J k

w.:rg. IM I

~~

~ 7

Invalid.

HfJ - 5"

~I Tfl1J lf/.i:.,

J

Jd 4..13

j"~

(._lc(J)

rgaw) V-- til!.. soc..
Valid under Matheson.
Afo - '-1 !tw, &:hiftJ )PS, Sec

rb..J .

' : .'. ,. '' ·-;£.+

~

1

~ .:!"'

~.

V.!J~, ~M~, {.+I (../P

1.{

Informed Consent
(i) Severability · - ~~~~(..<~~ ·~
Invalid
(ii) Provisions
(iii) Attending doctor
Invalid.
IJ..f( b - l..lr&, 'VY>7, N!tf1., '-Ff'1 .Jf'sJ Soc_
must counsel
personally
t~ ::2.. ~ gel..), '··H"E

--

Waiting Period

Invalid

Disposal of Fetal

Invalid

Remains

Akron Ctr
for Reproductive
Health
v.
Akron
No. 81-1172

Hospitalization in
2d trimester

5o'

'H6-s-

...;rb,71<'1, /';"~::'!_.

~rt, Je

f',;.,t · ~ , 7, S;~f' :_..~. ~'.J <-'( SD'-..••
t...v.JQ.. T~, "1 ~ , ~ r:. P, 'JP~, S oc

6a\,..AJ , L""' ~<~tt
Valid.

l)..(fB 7 rv. r-1?3.
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~(LW,

J

J

L
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IVr.f. . .St'L

.)

~
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'·

•..

The

issue of "Parental Notification" in the Akron case

was considered on the merits with a vote of 4 - 4.
the question is not before the Court.

Actually,

It was held valid be-

low and nobody sought review of that holding here.

lfp/ss 12/17/82
81-185 Simopoulous v. Virginia - Conference 12/16/82
CJ absent due to illness.
This memorandum will summarize the votes on the
three issues before us. My yellow notes give some - but by
no means all - of the details.
Issue No. 1 - Burden of Proof on "Necessity"
Affirmed:

8-0.

Issue No. 2 - Sufficiency of Evidence and Causation
Affirmed:

8-0.

Issue No. 3 - Hospitalization
Affirmed:

5-3

Votes to affirm:

WJB (tentative), BRW, LFP, WHR,

and SO'C.
Reverse and remand:

TM, HAB and JPS

Virginia's provision for clinics distinguishes
this case from Akron and Ashcroft.

SIM SALLY-POW

lfp/ss 04/05/83

MEMORANDUM
81-185 Sirnopoulos
DATE:

TO:

Jim and Mark

.FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr .

April 5, 1983

This memo is being dictated Monday evening at
horne

as

I

reread

discussion

of

forestalling
remand.

our

revising
a

move

It

opinion.

by

our

is

opinion

other

prompted

with

Chambers

the
to

by our
view

vacate

of
and

The observations and comments below are made at

random, with no attempt at cohesion.
1.

At page 11 we say that the issue:

"Is whether Virginia's licensing requirements
for
outpatient
surgical
clinics
performing
second trimester abortions are reasonable means
of furthering the state's compelling interest in
the woman's health".
(p. 11).
This framing of the issue is not likely to be
accepted
will

by Justices

not

issue.

try

to

who wish

anticipate

to vacate and

how

they

might

remand.
define

I
the

We might reframe our draft roughly as follows:

"The issue here is the validity of Virginia's
requirement that second trimester abortions be
performed in a licensed 'hospital' as the term
hospital is defined by regulations to include
'outpatient surgical hospitals'."

'·

2.

We

have

talked

about

the

possibility

of

describing the regulations in general terms without making
judgments as to the validity of specific provisions.
holding
second

would

be

trimester

hospitals,

and

that

the

abortions
the

Virginia
be

requirements

performed

regulations

The

in

that

outpatient

implementing

these

requirements, are facially valid.
3.

I am inclined to think we could leave Part

II, including subpart C, substantially as now written.
4.

substantially.

Part

III

The

first

would
two

have

to · be

paragraphs

that

revised
begin on

page 14, except for the last sentence thereof (commencing
at the top of p. 15), probably could be retained with some
editing.
The entire remaining portion of Part III would
be

rewritten

briefly and

in general terms.

I

will not

undertake this beyond suggesting some thoughts as to what
we might say and not say.
First, we would not discuss specifically any of
the "categories" of regulations identified briefly in Part
II-C.

Rather,

the

opinion

could

move

summarily

to

conclusion of facial validity on the record before us.

a
We

would repeat that appellant for its own reasons has chosen

.
..

•·

..

'

to

challenge

ofsecond

Virginia's

trimester

entire

regulatory

abortions.

The

requirements

Virginia

statutes

require "hospital" facilities that may include "clinics".
They authorize the State Board to adopt regulations,
these permit

such abortions only

in outpatient

and

surgical

hospitals.
Appellant has not questioned the validity of any
particular

regulation

abortions.

We therefore have no occasion to consider the

validity

of

Appellant's
Virginia's

each

of

attack

is

applicable

them

as

focused

hospitalization

to

second

applied
on

and

requirements

in

trimeter

this

limited
in

case.
to

total.

He

contends specifically, with respect to this case, that his
conviction was unlawful because Virginia may not require
second

trimester

abortions

even

after

20/22

week

of

pregnancy- to be performed in the facilities authorized
by Virginia law.
trial

(see,

supra,

hospitalization
facility.

Appellant knew - at least by time of his
at

requirement

that
was

a

the

licensed

specific
outpatient

But he chose to question any "hospitalization"

requirement for

second trimester abortions and to attack

the entire Virginia framework .

..·

-.

4.

This requires that we consider only the facial
validity of the Virginia requirements.

We have compared

these with the recommendations of ACOG and APHA, to be set
forth either in the footnotes or in an appendix.

Although

there are differences in detail, the Virginia regulations
are

carefully

standards

drawn

to

conform

recommended

by

ACOG

generally

and

APHA.

with
It

the

clearly

appears that the Virginia regulations are compatible with
generally

accepted

medical

standards

applicable

performance of second trimester abortions.
conclude,

on

Virginia's

the

basis

regulations

of

the

further

record
the

to

the

We therefore

before

state's

us,

that

controlling

interest in the health and safety of the pregnant woman.
We could put a footnote here somewhat along the
lines of what we now have in the text on page 19.

A state

cannot be expected to adopt regulations that serve every
case

with

the

necessarily

same

must

degree
have

of
some

relevance,
latitude

as
in

" [a]

state

adopting

regulations of general application in this sensitive area"
(perhaps including the balance of the paragraph beginning
on page 19) .
5.
roughest

..

I hardly need say that the foregoing is the

sort

of

summary

of

how

Part

III

might

be

I

rewritten.
language

or

excluded.

have
to

made

identify

Perhaps

we

no

attempt

footnotes

should

to

to

consider

frame

be

precise

included

seriously,

and
as

a

means of reducing the footnotes and also preserving most
of the

relevant regulations of ACOG and APHA,

including

these in an appendix.
5.

In addition to changes along the foregoing

lines, it would be necessary to confront specifically the
inclination

-

if

vacate and remand.
any care.

not

conviction

-

of

those

who

would

I have not thought this through with

Nor do I have Cory's memo before me.

Tentative

views as to what might be included at an appropriate place
are as follows:
For the first time in his reply brief filed with
this

Court,

appellant

hospitalization

focuses

outpatient

specifically

regulations.

In

on

addition

the
to

embracing them within his general challenge to Virginia's
entire hospitalization requirements,

appellant says that

the state did not rely on the regulations at trial and
therefore he had no opportunity to contest them.
As

noted

(n.

2},

appellant

was

indicted

for

violating §§18.2-71 and 18.73 that make it a crime, so far
as

relevant

-

to perform an abortion within the second

trimester except in a "licensed hospital".
the text

(p.

4)

123.1 to

include

As stated in

the term "hospital" is defined in §32.1"outpatient

.

.

hospitals",

and the

regulations duly adopted by the Department Health include
carefully

drawn

regulations

standards for these hospitals.

and

prescribe

minimum

The regulations also make

clear that second trimester abortions are to be performed
in them.

No question is raised as to the adequacy of the

indictment.

Nor has appellant denied that he

failed to

comply with the state requirements.

From the outset, he

simply

The

has

challenged

them

all.

state

met

the

challenge on the terms in which it was made:
The

transcript

of

the

trial

records

that

on

direct examination by his counsel, appellant acknowledged
the existence of the outpatient regulations, stated that
he was seeking a license, but denied that he knew of the
regulations when the abortion was performed - even though
they had been cons ide red at public hearings and adopted
some

two and a

half years earlier

(see n.

7).

Despite

full knowledge of the regulations at the time of trial,
appellant elected to defend only by a sweeping attack on
all of Virginia's hospitalization requirements.

His belated claim of no opportunity to contest
the regulations, made only in a few sentences in his reply
brief here,

comes

too

late.

Whether

a

trial tactic or

not, deferring until this Court to advance this claim in a
procedural default.

* * *
Jim and Mark:

'rhe

what we have in the opinion.

foregoing

contains much of

Perhaps some or all of the

new thoughts included above could be woven into the text
of our present opinion.

The alternative would be to make

appropriate changes in the text and present footnotes and
try

to

deal

with

all

of

I

see

that

this

textually

or

in

revised

notes.

Brennan/Blackmun point

I

that

have
it

not

mentioned

is not clear whether

the
the

Virginia court considered the regulations - even facially.
It

certainly

regulations

had

before

the
it,

statutes
and

it

basis of appellant's challenge.

decided

L . .F.P., Jr.

..

authorized
the

case on

the
the

We are not obligated to

remand in light of this.

ss

that

lfp/ss 04/07/83
MEMORANDUM
TO:

Jim

DATE:

.FROM:

Lewis .F. Powell, Jr •

April 7, 1983

81-185 Simopoulos
Your suggested revisions of this date, marked on
a copy of Chambers Draft No. II, are quite an improvement
in organization.
I
the

still would like to try out on you and Mark

following

thoughts

as

to

what

might

be

added

at

appropriate places, in the text or notes.
1.
i.e.

a

Section 18.2-73

defense -

indicted.

The

to the

provided

felony

abortion

for

would

an

"exception"

which appellant was

have

lawful

if

ha~

not

applied for a license this defense was not available.

He

"performed in a licensed hospital".

therefore

broadly

been

As appellant

attacked

Virginia's

entire

hospitalization requirements, equating them erroneously to
the acute care hospitalization

requirements

before

this

Court in City of Akron and Askcroft.

2.
details

of

I

agree,

appellant's

Jim

with

reply

vour
brief

idea

to

put

arguments

in

the
a

footnote.

In addition to the general "brush off" that we

give them at present,
what

you and

Mark

I am inclined to think, subject to

think,

that something more

should be

said, for example:
We can be
expect

from

reasonably sure that the opinion we

Justice

respondent's

belated

Blackmun
argument

will
that

the

"had

no opportunity to construe the

and

regulations'."

I

would

rely

heavily

Virginia

on

courts

'1 icens ing statutes

answer

by

saying

that

appellant chose to attack the entire Virginia framework of
regulation.

As appellant neither

the

invalidity of

the

outpatient surgical clinic regulations adopted pursuant to
the Virginia statutes, nor presented any evidence bearing
on their validity, the Virginia court did not address the
regulations apart from its specific approval of the entire
Virginia

regulatory

appellant

now

to

provision.

It

is

too

late

for

rely on grounds he had never advanced

below, did not present as an issue in his jurisdictional
statement, and did not mention here until his reply brief.

3.

In holding as it did that "second trimester

abortions must be performed

in hospitals as required by

Vir inia

Supreme

law",

the

State

Court

necessarily

sustained

the

validity

of

the

duly

adopted

regulations

pursuant ot the Virginia statutes.

4.
ef feet

that

On p.

15, you have added a sentence to the

possibly certain

unreasonable.

individual

We need not go this far.

regulations are
It is important

to make entirely clear that even appellant's reply brief
finds no fault with any specific regulation.

It would be

appropriate, perhaps, simplv to say in a footnote that as
appellant has made only a facial challenge in the broadest
language,

we

need

not

consider

whether

a

particular

requirement in the regulations may be invalid as applied.
As

Akron makes

clear,

interest

it

may

presented

no

evidence

in

view of

adopt

a

state's compelling

regulations.

challenging

the

Appellant
validity

of

has
the

regulations as distinguished from his attack on the entire
Virginia scheme.

5.
if

this

evidence
Supreme
facially

We have speculated as to what would happen

Court vacated and
with
Court

respect
could

valid.

It

to

remanded.
the

simply
is

do

In the absence of

regulations,
as

unlikely,

the Virginia

we would:
however,

find

them

that Justice

Blackmun

would

therefore,

consider

this

satisfactory.

My

guess,

is that he may well argue that the regulations

never entered into this case at all: that the Commonwealth
was as neglectful as Simopoulos, and that the conviction
should be set aside and a new trial ordered.
such

a

trial,

the

defendant

would

then

I suppose at
attack

the

regulations as applied.
I

am

not

suggesting

that

we

Justice Blackmun may do in this respect.
keep it in mind.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

anticipate

what

We simply should

8,

Simopoulos v.

Dear Chief:
~hank you for your recent note.
I a~ ma~ing some
cl.arifytng changes in note 12, page 10 (notP 10, naqe 7 of
the 1st draft) that I think will meet your suggestions. I
have the documentation that assures the accuracy of th~se
notes.

Your letter gives me rm opportunity to hrinq you
omm to clat,. on the s i. tuat ion with respect to the three.
abortion cases as I understand it.
~

Simoooulos
First as to Simopoulos . You are the only member
of the Court who has approved it even informally. Bill
Brennan has suqoested in a letter to me that '~e ~houl rl vacate and remand the case for reconsideration by thP Suoreme
Court of VirqiniR. "qarry and John have the sa.me view - at
least tentatively.
They make the point that the Virqinia court di~ not
specificallY ad~ress the va1i~ity of thP regulations, and
neither did the parties below. In my view, the reason that
court wrote as if it were reviewing acute care, general hospitalization requiiement wlthont: npE"'ci flcnlly afkJressing the
regulations, iR that Sirnopoulos Plected to c~atlenge Virqinia' s hospi tali zat ion requirement<:! a~ i. f thev rlere the same
as those reviewed in City of Akron and A~~croft. He oid
not distinguish between full service hospitals and the amhulatory surqical hospital.s (clinics) that Virginia law contemplates.
We are entitle~, T thin~, to ~eci~e the case on
the record on "Yrhich SimooouloE chose to rest his defense . I
therefore have no disposition to remand rather than affirm
the conviction .
I have spoken briefly to Randra who is writing in
all three of these cases . She indicated that though she did

··.

...

2.

not expect to join in my analvsis, she would affirm the conviction. I believe Bill Rehnquist also i.s of this view, and
svron voted at Conference to affirm. If the case were vacated and . remanded it would be back here i~ a year or two,
and meanwhile we would have given no guidance as to the validity of perfo~~inq abortiona in outpatient clinics.
am considering making somP revisions in section

I

III that now mav address the Virginia regulations in too

much detail.

*· * *
Akron and Ashcroft
It is also important that you 101n as m11ch of
these two cases as you can. ~he "hospitalization" issue is
the principal one. It also is the issue that haq caused the
greatest confusion - a confuRion arising primarily aR to how .
Roe would be construed. t have a hare Court for Akron, and
presumably /wi 11 have a Court. on the ho~pi tali zat ion J.ssue in
P Ashcroft that is identical to the hospitalization requirement in Akron.
Nhen you reread Roe,

I

think you

'>~ill

agree that

I have wr 1tten the "los pita lT"Zat ion iss,le as narr,owl v ac; no~

siblc consistently with t.hRt cac;P.

* * *

,l

You noted when yo1.1 asked me to write these opinions that you and I were in accord on most of th~ numerous
issues. I know th~t you "'ave had ~tronq f~eling<:; a~ to parental notice, and yet - also as we mentioned - the combination of what 1 wrote in Rellott' IT (a p1ura1itv of four)
and our combined opinions 1n Matheson have settler'l the rule
with respect to parental notification. It iA not the rule
for which HAB contendP.d in Bellotti II.

Foraive this "long wirded" 1Ptter. ~hese are important cases, and the Court needs the authority of the
Chief Justice in deci~tng them.
·

The Chief Justtce
lfp/ss

;;

.

• ,1', ~

I

·~

._._.'

April 12, 1983
81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia

Dear Bill and
I enclose for your consideration a substantially·
revised draft of an opinion.
~

The baste change is the elimination of th' discussion of particular regulations. This draft also makes
clearer th~t we would be decininq the case only on the
record before us - a record containing no evidence as to
unreasonableness of individual regulations.
With full knowledge of the regulations, appellant
elected to ignore them - apparently as a trial strategy and to analogize Virginia's overall regulation of abortions
to those before us in City of Akron and Ashcroft. This
is even clearer to me no\Ar than at the time of my fi.rst circulation.
As your rhamhers know, we have since obtained the
entire available record including the hi~tory of the adoption of the regulations almost two and a half years before
the abortion at issue was performed. Appellant had a fu1l
opportunity to &ttack the reasonableness of the regulations.
~' guess is that since he had made no effort to obtain a
license, he chose the strategy of arguing that the entire
Virginia scheme is invalid.

In these circumstances, T remain persu~oed that it
is appropriate and desirable to affirm. Appellant should
not benefit froll\ his own choice of (tefense straqegy. 'T'he
opinion as now drafted clearlyholds only that on the basis
of the recorn ht=~forP us the r~gulations cmpPar to be comPatible wtth accepted mP.dica1 Atandards.
t ~(td th~t our ~ler~s h~VP been collaboratinq constructively I think. Of course, T do not sugqest "politicking" of any kind: merely that they have been mutually
helpful.

I add one caveat.
The Chief Justice has indicated
that he approved my prior drafts. As the enclos~d is a
major revision, t would have to submit this to him.

Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
Justice Blackrnun
lfp/ss

,

...

.

28,

Simopoulos v. Virginia
\ ~

MEMORANDUM TO
Ther~

~HE

,. '

CONFERENCE:

HerA is another draft of my opinion in this
are a nu~ber of chanqes throuqhout.

.<

....\<3···,.,
J.·•""

ThA principal change is the elimination of specii: :
ic consideration of each of the regulations ind:iviflnolly.

The record contains no evidence as to the unreasonah1eness
of individual rf.>guJ.ations. Rather, wi.th full knC'w1edge of
the regulati.ons (see n. 19, P. 12), appPJ1Rnt elected - apparently as a trial strateqv - to challenge Virginia's over- ~
all r~qulations of abortions, arquing that in effect thev . . ·
were comparabl~ to those in Citv of Akron.
'
Since mv earJ.ier cirC"Illati.on, I have obtained the ~
entire availabl~ record includinq the history of the . adop- "'"'
tion of the regulations almost 2-1/2 years before the abor- ~ .
tion at issue was performeo.
(See n. 6, p. 6-8).
·
'
'I''

~\.·,

:': The opinion as now drafted would hold that,
on the basis of the record before us, the requlations on
their face appear to be compatible with accepted mecHcal
standards. ,..
."

ss

<

-~

'

'

lfp/ss 02/02/83
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Jim

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Feb. 2, 1983

Simopoulos
This memo relates only to the description of the
requirements of the Virginia regulations, and particularly
to the category of descriptions beginning on p. 14.
I have dictated a separate rider covering the
first category, my purpose being to de-emphasize the "corporate" requirements.
I suggest that you consider doing substantially
the same thing with respect to the second category.

The

construction standards for the physicial facilities will be
used against us by dissenters.

Although we can't ignore

them, try your hand at a summary paragraph.

If you can re-

duce it to a couple of sentences, it could be added to the
same paragraph with the first grouping.

For example, I see

no reason to talk about parking and fire codes.

It is well

to emphasize to the extent is is true, that the requirements
apply to all outpatient surgical clinics.
As noted in the margin on page 15, if the provision authorizing "deviations" applies to all of the regulations, this should be emphasized separately.
As indicated in the margin of page 15, I would
omit notes 13-15, but save a couple of copies of your first
draft as we may need them when dissents come in.

Possibly

2.

to avoid being criticized for overlooking these sections,
you could say - in a single note - that the regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting building
codes, zoning ordinance and the like.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

.

'·

lfp/ss 02/02/83
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

Feb.

This memo relates only to the description of the
requirements of the Virginia regulations, and particularly
to the category of descriptions beginning on p. 14.

o

.. _,

I have dictated a separate rider covering the
first category, my purpose beinq to de-emohasize the "corporate" requirements. ~·

rr

,.

suqgest that you consider doing substantially

the same thing with respect to the second category.

The

construction standards for the physicial facilities will be
used against us by dissenters. :·Althouqh we can't ,ignore,
,.t~

thern, try your hand at a summary paragraph.

If you can

re-~,
'~t

duce it to a couple of sentences, it could be added to the •
same paragraph with the first grouping.

For example, .I see

no reason to talk about parking and fire codes.

It is well

to emphasize to the extent is is true, that the requirements
•''1'~;

apply to all outpatient surgical clinics.
''

/

As noted in the marqin on page 15, i.f the provi- ~·

sion authorizing "deviations" applies to all of the regulations, this should be emphasized separately.

1

.1f

,.
As indicated in the margin of page 15, I would
''
•
omit notes 13-15, but save a couple of copies of your first ' .

draft as we may need them when dissents come in.

Possibly

2.

to avoid being criticized for overlooking these sections, ,
you could say

~

in a single note - that the regulations con-

tain customary provisions with respect to meeting building
codes, zoning ordinance and the like.

f/.

~~.

'•.,.. .•-...~·

~u.prtmt

<!Jauri of t4"' ~b ~bdtg

..agfringhtn. ~. <IJ. 2!lgi,.~
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

/

March 11, 1983

Re:

No. 81-185, Simopoulos v. Virginia

Dear Lewis:
I am with you but will have a few small suggestions
that will give you no trouble.

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

..

'

<!f.rurl of Urt ~b ,jtattg '
._as£ringt!tn. ~. <!f. 2.U~'!;l

_ju.p:rttttt

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

PERSONAL
April 4, 1983

Re:

No. 81-185, Simopoulos v. Virginia

Dear Lew is:
I am not at rest on the two "Akron" cases yet. I am
generally on the above. However I an "uncomfortable" with the
declaratory statements in note 10, page 7. They are, of course,
attributable to the source cited at the end of the statements.
But would it not help if a "said to be" were inserted early in
Note 10, with a similar qualifier in the second paragraph of note
7? Quoted out of context it could appear the Court is making the
statements, as to which we are not informed first hand.
Regards,

...

~u.prtmt

Qfttttrl ttf tqt 'Jnittb ,jtatts

._asJringhm. ~. <!f.

2!lgt~~

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

March 7, 1983
Re:

No. 81-185

Simopoulos v. Virginia

Dear Lewis:
I will await Sandra's writing.

Sincerely/

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

,juvrtmt arltltrt ttf tqt .,uittb ,jtatt.tr

JIU'Jriugtttu, ~.

ar.

2!1~~~

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

March 7, 1983

No. 81-185

Simopoulos v. Virginia

Dear Lewis,
I will concur in the judgment in this case
and will circulate something in due course.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

I

.i\nvuuu <l}O"m-t qf tlf~ ~nittb" ~tzd~g

Jl¥lfittgron. ~. <If.

2.0~'!.$

CHAMBERS OF

..J USTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 7, 1983

Re:

81-185 - Simopoulos v. Virginia

Dear Lewis:
It seems doubtful to me that in 1979 either the
Virginia Legislature or the medjcal profession
understood that the Sfatut~y r~~ment that a
second trimester abortion must be performed in a
hospital could be satisfied by making use of an outpatient surgical clinic. I shall therefore wait for
further writing in this case.
Respectfully,

av1~
Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.h}trtlV <!}lttlrlttf tlt.t ~ttitt~ ~htt.tg

._-Mftinghm. ~. <!}. 2llgt~'
C~AMBERS

OF"

March 8, 1983

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 81-185 - Simopoulos v. Virginia

Dear Lewis:
After reading and reflecting upon your proposed op1n1on
for this case, I have settled down at the alternative position I took at conference.
I now have concluded to vote to
vacate the judgment and remand the case for reconsideration
in the light of Akron.
I am inclined to this conclusion because your opinion
deals at length with the Virginia regulations.
Yet those
regulations were not really considered by the Supreme Court
of Virginia.
They are hardly mentioned in their opinion,
and the regulations, of course, were issued long after the
statute was enacted.
I would be far happier to have the
Virginia Supreme Court consider those regulations, their
meaning, and their reach and application in the first instance, and then let the case return here.
Sincerely,

Jutsice Powell
cc: The Conference

.hprmu <lf!turlltf f!rt ~b ,itwg
. .M~ ~.

<If.

2!lgi'!'

C HAMBE R S O F

J USTICE W t< . J . BRENNAN, JR.

March 9, 1983

No. 81-185

Simopoulos v. Virginia

Dear Lewis:
As with your Akron op1n1on, I am impressed with the
effort and thought you have so clearly devoted to this
case. Your opinion makes a very strong case that Virginia's hospitalization requirement, as you interpret it,
meets our constitutional standard, and it generally conforms to the view I expressed at conference. However,
after giving the matter some thought, I am inclined to
agree with Harry and John that we should not be the ones
to interpret the Virginia statute in the first instance.
Sorry though I would be to see your careful work go
for nought, I ask you to consider whether it wouldn't be
a good idea to dispose of this case with a brief per
curiam vacating and remanding for reconsideration in
light of Akron. I make this suggestion for two reasons.
First, although there is no absolute bar to interpreting
the Virginia statute for the first time in this Court,
and although I think your interpretation is correct,
surely if all other things were equal we would prefer to
let the Virginia Supreme Court say what "hospital" means
before we addressed the constitutionality of the statute.
Second, given the likely outcome in Akron, Simopoulos
will be a very important case, for it will tell the
states what they can do by way of regulating abortions.
If we can avoid it, I think we should not let such a crucial opinion issue without a clear majority.
At the same time, I believe (and I'm sure you agree)
that the states should have some guidance. A per curiam
opinion in Simopoulos might well serve that function. In
vacating and remanding, we could focus attention on the
possibility that Virginia's hospitalization requirement,
if in fact it is what you say, would pass muster under
the Akron standard. A remand would also permit full airing of the issues involved in regulating outpatient
second-trimester abortions. I am afraid that many pro-

~.,

- 2 -

'

'·.(

fessional groups and other amici have overlooked the importance of Simopoulos in this year's trilogy.
Accordingly, I offer the following rough suggestion
as something that might prove acceptable to a majority-indeed, perhaps to all of us:
The only substantial federal question presented by
this appeal is similar to one addressed today in City
of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, ante,
at 12-20: Is Virginia's statute requiring doctors to
perform all second-trimester abortions in a hospital
constitutional? we are informed, however, that the
relevant statute, Va. Code §18.2-73, may incorporate by
reference a definition of "hospital" in Va. Code §32.1123.1 and regulations promulgated thereunder, which
include as "hospitals" certain facilities providing
surgical services primarily on an outpatient basis. If
so, the Virginia hospitalization requirement differs
materially from the corresponding provision in Akron.
The Virginia statute so interpreted may burden women
and their doctors far less than a statute requiring
that all second-trimester abortions be performed in an
acute-care hospital. In the opinion under review, however, the Virginia Supreme Court did not adopt or even
address the interpretation of §18.2-73 pressed in this
Court by Virginia's Attorney General. Rather, it relied on grounds much like those we reject today in Akron. See 221 Va. 1059, 277 S.E.2d 194 (1981). If~
were to consider the Attorney General's argument, we
would have to interpret the statutory law of Virginia
in the first instance. Prudence suggests that the
highest court of the Commonwealth should have the opportunity to address the crucial question of what the
word "hospital" in §18.2-73 means before we do. Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the Virginia Supreme
Court and remand for reconsideration in light of our
opinion today in Akron.

siz

rely,

Kf&.

WJB, Jr.
Justice Powell

.

..

't

'
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SIM SALLY-POW

81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia
MEMORANDUM TO THE CON .FERENCE:
This refers to Harry's letter of March 8 stating
that he will vote to vacate the judgment and remand [this]
case for reconsideration in the light of Akron.

He

suggests that the Virginia regulations were not "really
considered by the Supreme Court of Virginia", and that
they were issued "long after the statute was enacted".
Bill Brennan has told me that he rather shares Harry's
view, and John's letter of March 7 expresses a somewhat
similar view, though he is awaiting "further writing".
I recognized, of course, that vacating and
remanding is an option available.

I adhere to the view,

however, that we should decide the case.

In my view, the

2.

issue on which we granted the case is here, and it was
argued in briefs and at oral argument, and there I think
we should decide it.
It is true that the primary focus in this case
has been, as appellant describes it, on the "mandatory
hospitalization requirement of Virginia law".

Appellant

had good reason to refrain from making the distinction
under Virginia law between full service, acute care
"hospitals" and "out-patient surgical hospitals" where
second trimester abortions also may be performed.
Appellant did not wish to call our attention to the latter
and their implementing regulations as he had made no
effort to comply with them.

Moreover, appellant has never

denied that he knew about the regulations.
made clear in footnotes

.·
.·
..

.'

'

and

As I have now

in the second draft of

3.

my opinion, the regulations were adopted two years and
five months prior to the abortion at issue.

They were

adopted only after public hearings at which several
abortions clinics and representatives of the medical
profession appeared and testified.
It is entirely clear from the Virginia statutes
that the term "hospitals" includes outpatient clinics
though they are characterized as "outpatient •
hospitals".

It also is clear that Part II of the

regualtions was adopted expressly to accommodate second
trimester abortions.

See fn.

and ----- • As the

Attorney General of Virginia stated in his brief:
"Under Virginia law, a second trimester abortion
may be performed in an outpatient surgical
clinic provided that the clinic has been
inspected and licensed as a hospital by the
state". Br., 19.

4.

The opinion of the Supreme Court of Virginia, as
Harry notes, apart from a reference to the relevant
Virginia statutes, did not address the outpatient
hospitals separately from general, acute care hospitals.
This is understandable as appellant's position has been a
sweeping attack on all "mandatory hospitalization
requirements".

There certainly is no basis for reversing

Simopoulos' conviction.

As he elected, apparently as a

tactic, not to challenge the outpatient regulations, it is
too late for him now to advance this distinction.
If we were to remand this case for
reconsideration in light of Akron, it would be an
unmerited victory for appellant's tactics.

Moreover, it

is not clear what the Virginia Supreme Court can do that
we also cannot do properly.

There is no factual evidence

5.

in this case with respect to the regulations as
distinguished from appellant's general attack on the
validity of all mandatory hospitalization requirements.
The Virginia Supreme Court rejected this defense, and its
opinion can be read - in light of Virginia law - as
sutaining facially both of the state's hospitalization
requirements, including those for second trimester
abortions as well as for those performed in acute care
hospitals.

Akron and Ashcroft settled the issue with

respect to the latter type of hospitals.

This leaves, as

the issue before us whether the mandatory outpatient type
hospitals requirements are valid on their face.

We would

have a different case if appellant had elected to
challenge - as unduly costly or otherwise - specific
provisions of these requirements.

6.

It is well to bear in mind that this case
involves an abortion performed some 20 to 22 weeks after
gestation, on the edge of the period of potential
viability.

Under any view of our prior decisions,

including Akron, the interest of the state at this point
is compelling.

All that my opinion does is to hold that

the Virginia regulations "on the record before us" (see
pp. 12 and 17} are not invalid.

We certainly do not

decide whether each of the specific regulations would be
valid if, for example, they were applied to a D&E abortion
quite early in the second trimester.
At the prudential level, there also are rather
compelling reasons to decide this case rather than remand
it.

The latter action would leave the law in Virginia -

and probably in a number of other states - unsettled as to

.

.

'[f~;~ ,i- /

'

..

,

.

7.

the validity of requiring that second trimester abortions
be performed in state licensed outpatient clinics that
conform generally to accepted medical practice and
requirements.
My recollection is that there were seven or

eight cases pending here that involved the validity of
state regulation of abortions.

After consideration at two

or more of our Conferences, we selected for plenary
consideration the three cases now before us.

In the

decade since Doe states have been endeavoring to adjust
their laws and regulations to the new constitutional
requirements.

Decisions by us in all three of these cases

should go far to resolve the existing uncertainties.
L • .F.P., Jr.

ss
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SIM SALLY-POW

81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia
Dear Bill:
Thank you for your recent letter and kind remarks
on my opinion in this case.

I believe your concerns are

similar to those expressed by Harry in his letter of March

8.
I recognized, of course, that vacating and
remanding on Akron is an option available.

As you note,

however, the case is properly before us on appeal.
issue has been briefed and argued.

The

I remain of the

opinion that we should decide it.
It is true that the primary focus in this case
has been, as appellant describes it, on the "mandatory
hospitalization requirement of Virginia law".

Appellant

2.

had good reason to refrain from making the distinction
under Virginia law between full service, acute care
"hospitals" and "out-patient surgical hospitals" where
second trimester abortions may be performed.

Appellant

had made no effort to comply with the implementing
regulations.

Moreover, appellant has not denied that he

knew about the regulations.
As footnotes

and

in the second draft of

my opinion show, the regulations became effective two
years and five months prior to the abortion at issue.
They had been fully considered at public hearings.
It is clear from the Virginia statutes that the
term "hospitals" includes outpatient clinics though they
are characterized as "outpatient surgical hospitals", and
that Part II of the regulations apply to second trimester

.•

.

,

3.

abortions.

See fn.

and ___ • As the Attorney General

of Virginia stated in his brief:
"Under Virginia law, a second trimester abortion
may be performed in an outpatient surgical
clinic provided that the clinic has been
inspected and licensed as a hospital by the
state". Br., 19.

The opinion of the Supreme Court of Virginia, as
Harry notes, apart from a reference to the relevant
Virginia statutes, did not address the outpatient
hospitals separately from general, acute care hospitals.
This is understandable in view of appellant's position
that all "mandatory hospitalization requirements" for
second trimester abortions are invalid.

He elected,

apparently as a tactic, not to challenge separately any of
the applicable regulations.
If we were to remand this case for
reconsideration in light of Akron, it is not clear what

,r.;y,.'r

..
'''

4.

the Virginia Supreme Court can do that we also cannot do
properly.

There is no factual evidence with respect to

the regulations as distinguished from appellant's general
challenge to all mandatory hospitalization requirements.
No specific regulations were questioned.

There certainly

is no basis for a new trial.
There are also prudential reasons to decide the
case: Any remand would leave the law unsettled to some
degree as to the validity of requiring that secondtrimester abortions be performed in state-licensed
outpatient clinics that conform generally to accepted
medical practice and requirements.

A decision by us in

all three of these cases should go far to resolve the
existing uncertainties.

5.

Sincerely,
Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc:

Justice Blackrnun

....

··.

~arC':h
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81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia

Dear Bil1:
Thank you for your recent letter and kind remarks
on my opinion in thi~ case.
I believe your concerns are similar to those expressed by Harry in his letter of \larch 8. I recognize, of
course, that vacating and remanding in liqht of Akron ~s an
av:::tilable option. A~ you note, ho,1ever, the case is properly before us on aopeal. The issue has been hriefed and argued. T remain of the opinion that we shoula d~cide it.
~he primary focus in this case has been, as appellant describes it, on the "mandatory ho~pitalization reqni rement of Virginia 1aw". APPellant had goon n:••ason to
refrain from making the rlistinction unoer Virginia law between general, acute care "hospitals" and "outPatient surgical hospitals" where second-trimester abortions may be oerformeo. Appellant ~ad made no effort to complv with the
i.mnlement:ing regulations. r~oreover, appellant has not denied that he knew about the regulations.

As footnotes 6 and 7 in the second draft of my
ooininn show, the regulations became effective two years and
five months before the abortion at issue. They had bPen
fullv considered at public hearings. Moreover, it is clear
from the Virginia statutes that the term "hospit.a1s" inclu~es outpatient clinics though they are characterized as
"outoAtient surqical hospitals", and that Part I I of the
regulations aoplies to second-trimester abortions. See nn.
7 and 9. As the Attorney GPneral of Virqinia stated tn hiA
brief:
"{U]nner Virginia l~w, a second-trimester
abortion may be pPrf"rmed in an outpatient
surgical clinic provided that [the} clinic
has been inspected and licensed as a hospital
by the State". ~rief of ~ppPllee 19.
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Vi~ginia, as
Harry notes, apart from a reference to the relevant Virginia

2.

statutes, did not address the outpatient hospitals separately from general, acute care hospitals. This is understan1ab1E" i.n view of appellant's position that all "mandatory
hospitalization requirements" for s~cond-trimester abortions
are invalid. He elected, apparently as A. tactic, not to
challenge s~parately any of the applfcahl• requlations.
If we were to remand this case for reconsideration
i .n light of Akron, it is not clear what the Virqinta SuPreme

Court can do that we properly cannot ~o as well. There is
no factua1 evidence with respect to the regulations as distinguished from aPPellant's general challenge to all mandatory hospitalization requir~ments, because no specific regulations were questioned. There certainlv is no hasis for a
new t.r ial.
There are also prudential reasons to decide the
case: Any remand would leave the law un~ettled as to the
validity of requiring that second-trimester abortions be
performe~ in state-licensed outpati~nt clinics that conform
generally to acceptefi medical Practice and requirements. A.
decision by us in all three of these cas@s should qo far to
resolve the existi.nq uncertainties.
Sincerelv,

Just ice Br(.!>nn;=m
lfp/o;s
cc:

Justice Slackmun
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To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Stevens
JJN 1

'8~

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-185

CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, APPELLANT v. VIRGINIA
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
[June-, 1983]

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
Prior to this Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113
(1973), it was a felony to perform any abortion in Virginia except in a hospital accredited by the Joint Committee on Accreditation of Hospitals and licensed by the Department of
Health, and with the approval of the hospital's Abortion Review Board (a committee of three physicians).* In 1975,
the Virginia Code was amended to authorize additional abortions, including any second trimester abortion performed by
a physician "in a hospital licensed by the State Department of
Health or under the control of the State Board of Mental
Health and Mental Retardation." Va. Code§ 18.2-73 (1982).
The amended statute might be interpreted in either of two
ways. It might be read to prohibit all second trimester abortions except those performed in a full-service, acute-care hospital facility. Or it might be read to permit any abortion performed in a facility licensed as a "hospital" in accord with any
regulations subsequently adopted by the Department of
Health. The Court today chooses the latter interpretation.
See ante, at ~.
*An in-hospital abortion was also unlawful unless (a) it was necessary to
protect the life or health of the mother, (b) the pregnancy was the product
of rape or incest, or (c) there was a substantial medical likelihood that the
child would be born with an irremediable and incapacitating mental or
physical defect. 1970 Va. Acts, ch. 508.

<,
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SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA

There is reason to think the Court may be wrong. At the
time the statute was enacted, there were no regulations identifying abortion clinics as "hospitals." The structure of the
1975 amendment suggests that the Virginia General Assembly did not want to make any greater change in its law than it
believed necessary to comply with Roe v. Wade, and it may
well have thought a full-service acute-care hospitalization requirement constitutionally acceptable. Moreover, the opinion below does not suggest that the Supreme Court of Virginia believed the term "hospital" to incorporate licensed
abortion clinics. It only discussed testimony pertaining to
full-service, acute-care hospitals like Fairfax Hospital. See
Juris. Statement 16a. And it stated that "two hospitals in
Northern Virginia and 24 hospitals located elsewhere in the
State were providing abortion services in 1977," Juris. Statement 19a, again referring to acute-care facilities. The opinion refers to "clinics" only once, as part of a general statement concerning the variety of medical care facilities the
state licenses and regulates; even there, the term is included
in the list as a category that is distinct from "hospitals." Juris. Statement 18a.
On the other hand, the Court may well be correct in its interpretation of the Virginia statute. The word "hospital" in
§ 18.2-73 could incorporate by reference any institution licensed in accord with Va. Code § 32.1-123.1 and its implementing regulations. See ante, at fH>. It is not this
Court's role, however, to interpret state law. We should not
rest our decision on an interpretation of state law that was
not endorsed by the court whose judgment we are reviewing.
The Virginia Supreme Court's opinion was written on the assumption that the Commonwealth could constitutionally require all second trimester abortions to be performed in a fullservice, acute-care hospital. Our decision today in City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante,
p. - - , proves that assumption to have been incorrect. The
proper disposition of this appeal is therefore to vacate the

81-l~DISSENT

SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA
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judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia and to remand
the case to that court to reconsider its holding in the light of
our opinion in Akron.
I respectfully dissent.

(

lfp/ss 06/03/83
MEMORANDUM
TO:

Jim

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

June 3, 1983

Ashcroft
After a rereading of the opinions below on the
"second

physician"

preargument),

and

issue
again

(that

I

had

not

reread

reading HAB' s dissent,

I

since
do not

believe proposed Rider A - as you and I have draft it - is
quite fair.

As a means of focusing my own thinking

(and

so you can check it), I dictate this memo.
The

DC

invalidated

second

the

physician

requirement as overbroad, devoting only a paragraph to it
(A 26).

Its findings included:

of choice, even after viability,
are

positive

contraindications

prostaglandins

installation":

"D&E may be the procedure
in cases in which there
to

the

"no

use

of

chance

saline
of

or

fetus

survival" when D&E is used: and, the concluding sentence:
"the attendance of a second physician during an abortion
procedure

which

holds

no

possibility

of

fetal

survival

does not further [the state's] interest."
The finding relied on by HAB is that D&E "may be
the

procedure

of

choice

even

after

viability",

but

'l

2.

apparently

only

in

cases

in

which

the

woman's

health

requires this because it might be endangered by the "use
of

saline

or

prostaglandins

We

installation".

would

agree, if the woman's life is endangered by methods other
than D&E.

Thus, the question seems to be whether there is

substantial evidence that during the third trimester D&E
may be required in the interest of the mother's health?
A footnote cites, without quoting, the testimony
of

"Doctors

Robert

Schmidt

for

opinion

correctly

concluding

Crist

for

defendants".

that

"in

It

states

the

some

cases

considerations will preclude

plaintiffs
seems

the

to

DC' s

and

me

Richard

that

holding

HAB's

(p.

maternal

health

use of procedures

might result in a live birth

6) '

that

[the second doctor in

such circumstances] "is superfluous".
CA 8 quoted Dr.
may

be

there

the
were

methods.

Crist as

testifying that

best medical procedure at
"contraindications"

(A 80)

to

28 weeks"
the

use

of

"D&E

because
other

CAS does state that "Missouri points to

testimony by other physicians that do not or would not use
D&E at

this

stage,

and therefore the evidence

indicates

that "the question is one in which medical opinions may
differ".

,.

3

If

I

am

reading

the

foregoing

correctly,

0

it

seems to me that our rider A needs substantial revision.
Sadly,

I

don't

think we can hang HAB directly with Dr.

Crist's testimony, as he does not mention him at all.

He

simply latches on to the findings of the two courts below,
and relies on the "two court" rule.
You are far more familiar with all of this, Jim,
than

I

am.

something

Unless

important,

I

am

mistaken

or

have

overlooked

it seems to me we must refocus our

response on this aspect of the two physician issue.
concedes that medical opinions differ.
the ultimate finding of fact below.
do

two

things:

(i)

show,

as

you

CAS

At best, this is

This entitles us to
have

devastatingly

(subject to a comment below) that on the plaintiff's side
the only "differing view"

is that of Dr.

Crist, whereas

the other view is that few if any physicians ever use a
D&E

during

third

contradictory
contrary

to

trimester~

evidence,
Dr.

Crist's

with
views,

( i i)

and
the
the

great

given
weigh

state's

this
of

interest

it
in

protecting a viable fetus justifies the second physician
requirement even though there may be the rare case where a
doctor

may

think

honestly that D&E

is

required

for

the

mother's health.

.'.
'.
...
\,

,

.....

.:t-~
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4.

My one qualification about Dr. Crist's testimony
is

the

possible

ambiguity

in

his

question

in the middle of the page

however,

that

that

reprinted

your
in

reading
the

of

this

appendix}

is

long

answer

{A 130}.

I

to

believe,

testimony

{at

least

correct.

The

final

question and answer on p. 131 was as follows:

Q.
And do you believe that as a general
principle
• where there is an abortion there
should never be a live fetus?
A.

That is correct."
We should discuss this.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss
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the

~0~ :he

Chie:f Justice
. uatioe Brennan
Justice White
.J ustice Marshall
.J ustice Blackmun
Justice Powell
gustice Rehnquist
. uat1ce Stevens

J'rom :J J'ustice

CircUlated:

O'Connor
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA'rE~ted : _ _ __ _
No. 81-185

CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, APPELLANT v. VIRGINIA
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
[June 15, 1983]

JusTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JusTICE WHITE and Jus-~
TICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
I agree with the Court's treatment of the appellant's arguments based on United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971)
and Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). Accordingly, I join parts I and II of the Court's opinion.
I concur in the judgment of the Court insofar as it affirms
the conviction. For reasons stated in my dissent in No.
81-746, Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health and
in No. 81-1172, Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Akron, I do not agree that the constitutional validity of the Virginia mandatory hospitalization requirement is contingent in
any way on the trimester in which it is imposed. Rather, I
believe that the requirement in this case is not an undue burden on the decision to undergo an abortion.
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81-185 Simopulous v.

1rginia

This is an appeal from the Supreme Court of Virginia.

The appellant is an obstetrician-gynecologist.

At

his unlicensed clinic, he performed an abortion - by injection of saline solution - on a 17-year-old woman who was
approximately 22 weeks pregnant.
Appellant was convicted of violating the Virginia
statut, frequiring that second-trimester abortions be performed in a licensed hospital.

The Supreme Court of

Virgin ~ ~

._ affirmed the conviction.
Under Virginia law, the term "hospital" is defined
to include outpatient hospitals.
ia Department of

Regulations of the Virgin-

Healt~rovide that second-trimester abor-

tions may be performed in outpatienyfsurgical hospitals licensed by the state.

Unlike the City of Akron ordinance~and

the State of Missouri statute / virginia does

~t

require

that second-trimester abortions be performed in acute-care,
full-service hospitals.
On their face, the Virginia regulations appear to
be generally compatible with accepted medical
erniRg outpatient second-trimester abortions.

sta~
I\

2.

We have not considered/ whether the regulations are
constitutional in every particular ;ffor appellant declined
to challenge them specifically.
We have no reason to doubt, however, that an adequately equipped clinic/ - upon proper application ;L could be
licensed to perform second-trimester abo~~n~~~~ ~~~
We conclude, therefore,

ment~that

that~ vi {ginia's

require-

second-trimester abortions be performed in li-

censed clinic, ;is not an unreasonable means of furthering
the state's compelling interest in protecting the woman's
health.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is
affirmed.
Justice O'Connor / joined by Justices White and
('

Rehnquist 1'has filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in

a dissenting opinion.

part~ Justice

Stevens has filed

81-185#

Simopou1os v. Virginia
(Jim)
LFP for the Court
1st draft 3/3/83
2nd draft 3/16/83
3rd draft 4/28/83
4th draft 5/23/83
5th draft 6/9/83
Joined by CJ, WJB, TM, HAB
SOC concurring in part and in judgment
1st draft 5/5/83
2nd draft 6/13/83
Joined by BRW, WHR
JPS dissent
1st draft 6/1/83
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CHAMBERS OF"

..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

May 4, 1983

No. 81-185, Simopoulos v. Virginia

Dear Lewis:
As you know, my original and preferred vote in this case
was to vacate and remand. In my letter of March 8, I noted my
discomfort with the Court's reaching out to consider the constitutionality of the Virginia regulations when they had not been
interpreted by the Supreme Court of Virginia. I do think, however, that it is important that we have an opinion for the Court
in this case, or at least an opinion that commands a substantial
plurality. Thus, although I would still prefer to vacate and
remand, I could 'oin a narrowly-written o inion affirming the
judgment. Your th1r
ra
comes a long way towar assuaging my
concerns -- a fact I deeply appreciate -- but I am still somewhat troubled by it.

l

J, My m~jor concern is that you still come out to uphold the
regulations, a1though now only on the basis of the record before
us. I am reluctant t~ affirm on thiJt groqQd. I do not mean to
suggest that I think 'E"Fie"regulations are unconstitutional, or
that I would not vote to uphold them in an appropriate case, but
I do not regard this case as an appropriate one. Because nei- } ~
ther the parties nor the courts below have addressed the consti~
tutionali ty of the particular regulations adopted by Virginia,
a...t..
we have no really firm basis on which to determine whether these
· 9
regulations are justified by the State's interest in protecting ~
maternal health. Ordinarily, we would not make such a decision
~/ .
without the benefit of a record, briefing, and argument. If the
record is inadequate, we would remand for further proceedings.
It is not our practice to decide constitutional questions on the
basis of an insufficient record, while noting that a better record might lead to a different result.

2 My second concern is with the way in which you uphold the
regulations.
You conclude that the regulations appear to be
medically reasonable, and you then rely on the fact that appellant has failed to introduce evidence to the contrary.
The
problem I have with this approach is that I am not sure aEpel- ~~
lant has the burden of proof on this point. Ordinarily, the d~~
State must bear the burden of demonstrating that its regulattDns
--,~
on--rne-practl.ce ot aoorfion are sufficiently related to its
interest in protecting maternal health. See City of Akron, at
12; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 195 (1973).
In this case,

Page 2.
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because the constitutionality of the regulations was not liti.
gated below, the State has introduced no evidence whatsoever to r~
show that the regulations promote maternal health.
As you
~
pointed out in your letter of April 12, this is "a record con- l'.L~
taining no evidence as to the unreasonableness of individual
+
regulations."
I would only add that the record is equally de- C... Ia
void of any evidence as to the regulations' reasonableness.
It ~
is not enough for me just to place the regulations side-by-side ~
with the ACOG standards; I think our adversary system demands ~1.-t~
that the parties be permitted to put in evidence and litigate
'·
the issue. ~
-l
... ?-.1-,r ~~ ~ ~

I would prefer to take a slightly different approach. You
~~
say that appellant failed to introduce evidence regarding the
~
constitutionality of the regulations, and that we therefore
should uphold them.
I would say, rather, that appellant failed
to raise the issue, and Enat we therefore need not reach it. As
you pointed out in your April l2 letber, appellant was aware of
the regulations by the time of trial but chose not to challenge
them.
In fact, it appears to me that appellant has expressly /
declined to contest the constitutionality of a clinic-licensing
~
scheme like Virginia's. He challenged Virginia's abortion statute
on the sole ground that a restriction to full-service general
hospitals was unconstitutional, and he repeatedly asserted that
the proper course would be for Virginia to permit secondtrimester abortions in appropriately licensed outpatient clinics.
This, of course, is just what Virginia has done.
It
seems to me that we justifiably could l}_old a~pellant to this
choice of litigation strategy, anaconclude £at the constitutiona 1 y o
e u
1
s is not at issue. This would make
it unnecessary for the regulations to be addressed at all,
other than to note that they permit second-trimester abortions
to be performed in outpatient clinics as well as in fullservice general hospitals.

I

Your opinion appears to be inconsistent with this approach
at only a few points.
I do not know whether you feel inclined
to make any further changes, but if what I have outlined above
would be acceptable to you, and in an effort to be helpful, I
offer on the following pages suggestions for your consideration.
This is a large and difficult task.
efforts.

I am grateful for your

Sincerely,
Justice Powell

~~

'-'--..

P.S. I enclose a copy of your opinion with the suggested changes
marked up.
They are not so bad as the two pages of "suggestions" seem to indicate •

...

"Given the plain lang age of the Virginia regulations and the history of t eir adoption, see notes
,
supra, we have no reason o doubt that an adequately
equipped clinic could obta n, upon proper application,
an outpatient hospital li nse permitting the performance of second-trimester a ortions. Appellant has thus
challenged a statutory sc erne that does not exist in
Virginia: a requirement th
second-trimester abortions
be erformed in full-serv ce hospitals.
Since appellan aae QecliAed to chal enge the constitutionality of
the
regulation
have no occasion to pass

~ __ 1
~~~~~~

(6) Page 13, footnote 20. I would prefer to eliminate the
first two sentences (through "and thus also invalid") and the
last three sentences
(beginning "And certainly appellant
cannot") •
At the end of fourth from last sentence (beginning
"Some of these arguments"), I would add "and none have been
raised below."
(7)
Pages 13-14.
I would prefer the first (run-over)
sentence of this paragraph to read as follows:
"We conclude
that Virginia's requirement that second-trimester abortions be
performed in licensed clinics is not an unreasonable means of
furthering the State's compelling interest in 'protecting the
woman's own health and safety.'"
(8)
Page 14, footnote 21.
I would prefer the last sentence to read: "The only issue before us, however, relates to
second-trimester abortions."
(9) Page 14. I would rewrite the last sentence of Part IV
to read:
"Rather, the State's requirement that second-trimester
abortions be performed in licensed clinics appears to comport
with accepted medical practice, and leaves the method and timing
of the abortion precisely where they belong -- with the physician and the patient."
(10)
Finally,
of Part v.

I would simply eliminate the first sentence

Suggestions
(1)
Page 5, footnote 3. The last sentence of this footnote states that "the validity of these requirements" is at
issue. I would prefer the sentence to read: "Thus, it is irrelevant to the issue before us whether appellant's clinic and his
procedures would have complied with the Virginia regulations."
(2) Pages 9-10, footnotes 9-17. These footnotes spell out
the details of the Virginia regulations, in contrast to the
textual description of the areas covered.
If the validity of
the regulations is reached, I would prefer to see these footnotes eliminated.
(3)
Page 11.
I would prefer to eliminate the first sentence of the second paragraph and the first sentence of the
third (run-over) paragraph, as well as footnote 18.
(4)
Pages 12-13.
to read as follows:

I would re-write the run-over paragraph

"We need not consider whether Virginia's regulations are constitutional in every particular. Despite
personal knowledge of the regulations at least by the
time of his trial, appellant has not attacked them as
being insufficiently relate~ to the State's interest in
protecting maternal health. 9 His challenge throughout
this litigation has been limited to an assertion that
the State cannot require all second-trimester abortions
to be performed in full-service general hospitals.
Indeed, appellant has taken the position, both before
the lower courts and before this Court, that a state
licensing requirement for outpatient abortion facilities would be constitutional. See 9 Record 196a, 214a;
Brief for Appellant in No. 801107 (Va. S .Ct.) , p. 35;
Juris. Statement 16; Brief for Appellant 32, 43, n. 75,
46.
In essence, appellant has argued that Virginia's
hospitalization requirements are no different in substance from thoi~ reviewed in the City of Akron and
Ashcroft cases.
Not until his reply brief in this
Court did appellant criticize the regulations apart
from Virginia's statutory hospitalization requirement."

~
~~:

(5) Page 13. I would add the following paragraph prior to
the one beginning "We therefore conclude."
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To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens

Justice O'Connor
Circulated:
~Jfll
5 ~~

From:

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 81-1255 AND 81-1623

PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSOCIATION OF
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, INC.,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
81-1255
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
MISSOURI, ET AL.
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
MISSOURI, ET AL., PETITIONERS
81-1623
v.
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSOCIATION OF
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, INC.,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[May - , 1983]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part in the judgment
and dissenting in part.
For reasons stated in my dissent in No. 81-746, Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health and in No. 81-1172,
Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Akron, I believe
that the second-trimester hospitalization requirement imposed by § 188.025 does not impose an undue burden on the
limited right to undergo an abortion. Assuming arguendo
t1iat th e requirement was an undue burden, it would nevertheless "reasonably relate[] to the preservation and protection of maternal health." Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 , 163

81-1255
2

&81-1623--0

PLANNED PARENTHOO

ASSN. v. ASHCROFT

(1973). I therefore~sent rom the Court's judgment tha
the requirement is unconstitutional.
I agree that second-phy:sician equirement contained in
§ 188.030.2 is con~cause the State possesses a
compelling interest in protecting and preserving fetal life,
but I believe that this st~_interest i~ extant thro~h9ut
pregnancy. I therefore concur in t'Flejudgment of the Court.
-I agree tha~ pathology-rep_2rt reqmreme
1mpose by
§ 188.047 is constitutionar'6ecause it imposes no undue burden on the limited right to undergo an abortion. Because I
do not believe that the validity of this requirement is contingent in any way on the trimester of pregnancy in which it is
imposed, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
Assuming arguendo that the State cannot impose a parental veto on the decision of a minor to undergo an abortion, I
agree that the parental consent provision contained in
§ 188.028.2 is constitution al. However, I believe that the
provision is valid because it imposes no undue burden on any
right that a minor may have to undergo an abortion. I concur in the judgment of the Court on this issue.
I also concur in the Court's decision to vacate and remand
on the issue of attorney's fees in light of Hensley v.
Eckerhart,- U. S. (1983).

I I

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
From:

Justice O'Connor

r ~;"_ _J_ _ _ _ __
Circulated: _ _

Recirculated: _ __ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-185

CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, APPELLANT v. VIRGINIA
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
[May - , 1983]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
I agree with the Court's treatment of the appellant's arguments based on United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971)
and Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). Accordingly, I join parts I and II of the Court's opinion.
I concur in the judgment of the Court insofar as it affirms
the conviction. For reasons stated in my dissent in No.
81-746, Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health and
in No. 81-1172, Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Akron, I do not agree that the constitutional validity of the Virginia mandatory hospitalization requirement is contingent in
any way on the trimester in which it is imposed. Rather, I
believe that the requirement in this case is not an undue burden on the decision to undergo an abortion.

.iUFtnlt Qf!tllrl of tlft ~tb .itaU•
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CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

/

May 5, 1983
Re:

81-185

Simopoulos v. Virginia

Dear Sandra:
Please join me.
Sincerely~

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The . Conference

.:§u:prnnt C!faurt cf tltt ~tb ~taie.s'
~lyittghtn, ~.
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

May 6, 1983

81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia

Dear Sandra:
Please add my name to your opinion in this case.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference

THE DIOCESE OF FARGO
1310 BROADWAY
BOX 1750
FARGO, NORTH DAKOTA 58107

CHANCERY

May 11, 1983

Mr. Harry Blackmun
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
c/o President Thomas Clifford
University of North Dakota
Grand Forks, ND 58202
Dear Mr. Blackmun,
This letter is written in response to the news item of
Fargo Forum (5/8/83) that you will be the speaker at the
graduation exercises of the Law School of the University of
North Dakota, May 15, 1983.
Commencement exercises are happy occasions, and I
join the people of this state in wishing the graduates good
fortune, indeed, God's blessings in their years of study ,
interpretation, and practice of law.
I am certain your presence as an Associate Justice of
the U.S. Supreme Court and the graduation-speaker will
have meaning and significance not only to the graduates , but
likewise to the entire University Family at Grand Forks.
This is as it should be, I feel.
Yet, your presence at the University of North Dakota,
and more especially your address to the graduates , both
fill me with anguish and travail.
I realize as I reflect with deep sadness , Mr. Justice
Blackmun, that a decade has passed since you masterminded the Roe vs Wade and Doe vs Bolton decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court:
the decision that denied and deprived
legal protection to the Unborn Child. You are aware , I am
confident what that decision has meant to this Nation in
terms of human life, in terms of approximately 15 million
young Americans who never will be given the opportunity to
live, to study law, or to be numbered among school children
of this great nation.
On various occasions , I have read news items in which
you were quoted about the abortion decision, about the hidden
rights you found lodged in the U.S. Constitution, to deny the
Unborn Child the gift of life, the privilege to be born.
Somehow I have always sensed, in your statements , a great

... .

.
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uncertainty, a lack of conviction or inner peace with the
abortion decision.
It is wrong, and I am convinced you are
fully aware of that fact.
That is why I am writing this
letter. As the U.S. Catholic Bishops recently stated in
their Pastoral Letter on Peace, "No society can live in
peace with itself, or with the world, without a full awareness
of the worth and dignity of every human person, and the
sacredness of human life" (Jas. 4: 1-2).
Your presence at the graduation of the Law School of
the University of North Dakota on May 15th, then, gives me
and, I am certain, numerous people of North Dakota the
opportunity to reflect anew on the value of the sacredness
of human life, and on the tragedy and devastation of the
Abortion Decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, January 22, 1973.
I am asking the Catholic people of this Diocese, and
people of all Religious Faiths to join me, especially on
May 15th, in thanking God for His gift of human life and to
beg His pardon and mercy for the wanton destruction of
human life, caused by the Abortion Decision of the Supr eme
Court and by all forms of Violence, oppression, and exploitation in our day.
Sincerely, I regret your coming to the University of
North Dakota as the graduation speaker on May 15th, and
openly I express that deep lament.
With every best wish, I remain
Sincerely yours,

~
Driscoll
of Fargo

cc:

President Thomas Clifford

l
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The purpose of this letter is to review ·the situa-,
tion i.n these three "headache" cases that you asked ·me to
write.
Akron
I have a bare Court (~l.JB, TM, HAB, ,JPS and LFP) , ' '
anrl Sandra - for her all-out dissent - has three votes (B~W,
WHR and SOC).
...

As I point out
Sandra's position simplv
cases that have accepted
voted, though I consider

in n. 1, P. 2, of my Akron opinion,
e't\C'!.sculates Roe ann the several
its basic principles. You have not
your joining as essential.
Ashcroft

I have no votes for my opinion. John has indicated by letter that he expects to join all but Part V of my ,
opini.on. My understanding is that Harry is writing a long
ooinion (presumably for ~~JB and TM). He wi.ll join Part II
of my opi.nion that invalidates Missouri •s requirement of an
acute-care general hospital. There are, as you know, several other issues in 1\shcroft, and Harry is rHssenting as to
parental consent (5-4) (NJB, TM, !JAB, JPS), the pathology
report (8-1) (HAB) {W.JB, TM were tentative), and the seconddoctor requirement (6-3) (WJB, TM, HAB) .
The O'Connor trio agrees with my result as to all
issues except hospitalization .
Simopoulos
Thi's case , in many ways the most important of the
three, is at a critical stage and I need your help.
I had hoped that the Justices sharing Sandra's
view would at least be with us in Simpoulos . They would

-·
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affirm the judgment, but on entirely different reasoning:
namely, that a state may impose virtually any limitation it
w!shes.
. '~· ', ,~,~·
~":""

·~

, · I{;Th~ only hope of a Court aff irmi~g al~ng th~ 1 ines
of your vote and mine lies essentially with what Harry and
Bill ,., Brennan (who a~.e cooperating) are wil \ ing to join. ,. ''
.~; _./ r have had a considerable private exchange with
'·
Harrt and Bill. Until recently, they were adamant in their
unwillingness to affirm. Their position has been that we
should vacate. and remand to allow the Virginia court to construe and pass upon the validity of the regulations. In
view of the curious way - if not negli.gent way - in which
Simopoulos was tried by both parties, the regulations never
were expressly addressed by the Supreme Court of Virginia.
I relJlain . firm ln my view,. however, that this is the result
of a strategy , choice by Simopoulos. "As he challenged the ,
entire Virqinia · regulatory schemP, it is appropriate to reject his ~ phallenge and affirm.
~

Harry has now given me a list of specific cha~nges
in my third draft of the opinion tha.t, if 1 accept, will
enable him to join. I ~eliver to you hPrewith a proposed
' fourth draft (not yet circulated) in which I have gone much
- but not all of tbe way ~ ~ith Harry, but not as far as he
woul<i like.
If you can find the time (perhaps today or tomorrow) to take a look at the changes I have made, I will be
grateful. If these meet with your approval, I will go back
to Harry and see if he will accept them as a compromise between us. Although I have .eliminated a good deal of language I would have preferred to keep in the opinion, I think
the proposed fourth draft would fairly well set-tle the validity of regulations like those of Virginia. This is our
basic objective.
I will be happy to discuss this with you at any
time. We should try to get this off of "dead center" before
next week's hectic schedule. A.lso, HA.B is expecting some
reply from me.
Sincerely,

~

The Chief Justice

j

lfp/ss
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May 16, 1983

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JuSTICE

Re:

81-185 - Simopoulos v. Virginia

Dear Lewis:
I join.

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conf erence
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From:

~)

Justice Blackmun
MAY 1 7 1983

~~b~£-(p

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

~

~~~ ~ ~ Recirculated: --'-......,.--.~-...._
--==---4
~~
~ ~~
7
L--1-

~s~ ~. ~ro-f.h~

~~~~

lstDRAFT ~~ ~ c~

SUPREME COURT OF THE pNITED STATES
~,./.lr;
~ 4<.;14J ~~'~t~Y

•--r-

Ustczuar+v~

~

Nos. 81-1255

AND

81-1623

PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSOCIATION OF
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, INC.,

7~1~~~~__

:5"~.5

JOHN A&ICROF'f, ATTORNEY

w-e_

G~

/C)

OF

~f ~~~ 5'5- ~~~ ~

JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF/.V~MISSOURI, ET AL., PETITIONERS
81-1623
v.
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSOCIATION OF
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, INC., ET AL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[May - , 1983]

JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
The Court's decision today in Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, invalidates the city of Akron's hospitalization requirement and a host of other provisions that infringe on a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy through abortion. I agree with the Court that
Missouri's hospitalization requirement is invalid under the
Akron analysis, and I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion in the present cases. I do not agree, however, that the
remaining Missouri statutes challenged in these cases satisfy

J/
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PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT

the constitutional standards set forth in Akron and the
Court's prior decisions.
I
Missouri law provides that whenever an abortion is perI.I . J- ~--.
~-- ;
formed, a tissue sample must be submitted to a "board eligi~~
ble or certified pathologist" for a report. Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 188.047 (1983). This requirement a2£lies t~~t ~itp_ester
abortions as well as to those performed later in pregnancy.
Our past decisions establish that the performance of abortions during the first trimester must be left "'free of interference by the State."' Akron, ante, at 12, quoting Roe
v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 163 (1973). As we have noted in
Akron, this does not mean that every regulation touching
upon first-trimester abortions is constitutionally impermissible. But to pass constitutional muster, regulations affecting
first-trimester abortions must "have no significant impact on
the woman's exercise of her right" and must be "justified by
important state health objectives." Akron, ante, at 11; see
ante, at 8.
Missouri's requirement of a pathologist's report is not justified by important health ob ·ectives. Although pathology
examma wns may be "useful and even necessary in some
cases," ante, at 10, Missouri requires more than a pathology
examination and a pathology report; it demands that the
examination be performed and the report prepared by a
"board eligible or certified pathologist" rather than by the attending physician. Contrary to the Court's assertion, ante,~:)~S" 9 .~
at 9, this requirement of a report by a pathologist is not in
accord with "generally accepted medical standards." The
routine and a~d medical practice 1s for the attending
physician to perform a gross (visual) examination of any tissue removed during an abortion. Only if the physician detects abnormalities is there a need to send a tissue sample to
a pathologist. The American College of Obstetricians and }
Gynecologists (AGOG) does not recommend an examination
by a pathologist in every case:

f. /
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"In the situation of elective termination of pregnancy,
the attending physician should record a description of
the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal
parts can be identified, the products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for
gross and microscopic examination.
". . . . Aspirated tissue should be examined to ensure
the presence of villi or fetal parts prior to the patient's
release from the facility. If villi or fetal parts are not
identified with certainty, the tissue specimen must be
sent for further pathologic examination.... " ACOG,
Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52, 54
(1982). 1
Nor does the National Abortion Federation believe that such
an examination is necessary:
"All tissue must be examined grossly at the time of the
abortion procedure by a physician or trained assistant
and the results recorded in the chart. In the absence of
visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination,
obtained tissue may be examined under a low power microscope for the detection of villi. If this examination is
inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest
suitable pathology laboratory for microscopic examination." National Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981)
(emphasis deleted).
The Court fails to distinguish between the medical practice
' See also ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 66
(1982):
"Tissue removed should be submitted to a pathologist for examination .. .. An ~ception to the practice may be in elective terminations of
pregnancy in which definitive embryonic or fetal parts can be identified.
In such instances, the physician should record a description of the gross
products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identified, the
products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for gross and microscopic examination."

81-1255 & 81-1623--CONCUR & DISSENT
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT

4

of performing a "tissue examination," ante, at 11, and Missouri's requirement that this examination be performed by a
pathologist. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, there was
expert testimony at trial that a nonpathologist physician is as
capable of performing an adequate gross examination as is a
pathologist, and that the "abnormalities which are of concern" are readily detectable by a physician. 655 F. 2d 848,
871, n. 37 (CA8 1981); see App. 135. 2 ~st
may be better ~ to perform a microscopic examination,
Missour"'ilaw does not require a microscopic examination unless "fetal parts or placenta are not identified." 13 Mo.
Admin. Code § 50-151.030(1) (1981). Thus, the effect of the
Missouri statute is to require a pathologist to perform the initial gross examination, which is normally the responsibility of
the attending physician and which will often make the pathologist's services unnecessary.
On the record before us, I must conclude that the State has
not "met its burden of demonstrating that [the pathologist requirement] further[s] important health-related State concerns." Akron, ante, at 12. There has been no showing
that tissue examinations by a pathologist do more to protect
health than examinations by a nonpathologist physician.
Moreover, I cannot agree with the Court that Missouri's pathologist requirement has "no significant impact" ante, at 8,
on a woman's exercise of her right to an abortion. It is undisputed that this requirement may increase the cost of a
first-trimester abortion by as much as $40. See ante, at 10,
n. 12; 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48. Although this increase
may seem insignificant from the Court's comfortable perspective, I cannot say that it is equally insignificant to every
woman seeking an abortion. For the woman on welfare or
the unemployed teenager, this additional cost may well put
The District Court made no findings on this point, noting only that
some witnesses for the State had testified that "pathology should be done"
for every abortion. 483 F . Supp. 679, 700, n. 49 (WD Mo. 1980).
2
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the price of an abortion beyond reach. 3 Cf. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 668 (1966) ($1.50 poll
tax "excludes those unable to pay"); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S.
252, 255, 257 (1959) ($20 docket fee "foreclose[s] access" to
appellate review for indigents).
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. I)anfort~, 428
U. S. 52, 81 (1976), the Court warned that the minor recordkeeping requirements upheld in that case "perhaps approach[ed] impermissible limits." Today in Akron, we have
struck down restrictions on first-trimester abortions that
"may in some cases add to the cost of providing abortions."
Ante, at 30; see ante, at 31-32. Missouri's requirement of a
pathologist's report unquestionably adds significantly to the
cost of providing abortions, and Missouri nas not shown that
it serves any substantial health-related purpose. Under
these circumstances, I would hold that constitutional limits
have been exceeded.
II

In Missouri, an abortion may be performed after viability
only if necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (1983). When a post-viability
abortion is performed, Missouri law provides that "there
[must be] in attendance a [second] physician ... who shall
take control of and provide immediate mediCal care for a child
born as a result of the abortion." Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 188.030.3
(1983). The Court recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at
A $40 pathologist's fee may increase the price of a first-trimester abortion by 20% or more. See 655 F. 2d, at 869, n. 35 (cost of first-trimester
abortion at Reproductive Health Services is $170); F. Jaffe, B. Lindheim,
and P. Lee, Abortion Politics: Private Morality and Public Policy 36 (1981)
(cost of first-trimester clinic abortion ranges from approximately $185
to $235); Henshaw, Freestanding Abortion Clinics: Services, Structure,
Fees, 14 Family Planning Perspectives 248, 255 (1982) (average cost of
first-trimester clinic abortion is $190); NAF Membership Directory 18-19
(1982/1983) (NAF clinics in Missouri charge $180 to $225 for first-trimester
abortion) .
3

.

.,

81-1255 & 81-1623-CONCUR & DISSENT
6

PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT

164-165, that a State's interests in preserving maternal
health and protecting the potentiality of human life may justify regulation and even prohibition of post-viability abortions, except those necessary to preserve the life and health
of the mother. But regulations governing post-viability
abortions, like those at any other stage of pregnancy, must
be "tailored to the recognized state interests." I d., at 165;
see H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 413 (1981) ("statute
plainly serves important state interests, [and] is narrowly
drawn to protect only those interests"); Roe, 410 U. S., at
155 ("legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake").

A
The Court upholds the second physician requirement on
the basis that it "furthers the State's compelling interest in
protecting the lives of viable fetuses." Ante, at 8. While I
agree that a second physician indeed may aid in preserving
th~il~ f®Js horn.. alive, this type of aid is possible only
when the abortion method used is one that may result in a
live birth. Although Missouri ordinarily requires a physician performing a post-viability abortion to use the abortion
method most likely to preserve fetal life, this restriction
does not apply when this method "would present a greater
risk to the life and health of the woman." Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 188.030.2 (1983).
~ DistricgCourt found that the dilatation and evacuation
~) 2;£th? of abortion entails no chance of fetal survival,
and that 1t w1 nevertheless be the method of choice for some
women who need post-viability abortions. In some cases, in
other words, maternal health considerations will preclude the
use of procedures that might result in a live birth. 483 F.
Supp., at 694. 4 When a D&E abortion is performed, the
'The Court of Appeals upheld this factual finding. 665 F. 2d, at 865.
As a general rule, we do not review a District Court's factual findings in

j .I~
.,-_
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second physician can do nothing to further the State's compelling interest in protecting potential life. His presence
is superfluous. The second- h sician requirement thus is
overbroad and "imposes a urden on women in cases where
thebllrden is not justified by any possibility of survival of the
fetus." 655 F. 2d, at 865-866.
The Court reasons that the State's interest in preserving
potential life "justifies the State in requiring a second physician at every third-trimester abortion" because "[w]e ...
cannot assume that all third-trimester abortions will be D&E
abortions, or that there will be no live births." Ante, at 7,
n. 7 (emphasis added). But the fact that other methods of
post-viability abortions may result in live births cannot justify requiring a second physician to attend an abortion at
which the chance of a live birth is nonexistent. The choice of
metiiOd"pre sumably will be made in advance, 5 and any need
for a second physician disappears when the woman's health
requires that the choice be D&E. Because the statute is not
tailored to protect the State's legitimate interests, I would
hold it invalid. 6
which the Court of Appeals has concurred. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S.
507, 512, n. 6 (1980).
• In addition to requiring the physician to select the method most likely
to preserve fetal life, so long as it presents no greater risk to the pregnant
woman, Missouri requires that the physician "certify in writing the available method or techniques considered and the reasons for choosing the
method or technique employed." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.2 (1983). This
ensures that the choice of method will be a reasoned one.
6
The State argues that its second-physician requirement is justified
even when D&E is used, because "[i]f the statute specifically excepted
D&E procedures, abortionists would be encouraged to use it more frequently to avoid the expense of a second physician, to ensure a dead fetus,
to prevent the presence of a second professional to observe malpractice or
the choice of a questionable procedure from a safety viewpoint, a fetusdestroying procedure, or to avoid their own awakening to concern for the
newborn." Brief for Cross-Petitioners in No. 81-1623, p. 44. The Court
rejected this purported justification for a second physician in Doe v. Bol-
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B
In addition, I would hold that the stat~e'~lure to Qrovide a clear exception for emergency situations renders it unco s 1tu wna. As t e ou recognizes, ante, at 7, n. 8, an
emergency may arise in which delay could be dangerous to
the life or health of the woman. A second physician may not
always be available in such a situation; yet the statute appears to require one. It states, in unqualified terms, that a
post-viability abortion "shall be performed ... only when
there is in attendance" a second physician who "shall take
control of'' any child born as a result of the abortion, and it
imposes certain duties on "the physician required by this section to be in attendance." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 (emphasis added). By requiring the attendance of a second physician even when the resulting delay may be harmful to the
health of the pregnant woman, the statute impermissibly fails
to make clear "that the woman's life and health must always
prevail over the fetus' life and health when they conflict."
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 400 (1979).
The Court attempts to cure this defect by asserting that
the final clause of the statute, requiring the two physicians to
"take all reasonable steps . . . to preserve the life and health
of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an
increased risk to the life or health of the woman," could be
construed to permit emergency post-viability abortions without a second physician. Ante, at 7, n. 8. This construction
is contrary to the plain language of the statute; the clause
upon which the Court relies refers to the duties of both physicians during the performance of the abortion, but it in no way
suggests that the second physician may be dispensed with.
ton, 410 U. S. 179, 199 (1973): "If a physician is licensed by the State, he is
recognized by the State as capable of exercising acceptable clinical judgment. If he fails in this, professional censure and deprivation of his license
are available remedies. Required acquiescence by co-practitioners has no
rational connection with a patient's needs and unduly infringes on the physician's right to practice."
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Moreover, since the Court's proposed construction is not
binding on the courts of Missouri, 7 a physician performing an
emergency post-viability abortion cannot rely on it with any
degree of confidence. The statute thus remains impermissibly vague; it fails to inform the physician whetner he may
proceed with a post-viability abortion in an emergency, or
whether he must wait for a second physician even if the woman's life or health will be further imperiled by the delay.
This vagueness may well have a severe chilling effect on the
physician who perceives the patient's need for a post-viability
abortion. In Colautti v. Franklin, we considered a statute
that failed to specify whether it "require[d] the physician to
make a 'trade-off between the woman's health and additional
percentage points of fetal survival." 439 U. S., at 400. The
Court held there that "where conflicting duties of this magnitude are involved, the State, at the least, must proceed with
greater precision before it may subject a physician to possible
criminal sanctions." I d., at 400-401. 8 I would apply that
reasoning here, and hold Missouri's second-physician requirement invalid on this ground as well. 9
7
"Only the [Missouri] courts can supply the requisite construction, since
of course 'we lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legislation."' Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 520 (1972), quoting United
States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 369 (1971).
8
A physician who fails to comply with Missouri's second-physician requirement faces criminal penalties and the loss of his license. Mo. Rev.
Stat. §§ 188.065, 188.075 (1983).
9
Because I would hold the statute unconstitutional on these grounds,
I do not reach the question whether Missouri's second-physician requirement impermissibly interferes with the doctor-patient relationship. I
note, however, that Missouri does not require attendance of a second physician at any other medical procedure, including a premature birth. There
was testimony at trial that a newborn infant, whether the product of a normal birth or an abortion, ordinarily remains the responsibility of the woman's physician until he turns its care over to another. App. 133; see
ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 31 (1982) ("The individual who delivers the baby is responsible for the immediate post-delivery
care of the newborn until another person assumes this duty").
This allocation of responsibility makes sense. Consultation and team-
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III
Missouri law prohibits the performance of an abortion on
an unemancipated minor abs t arental con
a court
order.
o.
Rev.
Stat.
§
188.028
(1983).
A
minor
who
has
__...
not obtained parental consent may petition the juvenile court
for court consent or the right to self-consent. The statute
then provides that
"the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion . . . ; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on
which the petition is denied .... " § 188.028.2(4).
The Court recognizes that this statute "[o]n its face ... authorizes juvenile courts to choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section." Ante, at 13 (footnote omitted). The District Court took a similar view, noting that
"each of the three [alternatives] is clearly independent of the
others, connected in the statute with the disjunctive 'or."'
The District Court also concluded that "[a]lternative (c) permits the court to 'deny the petition,' guided only by the general standard that such action be 'for good cause.'" 483
F. Supp., at 689. The District Court thus found it "clear
... that alternative (c) authorizes the juvenile court to deny
the minor's petition for good cause, but does not require a
prior finding that the minor is not sufficiently mature and not
competent to make a decision regarding abortion independently." Ibid.
If the statute is construed in accordance with its plain lanwork are fundamental in medical practice, but in an operating room a patient's life or health may depend on split-second decisions by the physician.
If responsibility and control must be shared between two physicians with
the lines of authority unclear, precious moments may be lost to the detriment of both woman and child.
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guage, it would be unconstitutional under the standards set
forth by the plurality in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622,
643-644, 647-648 (1979) (Bellotti II), and applied by the
Court today. To avoid the necessity of invalidating the statute, the Court applies the maxim that, "[w ]here fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality." Ante, at 14. The Court thus approves
the construction adopted by the Court-oTAppeals, conclllaing
that a Missouri juvem e court may no
eny a [minor's] petition 'for good cause' unless it first [finds] ... that the minor
was not mature enough to make her own decision." Ante, at
14.
The Court's maxim of statutory construction may be a wise
one for federal courts to follow in discerning the meaning of
federal statutes, but it is not one we can impose on state
courts interpreting their own law. The interpretation of
of Missouri, and "[t]he
Missouri law is a matter for the cou
majority's constructiOn of state law is, of course, not binding on the Missouri courts." Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 101, n. 4 (opinion of
WHITE, J .). A Missouri juvenile court considering a petition
brought by a mature minor may therefore conclude, despite
this Court's optimistic assertion to the contrary, that Missouri's judicial consent statute means exactly what it says: the
court may "for good cause ... [d]eny the petition." 10
This statute was enacted in 1979, after the Court's decision in Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I), but very shortly before its 1979
decision in Bellotti II. The Massachusetts statute held invalid in Bellotti
II, like the Missouri statute before us today, permitted a court to grant or
deny a minor's petition "for good cause shown." See Bellotti II , 443 U. S.,
at 625. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court interpreted this language to authorize the withholding of consent " 'in circumstances where
[the court] determines that the best interests of the minor will not be
served by an abortion, ' " even if the minor " 'is capable of making, and has
made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion.'" !d., at
630, quoting Baird v. Attorney General , 371 Mass. 741, 748, 360 N. E. 2d
10

I
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It is certainly possible that the courts of Missouri will
agree with this Court and construe Missouri law as the Court
does today. But this is a task that must be left to the state
courts. We cannot perform it for them. In Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I), the Court held that
the District Court should have abstained where "an unconstrued state statute is susceptible of a construction by the
state judiciary 'which might avoid in whole or in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least materially change the nature of the problem."' Id., at 147,
quoting Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U. S. 167, 177 (1959); see
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941). I
feel that the District Court should have abstained here as
well. 11 Although Missouri does not have a certification procedure comparable to the one employed in Bellotti I, its rules
of procedure provide for expedited review of questions of
"general interest or importance." Mo. S. Ct. Rules 83.02,
83.06 (1983). In Bellotti I, moreover, we did not "mean to
intimate that abstention would be improper ... were certification not possible." 428 U. S., at 151. 12 In cases where
288, 293 (1977). The Court does not explain why it expects the Missouri
courts to reach a different result.
11
The Court's interpretation of Missouri law is directly contrary to the
interpretation given by the United States District Judge, who has been on
the Missouri bench, state or federal, for over 30 years. The District Judge
declined to abstain on the basis that "[i]t is clear to this Court that section
188.028 is not susceptible to a reasonable construction which would
avoid the federal constitutional question controlling in Bellotti II." 483
F. Supp., at 690 (emphasis added). This District Judge's interpretation of
the statute should indicate that it is at least sufficiently ambiguous to necessitate abstention. Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 345-347 (1976).
12
While "speed in resolution" of this constitutional challenge remains important, Bellotti I, 428 U. S., at 151, it is worthy of note that enforcement
of these statutes has been stayed pending the outcome of this litigation.
The District Court would have been free to keep its stay in effect, in exercising its power to retain jurisdiction over the constitutional issue. See
England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 (1964).
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constitutional rights of this magnitude are at stake, we
should refrain from speculating on the meaning of Missouri
law when an authoritative interpretation may be obtained by
other means. 13

13
Because I believe abstention is appropriate, I do not reach the question whether Missouri's parental-judicial consent statute as construed by
the Court is constitutional.
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nea '' Barry:

Here are two copies of a proposed fourth draft of
an opinion in this case. The margins are marked to indicate
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changes.

J\11 of these changes are ma~e to accommodate the
suggestions in your letter and accompanying memorandum of
~ay 4.
Jim Browning, my clerk, has indicate~ in the margins of your memorandum the extent to which I have adopted
your suggestions. '"
, ,.
'·

~

In summary, T have retained the footnotes on pp. 9
and 10 that describe the Virginia regulations. On page 11,
I retained the first sentence in the third (run-over) paragraph. And I 'Tiade modest revisions in your suggested lan- ' ..f
guaqe for page~ 12 and 13.
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In all other respects (unless inadvertently I have:
overlooked something), I have accepted your s~ggestions.

·'
As the. Chief ioined an earlier draft, I felt I -. . ~'
owed hlm the duty to show him these changes. You have seen
his -join note of yf'>sterday. App;uently, he thought I han
circulated this fourth draft to the Conference. I had discussed the general nature of th~ chanqes with him previously. In any event, although he said to me that he would prefer my first circulation, he recognizes the importance of
putting together a solid Court.
•
I would very much prefer to retain the first sentence in the thir~ paragraph on page 11. It is not a holding sentence. It metely states that on their face the Virginia regulations appear generally to be "comp~tible with
accepted medical standards". In view of the qualifying language, I do not think there can be any doubt as to the accuracy of the sentence.
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I am happy to discuss any of this with you. Our •
exchange of views has been constructive. On the basis of
talks with him, I believe we can persuade the Chief also to
join Akron. With six of us agreeing on Akron and Simopoulos
(by far the two most important issues), each of which reaffir:'lls P.oe, I think we will have gone a long way to lay to
rest the controv~rsy of the last decade as to the faithfulof thi s Court to your historic decision. Guidance also
be given legislatures
and courts.
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Section 30.0
30.1

Special Hospital - Institutions, as defined by Section 32298(2), Code of Virginia (1950), as amended, which provide
care for a specialized group of patients and/or limits inpatient admission to provide diagnosis and treatment for
patients who have specified conditions (e.g., tuberculosis,
orthopedic, pediatric).
Procedures for Licensure or License Renewal

General
No person shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this State
any outpatient hospital as defined in and included within provisions
of these regulations without having obtained a license. Any person
establishing, conducting, maintaining, or operating an outpatient
hospital without a license shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon
conviction shall be punished by a fine of not less than twenty-five
dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, or by confinement in jail
for not more than twelve months, or both, and each day of such violation
before any conviction shall constitute a separate first offense.

30.2

Classification
Hospitals to be licensed shall be classified and designated pursuant
to Sections 20.2.8, 20.2.11, and 20.2.14 of these regulation.s.

30.3

Separate License
Separate license shall be required by outpatient hospitals maintained
on separate premises even though they are operated under the same
management. Separate license shall be required for separate buildings
on the same grounds .

30.4

Special Facilities
Hospitals which have separate organized sections, units, or buildings
to provide services of a classification covered by provisions of other
state statutes or regulations may be required to have an additional
applicable license for that type of service (e.g., maternity, psychiatric,
nursing home) .

30.5

Request for Issuance
Hospital licenses are issued by the Commissioner , but all requests for
licensing shall be submitted initially to the Bureau of Medical and
Nursing Facilities Services. The procedure for obtaining the license
shall include the follO\ting steps 1
30.5.1

Request for application forms shall be made in writing to
the Bureau.

30.5.2

Application for license or license renewal to establ1sh or
maintain a hospital shall be made and submitted to the Bureau.

5
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30.5.3

Appl•cation for original license, change 111 license , or
license renewal shall be accompanied by a check or money
order for the service charge, payable to the licensing
agency, when requested.

30.5.4

Appli..:ation or original lieense of a facility or fo r
additions or major alterations to existing licensed facilities
must be accompanied by a letter of approval indicating that
the building meets the requirements of the Virginia Fire
Safety Laws .

Service Charge
The service charge shall be $10.00.

\

1

1. 7

License Expiration

A license shall expire as specified or at midnight December 31
following date of issue, whichever is first, and shall be renewable
annually, upon filing of application and payment of the service charge,
unless cause apl'ears to the contrary.
30.8

Name
Every outpatient hospital shall be designated by a permanent and
appropriate name which shall appear on the application for license.
The name shall not be changed without first notifying the licensing
agency.

30.9

Posting of License
The outpatient hospital license issued by the Commissioner shall be
framed and posted conspicuously on the premises, either in the main
entrance or in a place clearly visable from the main entrance.

30.10

Return of License
The licensing agency shall be notified in writing within thirty (30)
working days concerning any proposed change in location, ownership,
or name of the facility. A license shall not be transferred from
one owner to another or from one location to another.
The license issued by the Commissioner shall be returned to the Bureau
when any of the following changes occur during the licensing year or if
the facility is closed:
30.10.1

Revocation.

30.10.2

Change of location.

30.10.3

Change of ownership.

30.10.4

Change of name.

30.10.5

Voluntary closure of hospital.
6
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30.11

Revocation or Suspension of License
A license to operate an outpatient hospital shall be revoked or
suspended by the licensing agency upon the findings of one or more
of the following•
30.11.1

Continuing violation of the proyisions of the licensing
act or the rules and regulations of the Board adopted
thereunder.

30.11.2

Permitting, aiding, or abetting the commission of any
ille gal act in the facility.

30.11.3

Conduct or practice detrimental to the welfare or safety
of any patient in the facility.

Before a revocation of a license is effective, the provisions of
the Administrative Process Act shall be observed.

7
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RULES AND REGULATIONS
FOR THE LICENSURE OF
OUTPATIENT SURGICAL HOSPITALS

PART II

ORGANIZATION, OPERATION AND CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS FOR
EXISTING AND NEW OUTPATIENT SURGICAL HOSPITALS
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PART II:

I
I

AND OPERATION OF EXISTING AND NEW HOSPITALS
Section 40.0
40 .1

Organization and Management

Governing Authority
Each outpatient surgical hospital shal l have a governing body or
other legal authority responsible for the management and control of
the operation of the facilities.

40.2

There shal l be disclosure of hospital ownership. OWnership interest
shall be made known to the licensing agency and in the case of corpora tions, all individuals or entities holding 10\ or more of total owner ship shall be identified by name and address . The licensing agency
shall be notified of any changes in ownership .

40.3

The governing body shall provide facilities , personnel and other
resources necessary to meet patient and program needs.

40.4

The governing body shal l have a formal organizational plan with
written by-laws, rules and regulations or their equivalent. These
shall clearly set forth organization, duties, responsibilities,
accountability, and relationships of professional staff and other
personnel. The person or organizational body responsible for formulating policies shall be identified.

40.5

The by-laws, rules and regulations , or their equivalent , shall include
at least the following:

40.6

40.5.1

A statement of purpose;

40.5.2

Description of the functions and duties of the governi ng
body, or other legal authority;

40.5.3

A statement of authority and responsibility delegated to
the chief administrative officer and to the medical staff;

40,5.4

Provisio n for selection and appointment of medical staff and
granting of clinical privileges;

40.5.5

Provision of guidelines for relationRhip among the governing
body, the chief administrative officer , and the medical staff.

Administrative Officer
40.6.1

The responsibility for administration and management of the
outpatient surgical hospital shall be vested in an individual
whose qualifications, authority and duties shall be defined in
a written statement adopted by the governing body .
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Section 41.0
41.1

Policies and Procedures

General Statement
Policies and procedures may vary depending on scope and type of
service, personnel, equipment and location of the facility. It
is recognized that no two facilities will be identical because
of variations in the scope and objective of the outpatient service. Even though each facility may be different, certain standards and procedures shall be applicable to all in assuring the
delivery of a high quality of care.

41.2

Policy and Procedures Manual
Each outpatient surgical hospital shall develop written policies
and procedures which shall include provisions covering the following
items:

I
41.3

41.2.1

The types of emergency and elective procedures which
may be performed in the facility;

41.2.2

Types of anesthesia which may be used;

41.2.3

Admissions and discharges, including criteria for
evaluating the patient before admission and before
discharge;

41.2.4

Written informed consent of patient prior to the
initiation of any procedure;

41.2.5

Procedures for hou s ekeeping and infection control.

A copy of approved policies and procedures and revisions thereto,
shall be made available to the Bureau upon request.

Section 42.0
42.1

Staffing

Medical Staff
The size and organizational structure of the medical staff will vary
de pe nding on the scope of service.

~·'· '
~42 . 1 . 2

42.1.3

Pro f e s sional and clini c al s ervices s ha ll be supervised by
a physician licen s ed t o practice me dicine or surgery in
Virginia.
Surgical procedures shall be performed by a physician
licensed to perform such pro cedures in Virginia.
Clini cal privileges of phy s ician and non-physician
practitioners shall be clearly defin~d.
10
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42 .1. 4

42.2

Credentials including education and experience shall be
reviewed and privileges identified, established, and
approved for each person allowed to diagnose, treat
patients, or perform surgical procedures in accordance
with guidelines, policies or by-laws adopted by the
governing body and approved by the medical staff.

Nursing Staff
The total number of nursing personnel will vary depending upon t.he
number and types of patients to be admitted and the types of cper~tivr·
procedures to be performed or the services programmed.
42.2.1

A registered nurse qualified on the basis of education,
experience, and clinical ability shall be responsible
for the direction o f nursing care provided the patient;.

42.2. 2

The number and type of nursing personnel, including
registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, and
supp lementary staff, shall be based upon the needs of
the patients and the types of services performed.
At least one registered nurse shall be on duty at all
times while the fa ci lity is in use.

42.2.4

Job descriptions shall be developed for each level of
nursing personnel and include functions, re spons ibilities,
and qualifications.

42.2.5

Evidence of current Virginia registration required by state
statute shall be on file in the facility.

Section 4 3. 0
43.1

Patient Care Services

Anesthesia Service
43.1.1

The anesthesia service sha ll be directed by and under
the supervision of a physician licensed to practice
medici ne or surgery in Virginia.

43.1.2

The physician responsible for the anesthesia service shall
be presen t for the administrat i on of anesthetics and recovery o~ patients when any general or major regional
anesthetic is used.

43.1.3

There shall be written procedures to assure safety in
storage and use of inhalation anesthetics and medical
gases.

11
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43.1.4

43.2

43 .3

StPrile Supply SC'rvice s

4 3. 2.1

Adeq uate provisions s hall be maintained for the processing,
ste rilizing, storing, and dispensin g o f clean and sterile
supplies and equipment .

4 3. 2. 2

Written procedures sha ll be estab l ished for the appropriate
disposal of patho l ogica l and other potential ly infectious
waste an d contaminated supplies .

Dietary Service

43.3.1

43.4

43.5

Unless the hospital program and official written action
by the governing body prohibit use of flammable anesthetics
the requirements of "Rul es and Regulations for the Licensure
of General and Special Hospitals," Depa rtment of Health shall
be met.

If the program calls for the serving of snacks or other
foods, adequate space, equipment, and supp lies shal l be
provided.
Applicable state and loca l codes pertaining to
receiving , storage, refrig era tion, preparation , and serving
of food shall be followed.

Evacuation Plan

43. 4.1

Each outpatient surgical hospital shall deve lop a written
evacuation plan to assure reasonable precautions are taken
to protect patients, employees, and visitors from hazards
of fire and other disaster.

43.4.2

A program to acquaint all personnel with evacuation procedures
shall be maintained.

43 . 4.3

A copy of the plan and procedures shall be made available
to the Bureau upo n request.

Emergency Services

I

43.5.1

Each outpatient surgical hospital shall maintain on the
premises adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus,
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and
control of hemorrhage and other complications.

43.5.2

A written agreement which ensures emergency transportation
to a licensed general hospital shall be executed with an
ambulance service.

43. 5. 3

A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital
to ensure that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital
shall receive needed emergency treatment. The agreement shall
be with a licensed general hospital capable of providing full
surgical , anesthesia, clinical laboratory, and diagnostic
radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which has
a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service
at all times.

12
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4 3 .6

43.7

Lahora tory a nd Patho l o gy Se rv i ces

4 3 . 6 .1

Each p at i ent admitted to the outpati e nt s urgi ca l hospital
shall r ec eive a ppropriate r o utine laboratory t es ting.

43.6.2

Outpa t i e nt surgi c al h os pitals whi c h p ro vide abo rtion servic e s s hall prov i d e l abo r ato ry se rvices which meet the
minimum r e qui reme nt s of S ec ti o ns 64 . 1.3 and 64.1.4 of
Part III o f thes e r e gul a tions.

4 3.6 . 3

All tissue r e moved shall be submitte d for histological
examinati on by a p a thol og ist and a wri t ten r e port of
h is exami n a t i on p r ovided to the a tt en d i ng physi c ian.
The repor t of find i ngs shall be filed in the pa tient's
clinica l r ecord . P a tho l o gy servi c e s f o r abo rtion patie nts
shal l mee t t h e min imum r e qui reme nt s of Sect i o n 6 4. 2. 4
of Part III o f t hes e r e gul at i o ns.

Me di c a l Re cords

43 .7 . 1

An accurate and comp l e te c l i n ica l rec o rd or chart sha ll
be maintained on each patie nt.
The reco r d or cha r t sha ll
contain sufficie nt i n f ormati o n to sat i s fy t he diagnosis o r
need for the medica l or surgical se r vice . It sha ll includ e ,
whe n app l icable , but no t be l imited t o th e fol l ow i ng : ,

(a)
(b)
(c )
(d)
(e )
(f )
(g )
(h )
(i )
(j )
(k)
(1)
(m )
(n)

Pati e n t identification;
Admitting information, i n cluding patie n t his tory
and physical examination;
Signed consen t ;
Co nfirmation of pregnancy, if a p plicabl e ;
Phy s ician orders;
Labo r atory te s ts, p a th o l o gist ' s re po rt of ti s sue ,
and radiologist ' s report of X- rays;
Anesth esia record ;
Operative reco rd ;
Surgical medication and medica l treatmen ts;
Recovery roo m notes;
Phy s ician and nur s es' progre s s notes:
Co ndition at time of di s charge;
Patient instru c t i on s , pre operative and postoperative;
Nam e s of referral physi c ian s an d/or ;, qe n c ies.

43.7, 2

Pro v is i o n s sha ll be made f or the safe sto r a qP o f me di ca l
r eco r ds o r acc ur ate and l e gi b le r ep r oduct 1o ns th e r e of .

43.7.3

All med i ca l r ecord s , ei the r o r i q in al o r o ccurat P rep r od uc tl o ns,
s hall be pre se rve d f o r a minimum of f i ve ( 5 ) years foll o w1ng
disc h arge of th e pati e nt.
(a)

Record s o f minors s hall b e k e pt for at lea s t five (5)
years after s uch minor has rea c h e d the age of 18 years .
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43.8

43.9

(b)

Birth and death information shall be retained for
ten (10) years in accordance with Section 32-353.29,
Code of Virginia (1950) , as amended.

(c)

Record of abortions and proper information for the
issuance of a fetal death certificate shall be furnished the Bureau of Vital Records, Virginia Department of Health, within ten (10) days after the abortion.

Pre-Operative Admission
43.8.1

Prior to the initiation of any procedure, a medical history
and physica l examination shall bt comfleted for each patient.

43.8.2

Where medical evaluation, ex~ination, and referrals are made
from a private physician 's ot'fice, another hospita l, clinic ,
or medical service, pertinent available records thereof shall
be mace and included as a pa rt of the patient ' s medical record
at the time the patient is admitted to the outpatient surgical
hospital.

43 .8 .3

Sufficient time sha ll be allowed between initial examination
and initiation of any procedure to permit the reforting and
review of laboratory tests by the responsible physician .

43.8.4

In outpatient sur gical ho spi tals which provide abortion s ervices, the diagnosis of pregnancy shall be th e responsibility
of the physician performing the abortion procedure.

43 . 8.5

Outpatient surgical hospitals whi ch provide abortion services
shall offer each patient appropriate counseling and instructi or.
in the abortion procedure and in birth control methods.

Post-aperative Recovery
43.9.1

Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications
under the direct supervision of a licensed nurse . Nurses who
supervise the recovery area shall have specialized training in
resuscitation techniques and other emergency procedures.
The recovery period will vary according to the procedure performed but patients shall be observed for post-operative
complications for a minimum of sixty (60) minutes •

...

43.9.3

A physician licensed in Virginia shall be present on the
premises at all times during the operative and post-operative
period until discharge of the patient.

43.9.4

Patients shall be discharged from the recovery only on written
order of the attendi ng physician.
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43.9.5

43.10

43.11

43.12

Rh 0 (D) anti-immune globulin (human) shall be administered
to Rh-negative patients who receive abortion services in
accordance with requirements of Section 64.3.5 of Part III
of these regulations.

Environment and Maintenance
43.10.1

All parts of the outpatient surgical hospital and its premises
shall be kept clean, neat, and free of litter and rubbish.

43.10.2

Hazardous cleaning solutions , compounds, and substances shall
be labeled, stored in a safe place, and kept in an enclosed
section separate from other materials.

Laundry Service
43.11.1

Each outpatient surgical hospital shall make provisions for
the cleaning of all linens.

43.11.2

There shall be distinct areas for the separate storage and
handling of clean and soiled linens.

43.11.3

All soiled linen shall be placed in closed containers prior
to transportation.

Physical Plant
43.12.1

Fire and Safety.
Each outpatient hospital shall establish a monitoring program
for the internal e nforcement of all applicable fire and safety
laws and regulations.

43.12.2

Lighting and Electrical.
(a)

(b)

43.12.3

Policies and procedures shall be established to rrQn~m~ze
the hazards in the use and operation of all electrical
equipment.
All electrical appliances used by the outpatient surgical
hospital shall have the Underwriter Laboratories label or
be approved by the local electrical inspection authority.

Plumbing.
(a)

(b)

All plumbing material and plumbing systems or parts thereof
shall meet the minimum requirements of the State Uniform
Building Code.
All plumbing shall be installed in such a manner as to
prevent back siphonage or cross connections between potable
and non-potable water supplies .

15
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43.12.4

Sewage Disposal Systems.
Existing and new facilities shall be connected to an approved
sewage system.

43.12.5

Waste Disposal.
Pathological and bacteriological wastes, dressings, and
other contaminated wastes shall be incinerated in an approved
incinerator or by other methods of disposal as approved by the
licensing agency.

43 . 12.6

Water Supply.
(a)
(b)

Water shall be obtained from an approved water supply
system.
The water shall be distributed to conveniently l0cated
taps and fixtures throughout the faci lity and shall be
adequate in volumn and pressure for all hospital purposes,
including fire fighting .

CONSTRUCTION ST11NDARDS FOR NEW HOSPITALS 1\ND ADDITIONS 1\ND ALTERATIONS
TO EXISTING HOSPITALS
Section 50 .0
50.1

Narrative Program
50 .1.1

50.2

The owner or his representative shall provide a brief narrative
which describes the functional space requirements, staffing
patterns, departmental relationship, and other basic information
relating to the fulfillment of the in=titution's objective.

Services
50.2.1

50.3

General Considerations

The narrative shall indicate the manner in which the se rvices are
to be made available to the outpatients. When se rvice s are to
be shared or purchased, appropriate modifications or deletions
in space and equipment requirements sha ll be considered to avoid
duplication . In many instances , minimum requirements will need
to be exceeded for the institution to function as programmed.
These minimum requirements are not intended in any way to
restrict innovations and improvements in design or construction
techniques. Plans and specifications which contain deviations
from the require ments prescnbed herein may be approved if it
is determined that the purposes of the minimum requirements
have been fulfilled . Request to waive any specific requirem~nt
shall be submitted as early as possible in the planning process.

Size
50.3.1

The extent (number and type) of the diagnostic, clinical, a nd
administrative facilities to be proVided shall be determined by
the se rvice s contemplated and the estimated patient load as
described in the na rrative program.
16

23

50. 4

Applicable Requirements
50 .4 . 1

If t h e outpatient surgical hospital is a physical p a r t of
a n inpatient hospital and is intended t o serve inpatie nts
as well as outpatients , the applicable requireme n ts of the
" Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Ge neral and
Special Hospitals , " Department of Hea l t h, sha ll apply.

50.5.1

In the absence of a formal parking study, vehicle parki ng
for outpatient surgical hospitals shall be provided at t he
ratio o f two parking spaces for each treatment room a nd
each examining room plus sufficient parking spaces to accommo d ate the maximum number of staff on duty at one ti me.
Exceptions may be made with approval of the Bureau f or
outpatient surgica l hospitals located in areas with high
population dens ity if adequ ate public parking is available
or if the hospital is accessible to a public tran spo rtation
system.

50.5

50.6

Codes, Fire Safety, Zoning
50.6.1

50.7

Conversions
50.7.1

50.8

All construction of new buildings and additions, alterations or repairs to existing buildings for occupancy as a
"free-standing" outpatient hospital shall conform to state
and local codes, zoning and building ordinances, and the
State Uniform Building Code requirements applicable to
type of occupancy.
In case of a conflict, codes with the
most strict standards shall apply.
All codes applicable
to the outpatient surgical h ospi tal shall be noted on the
preliminary and working drawings.

Conversions of existing buildings to outpatient surgical
hospital occupancy will be conside red only in those buildings
which meet or can be remodeled to meet the requirements of
the State Uniform Building Code. When the licensing agency
finds the enforcement of one or more of the requ1rements in the
following sections would clearly be impractical, the Commission er
shall have the auLhorlty to wa1ve, either temporar1ly or
permanently , the enforcement of one or more of these requirements , prov1dcd patient care and safety to life from fire are
not adversely affected.
Life safety dur1ng construction of
alterat1ons , conversions, or addit1ons shall be ma1ntained.
Additions shall conform to new cons tructi on requirements.

Site Requirements and Location
50.8.1

The site shall meet local zoning regulations.
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50.8.2

Facilities not located on the ground floor of a building
shall be served by an elevator(s) capable of accommodating
a standard stretcher.

50.8.3

Facilities shall be located in buildings providing emergency
electrical service. The emergency electrical service may
be provided by an . auxiliary generator, or, if available from
the power company, two separate lines, each supplied from a
separate generating source. The emergency electrical service
shall h ave the capability to cover at least the operating,
procedure, and r ecove ry room(s) lighting and electrical equipment.

50.8.4

The sanitatio n, water supply, sewage, and disposal facilities
shall comply with the applicable state and local codes and
ordinances.

50.8.5

Adequate fire protection facilities or fire department servic es shall be available.

Section 51.0
51.1

General
51.1.1

51.2

Archite ctural Plan Review

During the early phase of architectural planning, prime consideration shall be given to patient traffic from the patient parking
area to admissions and through the ser vice areas to discharge
offices and to areas for patient pick up. Also, personne l traffic
patterns from other areas to the service area, as well as those
related to internal operations, shal l be considered. Traffic
patterns for supply distribution are sometimes difficult to
coordinate with personnel and patient Lraffic but are just as
essential to the operations of the facility and therefore,
shall be included in the planning.

Drawings and Specifications
51.2 .1

When construction is contemplated for new buildings, additions,
or substantial alterations, preliminary drawings and outline
specifications shall be submitted to the Bureau, with a program
narrative description, for review and approval prior to starting
final working draw1ngs and specifications.

51.2 . 2

The final working drowings and specifications shall be submitted
to the Bureau for review and approval prior to release of contract documents for bidding. Change orders which affect scope
and/or function shall be submitted for approval prior to execution.

51.2.3

The Bureau shall be notified of the awa rd of contracts, of
the date when construction has been completed, and of the
estimated date of occupancy.
18
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51.2. 4

Minor altl!rations and rl!lllodt!.linq - Minor altl!rations or
remodeling changl!s which do not affect the structural
integrity of the buildinq, or change functional operation,
or which do not affect safety, need not be submitted for
approval.

51.2. 5

The preparation and submission of drawings and specifications
shall be executed by or under the immediate supervis ion of
an architect rl!gistered in th" State of Virginia.

Section 52.0

l

I

52 . 1

Construction Requirements

Administration and Public Areas
52 .1.1

Entrance to the building shall be located at grade level,
sheltered from the weathl!r and abll! to accommodate wheelchairs, if applicabll! .

52.1.2

While the same room may serve more than one function, the
planning process shall assure that adequate sp~c" is available
for all administrative services.

52.1.3

Reception area- Reception may be considered a part of
administrative services. Howevl!r, adequate space near the
entrancl! shall be provided for rl!ceiving and registering
patients. Work space shall provide privacy for obtaining
confidential information and discussing financial arrangements.

52.1.4

Lobby and waiting art!& - Adequatl! waiting space designed for
comfort s hall be provided for at least one family member/friend
per patient. Facilities shall include public toilets, public
telephone(s), drinking fountains(s), and wheelchair storage.

52.1.5

Preoperative preparation and holding - Adequate space to assure
privacy for both males and females shall be provided in dressinn
rooms and patient lockers, toilet and bathing fac1lities, preoperative preparation, medication administration, anrt pat1ent
holding areas.

52.1.6

Counsl!ling services - If the program calls for servi ·
quiring special patient counseling , private spacl! sh
provided for this servicl! .

52 .1. 7

Nourishment rooms - Facili til!s and space may be pr o\' .. ..j for
preparation of light nourishml!nt, and refrigeration • t juices.
An ice machine is desirabll!.
Han dwashing facilities shall be
provided in the room.

52 .1. 8

Space for general storage for office supplies, sterile supplies,
pharmacy and housekeeping supplies shall be provided.
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52 .1. 9

52.2

Adequate janitor's closet(s) with floor receptor or
service sink shall be provided.

Clinical Areas
52.2.1

Size and design - The size and design of units shall be
in accordance with individual programs, but the following
basic eiements shall be incorporated in all facilities,
wh ere applicab le.

52.2.2

Surgical suite -The plumbing, heating, and electrical
systems for this service shall meet all codes applicable
to the general hospital operating room as specified in
the "Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General
and Special Hospitals," Department of Health.

52.2.3

Operating rooms.
(a)

Number - The architectura l design of the facilities
shall provide a sufficient number of rooms for the
projected case load and types of procedures to be
perfonned.

(b)

Size of rooms - Operating rooms shall have .minimum
dimensions of 16' X 18'. One sma ller room may be
reserved for very minor local excisions but that
room shall be no less than 160 square feet.

52.2.4

Scrub-up facilities.- Regular scrub sinks shall be provided.
Scrub facilities shall be arranged to minimize
any incidenta l splatter on nearby personnel or supply
carts.

52.2.5

Personnel dressing - The personne l l oc ker and dressing
areas sha ll be so located that personnel enter from uncontrolled areas and exit directly into the surgical
suite.
Locker space shall be provided for each employee ,
and a toilet, shower , and dressing area shall be provided
in each personnel dressing room.

52.2 . 6

Recovery roo m.

(a)

52.2.7

This r oom shall have handwashing facilities, medication storaoe space, clerical work space , storage
for clerical supplies, linens, and patient care
supplies and equipme nt; and an adjoining toilet
which shall have a water closet and handwashing
facilities.

General purpose examination rooms - The prP.operative
preparation area may be designed and equipped for examination.
Each roo m shall have handwashing facilities and be
equipped for patient examination .
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52.2.8

52.2.9

52.3

· Anesthesia storage - Unless the narrative program and
governing body action prohibits in writing the use of
flammable anesthetics, a separate room shall be provided
for storage of flammable gases.

52.2.10

Anesthesia workroom- Anesthesia workroom and equipment
storage facilities with adequate ventilation, work counter
and sink shall be provided.

52.2.11

Nurses, clerical or control station- S~fficient clerical
control station(s) shall be appropriately des.igned and
located. Suitable space shall be provided for the following
activities: traffic control of the area; clerical functions
related to room or case scheduling and record maintenance;
personnel functions, and nursing activities related to
medication administration and treatments.

52.2.12

Doctors' dictation - Space shall be private
in size for the total number of doctors who
tating at the same time. It may be located
but not inside the nurses' station, lounge,
dressing area.

52.2.13

Housekeeping- A janitor's closet shall be conveniently
located and designated to serve only the sur gical suite.
It sha ll have suitable storage facilities and receptacles
for special equipment and supplies used in cleaning the
operating rooms.

and adequate
may be dicadjacent tQ
or doctors'

Laboratory and Radiology Services
52. 3.1

52.4

Work and storage space - Separate rooms shall be provided
for clean and sterile holding and for instrument or equipment clean-up functions.

Space and equipment requirements shal l be determined by
the workload described in the narrative program. These
services may be provided within the outpatient surgical
hospital or through an effective contractural arrangement with nearby facilit1es. If laboratory and/or
radiology services are not provided by contractural
agreement all applicable requirements of the "Rules
and Regulat1ons for the Licensure of General and Special
Hospitals," Department of Health, Ghall apply.

General Requirements
52.4. 1

Minimum pubhc corridor width shall be 5 '0".

52.4.2

Each building shall have at least two exists remote from
each other. Other details as to exists and fire safety
shall be in accordance with the Virginia Fire Safety Code.
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52.4.3

Items such as drinking fountains, telephone booths,
vending machines and portable equipment shall be
located so as not to restri ct corridor traffic or
reduce the corridor width below the required width.

52.4.4

Toilet rooms which may be used by patients shall be
equipped with doors and hardware which will permit
access from the outside in any emergency.

52.4.5

The minimum width of doors for patient access to
examination and treatment rooms sha ll be 3'0".

52.4.6

No door shall swing into a corridor in a manner
that might obstruct traffic flow or reduce the required corridor width, except doors to space such
as small closets which arc not subjec t to occupancy.

52 .4.7

Rooms containing ceiling mounted equipment and those
have ceiling mounted surgical li9ht fixtures shall
have height required to accommodate the equipmen t or
fixture. All other rooms shall have not less than
8'0" ceilings except that corridors , storage rooms ,
toilet rooms and other minor rooms shall not be less
than 7'8".

52.4.8

Cubicle curtains and draperies shall be non-combustible
or rendered flame retardent.

52.4.9

Floor materials shall be easily cleanab l e and have
wear resistance appropriate for the location involved.

52.4.10

Wall finishes shall be washable and, in t~e immediate
area of plumbing fixtures, shall be smooth and moisture
resistant.
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RULES AND REGULATI ONS

PART III

ORGANIZATION, OPERATION AND PHYSICAL FACILITY STANDARDS
FOR EXISTING AND NEW OUTPATIENT ABORTION HOSPITALS

23

''

..

'.

30

PART III.
Section 60.0
60.1

Or anization

Governing Authority
Each outpatient abortion hospital shall have a governi ~~ body or
other legal authority responsible for the manage;ent a n C3t trol
of the operation of the facilities.

60.2

There shall be disclosure of ownership. Ownership interest shall
be made known to the licensing agency and in the case of corporations, all individuals or entities holding 10\ or more of total
ownership shall be identified by name and address. The licensing
agency shall be notified of any changes in ownership.

60.3

The governing body shall provide facilities, personnel and other
resources necessary to meet patient and program needs.

60.4

The governing body shall have an organizational plan. The organizational plan shall clearly set forth duties, responsibilities,
accountability, and relationships of professional staff and other
personnel. The person or organizational body responsible for
formulating policies shall be identified.

60.5

The organizational plan shall include at least the following:

1
I

I

\

60.5.1

A statement of purpose;

60.5.2

A statement of authority and responsibility delegated
to the chief administrative officer and to the medical
staff;

60.5.3

Provision for selection and appointment of medical staff
and granting of c ~ cal privileges.

~

60.6

Administrative Officer
60.6.1

Section 61.0
61.1

~

The responsibility for administration and management of
the outpatient abortion hospital shall be vested in an
individual whose qualifications, authority and duties
shall be defined in a written stateme nt adopted by the
governing body.
Policies and Procedures

General Statement
Policies and procedures may vary depending on types of termination
of pregnancy technique, personnel and equipment required, and location of the facility. It is recognized that no two facilities will
be identical. Even though each facility may be different, certain
standards and requirements shall be applicable to all in assuring
the delivery of quality care.
24
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61.2

Policy and Procedures Manual
Each outpatient abortion hospital shall develop written policies
and procedures which shall include provisions covering the foll owi ng
itemsr

61.3

61. 2 .1

Patient Eligibility

61.2. 2

Personnel

61. 2. 3

Clinica l Services

61.2. 4

Medical Records

61.2. 5

Physical Facilities

A copy of approved policies and procedures and revisions thereto,
s hall be made available to the Bureau upon request.

Section 62.0
62.1

The outpatient abortion h ospital is maintained and operateo for the
primary purpose of terminating a confirmed pregnancy of a p~tient
who is medically eligible for an abortion performed on an o•ttpatient
basis.
62. 1. 1

Medical eligibility shnll be determined by the atte1ding
physician b ase d on thP medical history and the findings
of the physical examination .

62 .1. 2

Any procedure performed to terminate a pregnancy shall
be performed prior to the end of the !ir~t trimester
(12th week amenorrhea ).

62 .1. 3

Concomitant female ste rilization or any other procedure
requiring entry into the pelvic or abdominal cavity shall
be prohibited.

Section 63.0
63.1

Patient Eligibility

Medtc~l

Personnel
Staff

The size and organizational st ructur e of the medical staff will
vary dependi ng on the scope of serv ice.
63.1.1

Each outpatient abortion hospital shall have a Medical
Director.
(a)

The Medical Director shall be a physician licensed
to practice medicine or surgery ! n V1rg inia; and

(b)

Shall be c ~d by the American ~d of Obstetrics
and Gynecology and have training and exper1ence in
performing pregnancy termination procedures; and
25

63.1. 2

63.2

(c)

Shall supervise all medical aspects of the professional
and clinical services in the facility; and

(d)

Shall review credentials of all professional staff
including education, experience and hospital privileges
and identify, establish, and approve privileges for
e ach person allowed to diagnose, treat patients, or
perform pregnancy termi nation procedures in accordance
with guidelines or policies approved by the governing
body.

All pregnancy termination procedures shall be performed by
a physician licensed to practice medicine or surge ry in
Virginia.

Nursing Staff
The total number of nursing personnel will vary depending upon the
number of patients to be admitted and the services performed.
63.2.1

A registered nur~e qualified on the basis of education,
experience, and clinical ability sha~l be responsible for
the direction of nursing care provided the patients.

63.2.2

The number and type of nursing personnel, including registered
nurses, licensed practical nurses, and supplementary staff,
shall be based upon the needs of the patients and the types
of services performed.
At least one registered nurse shall be on duty at all times
while the fac f!!tyi; i n use for termination of pregnancy
procedures.

63.2.4

Job descriptions shal l be developed for each level of nursing
personnel and shall include functions, responsibilities, and
qualifications.

63.2.5

Evidence of current Virginia registration required by state
statute shall be on file in the facility.

,I
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63.3

Counseling Staff
63.3.1

Each outpatient abortion hospital sha ll offer each patient
ar. J inst ruction in the prec;nancy
termination procedure and in birth control methods.

~ r pgj;jA)Oe. ~ounseli.w~

63.3.2

An

individual qualified on the basis of education, training
and experience shall be responsible for the supervision of
the interviewing and counseling .s ervices provided the patients.

63.3.3

The counseling supervisor shall be available fa~ consultation
at all times the facility is open and receiving patients.
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63.4

63.3.4

Individ ual int e rview and couns eling shall be given prior
to the termination of pregnancy procedure.

63.3.5

Information obtained at admission counseling shall be
recorded in the medical record and brought to the
a tte n tion of the physician prior to the termination
of pregnancy procedure.

Laboratory Staff
63.4.1

Each outpatien t abortion hospital s hall have the capabilit
to perform rout i ne pre-operative labor ato ry examination on
th e premises.

63.4 . 2

An

63.4.3

The l abo ratory supervisor should be a graduate of an accre •ited schoo l of medical technology o r a laboratory technicia .•
certified by the American Society of Clinical Pathologists.

Section 64.0
64.1

individual qualified on the basis of education , trainina
and experience shal l be responsible for the supervision of
laboratory services provided the patients.

Clinical Services

Pre-Operative Admission
64.1.1

Prior to the initiation of any pregnancy termination procedur e , a medical history and physical examination , incluc: in•l
complete vaginal and bi-ma11ua l pelvic examination shall b<'
c omp leted for each patient.

64 .1. 2

Where medical evaluation, examinatior. , 3nd referrals are
made from a private physician's office , anothe r hospital,
clinic, or medical service , pertinent available records
th ereof shall be included as a part of the patient's
medical record at the time the pat.ient is admitted to
the outpatient abortion hospital.

64 . 1. 3

The following laboratory procedures shall be conducted on
each patient and results of (a), (b), ( c) , and (e) shall
be available prior to the performance of the pregnancy
termination procedure:
(a)

Pregnancy test;

(b)

Hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations;

(c)

Blood and Rh typing;

(d)

In the case of Rh-negative patients, a Coomb's test;

(e)

Urinalysis for sugar and albumin; and

(f)

Culture for gonorrheal infection.
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64 .1. 4

When medically indicated, serologic test for syphilis and
Papanicolaou smear shall be conducted.

64 .1. 5

Appropriate written informed consent of the patient shall
be obtained prior to the initiation of any procedure.

Surgical Procedures

64.2.1

The anesthesia service shall be directed by and under the
supervision of a physician licensed to practice medicine or
surgery in Virginia.

64.2.2

There shall be written procedures to assure safety in
storage and use of inhalation anesthetics and medical gases.

64.2.3

Only non-combustible agents shall be used for anesthesia
or for pre-operative preparation.

64.2.4

Tissue removed shall be submitted for histological examination by a patho logist in all cases where gross examination
by the attending physician does not confirm presence of
fetal parts. The attending physician shall document in
the patient's medical record the presence or absence of
fetal parts.

64.2.5

Each outpatient abortion hospital shall maintain on the
premises suction apparatus, oxygen, and related items
necessary for resuscitation or control of hemorrhage
and other complications .
Such items shall include but not be limited to the following:
(a)

Blood pressure cuff;

(b)

Oxygen;

(c)

Suction machine;

(d)

Oral airway;

(e)

Resuscitation bag;

(f)

Endotracheal tube;

(g)

Laryr.goscope;

(h)

Tracheotomy set;

(i)

Cut-down set;

(j)

Plasma expanders;

(k)

I-V sets;

(1)

Tilting stretcher;
28
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(m)

64.3

64.4

Appropriate drugs for the treatment of anaphylactic
reaction.

Post-Operative Recovery

64.3.1

Each patient shall be observed for post-operative
complications under the direct supervision of a
Registered Nurse. Nurses who supervise the recovery
area shall have specialized training in resuscitation
techniques and other emergency procedures.

64.3.2

The recovery period will vary but patients shall be
observed for post-operative complications for a minimum
of forty-five (45) minutes.

64.3.3

A physician licensed in Virginia shall be present on
the premises at all times during the operative and
post-operative period.

64.3.4

Patients shal l be discharged from the recovery area
only on written order of the attending physician .

64.3.5

Rh
(d) anti-immune globulin (human) shali be adminis0
tered to all Rh-negative patients who receive abortion
services, where medically indicated, unless refused.
The patient's decision to reject or accept must be in
writing and made a permanent part of the medical record.

64.3.6

Prior to discharge, each patient shall receive written
instructions and counseling regnrding post-abortion
complications and self-care.

64.3.7

Prior to discharge, arrangements shall be made for postoperative examination, either in the same facility or
elsewhere, within two (2) to four (4) weeks after discharge. Instructions for emergency care in the interim
shall be given.

64.3.8

Each outpatient abortion hospital shall provide treatment on the premises or by referral of any abnormal
condition(s) detected, such as venereal disease or
cervical carcinoma.

Emergency Care

64.4.1

Each outpatient abortion hospita! shall have a written
plan for identifying medical emergencies and procedures.

64.4.2

Supplies and equipment reserved for emergency use shall
be checked at least weekly to assure adequate supply
and proper working order .
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64.5

64.4.3

An agreement which ensures transportation of medical
emergency cases to a licensed general hospital shall
be executed with an ambulance service.

64.4.4

To ensure that patients of the outpati~nt abortion
hospital shall receive needed emergency treatment
there shall be:

(1)

A written agreement with a licensed general
hospital capable of providing full surgical,
anesthesia, clinical laboratory, and diagnostic
radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice
and which has a physician in the hospital and
available for emergency service at all times; or

(2)

Evidence that two or more staff physicians have
unsupervised obstetrical, gynecological, or
general surgical privileges in an accessible
licensed general hospital which meets the requirement of (1) above; or

(3)

A written agreement with two or more physicians
who have unsupervised obstetrical , gynecological,
or general surgical privileges in an accessible
lic ensed general hospital which meets the requirements of {1) above.

Nedical Records

64.5.1

An accurate and complete clinical record or chart
shall be maintained on each patient. The record or
chart shall contain sufficient information to satisfy
the diagnosis or need for the service. It shall include where applicable, but not be limited to the
following:
(a)

Patient identification;

(b)

Admitting information, including patient history
and physical exam1nation;

(c)

Pre-operative counseling notes;

(d)

Signed co nsent;

(e)

Confirmation of pregnancy;

(f)

Physician orders;

(g)

Laboratory tests, pathologist 's report of tissue,
and radiologist's report of X-rays;

(h)

Anesthesia record;
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(j)

Surgical medication and medical treatments1

(k)

Recovery room notes;

(1)

Physician and nur ses ' progress notes1

(m)

Condition at time of discharge,

(n)

Patient instructions,

(o)

Post-operative counseling notes1

(p)

Names of referral physicians and/or agencies.

Provisions shall be made for the safe storage of medical
records or accurate and legible reproductions thereof.

64.5.3

All medical records, either origina l or accurate reproductions, shall be preserved for a minimum of five (5) years
following discharge of the patient.
(a)

Records of minors shall be kept f o r at lea st five
( 5) years after such minor ha s reached the age of
18 years .

(b)

Record of abortions and proper information for
the issuan ce of a fetal death certificate shall
be furnished the Bureau of Vita l Records, Virginia
Department of Health, within ten (10) days after
the abortion .

Physical Facilities

Codes and Zo ning
65 .1.1

65 . 2

Operative record, including results of gross
examination to determine presence or absence
of fetal parts1

64.5.2

Section 65 .0
65.1

(i)

All construction of new buildings and additions,
alterations or repairs to existing buildings shall
conform to all applicable state and local codes,
zoning and building ordinances.

Fire and Safety
65.2.1

Each ou~patient abortion hospital shall establish a
monitoring program for the internal enforcement of all
applicable fire and safety laws and regulations.

65 . 2.2

Each outpatient abortion hospital shall develop a
written evacuation plan to assure reasonable precautions are taken to protect patients , employees ,
and visitors from hazards of fire and other disaster .
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65.3

65 .4

A program to acquaint all personnel with evacuation
p roce dures shall be maintained.

(b)

A c o py of the plan and procedures shall be made
a vai lable to the Bureau up on request.

Site Req u ireme n ts a nd Loca t ion

6 5 .3 . 1

The si t e shal l mee t

65.3.2

Adequate fire protection faci liti es or fire department
services shall be availab le.

65.3 . 3

Facilities not located o n t h e gro und floor of a building
shall be served by an elevato r capab le of accommodating
a standard stretcher.

65.3.4

Facilities should be located in buildings provi ding
emergency electrical service.

loc al zon i n g r e quirements.

Conversion of Existing Buildings

65.4.1

65.5

(a)

Conversions of existin g buildings to ou tpa t ie nt aborti o n
hospita l occupancy wi l l be considered on ly i n t hose
buildings which meet or can be remodel e d to mee t the
r equirements of the State Uni f o rm Bui l ding Code . When
the licensing agency finds the enforcemen t of on e or
more of the requirements in the regulations wou ld
clearly be impractical, the Commissioner shall have
the authority to waive, either temporarily o r permanently , t he enforcement of one or more of these
requirements , provided patient care and safet y t o
life from fire are not adversely affected. Life
safety during construction of alterations, conve rzions , or additions shal l be maintai n ed.

Building and Se rvice Requirements

65 . 5 .1

Administration and Public Areas
(a)

While the s ame r oom may serve mo re than one function,
the pl a nning proc e s s s hall a ss ure that adequate space
is available for all administrative services .

(b)

Reception area - Reception may be considered a part
of administrative services . However, adequate space
near the entrance shall be provided for receiving
and regis t ering patients. Work space shall provide
privacy for obtaining confidential information,
discussing financial arrangements and counseling.
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65.5.2

(c)

Lobby and waiting area - Adequate wa1:ing space
desi9ned for comfort shall be prov , ded for at
leas t <'ne family mcmbt•r/friend per p ;,ti ent.
Fa c ilities shall include public toilets, public
telephone• (s), drinking fountain (s I.

(d)

Pre- op~ r.ative

(e)

If the program calls for the se rv : ng of s11acks o r
othe r foods, adequate space, equipment, and supp lies
sh all be provided.
App li cable s:ate and local codes
pertain 1n g to receiving, storage , refr~ge~ation,
preparation, and serving of food shall be followed.

(f)

Space for general storage for office supplies
pharmacy and housekeeping supplies •hall be pro vided. !lazardous -leaning solutions, compounds ,
and sub~•. anccs shall be label en, stored and kept
in an enclosed section separate irom other supplies.

preparation and holding - Adequate
space t0 assure privacy shall be provided in
dressin9 rooms and patient lo ck er s , toilet,
preoperat1ve preparation, medi 2a tion administratior. and patient holding are~s .

Clinica 1 Are.1s
(a)

-

The size and design of uni ts shal l
and design
in accordance with individual programs, bu t the
followinq basic elements sha ll be incorporuted in
all facilities:

~ i ze

]o,

(b)

Procedures and Examining Rooms - The design of
facilities shall provide a sufficient nwnber of
rooms for the projected case load and the types
of pro.::edurcs to be performed.
(l)

Size of rooms - Rooms in which pregnancy
termination procedures ure performed shal l
h>ve a minimum clear fl oor area of 100 square
fe~t and have adequate lighting for surqical
proc>=>dures.

(2)

C0nv.•ntional gynecological exannnution or
o~er~ting tables with Jccessories, drapes,
and/or linen shall be used in all procenurcs.

(c)

Scrub-·"p facil1t1es - Regular scrub sinks shall be
provided.

(d)

Pert ·m nel dressing - The personnel locker and dressing
areus s h~ll be so lo cated that personnel enter from
uncont rnlled areas and ex1t directly into the surgical
procedure area.
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(e)

Recovery room - A separate recovery room shall be provided and shall have handwashing facilities, medication storage space, clerical work space, storage for
clerical supplies, linens, and patient care supplies
and equipment; and an adjoining toilet with handwashing facilities.

(f)

Sterile Supply Services - Adequate provisions shall be
maintained for the processing, sterilizing, storing,
and dispensing of clean and sterile supplies and equipment, Written procedures shall be established for the
appropriate disposal of pathological and other potentially infectious waste and contaminated supplies

(g)

Anesthesia workroom - Anesthesia work areas and storage
facilities with adequate ventilation shall be provided.

(h)

Emergency equipment storage - Space out of the direct
line of traffic shall be provided for a "crash cart,"
stretcher and similar emergency equipment .

(i)

Laboratory facilities - Space and equipment shall be
provided within the outpatient abortion hospital for
conducting pregnancy tests , hematocrit or hemoglobin
determination, urinalysis, blood grouping and Rh typing.
The space shall be adequate to provide at least the
following:

t
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(1)

Laboratory work counter;

(2)

Lavatory or counter sink equipped for handwashing;

( 3)

(j)

65.5.3

·storage cabinet or closet.

Laundry and linen facilities - Provisions shall be made
for cleaning, storage, and handling of all linen. There
shall be distinct areas for the separate storage and
handling of clean and soiled linen. All soiled linen
shall be placed in closed containers prior to transportation.

General Requirements
(a)

Environment and Maintenance - All parts of the outpatient
abortion hospital and its premises shall be kept clean,
neat, and free of litter and rubbish.
(l)

Floors shall be easily cleanable and shall have
wear resistance appropriate to the area involved.

(2)

Wall finishes shall be washable and in the inunediate
area of plumbing fixtures, shall be smooth, moisture
resistant and easily cleanable.
34
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Section 66 . 0
6o .l

(b)

Doors - Doors sh a ll b e not less tha n 3 ' 0" in width
in are as subject to patient occupancy. All doors
to toilets which may be used by patients shall be
equipped with hardware which will permit access in
any e me rgency. No door shall swing into a corridor
in a manner that might ob s truct traffic flow or reduce the r equired co~ridor width, except doors to
s p ace such as small closets 'which are not subject
to oc c upa ncy.

(c )

Corri dor s - Corridor width in areas of publi c us e
s ha ll be 5 • 0".

(d )

Lighti ng and El e ctri c al - Po l ic ies and procedure s
s ha ll be e stabli s hed to mi ni mi ze t he hazards in th e
use and ope ration o f a ll e l ectri ca l equipment . All
electrica l app lian ces s ha l l h ave the Underwriter
Laboratories l abe l or b e approve d by t he l oca l
electrica l inspection authority .

(e )

Plumbing - Al l p l umbi ng mate r ia l a nd plumbi ng systems
or parts tPereof sha l l meet the minimum requirements
of applicable state and l oca l codes . All plumbing
sha ll be install ed i n s uc h a manner as t o preve nt
back siphonage or cross connections between potable
and no n-potable wate r s upplies .

(f )

Sewage Disposa l Systems - Existing and new facilitie s
shall be connected to an approved sewage system .

(g)

Waste Disposa l - Pathological and bacteriological
wastes , dressings , and othe r co ntaminated wastes
sha l l be incinerated in an approved incinerato r
or by othe r methods of disposal as approved by t he
licensing agency.

(h)

Water Supply - Water shall be obtained from an
approved water supply system. The water shall be
distributed to conveniently located taps and fixtures throughout the facility and shall be adequate
in volume and pressure for all outpatient abortion
hospital purposes, includinq fire fighting.

Architectural Plan Review

General
66 . 1. 1

During the early phase of architectural planning, prime
consideration shall be given to patient traffic from the
patient parking area to admissions and through the service
areas to discharge offices and to areas for patient pick up.
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Also, personnel traffic patterns from other areas to
the service area, as well as those related to internal
operations, shall be considered. Traffic patterns for
supply distribution are sometimes difficult to coordinate
with personnel and patient traffic but are just as essential to the operations of the facility and therefore,
shall be included in the planning. ·
66.2

Drawings and Specifications
66.2.1

When construction is contemp lated for new buildings,
additions, or substantial alterations, preliminary
drawings and outline specifications shall be submitted
to the Bureau with a program narrative description for
review and approval prior to starting final working
drawings and specifications. All codes applicable to
the building shall be noted on the preliminary and
working drawings.

66.2.2

The final working drawings and specifications shall be
submitted to the Bureau for review and approval prior to
release of contract documents for bidding. Change orders
which affect scope and/or function shall be submitted for
approval prior to execution .

66.2.3

The Bureau shal l be notified in writing of the award of
contracts, of the date when construction has been completed, and of the estimated date of occupancy .

66.2 .4

Minor alterations and remodeling - Minor alterations
or remodeling changes which do not affect the structural
integrity of the building, or change functional operation,
or which do not affect safety, need not be submitted for
approval.

66.2.5

The preparation and submission of drawings and specifications shall be executed by or under the immediate
supervision of an architect registered in the Commonwealth
of Virginia.
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Organizatio1

Quality obstetric-gynecologic care requires efficient organization of the medical
staff and other personnel, whether the care is provided within an ambulatory
or a hospital setting.

AMBULATORY CARE

Ambulatory obst;,>ric-gynecologic cars-:is outpatient care that is provided in a
/ physician's office, outpatient clinic, or free-standing or hospital-based surgical
facility. The organization of the ambulatory care facility will vary depending
on the kind of facility or type of practice and on the patient volume. However,
certain standards are applicable to all types of settings, whether it be a solo
physician's office, group practice, or outpatient clinic.
Personnel directly involved in the welfare of the obstetric and gynecologic
patient should be organized into a health care team under the direction of an
obstetrician-gynecologist. Staff should be sufficient in number and training to
prevent undue delays and provide optimal care. Job descriptions and written
policies should be prepared and reviewed periodically where appropriate.
These policies should indicate specific responsibilities, as well as a plan for
continuing education of personnel. While it may not be feasible to provide
in-service education in all offices, it is desirable that personnel have access to
such programs.
A free-standin ambulator sur ical facilit should have a governing body,
similar to a hospital board o trustees, that as final authority and responsibility for patient care, facilities, services, appointment of the medical staff, and
establishment of clinical privileges. A mechanism similar to that used in the
hospital for granting privileges should be established in an ambulatory surgical
facility. Privileges granted to a physician should not exceed those held (by that
physician) in at least one accredited hospital within the geographical area. A
hospital-based facility usually function~ under the hospital's governing body, and
staff privileges will be established by hospital regulations.
1
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Details on how either a free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory facility
should be organized, and the relation of the hospital staff to the facility are
available from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals and the
Accreditation for Ambulatory Health Care, Inc.

I

·I

Incr sing medical knowledge and improved equipment
d facilities have
great! increased the range and quality of care that c
hospita. However, information, equipment, facilities, a even skilled personnel cann be used efficiently without effective o anization of each department i the hospital.

Ultimate responsi 'lity for patient care, staff and facilities and services resides
in the governing 1:) dy, usually a board f trustees. The board customarily
an administrator and medical redelegates administra Ye responsibility
sponsibility to the me al staff. Altho gh it may be impossible to draw sharp
lines of distinction betw n medical d administrative functions, the hospital
should establish guideline ensuri g cooperation between these areas.
The responsibility of dep tm ts or sections of the medical staff should be
established by the staff and a roved by the hospital's governing body. As a
f medicine, obstetrics and gynecology should
major and well-defined speci
be organized as an indepe ent
artment. The lines of authority within the
department should be de ly delin ted and understood and must apply to all
individuals to whom P, vileges are anted.
Organization of
I

'I

The organizatio of a department of obstet ·cs and gynecology is determined
by the size a
type of hospital in accordanc with the bylaws of the medical
mbers who also teach and do
staff. A hos tal with full time attending staff
research
1 have different organizational needs an a hospital devoted exclusively to atient care. There are, however, principl and objectives common to
all ho ital departments. The following general gui lines should be adapted
to lo al need and custom.

Department Head. The staff of the department of obstetrics nd gynecology
should be headed by a director or chairman, who may be ei er elected or
appointed. The choice of director or chairman should be based on rofessional
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ily, drug, and environmental factors. Inquiries should be made abou
outco
of previous pregnancies, mental retardation, or other known
suspected in rited or metabolic disease. Whenever possible, disorders auld be
diagnosed p · r to pregnancy. When a genetic disorder is suspect , the gynecologist may, "thin limits of training or experience, counsel e patient on
how the genetic · order might affect her health and repr
ctive capabilities
or the development f her offspring. When counseling couple with a suspected genetic abnorm "ty, the gynecologist should p vide information necide whether to proceed ith further investigation
essary for the patient to
liased on the potential socia emotional, and ec omic consequences. When
this decision is made, many g ecologists w· refer patients with potential
genetic disorders to qualified gene · counse · g and evaluation centers. It is the
obligation of the gynecologist to b fa 1liar with the availability of these
services.
Health Education
Patients are now better i armed about their bo ·es and health issues, and
physicians and membe of the health care team shou accept the responsibility to integrate educ on into every aspect of their care. he physician should
er members of the health care team nd use whatever
resources are a ilable.
Patient e cation should begin with the professional's first co act with the
patient a
continue for the length of their association. Content
include
and physiology of the reproductive organs, procedures an
tre
ent, as well as means of promoting and maintaining health. Thos ro. ·ng the education should be aware of the patient's level of understand1
physical and emotional status, and readiness for learning.

SURGICAL SERVICES
Certain surgical procedures may be performed on an ambulatory outpatient
basis to conserve time and expense for the patient and assist in efficient use of
hospital facilities. A physician's office, an outpatient clinic, or a free-standing
or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facility may be used. Procedures should
be limited to those that can be performed safely with available medications and
equipment and for which the participating personnel are trained. Only patients without major complicating medical disease should be selected. If a major
medical disorder is present, appropriate consultation should be obtained before
proceeding with a surgical procedure in an ambulatory facility.
Informed consent should be obtained before any surgical procedure is performed. On discharge, the patient should be given __adE;,guate ~ostogerative
instructions, preferably written, and arrangements should be mr e for routine
.,
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and emergency follow-up care. The importance of a follow-up evaluation
should be stressed during both the preoperative and postoperative interviews.
Tissue removed should be submitted to a pathologist for examination. The
patient should be informed of the operative findings, including tissue diagnosis. In the situation of elective termination of pregn~ncy, the attending
physician should record a Clescnptron of the gross products. Unless definite
embryonic or fetal parts can be identified, the products of elective interruptions
of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for gross and microscopic
examination.
sician's Office and Outpatient Clinic
Proce res commonly performed in a physician's offic
clinic inc de, but are not limited to:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Abortion, uncomplicated, up to 14 weeks fro
Aspiration
a breast cyst
Biopsy, aspira n, or washing of thee
Biopsy of the vu , the vagina, or
Cervical polypectom
Colposcopy
Cryosurgery or fulguratio
Culdocentesis
Cystoscopy
Dilatation and cur age
Hysterosalpingo aphy
Incision and ainage of vulvar or perin
Incomplet abortions, spontaneous and unc
Insertio of intrauterine contraceptive device
Proc sigmoidoscopy
R oval of skin lesions
ubal insufflation
·
• Urethroscopy
• Uterin~ sounding

Free-Standing and Hospital-Based Facilities
Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to requirements of state or federal legislation. Such facilities
should maintain the same sur ical, anesthetic, and ersonnel standards as recommended for hospitals. Surg'ica procedures may e performed in t ese facilities under general or regional block anesthesia when it is expected that the
postoperative recovery will permit discharge on the same day. There should be
a written policy requiring the medical staff to provide for prompt emergency
treatment or hospitalization in the event of an unanticipated complication.
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Prior to any surgical procedure, informed consent should be obtained in
writing, signed by the patient, and included in the patient's chart.
en indicated, for patient safety or because of special circumstance , any
proce
e that can be performed in the physician's office or the
tpatient
clinic may
erformed in a free-standing or hospital-based
ulatory surgical facility. A · ional procedures commonly performed · a free-standing or
hospital-based ambu ory surgical facility include b are not limited to:

• Extensive biopsies or extensive
• Hysteroscopy
• Laparoscopy, includin
agnostic,
procedures if lapar my is not anticipated
· • Marsupializaf
of a Bartholin duct abscess or cys .
• Minilapa omy for st~rilization
• Sim
perineoplasty
Anesthesia
Only surgical procedures that can be performed without anesthesia or with
local anesthesia may be performed in the physician's office or in an outpatient
clinic. When local anesthesia is used in these settings, equipment and trained
personnel should be available for emergency resuscitation.
Any ambulatory surgical unit that utilizes general, epidural, or spinal anesthesia should do s6 under the direction of an anesthesiologist. These anesthetics should be administered by a qualified anesthesiologist, another qualified
physician, or a certified nurse-anesthetist under the supervision of an anesthesiologist. When any form of anesthesia is used, trained personnel and proper
equipment for cardiopulmonary resuscitation must be available.
· Only a patient at low anesthetic risk should be considered for ambulatory
surgery. The patient should be provided with preoperative instructions, especially regarding the restriction of food and fluids, and advised that noncompliance can result in cancellation of the procedure.
A recovery area is necesearr. During the recovery period, the patient should
be under continuous observation by a qualified member of the health' care
team. This person should maintain a complete record of the patient's general
condition including vital signs, blood loss, and occurrence of complications.
The patient should remain in the area until recovery is sufficient to permit safe
discharge ·in the company of a responsible adult.
The supervising anesthesiologist, or another physician qualified in cardiopulmonary resuscitation, should be present in the ambulatory surgical facility
until all surgical patients have been discharged. This physician should oversee
the postanesthetic recovery area and should share with the surgeon responsibility for discharging patients or transferring them to the back-up hospital.
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Ambulatory care facilities providing abortion services should meet the same
standards of care as those recommended £or other surgical procedures performed in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the free-standing and
hospital-based ambulatory setting. Physicians performing abortions in their
offices should provide for P.!'.o mr_t emergency treatmeJlt or hospitalization in
the event of an unanticipatedcompfication. Clinics and free-standtlg ambulatory care facilities should have written agreements with nearby hospitals for
the transfer of patients requiring treatment for emergency complications of
abortion procedures.
Generall abortions in the h sician1s office or out atient clinic shoul
limited to 14 weeks from the 'rst da of the last menstrual eriod. In a
os 1tal- ase or in a free-stan m am u ator sur ical facility, or in an outpatient clinic meeting the criteria required for a free-standing surgica acility,
abortions should be limited generally to 18 weeks from the last menstrual
~ Prior to abortion, the woman should have access to special counseiing
that explores options for the management of an unwanted pregnancy, examines the risks, and allows sufficient time for reflection prior to making an
informed decision. If counseling has been provided elsewhere, the physician
performing the abortion should verify that the counseling has taken place.
In addition to the usual and customary history, physical examination, and
indicated laboratory procedures, an Rh factor determination should be made.
Aspirated tissue should be examined to ensure the presence of villi or fetal parts
prior to the patient's release from the facility. If villi or fetal parts are not
identified with certainty, the tissue specimen must be sent for further pathologic examination, and the patient must be alerted to the possibility of an ectopic pregnancy.
Rh immune globulin must be administered to every unsensitized Rh(D)
negative woman who has an abortion except when it is definitely known that
the father is Rh negative.
ADMINISTRATION OF PHYSICIAN'S OFFICE AND
OUTPATIENT CLINIC
Medical Records
Physician's offices and outpatient clinics should maintain accurate medical
records for each patient. The record should be legible, concise, cogent, and
complete. Further, the record should allow easy assessment of the care provided
to determine if the patient's health needs have been diagnosed and effectively
managed. Because modern medical practice frequently involves several physicians and professionals, the record must serve as a vehicle for communication
among all members of the health care team.
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All pertinent medical information should be secure, confidential and readily
accessible. All records should be retained by the physician's offices and outpatient facilities for the period of time prescribed by law or by good medical
practice or state statute of limitations for personal injury.
At the initial visit a comprehensive data base should be established to include
the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Reason for visit
Menstrual history
Obstetric history
Gynecologic history
Contraceptive method
Sexual history
Past medical and surgical history
Current medications
Allergies
Social history
Family history
Review of systems

If this information is supplied by the patient on a printed form prior to the
initial consultation, it should be reviewed by the physician before examining
the patient.
An appropriate physical examination should be recorded on the initial visit.
The extent of the examination will vary with the patient's health needs. A minimum record should include height, weight, nutritional state, blood pressure,
head and neck, heart, lungs, breasts, abdominal, pelvic, and rectal examinations. Other data should be recorded as obtained. All correspondence, operative notes, and laboratory data should be reviewed and filed chronologically
in the patient's medical record.
When the patient returns for continuation of her health care, it will be
necessary to update the original data base, as well as maintain concise progress
notes. Any pertinent dqta regarding changes in health status or inpatient care
should be recorded and may take the form of a diagnostic summary.
When a patient is seen in consultation, sufficient historical and physical data
should be obtained and recorded to support the diagnosis. The consultant's
findings should be reported promptly and a written report included in both the
consultant's and referring physician's files.

Quality Assurance
Each physician's office and outpatient clinic should assess whether effective
and efficient management of health care has been accomplished.
In the outpatient clinic evaluation of patient care should assess the completeness of medical records, the accuracy of diagnoses, appropriateness of use

.

'
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of laboratory and other services, and outcome of care. It should include the
identification of potential problems in the care of patients, the objective assessment of their cause, and designation of mechanisms to eliminate them. Efficient
use of medical resources can be documented by evaluating use of personnel,
finances, equipment, and facilities.
Patient care evaluation is difficult in the physician's office because few models of evaluation can be applied in this·context. However, gynecologists should
periodically review and compare their own experiences with standards of
patient care and office practices suggested by the scientific literature and continuing medical education programs.
Personnel
Administrative and professional personnel· requirements will vary considerably in each physician's office and outpatient clil).iC depending on the patient
load, pattern of practice, and type of facility. Whether the health care team has
one member or many individuals, the members of the team should participate
in the specific areas of care according to their training and within written definitions of their responsibilities. Policies and responsibilities should be reviewed
and revised periodically. Regular meetings of personnel should be encouraged,
and there should be an ongoing program for in-service training.
Facilities and Equipment
The physical facilities and equipment described in the following sections
should be reasonably available for the care of patients either within the office
or clinic setting. Additional facilities and equipment beyond those recommended below will vary depending on the type of practice and patient volume.
PATIENT RECEPTION AREA

The reception area should provide comfortable seating, patient educational
materials, and conveniently located restroom facilities. Provision should be
made for privacy in discussing financial arrangements and other confidential
information with the patient. Sufficient space should be provided to permit
medical and financial records to be handled and stored with security and
confidentiality.
CONSULTATION ROOM

A comfortable and private area should be provided for interviews and for
counseling with the patient or her family. The physician's office could serve as
a consultation room. Separate rooms, other than the physician's office, should
be available for use by nurses, social workers, health educators, and other
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Quality obstetric-gynecologic care requires efficient organization of the medical
staff and other personnel, whether the care is provided within an ambulatory
or a hospital setting.

AMBULATORY CARE

Ambulatory obst;>ric-gynecologic car~is outpatient care that is provided in a
/ physician's office, outpatient clinic, or free-standing or hospital-based surgical
facility. The organization of the ambulatory care facility will vary depending
on the kind of facility or type of practice and on the patient volume. However,
certain standards are applicable to all types of settings, whether it be a solo
physician's office, group practice, or outpatient clinic.
Personnel directly involved in the welfare of the obstetric and gynecologic
patient should be organized into a health care team under the direction of an
obstetrician-gynecologist. Staff should be sufficient in number and training to
prevent undue delays and provide optimal care. Job descriptions and written
policies should be prepared and reviewed periodically where appropriate.
These policies should indicate specific responsibilities, as well as a plan for
continuing education of personnel. While it may not be feasible to provide
in-service education in all offices, it is desirable that personnel have access to
such programs.
.
A fr;_e-standing ambulatory surgical facili!Y should have a governing body,
similarto a hospital board of trustees, that has final authority and responsibility for patient care, facilities, services, appointment of the medical staff, and
establishment of clinical privileges. A mechanism similar to that used in the
hospital for granting privileges should be established in an ambulatory surgical
facility. Privileges granted to a physician should not exceed those held (by that
physician) in at least one accredited hospital within the geographical area. A
hospital-based facility usually function~ under the hospital's governing body, and
staff privileges will be established by hospital regulations.

1
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members of the health care team, if such are being employed. Minimal equipment for each room should include a desk or table with two chairs.
EXAMINING ROOM AREA

The following equipment should be accessible to, although not necessarily in,
each room:
Biopsy instruments
Instruments for vaginal and rectal examinations
Microscope
Sphygmomanometer
Stethoscope
Reflex hammer
Ophthalmoscope
Scale
Supplies for obtaining:
,
Spe<i,mens and cultures
Wet slide preparation and bacterial smears
Stool examinations
Cytologic studies
• Equipment necessary for diagnostic studies and operative procedures performed in the facility.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

When local anesthesia is used, the following equipment should be available
for possible emergency resuscitation:
•
•
•
•
•

Positive pressure oxygen
Intravenous equipment and fluids
Suction
Cardiac monitor
Laryngoscope with assorted airways.

EXAMINING ROOMS

The exact number of examining rooms required will depend on the patient load
and type of practice; however, at least two examination rooms are preferable
even for a solo physician's office.
Equipment available for each examining room should include:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Screening to permit patient privacy
Handwashing facilities and paper towels
Examination table with suitable disposable cover and a stool
Examination light
Gynecologic examination equipment and supplies
Work counter or table
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• Small desk, table, or shelf for writing
• Storage cabinet
UTILITY ROOM AND STORAGE

. The utility room area should contain:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Work counter
Handwashing facilities and paper towels
Deep sink
Closed cabinets for storage
Locked medicine cabinets
Refrigerator for biologicals and specimens
Facilities for sterilization unless central sterilization is available
Waste receptacle

CONFERENCE ROOM

For larger practices or clinics, a conference and patient education room may
contain:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Comfortable chairs
Conference table
Educational materials and pamphlets
Chalk board
Bulletin board
Models and demonstrating equipment
Screen
Slide projector
Movie projector
Videotape equipment

SAFETY STANDARDS

Specific plans and procedures for the health and safety of patients and personnel should meet all applicable local and state safety, building, and fire codes and
should include:
• Methods for controlling electrical hazards and preventing explosion and
fire
• Procedures for controlling and disposing of needles, syringes, glass, knife
blades, and contaminated waste supplies
• Methods for storing, preparing, and administering drugs, when applicable
• Plans for handling reasonably foreseeable emergencies, including methods
for transferring a patient to a nearby hospital
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• Plans for emergency patient evacuation and the proper use of safety,
emergency, and fire extinguishing equipment
• Plans for training of personnel in cardiopulmonary resuscitation
• Plans for adequately maintaining and cleaning facilities.

ADMINISTRATION OF FREE-STANDING AND HOSPITAL-BASED
AMBULATORY SURGICAL FACILITIES
Medical Records
All ambulatory facilities should maintain accurate medical records for each
patient. An efficient record system should be established that conforms to a
standard record used in that community or back-up hospital. All pertinent
medical information should be secure, confidential, and readily accessible. The
record should be legible, concise, cogent, and complete. Further, the record
should allow easy assessment of the care provided to determine if the patient's
health needs have been identified, diagnosed, and effectively managed. The
patient's record should include the pertinent details of any anesthetic used, the
procedure performed, any difficulties encountered, and the patient's subsequent condition. Because modern medical practice frequently involves several
physicians and professionals, the record must serve as a vehicle for communication among all members of the health care team.
This record should contain sufficient information to justify the preoperative
diagnosis and the operative procedure and to document the postoperative
course. All diagnoses and operative procedures should be listed to facilitate data
retrieval.
The record should contain:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Patient identification data
History and physical examination
Provisional diagnosis
Diagnostic and therapeutic orders
Surgeon's and nurses' notes
Laboratory data
Operative consent
Operative report
Anesthesia report
Tissue report
Medications record
Discharge summary and instructions

The appropriate records should be completed and laboratory data recorded
prior to surgery. The laboratory data shou~clude hemoglobin or hematocrit,
urinalysis, and, in certain selected patient~, ot}te~tudies such as a chest x-ray,
electrocardiogram, and electrolytes.
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A preoperative history and physical examination should be completed and
recorded no more than two weeks prior to the surgical procedure. The physician should strive to identify pre-existing or concurrent illness, medications,
and adverse drug reactions that may have a bearing on the operative procedure
or anesthesia. All records should be reviewed before any surgery is performed.
On the day of surgery a preanesthetic evaluation, including an interval
history, medical record review, and heart and lung examination should be
performed by a physician and the findings should be noted in the record.
The record should be completed promptly and signed by the attending
physician. A discharge summary should be written or dictated; every effort
must be made to forward information necessary for continuity of treatment to
physicians who will subsequently care for the patient.
The ambulatory care facility should keep registries of admissions and discharges, operations, and controlled substances. Records should be kept confidential and should be protected against fire, theft, and other damage for the
duration of time prescribed by law, or by good medical practice or state statute
of limitations for personal injury.
Quality Assurance
The effectiveness of patient care and the appropriate use of the ambulatory
surgical facility should be continually evaluated. Evaluation of patient care
should be performed by a team of ·professionals qualified to assess all aspects
of patient care, including the completeness of medical records, the accuracy of
diagnoses, and outcome of care. The evaluation should include the
identification of potential problems in the care of patients, the objective assessment of their cause, and designation of mechanisms to eliminate them. Particular care should be taken to identify ambulatory treatments that might have
been undertaken more appropriately on an inpatient basis.
Personnel
The efficient operation of an ambulatory surgical facility requires ad~uc;te
staffing with administrative and rofessional personnel. The assignment of
pers'on·~n
~
eli"'s...,...o~u..,·,..,..,..e~-a~
se-.,.....o'""nlll:t~e-n
..._
um
_.,""'e-r-o"-7'""p
~
a ,..Jen
-t:-s-,-patient profiles, type of
procedures, and facility design.
Written policies describing specific responsibilities of each member of the
team are desirable, and should be reviewed and revised periodically. There
should be an ongoing program for in-service training of personnel.
A governing_b~ of the ambulatory surgical facility has the final authority
and responsibility .for the appointment of the medical staff. Privileges should
be granted only to those who are properly trained, licensed, and who have
demonstrated competence. These privileges should not exceed those granted to
the same individual in at least one accredited hospital within a geographic area.

'.
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Facilities and Equipment
GENERAL DESIGN AND EQUIPMENT

The general physical design for a free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory
surgical facility will depend on the number and types of surgical procedures to
be performed. The facility should provide a comfortable, safe environment
with minimal architectural barriers. Standards for both the construction and
operation of ambulatory surgical facilities should be equivalent to those applied
to an accredited hospital handling similar surgical procedures.
.
Attention should be given to a convenient and efficient traffic flow. In a
multilevel facility, elevators that can accommodate stretchers should be available for immediate use.
The facility should include adequate space for:
• Reception and waiting
• Administrative activities, such as patient . admission, record storage, and
business affairs.
• Patient dressing and lockers
• Preoperative evaluation including physical examination, laboratory testing, and preparation for anesthesia
• Performance of surgical procedures
• Preparation and sterilization of instruments
• Storage of equipment
• Storage of drugs and fluids
• Postanesthetic recovery
• Staff activities
• Janitorial and utility support

~

Instruments, equipment, and supplies used in the ambulatory surgical facility should be equivalent to those used ·for similar procedures in an accredited
hospital and should provide for:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Control of sources and transmission of infection
Infection surveillance
Functional oxygen and suction
Resuscitation and defibrillation
Emergency lighting
Sterilization
Emergency intercommunication

SAFETY STANDARDS

Specific plans and procedures should be established for the health and safety
of patients and personnel. Such plans and procedures should meet all state and
local building, safety, and fire codes and should include:
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• Methods of control against the hazards o( electrical or mechanical failure,
explosion, and fire
• Comprehensive emergency plans, including but not limited to patient
evacuation and the proper use of safety, emergency and fire extinguishing
equipment
• Equipment and personnel for handling reasonably foreseeable medical
emergencies arising from services rendered
• Provision for transferring unanticipated emergency cases to a nearby backup hospital
• Training of personnel in cardiopulmonary resuscitation
• Control and disposition of needles, syringes, glass, knife blades, and con. taminated waste supplies
• Proper storage, preparation, and administration of drugs
• Facilities that are accessible, barrier free, and safe for all, including the
handicapped
• Adequately maintained and clean facilities
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and retention of records. He also agreed with the majority that§ 6 (1) was unconstitutionally overbroad. He
dissented from the majority opinion upholding the constitutionality of§§ 3 (3), 3 (4), 7, and 9, relating, respectively, to spousal consent, parental consent, the termination of parental rights, and the proscription of saline
amniocentesis.
In No. 74-1151, the plaintiffs appeal from that part
of the District Court's judgment upholding sections of
the Act as constitutional and denying injunctive relief
against their application and enforcement. In No. 741419, the defendant Attorney General cross-appeals from
that part of the judgment holding § 6 (1) unconstitutional and enjoining enforcement thereof. We granted
the plaintiffs' application for stay of enforcement of the
Act pending appeal. 420 U. S. 918 (1975). Probable
jurisdiction of both appeals thereafter was noted. 423
U.S. 819 (1975).
For convenience, we shall usually refer to the plaintiffs
as "appellants" and to both named defendants as
"appellees."

III
In Roe v. Wade the Court concluded that the "right
of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions
upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court
determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of
rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 410 U. S., at 153. It emphatically rejected,
however, the proffered argument "that the woman's
right is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate
her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and
for whatever reason she alone chooses." Ibid. Instead,

.,.
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this right "must be considered against important state
interests in regulation." Id., at 154.
,
The Court went on to say that the "pregnant woman
cannot be isolated in her privacy," for she "carries an embryo and, later, a fetus." I d., at 159. It was therefore
"reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at
some point in time another interest, that of health of
the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The woman's privacy is no longer
sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be
measured accordingly." Ibid. The Court stressed the
measure of the State's interest in "the light of present
medical knowledge." Id., at 163. It concluded that the
permissibility of state regulation was to be viewed in
three stages: "For the stage prior to approximately the
end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its
effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of
the pregnant woman's a~ndin~ian," without interference from the State. --:ra.;at 164~ The participa-~
tion by the attending physician in the abortion decision,
and his responsibility in that decision, thus, were emphasized. Af!.~ ~ first_~age, as so described, t~tate
l!:ay, if it chooses, r~Jilir.....t~~~t~ ~ortion procedure to preserve and protect maternal liearth."" Ibid.
FTnally, for the stage subsequent to viability, a point ·\
purp~sefully _left flexible for professional determination, r
a~<!_ df2J_~~~~~~.EQ!l_ g_eyeloping_ medical skill an~ tech: 1
. m_!:l~l __ ablhcy.~... t..he . State may regulate an abortiOn to \
protect the life of the fetus and even may proscribe abor- :
~ion-except where it is nec~ssary, in a~propriate medical j
JUdgment, for the preservatiOn of the hfe or health of the
_Ir}ot~er.: _ Jd., at 163-165.

l

1 "Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks)
but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.,
at 160 .

•: ...-c,
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IV
With the exception specified in n. 2, infra, we agree
with the District Court that the physician-appellants
clearly have standing. This was established in Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U. S., at 188. Like the Georgia statutes
challenged in that case, "[t]he physician is the one
against whom [the Missouri Act] directly operate[s]
in the event he procures an abortion that does not meet
the statutory exceptions and conditions. The physicianappellants, therefore, assert a sufficiently direct threat of
personal detriment. They should not be required to
await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole
means of seeking relief." 2 Ibid.
Our primary task, then, is to consider each of the
2 This is not so, however, with respect to § 7 of the Act pertaining to state wardship of a live-born infant. Section 7 applies
"where a live born infant results from an attempted abortion which
was not performed to save the life or health of the mother." It
then provides that the infant "shall be an abandoned ward of the
state" and that the mother-and the father, too, if he consented
to the abortion-"shall have no parental rights or obligations whatsoever relating to such infant."
The physician-appellants do not contend that this section of the
Act imposes any obligation on them or that its operation otherwise
injures them in fact . They do not claim any interest in the question of who receives custody that is "sufficiently concrete" to satisfy
the "case or controversy" requirement of a federal court's Art . III
jurisdiction. Singleton v. Wulff, post, at 112. Accordingly, the
physician-appellants do not have standing to challenge § 7 of
the Act.
The District Court did not decide whether Planned Parenthood
has standing to challenge the Act, or any portion of it, because of
its view that the physician-appellants have standing to challenge
the entire Act. 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1366-1367 (1975). We decline to
consider here the standing of Planned Parenthood to attack § 7.
That question appropriately may be left to the District Court
for reconsideration on remand. As a consequence, we do not
decide the issue of § 7's constitutionality.
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challenged provisions of the new Missouri abortion statute in the particular light of the opinions and decisions
in Roe and in Doe. To this we now turn, with the assistance of helpful briefs from both sides and from some of
the amici.
A
The definition of viability. Section 2 (2) of the Act
defines "viability" as "that stage of fetal development
when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial lifesupportive systems." Appellants claim that this definition violates and conflicts with the discussion of
viability in our opinion in Roe. 410 U. S., at 160, 163.
In particular, appellants object to the failure of the definition to contain any reference to a gestational time period, to its failure to incorporate and reflect the three
stages of pregnancy, to the presence of the word "indefinitely," and to the extra burden of regulation imposed.
It is suggested that the definition expands the Court's
definition of viability, as expressed in Roe, and amounts
to a legislative determination of what is properly a matter for medical judgment. It is said that the "mere
possibility of momentary survival is not the medical
standard of viability." Brief for Appellants 67.
In Roe, we used the term "viable," properly we
thought, to signify the point at which the fetus is "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit
with artificial aid," and presumably capable of "meaningful life outside the mother's womb," 410 U. S., at 160,
163. We noted that this point "is usually placed" at
about s~s or 28 weeks, but may occur earlier.
!d., at 160.
We agree with the District Court and conclude that the
definition of viability in the Act does not conflict with
what was said and held in Roe. In fact, we believe that
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§ 2 (2), even when read in conjunction with § 5 (proscrib-

ing an abortion "not necessary to preserve the life or
health of the mother ... unless the attending physician
first certifies with reasonable medical certainty that the
fetus is not viable"), the constitutionality of which is
not explicitly challenged here, reflects an attempt on the
part of the Missouri General Assembly to comply with
our observations and discussion in Roe relating to viability. Appellant Hall, in his deposition, had no particular difficulty with the statutory definition. 3 As noted
above, we recognized in Roe that viability was a matter
of medical judgment, skill, and technical ability, and we
preserved the flexibility of the term. Section 2 (2) does
the same. Indeed, one might argue, as the appellees do,
that the presence of the statute's words "continued indefinitely" favor, rather than disfavor, the appellants, for,
arguably, the· point when life can be "continued indefinitely outside the womb" may well occur later in pregnancy than the point where the fetus is "potentially able
to live outside the mother's womb." Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S., at 160.
In any event, we agree with the District Court that
it is no~ ~f ~h,e !eg;islatu!e or the
t-<'
~ourts ~' which essentially is a medical
t#p.. concept, ~oint in the gestation perio<;l. The
, .J.~:..
time when viability IS achieved may vary with each
)
pregnancy, and the determination of whether a particular fetus is viable is, and must be, a m~tter_for __!he .b:!_dgment of the responsible attending ~p~y~i_£i~. The definition of viabil~elyreRects this fact.
The appellees do not contend otherwise, for they insist

\.J.-/

3 "[A]lthough I agree with the definition of 'viability,' I think
that it must be understood that viability is a very difficult state
to assess." Tr. 369.
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that the determination of viability rests with the physician in the exercise of his professional judgment.~
We thus do not accept appellants' contention that a
specified number of weeks in pregnancy must be fixed by
statute as the voint of viability. See Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631 , 637 (WD Ky. 1974); Hodgson v.
Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008, 1016 (Minn. 1974), dismissed for want of jurisdiction sub nom. Spannaus v.
Hodgson, 420 U. S. 903 (1975)."
We conclude that the definition in § 2 (2) of the Act
does not circumvent the limitations on state regulation
outlined in Roe. We therefore hold that the Act's definition of "viability" comports with Roe and withstands
the constitutional attack made upon it in this litigation.

~J-

B
The woman's consent. Under § 3 (2) of the Act;:~-.-----:r ,
woman, prior to submitting to an abortion during the - ~
first 12 weeks of pregnancy, must certify in writing her
consent to the procedure and "that her consent is informed and freely given and is not the resultof coercion."
Appellants argue that this requirement is violative of

--

4
"The determination of when the fetus is viable rests, as it should,
with the physician, in the exercise of his medical judgment, on a
case-by-case basis." Brief for Appellee Danforth 26. "Because
viability may vary from patient to patient and with advancements
in medical technology, it is essential that physicians make the
determination in the exercise of their medical judgment." !d., at
28. "Defendant agrees that 'viability' will vary, that it is a difficult
state to assess . . . and that it must be left to the physician's
judgment." !d., at 29.
5
The Minnesota statute under attack in Hodgson provided that
a fetus "shall be considered potentially 'viable' " during the second
half of its gestation period. Noting that the defendants had presented no evidence of viability at 20 weeks, the three-judge District
Court held that that definition of viability was "unreasonable and
cannot stand." 378 F. Supp., at 1016.
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Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 164-165, by imposing an
extra layer and burden of regulation on the abortion
decision. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S., at 195-200.
Appellants also claim that the provision is overbroad
and vague.
The District Court's majority relied on the propositions that the decision to terminate a pregnancy, of
course, "is often a stressful one," and that the consent
requirement of § 3 (2) "insures that the pregnant woman
retains control over the discretions of her consulting
physician." 392 F. Supp., at 1368, 1369. The majority
also felt that the consent requirement "does not single
out the abortion procedure, but merely includes it within
the category of medical operations for which consent is
required." 6 !d., at 1369. The third judge joined the
majority in upholding § 3 (2), but added that the written consent requirement was "not burdensome or chilling" and manifested "a legitimate interest of the state
that this important decision has in fact been made by
the person constitutionally empowered to do so." 392
F. Supp., at 1374. He went on to observe that the
requirement "in no way interposes the state or third
parties in the decision-making process." !d., at 1375.
We do not disagree with the result reached by the
District Court as to § 3 (2). It is true that Doe and
Roe clearly establish that the State may not restrict the
decision of the patient and her physician regarding abortion during the first stage of pregnancy. Despite the
fact that apparently no other Missouri statute, with
the exceptions referred to in n. 6, supra, requires a

1

6
Apparently, however, the only other Missouri statutes concerned
with consent for general medical or surgical care relate to persons
committed to the Missouri State chest hospital, Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 199.240 (Supp. 1975), or to mental or correctional institutions,
§ 105.700 (1969).
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p~n co2~n~ to~ ~~c~ procedure/
the imposition by § 3(2)
arequiremeritror ter-

orsucn

mination of pregnancy even durin~r the first stage, in our
----~~~-view, is not in itself an
unconstitutwna1 requirement.
The decTsT;;~~r;~;rc,-indeed"; TSa~
an.d often
a stressful one, and it is desirable and imperative that
it be made with full knowledge of its nature and consequences. The woman is the one primarily concerned,
and her awareness of the decision and its significance
may be assured, constitutionally, by the State to the
extent of requiring her prior written consent.
We could not say that a requirement imposed by
the State that a prior written consent for any surgery
would be unconstitutional. As a. consequence, we see
no constitutional defect in requiring it only for some
types of surgery as, for example, an intracardiac procedure, or where the surgical risk is elevated above a specified mortality level, or, for thatmatter, for abortions. 8

'important,

c
The spouse's consent. Section 3 (3) requires the prior
written con;Iit of tbe spouse of the woman seeking an
abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, unless
There is some testimony in the record to the effect that taking from
the patient a prior written consent to surgery is the custom. That
may be so in some areas of Missouri, but we definitely refrain from
characterizing it extremely as "the universal practice of the medical
profession," as the appellees do . Brief for Appellee Danforth 32.
8 The appellants' vagueness argument centers on the word "informed ." One might well wonder, offhand, just what "informed
consent" of a patient is. The three Missouri federal judges who
composed the three-judge District Court, however, were not concerned, and we are content to accept, as the meaning, the giving of
information to the patient as to just what would be done and as to
its consequences. To ascribe more meaning than this might well
confine the attending physician in an undesired and uncomfortable
straitjacket in the practice of his profession.
7

'
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· additional challenges to § 3 (3) based on vagueness and
~
y..;..
overbreadth.
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Parental
Section 3 ( 4) requires, with re. . - -Consent.
--spect to the first' 12 weeks of pregnancy, where the
·---.......--·-- ~
woman is unmarried
and under the age of 18 years, the
written consent of a parent or person in loco parentis
unless, again, "the abortion is certified by a licensed
physician as necessary in order to preserve the life of
' the mother." It is to be observed that only one parent
need consent.
The appellees defend the statute in several ways.
They point out that the law properly m_a y subject
minors to more stringent limitations than are permissible
with respect to adults, and they cite, among other cases,
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944), and _McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). Missouri
law, it is said, 11 is replete with provisions reflecting the interest of the state in assuring the welfare of minors," citing statutes relating to a guardian ad litem for a court
proceeding, to the care of delinquent and neglected children, to child labor, and to compulsory education. Brief
for Appellee Danforth 42. Certain decisions are considered by the State to be outside the scope of a minor's
ability to act in his own best interest or in the interest of
the public, citing statutes proscribing the sale of firearms
and deadly weapons to minors without parental consent,
and other statutes relating to minors' exposure to certain
types of literature, the purchase by pawnbrokers of property from minors, a.1d the sale of cigarettes and alcoholic
beverages to minors. It is pointed out that the record
contains testimony to the effect that children of tender
years (even ages 10 and 11) have sought abortions.
Thus, a State's permitting a child to obtain an abortion without the counsel of an adult 11 Who has responsi-

··---

•
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bility or concern for the child would constitute an irresponsible abdication of the State's duty to protect the
welfare of minors." !d., at 44. Parental discretion, too,
has been protected from unwarranted or unreasonable
interference from the State, citing Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U. S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U. S. 510 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205
( 1972). Finally, it is said that § 3 ( 4) imposes no additional burden on the physician because even prior to the
passage of the Act the physician would require parental
consent before performing an abortion on a minor.
The appellants, in their turn, emphasize that no other
Missouri statute specifically requires the additional consent of a minor's parent for medical or surgical treatment, and that in Missouri a minor legally may consent
to medical services for pregnancy (excluding abortion),
venereal disease, and drug abuse. Mo. Rev. Stat.
§§ 431.061-431.063 (Supp. 1975). The result of§ 3 (4),
it is said, "is· the ultimate supremacy of the parents' desires over those of the minor child, the pregnant patient."
Brief for Appellants 93. It is noted that in Missouri a
woman under the age of 18 who marries with parental
consent does not require parental consent to abort, and
yet her contemporary who has chosen not to marry must
obtain pa.r ental approval.
The District Court majority recognized that, in contrast to § 3 (3), the State's interest in protecting the
mutuality of a marriage relationship is not present with
respect to§ 3 (4). It found "a compelling basis," however, in the State's interest "in safeguarding the authority
of the family relationship." 392 F. Supp., at 1370. The
dissenting judge observed that one could not seriously
argue that minor must submit to an abortion if her
parents insist, and he <;ould not see "why she would not
be entitled to the same right of self-determination now

a

I
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explicitly accorded to adult women, provided she is sufficiently mature to understand the procedure and to
make an intelligent assessment of her circumstances with
the advice of her physician." Id., at 1376.
Of course, much of what has been said above, with
respect to § 3 (3), applies with equal force to § 3 ( 4).
Other courts that hav_e considered the parental-consent
issue in the light of Roe and Doe, have concluded that
a statute like § 3 ( 4) does not withstand constitutional
scrutiny. See, e. g., Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F. 2d, at 792;
Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp:, at 636-637; Doe v.
Rampton, 366 F. Supp., at 193, 199; State v. Koome, 84
Wash. 2d 901, 530 P. 2d 260 (1975).
We agree with appellants and with the courts whose
decisions have just been cited that the State may not
im_£~~-~_Ela~~£~<!_vi.§!QJ1, such as § 3( 4), ~~i~i_the
co~_pj __0'_~~Plmmt or person in loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor during the first
12 weeks of her pregnancy. Just as with the requirement of consent from the spouse, so here, the State does
not have the constitutional authority to give a third
party an absolute, and possibly arbitra!y, veto over the
decision of the -physician and his patient to terminate the
patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent.
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into
being magically only when one attains the state-defined
age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected
by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.
See, e. g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975); Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines
School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969); In re Gault, 387
U. S. 1 (1967). The Court indeed, however, long has
recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults.
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Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S., at 170; Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968). It remains, then, to ,,
examine whether there is ~ificant st~te inter!st
a parent
in conditioning an abortion on tli~ consent
or person in loco parentis that is not present in the case
of an adult.
One suggested interest is the safeguarding of the family
unit and of parental authority. 392 F. Supp., at 1370.
It is difficult, however, to conclude that providing a
parent with absolute power to overrule a determination,
made by the physician and his minor patient, to terminate the patient's pregnancy will serve to strengthen the
family unit. Neither is it likely that such veto power
will enhance parental authority or control where the
minor and the nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of the pregnancy
already has fractured the family structure. Any independent interest the parent may have in the termination
of the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty
than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature
enough to have become pregnant.
We emphasize that our holding that § 3 ( 4) is invalid
does not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or
maturity, may give effective consent for termination of
her pregnancy. See Bellotti v. Baird, post, p. 132. The
fault with § 3 ( 4) is that it imposes a special-consent
provision, exercisable by a person other than the woman
and her physician, as a prerequisite to a minor's termination of her pregnancy and does so without a sufficient
justification for the restriction. It violates the strictures ·
of Roe and Doe.

or

I

f.

E
Saline amniocentesis. Section 9 of the statute prohibits the use of saline amniocentesis, as a method or
technique of abortion, after the first 12 weeks of preg-
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May 18, 1983

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re: No. 81-185 - Simopoulos v. Virginia
Dear Lewis:
I very much appreciate what you have done with the
uncirculated fourth draft of your opinion in this case. You
certainly and most graciously have accommodated most of the
concerns expressed in my letter of May 4. I am deeply grateful for all this.
I could, and if necessary would, join your fourth
draft in its present form.
I must confess, however, that I
remain very uncomfortable w'th the combination of the presence of both footnotes L9-J. 7 and the sentence on page 11 to
the effect that the regulations appear to be generally compatible with accepted medical standards. Under your analysis
in Akron, this phrase does have constitutional significance;
regulations that accord with accepted medical standards carry
a presumption of constitutionality.
Although the Virginia
regulations may well turn out to be constitutional upon closer examination, I do not want to create the impression that
we have prejudged the question.
Footnotes 13 and 15 provide an example of the problem. There is nothing wrong with any of the tests mentioned
in footnote 13, but it is not at all clear to me that each
and every one of those tests is necessary prior to every
abortion. Moreover, when coupled with footnote 15's requirement that test results be received before an abortion is
performed, the result may be a mandatory waiting period of
sever~l d_gys prior to the abortion.
{I am always d1sturbed
wruen people in Washington tell me about how long they must
wait for laboratory results.
I was spoiled by the Mayo system where results are available either immediately through
frozen sections or, in almost all cases, within 24 hours.)
I
think it is at least open to question whether such a result
would be consistent with good medical practice, yet this is
what the footnotes and the sentence on page 11 imply.
Would you be willing to compromise by omitting the
footnotes and have the sentence on page 11 remain? I could
then join with enthusiasm and contentment.
I say again that I am grateful for your sympathetic
consideration.
Sincerely,
Justice Powell

J~
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Justice White
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Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 81-1255 AND 81-1623

'PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSOCIATION OF
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, INC.,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
81-1255
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
MISSOURI, ET AL.
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
MISSOURI, ET AL., PETITIONERS
81-1623
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PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSOCIATION OF
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, INC., ET AL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[May - , 1983]

JUSTICE BLACKMUN,

concurring in part and dissenting in

part.
The Court's decision today in Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, invalidates the city of Akron's hospitalization requirement and a host of other provisions that infringe on a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy through abortion. I agree with the Court that
Missouri's hospitalization requirement is invalid under the
Akron analysis, and I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion in the present cases. I do not agree, however, that the
remaining Missouri statutes challenged in these cases satisfy

..
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the constitutional standards set forth in Akron and the
Court's prior decisions.
I
Missouri law provides that whenever an abortion is performed, a tissue sample must be submitted to a "board eligible or certified pathologist" for a report. Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 188.047 (1983). This requirement applies to first trimester
abortions as well as to those performed later in pregnancy.
Our past decisions establish that the performance of abortions during the first trimester must be left "'free of interference by the State."' Akron, ante, at 12, quoting Roe
v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 163 (1973). As we have noted in
Akron, this does not mean that every regulation touching
upon first-trimester abortions is constitutionally impermissible. But to pass constitutional muster, regulations affecting
first-trimester abortions must "have no significant impact on
the woman's exercise of her right" and must be "justified by
important state health objectives." Akron, ante, at 11; see
ante, at 8.
Missouri's requirement of a pathologist's report is not justified by important health objectives. Although pathology
examinations may be "useful and even necessary in some
cases," ante, at 10, Missouri requires more than a pathology
examination and a pathology report; it demands that the
examination be performed and the report prepared by a
"board eligible or certified pathologist" rather than by the attending physician. Contrary to the Court's assertion, ante,
at 9, this requirement of a report by a pathologist is not in
accord with "generally accepted medical standards." The
routine and accepted medical practice is for the attending
physician to perform a gross (visual) examination of any tissue removed during an abortion. Only if the physician detects abnormalities is there a need to send a tissue sample to
a pathologist. The American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG) does not recommend an examination
by a pathologist in every case:
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"In the situation of elective termination of pregnancy,
the attending physician should record a description of
the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal
parts can be identified, the products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for
gross and microscopic examination.
". . . . Aspirated tissue should be examined to ensure
the presence of villi or fetal parts prior to the patient's
release from the facility. If villi or fetal parts are not
identified with certainty, the tissue specimen must be
sent for further pathologic examination.... " ACOG,
Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52, 54
(1982). 1
Nor does the National Abortion Federation believe that such
an examination is necessary:
"All tissue must be examined grossly at the time of the
abortion procedure by a physician or trained assistant
and the results recorded in the chart. In the absence of
visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination,
obtained tissue may be examined under a low power microscope for the detection of villi. If this examination is
inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest
suitable pathology laboratory for microscopic examination." National Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981)
(emphasis deleted).
The Court fails to distinguish between the medical practice
1
See also ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 66
(1982):
"Tissue removed should be submitted to a pathologist for examination . . . . An exception to the practice may be in elective terminations of
pregnancy in which definitive embryonic or fetal parts can be identified.
In such instances, the physician should record a description of the gross
products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identified, the
products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for gross and microscopic examination."
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of performing a "tissue examination," ante, at 11, and Missouri's requirement that this examination be performed by a
pathologist. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, there was
expert testimony at trial that a nonpathologist physician is as
capable of performing an adequate gross examination as is a
pathologist, and that the "abnormalities which are of concern" are readily detectable by a physician. 655 F. 2d 848,
871, n. 37 (CA8 1981); see App. 135. 2 While a pathologist
may be better able to perform a microscopic examination,
Missouri law does not require a microscopic examination unless "fetal parts or placenta are not identified." 13 Mo.
Admin. Code § 50-151.030(1) (1981). Thus, the effect of the
Missouri statute is to require a pathologist to perform the initial gross examination, which is normally the responsibility of
the attending physician and which will often make the pathologist's services unnecessary.
On the record before us, I must conclude that the State has
not "met its burden of demonstrating that [the pathologist requirement] further[s] important health-related State concerns." Akron, ante, at 12. There has been no showing
that tissue examinations by a pathologist do more to protect
health than examinations by a nonpathologist physician.
Moreover, I cannot agree with the Court that Missouri's pathologist requirement has "no significant impact" ante, at 8,
on a woman's exercise of her right to an abortion. It is undisputed that this requirement may increase the cost of a
first-trimester abortion by as much as $40. See ante, at 10,
n. 12; 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48. Although this increase
may seem insignificant from the Court's comfortable perspective, I cannot say that it is equally insignificant to every
woman seeking an abortion. For the woman on welfare or
the unemployed teenager, this additional cost may well put
' The District Court made no findings on this point, noting only that
some witnesses for the State had testified that "pathology should be done"
for every abortion. 483 F. Supp. 679, 700, n. 49 (WD Mo. 1980).

.....
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the price of an abortion beyond reach. 3 Cf. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 668 (1966) ($1.50 poll
tax "excludes those unable to pay"); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S.
252, 255, 257 (1959) ($20 docket fee "foreclose[s] access" to
appellate review for indigents).
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U. S. 52, 81 (1976), the Court warned that the minor recordkeeping requirements upheld in that case "perhaps approach[ed] impermissible limits." Today in Akron, we have
struck down restrictions on first-trimester abortions that
"may in some cases add to the cost of providing abortions."
Ante, at 30; see ante, at 31-32. Missouri's requirement of a
pathologist's report unquestionably adds significantly to the
cost of providing abortions, and Missouri has not shown that
it serves any substantial health-related purpose. Under
these circumstances, I would hold that constitutional limits
have been exceeded.
II
In Missouri, an abortion may be performed after viability
only if necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (1983). When a post-viability
abortion is performed, Missouri law provides that "there
[must be] in attendance a [second] physician ... who shall
take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child
born as a result of the abortion." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3
(1983). The Court recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at
3
A $40 pathologist's fee may increase the price of a first-trimester abortion by 20% or more. See 655 F. 2d, at 869, n. 35 (cost of first-trimester
abortion at Reproductive Health Services is $170); F. Jaffe, B. Lindheim,
and P. Lee, Abortion Politics: Private Morality and Public Policy 36 (1981)
(cost of first-trimester clinic abortion ranges from approximately $185
to $235); Henshaw, Freestanding Abortion Clinics: Services, Structure,
Fees, 14 Family Planning Perspectives 248, 255 (1982) (average cost of
first-trimester clinic abortion is $190); NAF Membership Directory 11>-19
(1982/1983) (NAF clinics in Missouri charge $180 to $225 for first-trimester
abortion).

'
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164-165, that a State's interests in preserving maternal
health and protecting the potentiality of human life may justify regulation and even prohibition of post-viability abortions, except those necessary to preserve the life and health
of the mother. But regulations governing post-viability
abortions, like those at any other stage of pregnancy, must
be "tailored to the recognized state interests." I d., at 165;
see H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 413 (1981) ("statute
plainly serves important state interests, [and] is narrowly
drawn to protect only those interests"); Roe, 410 U. S., at
155 ("legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake").

A
The Court upholds the second physician requirement on
the basis that it "furthers the State's compelling interest in
protecting the lives of viable fetuses." Ante, at 8. While I
agree that a second physician indeed may aid in preserving
the life of a fetus born alive, this type of aid is possible only
when the abortion method used is one that may result in a
live birth. Although Missouri ordinarily requires a physician performing a post-viability abortion to use the abortion
method most likely to preserve fetal life, this restriction
does not apply when this method "would present a greater
risk to the life and health of the woman." Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 188.030.2 (1983).
The District Court found that the dilatation and evacuation
(D&E) method of abortion entails no chance of fetal survival,
and that it will nevertheless be the method of choice for some
women who need post-viability abortions. In some cases, in
other words, maternal health considerations will preclude the
use of procedures that might result in a live birth. 483 F.
Supp., at 694. 4 When a D&E abortion is performed, the
'The Court of Appeals upheld this factual finding. 665 F. 2d, at 865.
As a general rule, we do not review a District Court's factual findings in

'r•
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second physician can do nothing to further the State's compelling interest in protecting potential life. His presence
is superfluous. The second-physician requirement thus is
overbroad and "imposes a burden on women in cases where
the burden is not justified by any possibility of survival of the
fetus." 655 F. 2d, at 865--866.
The Court reasons that the State's interest in preserving
potential life "justifies the State in requiring a second physician at every third-trimester abortion" because "[w]e ...
cannot assume that all third-trimester abortions will be D&E
abortions, or that there will be no live births." Ante, at 7,
n. 7 (emphasis added). But the fact that other methods of
post-viability abortions may result in live births cannot justify requiring a second physician to attend an abortion at
which the chance of a live birth is nonexistent. The choice of
method presumably will be made in advance, 5 and any need
for a second physician disappears when the woman's health
requires that the choice be D&E. Because the statute is not
tailored to protect the State's legitimate interests, I would
hold it invalid. 6
which the Court of Appeals has concurred. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S.
507, 512, n. 6 (1980).
5
In addition to requiring the physician to select the method most likely
to preserve fetal life, so long as it presents no greater risk to the pregnant
woman, Missouri requires that the physician "certify in writing the available method or techniques considered and the reasons for choosing the
method or technique employed." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.2 (1983). This
ensures that the choice of method will be a reasoned one.
6
The State argues that its second-physician requirement is justified
even when D&E is used, because "[i]f the statute specifically excepted
D&E procedures, abortionists would be encouraged to use it more frequently to avoid the expense of a second physician, to ensure a dead fetus,
to prevent the presence of a second professional to observe malpractice or
the choice of a questionable procedure from a safety viewpoint, a fetusdestroying procedure, or to avoid their own awakening to concern for the
newborn." Brief for Cross-Petitioners in No. 81-1623, p. 44. The Court
rejected this purported justification for a second physician in Doe v. Bol-
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In addition, I would hold that the statute's failure to provide a clear exception for emergency situations renders it unconstitutional. As the Court recognizes, ante, at 7, n. 8, an
emergency may arise in which delay could be dangerous to
the life or health of the woman. A second physician may not
always be available in such a situation; yet the statute appears to require one. It states, in unqualified terms, that a
post-viability abortion "shall be performed ... only when
there is in attendance" a second physician who "shall take
control of' any child born as a result of the abortion, and it
imposes certain duties on "the physician required by this section to be in attendance." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 (emphasis added). By requiring the attendance of a second physician even when the resulting delay may be harmful to the
health of the pregnant woman, the statute impermissibly fails
to make clear "that the woman's life and health must always
prevail over the fetus' life and health when they conflict."
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 400 (1979).
The Court attempts to cure this defect by asserting that
the final clause of the statute, requiring the two physicians to
"take all reasonable steps ... to preserve the life and health
of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an
increased risk to the life or health of the woman," could be
construed to permit emergency post-viability abortions without a second physician. Ante, at 7, n. 8. This construction
is contrary to the plain language of the statute; the clause
upon which the Court relies refers to the duties of both physicians during the performance of the abortion, but it in no way
suggests that the second physician may be dispensed with.
ton, 410 U. S. 179, 199 (1973): "If a physician is licensed by the State, he is
recognized by the State as capable of exercising acceptable clinical judgment. If he fails in this, professional censure and deprivation of his license
are available remedies. Required acquiescence by co-practitioners has no
rational connection with a patient's needs and unduly infringes on the physician's right to practice."
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Moreover, since the Court's proposed construction is not
binding on the courts of Missouri, 7 a physician performing an
emergency post-viability abortion cannot rely on it with any
degree of confidence. The statute thus remains impermissibly vague; it fails to inform the physician whether he may
proceed with a post-viability abortion in an emergency, or
whether he must wait for a second physician even if the woman's life or health will be further imperiled by the delay.
This vagueness may well have a severe chilling effect on the
physician who perceives the patient's need for a post-viability
abortion. In Colautti v. Franklin, we considered a statute
that failed to specify whether it "require[d] the physician to
make a 'trade-off' between the woman's health and additional
percentage points of fetal survival." 439 U. S., at 400. The
Court held there that "where conflicting duties of this magnitude are involved, the State, at the least, must proceed with
greater precision before it may subject a physician to possible
criminal sanctions." I d., at 400-401. 8 I would apply that
reasoning here, and hold Missouri's second-physician requirement invalid on this ground as well. 9
7
"Only the [Missouri] courts can supply the requisite construction, since
of course 'we lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legislation."' Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 520 (1972), quoting United
States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 369 (1971).
8
A physician who fails to comply with Missouri's second-physician requirement faces criminal penalties and the loss of his license. Mo. Rev.
Stat. §§ 188.065, 188.075 (1983).
• Because I would hold the statute unconstitutional on these grounds,
I do not reach the question whether Missouri's second-physician requirement impermissibly interferes with the doctor-patient relationship. I
note, however, that Missouri does not require attendance of a second physician at any other medical procedure, including a premature birth. There
was testimony at trial that a newborn infant, whether the product of a normal birth or an abortion, ordinarily remains the responsibility of the woman's physician until he turns its care over to another. App. 133; see
ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 31 (1982) ("The individual who delivers the baby is responsible for the immediate post-delivery
care of the newborn until another person assumes this duty").
This allocation of responsibility makes sense. Consultation and team-
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III
Missouri law prohibits the performance of an abortion on
an unemancipated minor absent parental consent or a court
order. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 (1983).
A
Until today, the Court has never upheld "a requirement of
a consent substitute, either parental or judicial," ante, at 11.
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U. S., at 74, the Court invalidated a parental consent requirement on the ground that "the State does not have the
constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and
possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and
his patient, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent." In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979 Bellotti II
eight Justices agreed that a statute permitting a judicial veto
of a mature minor's decision to have an abortion was unconstitutional. See id., at 649-650 (opinion of POWELL, J.); id.,
at 654-656 (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Althou h four Justices
stated in Bellotti II that ap ropna e y structured judicial
consent requirement would be constitutional, id., at 647-648
(opinion of POWELL, J.), this statement was not necessary to
the result of the case and did not command a majority. Four
other Justices concluded that any judicial-consent statute
would suffer from the same flaw the Court identified in Danforth: it would give a third party an absolute veto over the
decision of the physician and his patient. I d., at 65fr656
(opinion of STEVENS, J.).
I continue to adhere to the views expressed by JUSTICE
STEVENS in Bellotti II:
work are fundamental in medical practice, but in an operating room a patient's life or health may depend on split-second decisions by the physician.
If responsibility and control must be shared between two physicians with
the lines of authority unclear, precious moments may be lost to the detriment of both woman and child.

/
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"It is inherent in the right to make the abortion decision
that the right may be exercised without public scrutiny
and in defiance of the contrary opinion of the sovereign
or other third parties .... As a practical matter, I would
suppose that the need to commence judicial proceedings
in order to obtain a legal abortion would impose a burden
at least as great as, and probably greater than, that imposed on the minor child by the need to obtain the consent of the parent. Moreover, once this burden is met,
the only standard provided for the judge's decision is the
best interest of the minor. That standard provides little
real guidance to the judge, and his decision must necessarily reflect personal and societal values and mores
whose enforcement upon the minor-particularly whe~·<i' '1
contrary to her own informed and reasonable decisionis fundamentally at odds with privacy interests underlying the constitutional protection afforded to her decision." 443 U. S., at 655-656 (footnote omitted).
Because Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 permits a parental or judicial veto of a minor's decision to obtain an abortion, I would
hold it unconstitutional.

B
Even if I believed that a State could require parental or judicial consent, I could not accept the Court's conclusion that
the Missouri consent statute should be upheld. Under Missouri law, a minor who has not obtained parental consent may
petition the juvenile court for court consent or the right to
self-consent. Section 188.028. 2( 4) then provides that:
"the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion ... ; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on
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which the petition is denied. . . ."
'
The Court recognizes that this statute "[o]n its face ... authorizes juvenile courts to choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section." Ante, at 13 (footnote omitted). The District Court took a similar view, noting that
"each of the three [alternatives] is clearly independent of the
others, connected in the statute with the disjunctive 'or."'
The District Court also concluded that "[a]lternative (c) permits the court to 'deny the petition,' guided only by the general standard that such action be 'for good cause.'" 483
F. Supp., at 689. The District Court thus found it "clear
... that alternative (c) authorizes the juvenile court to deny
the minor's petition for good cause, but does not require a
prior finding that the minor is not sufficiently mature and not
competent to make a decision regarding abortion independently." Ibid.
If the statute is construed in accordance with its plain language, it would be unconstitutional under the standards set
forth in either the opinion of JUSTICE POWELL or the opinion
of JUSTICE STEVENS in Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at 643-644,
647-648, 652-656. To avoid the necessity of invalidating the
statute, the Court applies the maxim that, "[w ]here fairly
possible, courts should construe a statute to avoid a danger of
unconstitutionality." Ante, at 14. The Court thus approves
the construction adopted by the Court of Appeals, concluding
that a Missouri juvenile court may not "deny a [minor's] petition 'for good cause' unless it first [finds] ... that the minor
was not mature enough to make her own decision." Ante, at
14.
The Court's maxim of statutory construction may be a wise
one for federal courts to follow in discerning the meaning of
federal statutes, but it is not one we can impose on state
courts interpreting their own law. The interpretation of
Missouri law is a matter for the courts of Missouri, and "[t]he
majority's construction of state law is, of course, not bind-
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ing on the Missouri courts." Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. 8., at 101, n. 4 (opinion of
WHITE, J.). A Missouri juvenile court considering a petition
brought by a mature minor may therefore conclude, despite
this Court's optimistic assertion to the contrary, that Missouri's judicial consent statute means exactly what it says: the
court may "for good cause ... [d]eny the petition." 10
It is certainly possible that the courts of Missouri will
agree with this Court and construe Missouri law as the Court
does today. But this is a task that must be left to the state
courts. We cannot perform it for them. In Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti 1), the Court held that
the District Court should have abstained where "an unconstrued state statute is susceptible of a construction by the
state judiciary 'which might avoid in whole or in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least materially change the nature of the problem."' ld., at 147,
quoting Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U. S. 167, 177 (1959); see
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941). I
feel that the District Court should have abstained here as
well. 11 Although Missouri does not have a certification proThis statute was enacted in 1979, after the Court's decision in Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I), but very shortly before its 1979
decision in Bellotti II. The Massachusetts statute held invalid in Bellotti
II, like the Missouri statute before us today, permitted a court to grant or
deny a minor's petition "for good cause shown." See Bellotti II, 443 U. S.,
at 625. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court interpreted this language to authorize the withholding of consent " 'in circumstances where
[the court] determines that the best interests of the minor will not be
served by an abortion,'" even if the minor "'is capable of making, and has
made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion.'" !d., at
630, quoting Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 748, 360 N. E. 2d
288, 293 (1977). The Court does not explain why it expects the Missouri
courts to reach a different result.
11
The Court's interpretation of Missouri law is directly contrary to the
interpretation given by the United States District Judge, who has been on
the Missouri bench, state or federal, for over 30 years. The District Judge
10
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cedure comparable to the one employed in Bellotti I, its rules
of procedure provide for expedited review of questions of
"general interest or importance." Mo. S. Ct. Rules 83.02,
83.06 (1983). In Bellotti I, moreover, we did not "mean to
intimate that abstention would be improper . . . were certification not possible." 428 U. 8., at 151. 12 In cases where
constitutional ·rights of this magnitude are at stake, we
should refrain from speculating on the meaning of Missouri!
law when an authoritative interpretation may be obtained by
other means.

declined to abstain on the basis that "[i]t is clear to this Court that section
188.028 is not susceptible to a reasonable construction which would
avoid the federal constitutional question controlling in Bellotti II." 483
F. Supp., at 690 (emphasis added). This District Judge's interpretation of
the statute should indicate that it is at least sufficiently ambiguous to necessitate abstention. Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 345-347 (1976).
2
' While "speed in resolution" of this constitutional challenge remains important, Bellotti I, 428 U. S., at 151, it is worthy of note that enforcement
of these statutes has been stayed pending the outcome of this litigation.
The District Court would have been free to keep its stay in effect, in exercising its power to retain jurisdiction over the constitutional issue. See
England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 (1964).

81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia

Dear Harry:
I am pleased by your letter of the 18th because,
at long last, we should be able to get a Court together that
will adequately protect all of the relevant interests, and
also afford guidance that is now lacking.
You are generous to express vour willingness to
join my fourth draft in its presP.nt form. Your strong preference, ho~"'ever, would be to omit footnotes 9-17 that include a more detailed statement of the regulations than the
general summary in the text. Altho,Jgh t reallv do not share
your concern, I understand it. Also, I think it is important for both of us to he stronglv supportive of a fourth
draft. After all, we need three more votes.
Accordinqly, if we can ohtatn the concurrence of
Bill Brennan nnd Thurgood in the ooinion, T wiJl remove the
eight footnotes.
It will be necessary, of course, for me to persuade the Chief. J think this can be done to assure a
Court, though I have not spoken to him.
Would you be willing to talk to Bill Brennan, either alone or with me as vou think best?
When John called me on the 18th to say that he
will join your Ashcroft dissent, we discussed the status of
Simopoulos. He recognizes the importance of trying to have
a solid six Court majority, and ha~ agreed to await my
fourth draft. In the discussion with John, I summarized
very briefly the exchanges you and I have had.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
lfp/ss

'·

23, 1983

81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia

Dear Chief:
This is the 4th draft I am circulating this morning. ~he copy marked "4th draft" that you saw - and approved - last week had not then been circulated.
I wanted your approval before I showed it to
Harry. He has now agreed to "go along". He wanted one
change: the deletion of the footnotes that described the
Virginia regulations in netail.
I have agreed. The requlations are summarized in
the text, with specific reference to the section number of
each regulation. The deletion of the Jtll1re detailed description in the footnotes therefore is really immaterial.
I believe we now can get a Court to affirm - rather than remand as RAB and WJB have insisted until now. My
thanks for your cooperation.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
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Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,
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Justice Powell
cc:
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The Conference
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JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR .

May 23, 1983

81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia

Dear Chief:
This is the 4th draft I am circulating this morning. The copy marked "4th draft" that you saw - and approved - last week had not then been circulated.
I wanted your approval before I showed it to
Harry. He has now agreed to "go along". He wanted one
change: the deletion of the footnotes that described the
Virginia regulations in detail.
I have agreed. The regulations are summarized in
the text, with specific reference to the section number of
each regulation. The deletion of the more detailed description in the footnotes therefore is really immaterial.
I believe we now can get a Court to affirm - rather than remand as HAB and WJB have insisted until now. My
thanks for your cooperation.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
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May 23 , 1983
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Simopoulos v. Virginia

Dear Lewis ,
I deeply appreciate the way you ' ve
accommodated my problems.

I am

delighted to join your circulation of
May 23rd .

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
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Justice Powell
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Dear Lewis:
Herewith, for your information, is a copy of the
letter I received from the Catholic Bishop at Fargo.
This was hand delivered to me when I was at the
University at Grand Forks the weekend before last.
Sincerely,

A---Justice Powell

No. 81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia

Dear Bill:
Thank you for your recent letter and kind remarks on my opinion
in this case.

I understood your concerns to be similar to those

expressed by Harry in his letter of March 8 and by John on March 7.
I recognize that vacating and remanding in light of Akron is an
option, but am inclined to believe that we shouln decide the case.
There may be some prudential reasons why the issue in this case
should be avoided, but, as you note, the case is properly before us
on appeal, and the hospitalization issue was argued in briefs and at
oral argument.

There are also prudential reasons to decide the

case: Any remand would leave the law unsettled to some

ae§r ~as

to

the validity of requiring that second-trimester abortions be
performed in state-licensed outpatient clinics that conform
generally to accepted medical practice and requirements.

A decision

by us in all three of these cases should go far to resolve the
existing uncertainties.
I am today circulating a second draft.

I have added two

footnotes and substantially rewritten another specifically with your
concerns in mind.

See nn. 5, 6, 7.

See also n. 9.

I hope these

changes will be helpful.
I look forward to hearing whether my work has addressed the
problems that you raise.
Sincerely,
L • .F.P., Jr.

cc: JUSTICE BLACKMON
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COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services
Richmond, Virginia

June 30, 1977

2

Promulgated under Title 32, Chapter 16, Section 32.297 et seq., of
the Code of Virginia, 1950 as amended and in conformity with the
General Administrative Process Act, Title 9, Chapter 1.1:1, Section
9-6.14:1 et seq.

These are new regulations:
Preliminary Approval by State Board of Health - December 1, 1976.
Public Hearing Held January 26, 1977.
Final Approval by State Board of Health - May 11, 1977.
Effective Date:

June 30, 1977

Copies may be obtained from• State Department of Health, Bureau of
Medical and Nursing Facilities Services, James Madison Building,
109 Governor Street, Richmond, Virginia 23219.

~~··
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The following rules and regulations are presented in three parts: Part I,
general information and procedures for licensure of outpatient hospitals:
Part II, requirements for licensure of outpatient surgical hospitals: ·and
Part III, requirements for licensure of outpatient hospitals performing
abortions only.
Part II of these rules and regulations specify minimum organization, operation
and construction standards for o~ t lent surgical hos p~s. These facilities
are sometimes referred to as "day surgery,~ -an d -out surgery" or "surgi-

centers." The scope of service and types of operative procedures performed
in these facilities are usually multidisciplinary. Operational standards
and clinical requirements are at a level similar to inpatient surgical
facilities.
Part III of these rules and regulations set forth the minimum standards for
the organization, operation and physical facility requirements for outpatient
abortion hospitals. These facilities are usually referred to as "outpatient
abortion clinics." These facilities limit the operative procedures to termination of pregnancy during the first trimester.

i
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OUTPATIENT HOSPITALS
PERFORMING ABORTIONS ONL'i

PART I

GENERAL INFORMATION AND PROCFDURES
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HOSPITALS
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8

PARI' I:

GENERAL INFORMATION AND PROCEDURES

Section 10.0

II

10.1

General Information

Authority
Title 32, Chapter 16, of the Code of Virginia (1950), as amended,
authorizes the Board of Health (hereinafter referred to as Board)
to issue licenses to establish, conduct, maintain, and operate
hospitals. In order to discharge that duty, the Board is empowered
to adopt rules and regulations prescribing minimum standards to
promote the safety and ensure proper attention and service to and
care of patients of hospitals within the State.

10.2

Purpose
These regulations have been promulgated by the Board for the purpose
of defining the minimum standards of operation and construction which
shall be permitted in or by licensed outpatient hospitals, and to:
1

10.3

(a)

Guide the Board in its determination of compliance with licensure
standards as set forth herein; and

(b)

Assist the owner or his authorized agent in the preparation of
an application, architectural drawings and specifications, and
other reports.

Administration
These regulations are administered by the followingr
10.3.1

State Board of Health
The Board of Health has responsibility for promulgating,
amending, and repealing regulations pertaining to the
licensing of hospitals.

10.3.2

State Health Commissioner
The State Health Commissioner (hereinafter referred to as
Commissioner) is the executive officer of the State Board
of Health with the authority of the Board when it is not
in session and subject to such rules and regulations as
may be prescribed by the Board.

10.3.3

Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services
The Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services
(hereinafter referred to as Bureau) of the Department of
Health of the Commonwealth of Virginia is designated as
the primary reviewing agent of the Board for the purpose
of admi~istering these regulations.
2

...

I

9

III

'

I.
!I,,

10.3.4

Bureau Offices
The Bureau maintains a central office in the City of
Richmond with a mailing address of James Madison Building,
109 Governor Street, Richmond, Virginia, 23219.

10.4

Effective Date
These regulations shall be effective on June 30, 1977.

10.5

Extreme Emergency Regulations
If the establishment of an extreme emergency r egulation is necessary
for the preservation of public health, safety or welfare, the Commissioner
may immediately promulgate and adopt the necessary regulation.

10.6

Comp liance and Prohibition
These regulations sha ll apply to '"free standing"' outpatient hospitals.
Such facilities which are operated by and physically attached to a
hospital licensed unde r "'Rules a nd Regulations for the Licensu re of
Genera l and Special Hospitals,"' Department o f Health, shall be subject
to provisions of those regulations.

10.7

Allowable Variance
Upon the finding that the enforcement of one or more of these regulations would be clearly impractical, the Commissioner shall have the
authority to waive, either temporarily or permanently the enforcement
of one or more of these regulations, provided safety and patient care
and se rvi ce are not adversely affected.

10.8

Severability
If any provision of these r egulations or the application thereof to
any facility or circumstances shall be held invalid, such invalidity
shall not affect the provisions or application of the regulations which
can be given effect, and to this end the provisions of the regulations
are declared to be severable.

Section 20.0
20.1

Definitions

Genera l
As used in these regulations, the words and terms hereinafter set forth,
shall have meanings re spective ly set forth unless the context clearly
requires a different meaning.

20.2

Definitions
20.2.1

Board - The State Board of Health.
3
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ABORl SALLY-POW

81-1255 Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft (Missouri)
Conference 12/16/82
CJ absent due to illness.
This memorandum

~

f
summarize the votes on the

issues before us.

M')J- yellm1 net::ES qi..rE S<5illE

meaRs all

det~

of the

bat bV'

Issue No. 1 - Abstention.
Affirm:

8-0.

Issue No. 2 - Parental Notification and Consent
Divided vote - 4-4.

'.,

·'"'

Voting to reverse:

WJB, TM, HAB and JPS

Voting to affirm:

BRW, LFP, WHR, SO'C

110

r

2.

Note:

CAS construed the Missouri statute to

require an independent decision-maker, expressly relying

on my

opinion~n Bellotti I~

* * *
Sl-1623 Ashcroft v. Planned Parenthood

Issue No. 1 - Hospitalization in JCAH Hospitals
Affirmed 5-3 (-s.J abaeflt:1
A vote to affirm in this case sustains CAS
(
holding of invalidity.
Voting to affirm:
Voting to reverse:

WJB, TM, HAB, LFP and JPS.
BRW, WHR and SO'C

Issue No. 2 -Pathologist's Report
CAS held this requirement invalid.

3

Reversed:

0

6-2 (several tentative).

Voting to reverse:

WJB (tentative), , BRW, TM

(
(tentative), LFP

-;5 ~ (

(~

tentative), WHR, and SO'C.

Voting to affirm:
requirement.

i.e., invalidate the

HAB and JPS

Note:

I would not be surprised to see WJB and

TM change their votes on this issue.

I also was

tentative.

Issue No. 3 -Second Physician's Opinion

Invalidated by

CAS
Reversed 5-3.
Voting to reverse (to sustain the requirement)
BRW, LFP, WHR, JPS and SO'C.

4.

Voting to affirm:

Note:

WJB, TM and HAB.

HAB feels strongly about this issue.

He

thinks that sustaining the second physician requirement is
"flatly contrary to Bolton".
first trimesters.

But Bolton involved only

Here the requirement exists only when

the fetus is viable and the state's interest is at its
strongest.

* * *
Issue No. 4 -Attorney's Fee
All vote to Hold for my opinion in Hensley.

ABORTION SALLY-POW

lfp/ss 12/16/82

81-185 Simopoulous v. Virginia - Conference 12/16/82
CJ absent due to illf ness.
This memorandum will summarize the votes on the
three issues before us.

My yellow notes give some - but

~ no means all - of the details.
iW

Issue No. 1 - Burden of Proof on "Necessity"
Affirmed:

8-0.

Issue No. 2 - Sufficiency of Evidence and Causation
Affirmed:

8-0.

Issue No. 3 - Hospitalization

~
Affirm:
1\

5-3

2.

Votes to affirm:

WJB (tentative), BRW, LFP,

WHR, and SO'C.
Reverse and remand:

TM, HAB and JPS

lfp/ss 12/17/82

ABOR2 SALLY-POW

81-746 Akron v. Akron Center (Conference 12/16/82
CJ absent due to illness.
This memorandum will summarize the votes on the
(

three issues before us.

(?,r-~~
Issue No. 1 ...

~) s~
A

-

issue.
there is

J~ou;i&ot;lictiOD-

(Ste:ndil"tg?)

Most of the Justices had not focused on the
WJB saw no standing problem.

a...
ftO
1\

I rather think that

~~

standing, but the only vote we took was on the
1\

merits.

10n and
1nance.

2.

+ •sllli N<l??:-?:- ParliR'sill QePtee R & •

G)~~~~
CA affirmed the DC decision of invalidity.
We

s-~

affirmed~

Voting

~
/\ LFP

(with some questions)

&e~in4tel¥

(if issue is here),

~Ad

to affirm were WJB, TM, HAB,
SO'-e! (-r be1h:vm.

/p~ ~· /j/lwJ Wfl-f<J

s'o'c.

l..

Issue No.

Jr

Parental Notification

The DC invalidated, but CA6 reversed - relying
on Matheson.
In my view, the issue is not here ('~~

~ M~

~#'A

Issue No.

~

dk-

3

/k..4.~c:L~).
to Assure Consent is "Informed"

3•

CA6 invalidated all provisions, and we affirmed
6-2.
Voting to affirm:

WJB, TM, HAB, LFP, JPS and

SO'C

Issue No.

4

1-

f

24 Hour Waiting Period

CA6 held it invalid.
We affirmed 5-3.

Voting to

affirm:~

TM, HAB, LFP, and

JPS.
To reverse:

BRW, WHR and

>
,

so•c

Issue No. ~- Disposal of Fetal Remains
CA6 held invalid.
We affirmed 6-2.

4.

Voting to affirm:

WJB, TM, HAB, LFP, JPS and

SO'C
To reverse:

BRW and WHR

* * *
81-1172 Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Akron
The only issue is the requirement for
hospitalization in all second trimester cases.
CA6 sustained validity reluctantly, relying on
our summary affirmance of the Indiana statute.
We reversed 5-3.
Voting to reverse:
To affirm:

Note:

WJB, TM, HAB, LFP and JPS

BRW, WHR and SO'C

The hospitalization provision in the

Akron ordinance is substantially identical with that in

5•

Missouri.

Second trimester abortions may not be performed

in clinics, even the licensed type like those in Virginia.

:Justices, in Fervent Debate, ·
:Tackle Abortion Issue Again
By Fred Barbash

islation and declare it unconstitutional.
. Supreme Court Justice Harry A.
"Did you personally write this
· Blackmun, author .of the 1973 deci- brief?" he said finally, in a tone of
. lion legaliziog abo~on, leaned for- disgust.
ward, glared down ·al the solicitor
"Substantial portions,• Lee re· .
general of the United States and sponded tersely. ·
It was the dramatic high point of
waved the Reagan administration's
legal bri~f asking the court to ap- three hours of fervent debate yesterprove new and stringent restricUQns day as the Supreme Court began its 1
on abortions. .
most comprehensive review of abor"Mr. Solicitor ·General, 'are you tion law since its 1973 decision. The
asking us to overrule" the abortion justices questioned the lawyers indecision, he snapped at Solicitor . tensely about new medical proce- .
General Rex E. Lee. "It seems to me dures, counseling, and safety in tlie
· that you are ·asking that or you're thousands of abortion clinics estabasking that we overrule Marbury w. lished acr088 the country since ~
Madison: be said sarcastically, re- original ruling.
ferring to ~e 1803 case that estabThey focused as well on the Con- · JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN
lished the court's right to review legSee ABORTION, A8, CoL 1
••• touP QUII&Iaul ud ali&&le ...-cum
Wuhln~~AJn ~t swr Writer
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Justices, Re~~wing Abortion Law~

: , ABORTION, From At
ititution and the relationship between bra+ of government.
At iaa~e were laM in Virginia,
Miaaouri'.lnd Akron, Ohio, that regulate a~: Virjinia BUcceasfully
a doctor for performing
ln abortiOn ' ' his clinic, instead of
in a
required by state
'"'.. ...
.. ~ . .
. Iaw.
Miaaouft.'eDa,:ted a law requiring,
1mong other things, that women be
.hospitalized (or abortions after the
1eeond three months of pregnancy
and obtain parental or court consent
if they are under 18.
Akron, in
in01t far-reaching
legislation, ~posed · among other ·
things a parental consent requirement for women uDder 15, a 24-hour
•cooling-off period" before ari abortion at any stage of pregnancy, and
an Mjnformed consent" provision
forcing doctors to describe in anatomical detail the appearance of the
fetus and to tell patients that it ia a
"human life from the moment of

'

.

.

! .
I

proaecuua

bolp:.f'•

"

(

..

.. ' .

~·

the

conception.~

None of the justices who asked
questions yesterday indicated any
inclination to revise subataptially the
1973 ruling, Roe us. Wack· as anti- · ~~~~~:- • 111.~
abortion forces bad hoped_;:~
··--- ----- --• -·
In fact, the arguments before the
.·
court yesterday revolved around
whether the new laM were consis- Lawyer Alan G. ~ cleleada Akron law reqalriDI doctors to delcribe the fetut to wor
tent with Roe vs. Wade, which held
that m01t abortions-the ones in the
early stages of pregnancy-were a tion or chiidbirth." The Akron law law creates a doetor•patient relationmatter of choice between a woman helps women make that choice by lhip in abortion dinics where he
giving them the information about ..WUtained .that none would exist
and her doctor.
otherwise. .
the
fetus, he said.
Akron's lawyer, AJan G. Segedy, ·
Segedy urged the court to give
"The state has an int.eres't in prosaid the municipal law, appealed to tecting the woman's freedom of ltates and cities more flexibility to
the Supreme Court after being choice whether or. not to have an . impoee restrictions on abortions in
struck down by a federal ·appeals abortion .... This ia nOt a burden- the ftrat three months of pregnancy.
court in Ohio, did not rob women of some law. This is a choice-enhancing States should not have to ahow a
choice.
•compelling" reuon for restrictions,
law.•
,· "The right II DOt a right to have
The doctor-patient relationship is be said.
an ·abortion," he told the co\lft, "but oot disrupted by the Akron ordiStephen Landsman, representing
the right to make a deciaion: abo!-/ nance, Segedy added. Rather, the Akron abortion clinics challenging

_____,______·u

...

.

-; ,..... '.' .. .

Asl{ed to Approve Restrictions
.

..

:

~

~ ~· .'

.

'•.

" · ·-: ~ .7'• .•.

; · ,

'

. ......

I

'

By Vl•ctor luhau tor t.he Wuhtncton Poet ·

oateD

NekJDI abortloas: "The right is ••• the right to mak:e a cleeisioa," ht tells court.

the law, pointed out that the ordi·
nance impoees more reculationa on
women eeeking abortions than are
Imposed on mental patients eeeking ·
medical treatment. •Jt treats women
as if they are not to be trusted to
know their own minds and to make
rational decisions.•
-rhe real purpoee of all these statutes,• uid Frank Susman, repreeent·
ing PJanned Parenthood Association
of Kansas City, "is to thwart" abor. tiona.

·

Lawyers defending the hospitalilation requirements in all three jurU!dictions argued that Roe vs. Wade
permitted the hospitalization requirements by uying that in the
fmt three months of pregnancy, the
atate may regulate abortions in order
to protect the health of the woman.
Hoepitala, rather than abortion clinics, are belt able to IChieve that,
they aaid.
-But there's no law preventing a
doctor from doing brain IUrpry out·

side a hospital, is there," said Justice
John Paul Stevens. "A doctor could
do that at home, couldn't he," he
told Deputy Virginia Attorney General William G. Broaddus.
Missouri Attorney General John
Ashcroft said there was a "medical
debate" about whether abortions
were safer in a hospital or in a clinic
in the early period of the second trimester. "When a medical debate
rages, I think the state ought to have
the ability to err on the side of safety."
The Reagan administration en·
tered the eases as a "friend of the
court." Lee told Blackmun that the
1ovemment was not asking now for a
reversal of 'the 1973 abortion ruling.
"That issue must await another day,"
he aaid. But he said that in reviewing abortion regulations, the courts
should more often defer to legislatures, which are better equipped
than eourta to make such sensitive
policy choices.
"At Che end _of the day, the decisions must be made by the _courts,"
he acknowledged. "But the courts
must be mindful of the choices already JWtde" by those elected by the
voters. "Balancing" of competing interest. is involved in abortion regulation, Lee said. And legislatures
"do it (the balancing) better."
Frank Susman, the lawyer chaJ.
lenging the Missouri law, called
Lee's argument a "terrifying
thought" that attacks the "very foundations of liberty." It would result in
the "bargaining away" of fundamental rights, Susaman said. "A hundred
and seventy-nine years of constitutional history would appear to fly
out the door."
The cases heard yesterday were
Simopoulos vs. Virginia, City of
Akron vs. Akron Center for Reproductive Health , and Planned Partnthood Association of Kansas City
111. Ashcroft, Attorney General of
Missouri Et AI.
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81-746 Akron
}

\

There are two sections that tend to be confused:
,,., ,r:>n

Section 1870.05(A) requires with respect to women

'v, ·'''

unrler 18, the giving of 24 hours prior notice to a parent or
guar di an "unless the abortion is ordered by a court having
jurisdiction".

(the "notice provision")

· Section 1870.05(B) provides, with respect to minors under 15, that written consent must be obtaineo both
from the minor and a parent or
~-

\

;,

t

K

!

qu~rdian

unless approval has

been obtained fr.om a cour.t having jurisdiction. (the "con-

i:

sent" provision)

-~~-~~

;•;.lll
v_j

_.f''

.

:~.

The Notice Provision is Not
... ·l".'t'he DC invalidated both the not i.ce
provisions.

~nd

consent

The original defendants (the city, etc.) did

not appeal; but intervenors did appeal. ' Relying on
~.

.t"
,~

',,

Matheson, and part i.cularly on my concurr lng opinion,
reversed.

C~6

Matheson sustained the notice provision because

the minor. in that case made no claim either. that she was
mature or that her best interests would not be ser.ved by
parental notification.
tn this case, CA6 noted that the intervenors - the
only appealing parties - ·a,re "parents of unmarried minor
daughters".'

Neither the maturity nor condition with respect

to emancipation of. these minors was shown.

CA6 accordingly

held that the notice provision "is a constitutionally per-

'·.~·

,

''

'

2.

missible reogulation insofar. as it a.pplies to immature minors
who live with their parents, are dependent upon them and are
.,

not emancipated by marriage or ptherwise".

This leaves open

situations where the minor is mature or emancipated or where
..
~\
::.;/ . ~~ ,;
"notice would not be in her best i.nterest". ,-,~.:.;,
Accordinqly, CA6 reversed the DC. · It thus he]d ''"
that
''

~1870.05

(A) i.s facially va

irl.~

Apparently no appeal

was taken from this decision. · Even the brief on behalf of
the original plaintiffs (the clinics and the phvsicians)
states in footnote 79, p. 48 (red brief) that §1870.05(A) is
"not before this Court". ·
ill'

'.'!.,1

Consent Provision May Be Here [Sl870.05(B)]
CJ\.6 affirmed the ded.sion of the District Court
invalidating the consent provision.

Again, it

~11as

held that

no independent decision-maker was provided because juvenile
courts - even when they have 1urisdiction - are required to
'A·

notify
parents.
\1 .

CA6 relied on Danforth.

On the merits, 1 would affirm on the •. basis
of my•
'·· y'''
~(

prior opinions.

~·

'

,<,;
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81-1255 Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft (Missouri)
Conference 12/16/82

.'

CJ absent due to illness .

·,

This memorandum summarizes the votes on the issues

before us.
.,. '

Issue No . 1 - Abstention.
Affirm:

rssu~

8-0 .

No. 2 - Parental Notification and Consent
Divided

""..: ~~
~· {,:•. -!>' '#'

VOtP -

,

4-4.

.,

Voting to reverse:

WJB , TM, HAB and JPS

Voting to affir.m:

BRN, T.FP, NHR, SO ' C

....

NotP: c~s ~on~trueo the Missouri statute to require an in~eoenoent deciRion - maker, expressly relying on my
opinion in Bellotti II.
..

~-

.J

~1-

* * *

A-

"j.'

Ashcroft v . PJanned Parenthood

'I

Issue No. 1 - Hospi ta 1 t zat ton in ,"J'CAH Hosr;>i ta ls
.,

. -~~-

Affirrn~n

5-3

. '

A vote to affirm in this case SUStRins CAB holding
of invalidity.
~·.

.!1

ti'

W,'JB , TM , HA'A , r.. FP and .lPS.

Votinq to affirm:
Voting to reverse:

BRlA1, WHR and SO ' C
'•!>I

,,

...
,..

,.' ~~\. 'i:'
"•·

'

.
.

\

..

''I';•

t·

2.

Issue No. 2 - Pathologist's Report
CAS held this requirement invalid.
t, ,,

'f.!

Reversed:

!";

6-2 (several tentative).

Voting to reverse: WJB (tentative), BRW, TM (tentative), LFP (tentative), WHR, and SO'C.
~·
CJ!'

•:,

ment.

~c' ~,
l

' ~·

HAP

Vottnq to affirm:
ano JPS

i.e., invalidate the require-

)·;:

."

,,,~I j

Note: I would not be surprised to see w~lB and TH
change their votes on this issue. I also was tentative.
Issue Mo. 3 - Second

Phy~ician's

Opinion _ Invalidated

CAS
R~versed

5-3.

Voting to reverse (to suf:;tain the . requirement)

' \ '1

BRW, I,FP, WHl:t, JPS and SO' C.
Voti.ng

to affirm:

,.. ""' •'
r7JB, ,.,M

anr1 'RAB.
•

lj

Note:
ltAR feels strongly about this issue. He ,.,.''
thinks that sustaining the second physician requirement is
"flatly contrary to Bolton". But Bolton involved only first
trimesters. Here the requirement exists only when the fetus
is viable and , the state's interest is at its strongest.

' ·'· .:ti. * *
to Halo for

,i
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81-746 Akron v. Akron Center (Conference 12/16/82
CJ absent due to illness.
~his memorandum will summarize the votes on the
three issues before us.

Issue No. 1 - Parental Consent
(i) Standing: Most of the Justices had not focused on the issue. WJB saw no standing problem. I rather
thlnk that there is a standing problem, but the onlv vote we
took was on the merits.
··tl>

(ii) Merits of Parental Consent:

., ' ',S' I',. I> •

'}
•W

CA

affirmed the DC decision of invalidity. ·

We affirmed 5-3 (with some questions)
Voting to affirm were tiJB, , .™' HAB, and LFP (if
issue i. s here) .
~To reverse:
Issue No. 2
The
I•'

BRW, W'HR, SO'C

Parental Notification
DC

invalidated, but

CA6

I,

"j~l

reversei.i - r_elyinq on

Matheson.

··~·

>}~;.! ~··

In my view, the issue is not here.
on notice and consent).
On merits we affirmed 5-3.

(See my memo
:I

'·;'."

Voting to affirm:

To reverse:

WJB, TM, HAB

Issue No. 3 - Provisions to Assure Consent is "tnformed"
CA6 invalidAted all provisions, anii

\-Te

affirmed

6-2.

.

,.

.

'

2.
,:_:
{

.:'·

-'i.

-r(•

Voting to affirm:

WJB, TM, HAB, LFP, JPS and SO'C

)·'

~ro

' t: "

'1'0

J'

~.1

..

'l'

~

"

~~

reverse:

Issue No. 4

'f''''

WHR

BR~~,

~iii-

'1'

24 Hour r,.;ra it inq ·perior!

CA6 held it invalid.
~Je

I.

affirmed '5-3.

'"'"

Voting to affirm:

WJB,

T~,

HAB, LFP ann ,lPS.
··;(;·,.,

~--

l'f'o

~--,

..

reverse:

BRW, WRR and SO'C

~

' -~~~

.,.,

Issue No. 5

Dispo~al

of Fetal Remains

,; .. ·)

l,'lil;

''

CA6 held invalid.
''

., We affirmed 6-2.
Vot5nq to Affirm:
To reverse:

BRW and

* *
81-1172 Akron Center for Reoroductive Health v. Akron

'rhe only issue is the requireme"lt for
tion in all secono trimester cases. ,
CA6 sustained validity reluctantly~
aummary affirmanct=- of the Indiana statute. ';,
~·

11'

hospltaliza'~ \
· \~

. relying

on our

f •,;

;),

We 1reversed S-3.
Voting to reverse:
To affirm:

BR~'J,

·.{''

, T'JHR

and SO' c., ,

Note: The hospitalization provision
the Akron
ordinance is substantially identical with that in Missouri.
Second trimester abortions may not be Performed in clinics,
~ :~,'
even the licensed type like those in Virginia.
j

,.

..

"
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Bl-185 Sirnopoulous v. Virginia - Conference 12/16/82
(':,

rJ absent due to illness.

This memorandum will summarize the votes on the
three issues before us. My yellow notes give some - but by
no means all - of the details.
Issue No. l - Rurden of Proof on
Affirmed:

"Nece~sity"

8-0.

Issue No. 2 - Sufficiency of F.vidence and Causation
Affirmed:

B-0.

Issue No. 3 - Pospitalization

and

so•c.

Votes to affirm:

WJB (tentative), BRW, LFP, WHR,

Reverse and remand:

TI-t, HAB and JPS

li.

Virginia's provision for clinics distinguishes
this case from Akron and Ashcroft.

..,.

'

..

'··

·•

17, 1982

,

Abortion Cases

<

Dear Chief:

!n accordance with your. request, I now send out to
your residence a me~orandum that summarizes the voting in
these three cases.
I also enclose a memorandum that deals particular:
ly with the confusing auestions in the Akron case of
"notice" and ~consent ...
.;;·,

':''1·:

~here were so many issues that recording the votes
became somewhat speculative. There may be a few mistakes in
my notes. o';~,''
,u:

RPcause of the multiplicity of issues, and also
because we were following your form chart primarily, my explanatory notes arP too haphazrd to be of much assistance.
Often we would take a vote with no discussion.
In my view,
the hospitalization issue is the most important one. We
have a Court - including Bill Brennan - to affirm
''\
Simopoulos. Unlike the Virginia qt~tute, both Akron and
Missouri require all second semester abortions in hospitals, .
without exception for clinics however adequate.
On questions relating to notice of parents and
parental consent, I adhered to views expressed by me in
Bellotti I I and Matheson. These also are important and
recurring issues.
If ~ I
"-~?

can be of any assistance, do not hesitate to

call on my. ~:. ~

'~ rdo hope you are proqressinq satisfactorily,
and will not strain to return here until you have fully
recovered.

The
lfp/ss

A-~ ·-

~~ ~.

,~1~~; ~ 1~

..•. ~··
ltjj.;

;;

'li:_

December 17, 1982
I

··;:-

Abor t ion Cases

·'

MEMO TO THB CONFFRENCB:

WI

/

I found the consent ana notice provisions o f the
Akron ordinance confusinq, and still do to some extent .

f

With respect to the consent provision
I voted to affirm on the merits . There may
still be a standing problem for me .

§1870 . 05(B) -

t~
, As to the notice provision, I was uncertain as to
whether it is before UR at all. I am now satisfie~ that it
is not. See the brief on behalf of the original plaintiffs
(respondents and cross petitioners brief) at p. 48, footnote

79 .

''\

If the Court reaches the merits , I would affirm on
the basis of Matheson. CA6 reversed the District Court's
holaing of invalidity, relying on Matheson . See appendix ,
p. 12a, 13a.

.

•..

""

~.-'
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10 Years After the Abortion Decision
By TBUY EAS11.AND
Ten years ago this week the Supreme
Court ruled that a woman has an almost
unrestrictable rtgbt to seek an abortion.
Roe v. Wade began a decade of con trover·
sies, the most recent of wbkh arise from
conrressional attempts to reverse or mod·
lfy the decision. Wbatever one may think
of tbese recent efforts-and I am yet to be
persuaded by any of them-and whatever
one may think of the morality of abortion,
the court's decision 10 years ago was mls·
taken. 'l1lat was clear then, and time has
ooly served to empbaslze the mistake and
to Indicate Its gravity.
Roe v. Wade bolls down to this: A
woman has a constltuHonally protected
rtgbt to seek an abortion. It ts an absolute
rtgbt durtnr the first three months of preg·
nancy. After that, and up to the point of
"viabUity"-which the court defined as the
fetus' "capabUity of meaningful life" -the
rtgbt may be llmlted only by the state's In·
terest In protecting the health of the
mother. After vlabWty, wbkh the court
reckoned to occur at the seven·mooth
mart of a pregnancy, the rtgbt may be
llmlted and even proscribed by the state's
Interest In "the potentiality of human life,"
unless abortloo Is necessary to preserve
the life or bealth ol the woman.
Note the word "health." Inasmuch u
the court. In a companion case to Roe, rec·
op1Jed a vey broad deftD1tloo ol"bealth,"
lncludtnr the prepant woman's "emotlooal weU·belnr.'' the rtPt to an aborUoo
could euOy be exerdled In the tblrd trt·
mester ot prepancy. Thus the abortioD
rtPt &IIDOWlCed by the court Ill Jan. 22.
1J73, wu vlrtually unl1mlted.

Numerous Problems
A wide fiDit! of scbolars boldlnf both
pro- and antl·abortloo beliefs quickly
pointed out the nwnerous problems with
Roe v. .Wade. These Included mtstalces In
blstory, lldence and law. But the essential
difftculty wu, U It remalDI today, that
Roe v. Wade lmpoled m the Dation a view
ot the abortiCil lillie llcklDI COIIItltutloaal
warrant.
A riPt to abortion obvloully can't be
found In the Coostltutloo. Neither can It
reallll\lbly be concluded trom a prtnclpjed

interpretation of the Constitution. The
court thought the right might Inhere In the
14th Ameildment, but It can lie there only
on a reading of Individual liberty and the
famlly that has only the slightest legal precedellt and Dies In the face of AmericaD lepl and social history.
To be sure, the court did recognize that
If the unborn were a person, It would deserve 14th Amendment protection, and the
abortion liberty would be significantly clr·
cumscrtbed. But the court combed through
the Constitution to conclude that the word
"person" In that docwnent nowhere hu
"pre-natal appUcatlon." Turnln&' to the ex·
perts In medicine, philosophy and tbeol·
OCY, the court said that because they could
DOt reach a consensus as to wben life be-

ethical considerations than social embar·
rassment, dislike of children, lost wages,
career planning and the "wronr" sex of
the unborn child.
Since 1973, the nature of the court's decision has become even clearer. Its essen·
tially legislative character II Indicated by
the stream of litigants who have gone to
the court In 1976, 1977, 1979, 1981 and now
again this year aslt1ng for clartflcatlon and
testin&' the decision's limits. ADd the fact
that It violates the view many people still
have of abortion ethics Is Indicated by the
several efforts to hedge the lmpUcatlons ol
Roe v. Wade (such as the Hyde amendment problbltin&' federal fundlnc of abortion), aome ot wblcll bave been succesl·
ful.

Whatever one thinks of the morality of abortion, the
Supreme Court's decision 10 years ago was mistaken, and
time has only emphasized the gravity of the mistake.
(ins, then neither could It, and, thus, nel·
ther could the citizens of any state actin&'
tbrou(b their legislature.

Thts act of "raw judicial power,'' as
Justice White called It In hts vigorous dis·
sent, prevented the states from balancing
concern for the mother and concern for the
unborn In the many other ways that are
clearly possible and wblch the citizens ot
tbe various states then clearly preferred.
In 1J73, a small nwnber of states pennlt·
ted abortions of pregnancies lnvolvinl
rape, Incest or fetal defonnlty, and a very
few allowed abortions for no reason. All of
these states, however, set limits on latetenn abortions. No state pennltted a rlcht
to abortion so expansive u the one protected by the court.
·
Without clearly advertlnr to what It
surely must have known It was doln&, the
court pve the green llibt to abortion for
almost any reason, lncludlni none at all.
Roe v. Wade thus was an affront not
merely to those wbo bold that the unborn
deserve the fullest protection. It was also
an affrlllt to those many Americans who
do not consider themselves part of the
"pro-life" movement but wbo deeply beUeve that abortion Involves more serious

With the fetus' status as a human beln(
In limbo, the court said It could not be a
constitutionally protected person. The most
It would say was that fetuses beyond the
28th week have "potential life" -a curious
pbrase, inasmuch as some fetuses of even
lesser are have bad actual life. They have
survived outside the womb; miraculously,
some have survived desptte eftortl to abort
them.
A case for tncludln&' the unborn amonr
those covered by tbe 14th Amendment Is at
least as plausible u the court's arcument
that the rtpt to abortion Is secured by tbe
Coostltutlon. Protection of the unborn bu
a more dlst1ngulsbed blstorlcal and lepl
pedigree In this nation than does the Uberty to abort. Interestinely, during the tat·
ter half of the 19th century, wben most
states moved to problblt abortion except
when the mother's life was endangered,
there was no serious orpnized opposttloo
argulnf for the constitutional ri&'bt to abortion that tbe court discovered In 1J73. In·
deed, women's &'fOUJlS did DOt oppo1e tbe
·
antl·abortlon movement.
Even so, the safest conclusion of law
and blstory Is that neither the abortion Uberty nor the ript to life of the unborn Is
secured beyond doubt by the Constitution.

'\J"-

Faced with this, the court should have deferred to the states and thus to the Jud&'·
ments of citizens as expressed through
their legislatures. As .ouver Wendell
Holmes once said, wisely, the 14th Amend·
ment does not etve ~ jiiiUces "carte
blanche to embody (their) ecooomk or
moral beUefs In ltl problbltlool." In Roe v.
Wade, however, the court read ltl on
moral bellefs Into tbe Coostltutloo to ere.
ate the abortion Uberty and tbeD proceeded ·
to act lllte a legislature In settlDC Jortll tM
CODdltions ol lts exercise.

A Fallible lastltudoD

ODe of the most serious consequences
of the court's decision touches tbe deepest
foundations of our society. Our system of
law depends oo respect for Individual life,
a value rooted In the Judeo-<lu1stlan ethic.
The court's decision In Roe v. Wade cannot
ftslly be recoocUed with that value. Indeed, It points the way toward a future In
which' respect for human life becomes, lllte
beauty, merely relative. Tbe court teaches
through Its dectslons, and there Is some ev·
ldence-one thinks of the "Infant Doe"
case In Bloomington last year-to suuest'
that the people are now more disposed to ·
place relative values on human life.
·
Today It ls fuiUonable for some to crltl· •
clz.e those wbo say the Supreme Court ll•:
wroac. All too frequently defeuse of a ;
court decision seems to become a ~~
ment ot tbe court'slnfalllbUlty, and too of.
ten It Is u1d that tbe Ccllltltutlon II what'
the court says It Is. But, u Llncoln ooce
remarked, a declllon by the court II DOt a
"thus sayetb tbe Lord"; tbe judklary, lllte
tbe other two brancbes or our penunent.·'
II a falUble lnltltutloo.
To be sure, It may not be clear wbat the :
next step beyond criticism of the court ~
should be-whether leelslatloo, a COIIIUtu·=·tlooal amendment, a packlnr ot tbe court,"
a withdrawal of jurlldlctllll-and IOIIle"
steps are wtaer than otben. But It II certain that whatever step II takell C&DDOt be··
taken unl• t1ae wbo belleve tbe court '·
wu wroq In a liven lnltaDce speak up '
wben tbey bafe tM chaDce. ADd 10 yean
qo, In Roe v. Wade, tbe court wu::
I

wron&'-&er1ously WfOIII.

l'

Mr. Eatliuld is editor tl Ute Virgillia····

AwL

~

~utttt

<!fouri ltf tfr~ ~mu~ ~httts
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C HAMBERS OF"

March 8, 1983

JUSTI CE H ARR Y A . BLA CKMU N

Dear Lewis:
Re:

Abortion Cases

My writing this letter is presumptuous, but I dare to do so
because of experience I have had with the Clerk and the Reporter
in the past.
I am in hearty agreement with your treating the Akron case 5
as the primary one. Your three opinions all indicate that the
order in which they are to be reported is Akron first, Missouri
second, and Simopoulos third.
Numerical order, however, seems to be a routine fact of
life here in the Court, and, unless specific and positive instructions are given to Mr. Lind and Mr. Stevas, the case with
the lowest number always will be first.
This is why Simopoulos
was argued first (a mistake in my opinion) at the December session.
If you indicate and stress your preference to Henry Lind
he will, I am sure, follow it. But, if not, Simopoulos will be
reported first and your "post" and "ante" references will be
changed.
I certainly shall support you in this minor skirmish.
Sincerely,

~~
Justice Powell

Harch 14, 1983

Abortion Cases

Dear Harry:
'

~his fq to thank you for your note of March 8 sug., qesting that ~essrs. Lind and Stevas be requestPd to report
• ,these cases i.n the fo 11o~'ing order: Akron 1 Missouri and
'• Simoooulos.

this.

I may well have overlooked the desirability of
Si. ncer.e1y 1

Justice Blackmun
1fp/ss

.

..

~upum.t Qflluri gf tlf.t ~it.tb ~bd.t~

Jl'RS'.lfin:gton. ~. <lJ.

2llc?~~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 9, 1983

Re:

81-746 & 81-1172 - City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Repro. Health

Dear Lewis:
Your new footnote responding to the dissent is
effective. You need not change a word to keep me
happy, but I have two thoughts to suggest for your
consideration:
First, in the third sentence of the second
paragraph, would it not be more accurate to say
that the dissent's reasoning "would accomplish
precisely that result."
Second, in the next to the last sentence in
the footnote, I wonder if you might consider a
revision along these lines: "In sum, it appears
that the dissent would uphold virtually any
abortion-inhibiting regulation because every
such regulation is rationally related to the
State's interest in preserving potential human
life. This analysis is wholly incompatible

"
As I say, these are just suggestions.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell

81-746 City of Akron v. Akron Center

lfp/ss 06/14/83

for Reproductive Health, Inc.
AKRON SALLY-POW
This Term we have considered three cases that
present challenges to laws regulating abortions.
v.

Wade

this

Court

recognized

a

woman's

In Roe

constitutional

right to choose abortion - subject to the state interests
also recognized by the Court.
ago.

None of our

Roe was decided a decade

subsequent cases has questioned Roe's

authority as a constitutional precedent.

We respect the

doctrine of stare decisis, and today we reaffirm Roe.
The first of the three cases
Court

of

Appeals

for

the

Sixth

is here from the

Circuit.

This

case

involves a comprehensive city regulatory ordinance.

Its

validity was questioned by several abortion clinics and
physicians.

Five

of

the

ordinance's

provisions

are

at

issue here.
The first and most important requires that all
second-trimester abortions be performed in an acute care,
full

service hospital.

If valid,

it would prevent this

surgical procedure from being performed in an outpatient
clinic - however well staffed and equipped.

2.

The

Court

of

Appeals

held

that

this

hospital

requirement is constitutional.
In

Roe

v.

Wade

we

held

that,

beginning

at

approximately the end of the first trimester of pregnancy,
a

state "~ enact

relate

to

health.
free

the

abortion

preservation

regulations
and

that

protection

reasonably

of

maternal

It was made clear, however, that a state is not

to

adopt

regulations

that

depart

from

accepted

medical practice, and that impose unnecessary burdens on a
woman's access to an abortion.
There is convincing evidence American College of
other

medical

Obstetricians

authorities

accepted by the

and Gynecologists

that

abortions

-

at

and

least

during the first few weeks of the second trimester - can
be performed safely in appropriate non-hospital facilities
at substantially less cost than in a full hospital.
In light of the record
the

Akron

unreasonably

hospital
burdens

in this case, we think

requirement
the

woman's

unnecessarily
right.

We

and

therefore

reverse the Court of Appeals on this issue.
There are four other provisions of
before this Court.

They relate to

{i}

the~ordinance

parental consent,

{ii} informed consent, {iii} a 24-hour waiting period, and

·.,

•.
i

,.

3.

(iv) disposal of fetal remains.

For the reasons stated in

our opinion, we agree with the Court of Appeals that each
of these provisions also is invalid.
Justice O'Connor has filed a dissenting opinion,
joined by Justices White and Rehnquist.

lfp/ss 06/14/83

81-1255 Planned Parenthood Association
of Kansas City, Inc. v. Ashcroft

SPEECH2 SALLY-POW
The

second

of

these

cases

comes

to

us

on

certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
It

involves

four

provisions

of

a Missouri

statute

that

comprehensively regulates the performance of abortions.
The

first

of

these

is

a

hospital

substantially similar to that in Akron.

requirement

For the reasons

stated in that case, we affirm the judgment of the Court
of Appeals that the Missouri requirement is invalid.
A second

provision

requires

minors

to

secure

parental or judicial consent before obtaining an abortion.
The

Court

of

requirement.

Appeals

each

the

validity

of

this

We agree and affirm its judgment.

A third
for

sustained

provision

abortion

requires

performed.

invalidated this requirement.
Finally,

fourth

a

The

a

pajtholgy
Court

of

report
Appeals

We disagree and reverse.
provision

requires

the

presence of a second physician during abortions performed
after the fetus has become viable.

The Court of Appeals

invalidated this provision.

''·

...
".'

,.'
i

..'•

2.

As was made clear

in Roe, after viability the

state has a compelling interest in preserving the life of
a viable fetus.
invalidating

We think the Court of Appeals erred in

the

second-physician

requirement,

and

we

reverse its judgment.
The

views

of

the

Justices,

however,

have

diverged considerably O n the issues in this case.
With respect to the several opinions, Parts III,
IV,

and V of my opinion were joined only by the Chief

Justice.
Justice Blackmun has filed an opinion concurring
with respect to the hospital requirement, but dissenting
on

the

other

three

issues.

His

opinion

is

joined

by

Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.
Justice O'Connor has filed an opinion dissenting
from

the

judgment

on

the

hospitalization

issue,

but

concurring in the judgment on the other three issues.

She

is joined by Justices White and Rehnquist.

81-185 Simopulous v. Virginia

lfp/ss 06/14/83
SPEECH3 SALLY-POW
This
Virginia.

is

an

appeal

from

the

Supreme Court of

The appellant is an obstetrician-gynecologist.

At his unlicensed clinic, he performed an abortion - by
injection of saline solution - on a 17-year-old woman who
was approximately 22 weeks pregnant.
Appellant

was

convicted

of

violating

the

Virginia statute requiring that second-trimester abortions
be performed in a licensed hospital.

The Supreme Court of

Virginia affirmed the conviction.
Under

Virginia

law,

the

term

defined to include outpatient hospitals.

"hospital"

Regulations of

the Virginia Department of Health provide
trimester

abortions

may

be

performed

surgical hospitals licensed by the state.
of

Akron ordinance

and

is

that secondin

outpatient

Unlike the City

the State of Missouri

statute,

Virginia does not require that second-trimester abortions
be performed in acute-care, full-service hospitals.
On their face,

the Virginia regulations appear

to be generally compatible with accepted medical standards
governing outpatient second-trimester abortions.

'',-:r

i'

2.

We have not considered whether the regulations
are

constitutional

in

every

particular,

for

appellant

declined to challenge them specifically.
We
adequately

have

no

equipped

reason

to doubt,
upon

clinic

however,

proper

that

an

application

-

could be licensed to perform second-trimester abortions.
We
requirement
in

.

that

licensed

furthe~e

therefore,

conclude,

second-trimester

clinics

is

not

an

Virginia's

that

abortions

be performed

unreasonable

means

of

state's compelling interest in protecting the

woman's health.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is
affirmed.
Justice 0' Connor,
Rehnquist,

has

filed

joined by Justices White and

an opinion concurring

concurring in the judgment in part.
filed a dissenting opinion.

in

part

and

Justice Stevens has

lfp/ss 06/14/83

81-1255 Planned Parenthood Association
of Kansas City, Inc. v. Ashcroft

SPEECH2 SALLY-POW
The second of these cases comes us on certiorari
to

the

Court

involves

of

four

Appeals

provisions

for
of

the
a

Eighth

Missouri

Circuit.
statute

It
that

comprehensively regulates the performance of abortions.
The

first

of

these

is

a

hospital

substantially similar to that of Akron.

requirement

For the reasons

stated in that case, we affirm the judgment of the Court
of Appeals that the Missouri requirement is invalid.
A second provision requires a pathology report
for

each abortion performed.

minors

to

secure

prental

obtaining an abortion.
validity

of

both

of

A third provision requires
or

judicial

consent

before

The Court of Appeals sustained the
these

requirements.

We

agree

and

affirm its judgment.
Finally,

a

fourth

provision

requires

the

presence of a second physician during abortions performed
after the fetus has become viable.

The Court of Appeals

invalidated this provision.
As was made clear in Roe,

the state's interest

in the woman's health is compelling, but after viability

2.

the state also has a compelling interest in preserving the
life of a viable fetus.
erred

in

invalidating

We think the Court of Appeals

the

second-physician requirement,

and we reverse its judgment.
The

views

of

the

Justices,

however,

diverged considerably of the issues in this case.

have

To this

point I have announced only the judgment of the Court.
With respect to the several opinions, Parts III,
IV and V of my opinion were joined by the Chief Justice.
Justice Blackmun has filed an opinion concurring
with respect to the hospital requirement, but dissenting
on

the

other

three

issues.

His

opinion

is

joined

by

Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens.
Justice O'Connor has filed an opinion dissenting
from

the

judgment

on

the

hospitalization

issue,

but

concurring in the judgment on the other three issues.

She

is joined by Justices White and Rehnquist.

CASE

S irropoulos v.
Virginia
No. 81-185

s.ct. va.

ISSUE/REQUIRMENI'

DECIS 100 BELCM

Failure to allege
or prove lack of
maternal necessity
Failure to prove
causation
Hospitalization
in 2d trimester

Requuement
held valid

Planned
Parenthood

v.
Ashcroft
No. 81-1255
CA8
Ashcroft

v.
Planned
Parenthood
No. 81-1623

Attorneys fees

Akron Ctr
for Reproductive
Health

v.
Akron
No. 81-1172

Hospitalization in
2d trimester

Valid.

VOI'E

lfp/ss 02/02/83

Rider A, p. 14 (Simopoulos)

SIMOP14 SALLY-POW
The
abortion

regulations

clinics"

applicable

include

addressed

to

abortion.

identical

to

those

some
In

surgical hospitals" as defined.
n.

---

and

provisions

most

applicable

to

respects,

to

"other

"outpatient
explicitly
they

are

outpatient

See supra, at p.

The regulations may be grouped for

purposes of discussion into three main categories.
The

first

grouping

relates

mainly

to

organization, management, policies and staffing - matters
not presently relevant.

These do require personnel and

facilities "necessary to meet patient and program needs."
§§40.1,

40.3.

They

require

a

policy

and

procedures

manual, §43.2, 12 an administrative officer, §40.6, and a

Rider A, p. 2 (Simopoulos)

lfp/ss 02/02/83

Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic witt
her boy friend.

The abortion was performed by means of an

injection of a saline solution.
she

planned

understood

to

deliver

that

the

appellant

P.M. told appellant that

fetus

in

agreed

a

this

motel,
was

and

all

she

right.

Appeellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analegsic and a
"Post-Injection
undergone

"a

Information"

surgical

sheet

procedure"

range of normal reactions".

that

stated

and warned of

does not recall being advised

when labor began,

a

had

"wide

The sheet also advised that

she call the doctor if "heavy bleeding began".
P.M.

she

Although

to go to a hospital

this was specified in the instruct ion

sheet.

* * *
Jim:

I

have elaborated on the facts a bit, as these are

important background
theopinion

of

to

Virginia

this

case.

Supreme

questioned by petitioner's briefs.

My

Court.

facts
They

came

from

are

not

lfp/ss 02/02/83

Rider A, p. 2 (Simopoulos)

Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with
her boy friend.

The abortion was performed by means of an

injection of a saline solution.

P.M. told petitioner that

she planned to deliver the fetus in a motel, and petitioner
agreed that this was all right.

Petitioner gave P.M. a

"Post-Injection Information" sheet and a perscription for an
analgesic that her advised her she had undergone "a surgical
procedure" and warned of a "wide range of normal reactions".
The sheet also advised her to call the doctor if "heavy
bleeding began".

Although P.M. does not recall being

advised to go to a hospital when labor began, this was
specified in the instruction sheet.
Jim:

I have elaborated on the facts a bit, as these are

important background to this case.

My facts came from the

opinion of Virginia Supreme Court.

They are not questioned

by petitioner's briefs.

lfp/ss 02/02/83

Rider A, p. 17 (Simopoulos)

SIMOP17 SALLY-POW
III
Appellant does not attack these regulations as
such either
brief.

In

in his
these,

hospitalization

jurisdictional statement or principal
he

for

emphasizes
second

that Virginia

trimester

requires

abortions

without

alluding to the fact that the statutory term "hospital" is
defined

to

include

outpatient

surgical

clinics

and

specifically those that may be licensed for abortions.

As

appellant had not sought a license for his clinic, perhaps
he

deemed

it

necessary

broadly

to

equate

the Virginia

provisions with the hospitalization requirements we have
considered
reply

in

brief

City

does

various grounds.

of

Akron

criticize

and

Ashcroft.

the Virginia

Appellant's

regulations

on

He argues that even if he had applied

for a license, it is uncertain whether it would have been
granted:

that Virginia courts have had no opportunity to

construe

the

11

1 icens ing

statutes

Part II of the regulations
"cover

a

abortions
rebuts

the

surgical
[are]
view

facility

it

regulations 11

(see, supra, at

performed":
that

and

is

where
and

that

"safer

second
medical

:

that

) do not
trimester
evidence

to perform trimester

-.
2.

abortions in hospitals".
13.

Appellant's reply brief, pp. 9-

None of these contentions finds support in the prioer

decisions of this Court, and the Virginia requirements are
strikingly different from those we invalidated in City of
Akron and Ashcroft.
has

made

a

Indeed,

thoughtful

it is evident that Virginia

effort

to

adopt

statutes

regulations compatibel with our decisions.
convinced

that

the

Virginia

and

We are

provisions

are

reasonably

related to and further the state's compelling interest in
protecting

the

health

of

the

mother

during

the

second

trimester, and that they do not unduly burden the right of
a woman to an abortion.
The
categories

of

requirements
regulations

of

the

discussed

have little relevancy in this case.

first
in

and

Part

second

II-C

above

They have not been

challenged by appellant beyond his general condemnation of
any

requirement

that

second

trimester

abortions

-

even

those during the 22nd week of pregnancy - be performed in
hospitals however defined and whether outpatient or not.
In any event, as appears from the recommendations of the
ACOG set forth in the margin below, Virginia requirements
with

respect

to

the

type

of

facilities,

equipment

and

3

0

personnel are compatible with generally accepted medical
standards, and further the state's legitimate interest.
Appellant's argument centers essentially on the
patient services requirements of the Virginia regulations.
He contends that they do not further the state's interest
in the health of the mother.
sanitation 29

The

typical

and

and

We think they clearly do.

record

not unreasonable

standards 30

keeping
in detail.

The

are

labor a tory

services support - and often are essential to - the direct
medical services performed by the physician and nurse. 31
The

post operative recovery standards

accepted medical practice. 32
for

emergency

services

are

also comport with

The equipment requirements
minima1 33 ,

and

are

further

prefaced with the "adequate".34
We
requirements
abortion.
serve

not

are

suggest

necessary

that
for

all

every

of

Following

case

with

the

same

the

second

A state simply cannot adopt

every

we adhere

do

Virginia
trimester

regulations that

degree

of

relevance.

as we must -- Doe and subsequent precedents,
to

the

trimester periods as providing general

guidance for the purpose of state regulation in accordance
with medical knowledge and generally accepted standards.
The trimester periods are approximations.

As we noted in

.

4.

City of Akron,
experience

in light of current medical knowledge and
and

particularly

the

use

of

the

saline

injection method -- abortions may be performed safely in
most cases during the early weeks of the second trimester.
But

a

state's

accommodate

general

regulations

reasonable

particular

requirement

periods
"is

of

not

must

be

time.

drawn

to

Thus,

a

unconstitutional

simply

because it does not perfectly correspond to the asserted
state interest".
We

City of Akron,

U.S., at _ _

therefore conclude,

before

us

in

this

case,

second

trimester abortions

at least on

that Virginia's
is

the

record

regulation

reasonably related

of

to and

furthers the state's legitimate interest in the health of
the mother.
patient

to

We note that Virginia does not require the
be hospitalized

as an

inpatient or

that

the

abortion be performed in a full service general hospital.
The Virginia requirements - the statutes and regulations accommodate medical advances, are in accord generally with
accepted
timing

of

medical
the

requirements,

abortion

and

precisely

leave
where

between the physician and his patient.

the
it

type

belongs

and

5.

Note to Jim and Mark:
have

observed,

pages 17-23.

is

a

The foregoing rider,
condensed

revision

of

I would put this discussion

as you will
Jim's

draft

in a separate

Part I I I .
The
,

accepted
general

by

foregoing
you

guide

or

for

is

even

by

no

by me.

putting

this

means

a

Jim can
Part

III

draft
use
into

to

it
a

as

be
a

more

finished form.
I

will discuss certain points orally with you

both.

L.F.P., Jr.
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RIDER A

he Supreme Court of Virginia interprets the word
"hospital" in §18.2-73

{t~e sa~~s

it is defined in §32.1-123.1 1is

(. 75"

made clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to
32.1 of the Virginia Code, >-.w!a.it is

-tiili-a

"He-alHt":

~1tle

L-£/X.~

M

v~s

The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, ~ ~~
clinics, home health agencies, and other medical care
~!
facilities, see generally, Title 32.1 of the Code, and to
fix and enforce different standards of medical care for
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided
that medical procedures employed in second-trimester
abortions must be performed in hospitals. Based upon the
evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that the
hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's
compelling interest in preserving and protecting maternal
health.

Th~re){hus is no basis for

221 Va., at 1075, 277 S.E.2d, at 204.
I

f'...

assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in §18.2-73 any
differently than it is interpreted in title 32.1, and specifically
in §32.1-123.1.

See n. 6, infra.

w-~~~r~t~~

1-D /f1.~~ ~ :B ~-~y
I

~~~IP-!h. I }1)-y..-L~ ~
/]~&?

job 03/10/83

RIDER A

5.

The Supreme Court of Virginia interprets the word

"hospital" in §18.2-73 as it is defined in §32.1-123.1.

This is

made clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title
32.1 of the Virginia Code, the Title of the Code that contains many
of Virginia's health laws:
The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals,
clinics, home health agencies, and other medical care
facilities, see generally, Title 32.1 of the Code, and to
fix and enforce different standards of medical care for
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided
that medical procedures employed in second-trimester
abortions must be performed in hospitals. Based upon the
evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that the
hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's
compelling interest in preserving and protecting maternal
health.
221 Va., at 1075, 277 S.E.2d, at 204.

Thus there is no basis for

assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in §18.2-73 any
differently than it is interpreted in title 32.1, and specifically
in §32.1-123.1.
Note to Jim:

See n. 6, infra.

Would it not be better to have Rider B, defining

hospitals, precede this note?

I

.

RIDER B

6.

Section 32.1-123.1 provides:

"Hospital" means any facility in which the primary
function is the provision of diagnosis, of treatment, and
of medical and nursing services, surgical or nonsurgical,
for two or more nonrelated individuals, including
hospitals known by varying nomenclature or designation
such as sanatoriums, sanitoriums and general acute, shortterm, long-term, outpatient and maternity hospitals.
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when §18.2-73 was
enacted is similar, see 1947 Va. Acts, c. 15, §1514-a2, repealed by
1979 Acts, c.

711~

Jr

specifically

A

,

includi~
~

at that time "out-patient

surgical hospitals (which term shall not include the office or
office of one or more physicians or surgeons unless such office or
offices are used principally for performing surgery)."
§32.298(2)

(1973 & Supp. 1978).

See Va. Code

RIDER C

7.

The regulations were promulgated pursuant to 1947 Va. Acts,

c. 15, §1514-a5, repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711.

Ttie State Board of

Health gave preliminary approval on December 1, 1976, and a public
hearing was held January 26, 1977.

At this hearing, Dr. William R.

Hill, a member of the Board, presided, and staff present from the
Department included two doctors and the Director of the Bureau of
Medical and Nursing Facilites Services.

Witnesses included the

Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital Association: a
representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the State:
representatives of the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest
Clinic, abortion clinics: a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical
School representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and
the Tidewater OBGYN Society: the Medical Director of the Ambulatory
Surgical Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, a Division of Medical
Center Hospitals, in Norfolk: the Administrator of Leigh Memorial
Hospital: a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life:
and a representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center.

See

Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re:
Proposed Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient
Hospitals in Virginia (January 26, 1977).

The Board apparently made

changes in the regulations before giving its final approval on
11, 1977.

May~

The regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. ~~

~/X&> ~~•~L-h:J ~~

Although n,i:)..t;_paui-el:rl:-arl-;t~emm-t bQE-e, we note that new but
similar regulations now supersede the regulations in effect when

'·J,

. •..d ;··"

~

•'

2.
~

appellant performed the abortion for which he hae been prosecuted.
See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of
Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982}.

These new regulations were

promulgated pursuant to Va. Code §§32.1-12, 32.1-127,
enacted in 1979.

~

lfp/ss 03/09/82

DRAFT SALLY-POW

)~~-------- The abortion for which petitioner was prosecuted

was performed on November 10, 1979, some two years and
five months after these regulations became effective on
June 30, 1977.

In view of the public hearing on January

26, 1977, attended as noted above by representatives of
various organizations specifically concerned with
abortions, it cannot be said - and
not argue - that he was not fully aware of the regulations
and the statutory requirement that his clinic be licensed.
Although of no direct relevance to this case, we
note that new but similar regulations

'

.

lfp/ss 03/09/82
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YP5 SALLY-POW
Appellant does not argue that his clinic would meet the
requirements of the Virginia statute and regulations;
.r ather, he broadly attacks ' their validity as applied to
second-trimester abortions.

Thus, the issue before us is

the validity of the Virginia requirements; not whether
appellant's clinic and his procedures would have
with them.

lt:"'

..

~omplied

rl
RIDER
r

It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester
hospitaliztion requirement differs from those at issue in City of
Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas
City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, at 4-5.

In those cases, we rec-

ognized the medical fact that, "at least during the early weeks of
the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be performed as safely in
an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital."
ante, at 19.

City of Akron,

The requirements at issue, however, mandated that "all

second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, acute-care
facilities."

Ashcroft, ante, at 5.

In contrast, the Virginia stat-

utes and regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions
be performed exclusively in full-service hospitals.

Under

Virginia's hospitalization requirement, outpatient surgical hospitals may qualify for licensing as "hospitals" in which secondtrimester abortions lawfully may be performed.

Thus, our decisions

in City of Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here.

RIDER B
We need not consider each of the regulations separately.

De-

spite personal knowledge of the regulations at least by the time of
his trial,l9 appellant introduced no medical evidence questioning
the reasonableness of any of them.

This is to be contrasted with

the evidence in City of Akron and Ashcroft, where the plaintiffs
sought at great length to show that particular requirements as to
equipment and services were unreasonable restraints on women seeking
second-trimester abortions.

Appellant persisted in arguing broadly

that Virginia's hospitalization requirements are no different in
substance from those we reviewed in the City of Akron and Ashcroft
cases.20

Indeed, not until his reply brief in this Court did appel-

lant criticize the regulations apart from Virginia's statutory hospitalization requirement.

lfp/ss 03/14/83
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The most important difference was that the requirements
now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all
outpatient clinics, in which abortions could be performed,
regardless of the trimester.

Thus, no

w

distinctionf ~as

made between first and second trimester abortions with

I

L.

respect to the appropriateness of and need for state

~~
regulation.

As....-a restrl.--t- e4i

Part III of the

tlH~--fre.a.r:iA'3S,

(\

present regulations - relating only to first trimester
abortions - was added.

It therefore is clear that

Virginia has recognized the need for discrete and
different types of regulations for the two periods.

,.

'* ..;, '.

.

>

I

•,'

...

·~

RIDER B

The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital Association stated
that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and have our
support."

Id., at 4.

The existing abortion clinics were concerned,

however, about the imposition of the regulations on existing
outpatient abortion clinics doing first-trimester abortions.

The

clinics acknowledged that during the second trimester "the State may
regulate the procedure in the interest of maternal health.
the law of the land."

Id., at 7.

This is

But the clinics specifically

"propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules
and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in
Virginia."

Id., at 26.

See also id., at 28.

The Medical Director

of the Ambulatory Surgical Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital,
concerned about the need to regulate outpatient surgical clinics in
the State, agreed that such a change was necessary, saying "it would
be an irrevocable mistake to allow compromise of the standards for
outpatient surgical units to accommodate abortion clinics if they
are both to be considered under the same Regulations."
G~ommants)

Id., at 30.

it 's not surprisinq that the Board created

Part III, the regulations of which apply only to clinics doing
first-trimester abortions.
regulations before us on

'

M~y

The Board gave its final approval to the
11, 1977.

RIDER A

The first draft of the regulations was considerably different
from the regulations that the Board finally approved.

See

Department of Health, Draft I, Rules and Regulations for the
Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (October 27, 1976).

~~~

The most important difference was that the requirements Row in Partj

~h ~~

~~~

~~ ~an ~ II of the regulations were applicable to all a~r~iGn~ clinics
..

~

regardless of the trimester in which the procedure was performed.

~

~

There was no segarate set of regulations for o ~tpatient abortion

Y

i.,-J

~/
~vr
r

{AA.. ~ ~-.(.._ ~~ ~ I 'I~ ~ ~ ¢ I
~ t.
~ 1 ', , r 6.)! 1 -r~
clinics~ only, such as existed in Part III in the final regulations.

.

Seen. 9, 1nfra.

a-z__ e:L ,~~-~- .!Pf ~~ 4'....e.~ s/
~~-t- , Y R1' ~ ~ 1.-r.}-~
~,.

cL.

1-~

M

~,__,..._..,,~- ~~~r

;

.

..
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81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
This refers to Harry's letter of March 8 stating
that he will vote to vacate the judgment and remand [this]
case for reconsideration in the light of Akron.

He

suggests that the Virginia regulations were not "really
considered by the Supreme Court of Virginia".

Bill

\Brennan has told me that he rather shares Harry's view,
and John's letter of March 7 expresses a somewhat similar
view, though he is awaiting "further writing".
I recognized, of course, that vacating and

I

remanding is an option available.

I adhere

s~gly

the view, however, that we should decide the case.

' ,,

to
In my

2

0

view, the issue on which we granted the case is here, and
it was argued in briefs and at oral argument.

~ I~ i~ l~~e ~hat ~he

primary focus in this case

has been, as appellant describes it, on the "mandatory
hospitalization requirement of Virginia law".

Appellant

had good reason to refrain from making the distinction
under Virginia law

betwee~~etviee ,

acute care

"hospitals" and "out-patient surgical hospitals" where
second~rimester

abortions also may be performed.

Appellant did not wish to call our attention to the latter
and the implementing regulations as he had made no effort
to comply with them.

Moreover, appellant has never denied

that he knew about the regulations.
clear in footnotes

~

S

and

7

As I have now made

in the second draft of my

opinion, the regulations were adopted two years and five

•.

•'•
•·

'

3•

abortion at issue.

months

They were adopted

only after public hearings at which several abortions
clinics and representatives of the medical profession
appeared and testified.

The hearings resulted in

significant changes being made in the regulations.

See n.

It is entirely clear from the Virginia statutes
that the term "hospitals" includes outpatient clinics
though they are characterized as "outpatient . . .
hospitals".

vt

It also is clear that Part l.liof the

I~

f~-

regu5~tions was adopted expressly to accommodate ~
OJt<1. ~ t>~ 1I:. WOA ~ ~ ~e~~ ~cr.J..- ~

trimester abortion{

Se~.

7

and

'1

·LAs

t~~

Attorney General of Virginia stated in his brief:
/

"~der

Virginia law, a second trimester abortion
may be performed in an outpatient surgical

«lood:>O..a.

4.

clinic provided that Gh ~ clinic has been
inspected and licensed as a hospital by the

j ~tate".

'Si;....,( ~ \~ ~

The opinion of the Supreme Court of Virginia, as
Harry notes, apart from a reference to the relevant
Virginia statutes, did not address the outpatient
hospitals separately from general, acute care hospitals.

~ This is understandablel.\as appellant's position has been a
j

sweeping attack on all "mandatory hospitalization
requirements".

There certainly is no basis for reversing

Simopoulos' conviction.

He elected, apparently as a

tactic, not to challenge the outpatient regulations on all
of Virginia's hospital requirements.
If we were to remand this case for
reconsideration in light of Akron, it would be an
unmerited victory for appellant's tactics.

Moreover, it

...
'·

•'

I

5.

is not clear what the Virginia Supreme Court can do that

l~o\o~ ~£~
we also cannot do properly. ~ eEe is Ro f factual evidence
~..

-Ut

in this case with respect to the regulat1ons~~

k
~-s.t..ingni

~ C..

() ...

~~~

Y,\

shQ 4:fFe:m appellanb' s general challenge to the

validity of all mandatory hospitalization requirements.
The Virginia Supreme Court rejected this challenge, and
./

its opinion can be read - in light of Virginia law - as

.
~ ~~~~{l~~.,~
s-sutaining facially 8etR o{ ~~ taeel~ Hespitali•atioR

6

( requirementt

.

i.ncl~d.in¥os~nd
~
well as ~

trimester

~~~A,..,., \b_d~J
thos~r:m~ n acute care

{
hospitals.

Akron and Ashcroft settled the issue with

respect to the latter type of hospitals.
the issue before us, whether

t~ mandatory

This leaves, as
outpatient

hospitals requirements are valid on their face.
have a different case if appellant had elected to

We would

6•

challenge - as constitutionally burdensome or otherwise specific provisions of these requirements.
It is well to bear in mind that this case
involves an abortion performed some 20 to 22 weeks after
gestation, on the edge of the period of potential
viability.

Under any view of our prior decisions,

including Akron, the interest of the state at this point
is compelling.

All that my opinion does is to hold that

the Virginia regulations "on the record before us" (see

I~

pp.

20
~ and~)

are not invalid.

We certainly do not

decide whether each of the specific regulations would be
valid if, for example, they were applied to a D&E abortion
quite early in the second trimester.
At the prudential level, there also are rather
compelling reasons to decide this case rather than remand

~

~

''
\
~

7

it.

0

The latter action would leave the law in Virginia

and probably in a number of other states - unsettled as to
~

the validity of requiring that

~

be performed in

state~licensed

second~rimester

abortions

outpatient clinics that

conform generally to accepted medical practice and
requirements.
My recollection is that there were seven or
eight cases pending here that involved the validity of
state regulation of abortions.

After consideration at two

or more of our Conferences, we selected for plenary
consideration the three cases now hefore us.
~ decade

since

~tates

In the

have been endeavoring to adjust

I

their laws and regulations to the new constitutional
requirements.

Decisions by us in all three of these cases

should go far to resolve the existing uncertainties.

8.

L • .F.P., Jr.

ss
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We need not consider whether Virginia's
regulations are constitutional in every particular.
Despite personal knowledge of the regulations at least by
the time of his trial,

~llant

has not attacked them as

being insufficiently related to the State's interest in
protecting maternal health. 19

His challenge throughout

this litigation has been limited to an assertion that the
State cannot require all second-trimester abortions to be
performed in full-service general hospitals.

In essence,

appellant has argued that Virginia's hospitalization
requirements are no different in substance from those
reviewed in the City of Akron and Ashcroft cases. 20

At

the same time, however, appellant took the position - both

.

~

2.

before the Virginia courts and this Court - that a state
licensing requirement for outpatient abortion facilities
would be constitutional.

See 9 Record 196a, 214a; Brief

for Appellant in No. 801107 (Va.S.Ct.), p. 35; Juris.
Statement 16; Brief for Appellant 32, 43 n. 75, 46.

The

. ~~/

clear implication of appellant's defense in this case is
....

that the Virginia requirements for outpatient facilities
in which second-trimester abortions may be performed are
unconstit~ional.

Yet, not until his reply brief in this

Court did he elect to criticize the regulations apart from
his broadside attack on the entire Virginia
hospitalization requirements.
Given the plain language of the Virginia
regulations and the history of their adoption, see notes
______ , supra, we see no reason to doubt that an

3.

adequately equipped clinic could, upon proper application,
obtain an outpatient hospital license permitting the
performance of second-trimester abortions.
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SIMll SALLY-POW
We need not consider whether Virginia's
regulations are constitutional in every particular.
Despite personal knowledge of the regulations at least by
the time of his trial, "appellant has not attacked them as
being insufficiently related to the State's interest in
protecting maternal health. 19

His challenge throughout

this litigation has been limited to an assertion that the
State cannot require all second-trimester abortions to be
performed in full-service general hospitals.

In essence,

appellant has argued that Virginia's hospitalization
requirements are no different in substance from those
reviewed in the City of Akron and Ashcroft cases. 20

At

the same time, however, appellant took the position - both

'

'

2.

before the Virginia courts and this Court - that a state
licensing requirement for outpatient abortion facilities
would be constitutional.

See 9 Record 196a, 214a; Brief

for Appellant in No. 801107 (Va.s.ct.), p. 35; Juris.
Statement 16; Brief for Appellant 32, 43 n. 75, 46.

The

clear implication of appellant's defense in this case is
that the Virginia requirements for outpatient facilities
in which second-trimester abortions may be performed are
unconstittuional.

Yet, not until his reply brief in this

Court did he elect to criticize the regulations apart from
his broadside attack on the entire Virginia
hospitalization requirements.
Given the plain language of the Virginia
regulations and the history of their adoption, see notes
______ , supra, we see no reason to doubt that an

•.

3.

adequately equipped clinic could, upon proper application,
obtain an outpatient hospital license permitting the
performance of second-trimester abortions.

..,
~
I·
~

'>
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SIMll SALLY-POW
In essence, appellant has argued that Virginia's
hospitalization requirements are no different in substance
from those
cases. 20

~

review~ in

the City of Akron and Ashcroft

At the same time, however, appellant took the

position - both before the Virginia courts and this Court
- that a state licensing requirement for outpatient
abortion facilities would be constitutional.

See 9 Record

196a, 214a: Brief for Appellant in No. 801107 (Va.s.ct.},
p. 35: Juris. Statement 16: Brief for Appellant 32, 43 n.
75, 46.

The clear implication of appellant's defense in

this case is that the Virginia requirements for outpatient
facilities in which second-trimester abortions may be
performed are unconstittuional.

.

.

Yet, not until his reply

2.

brief in this Court did he elect to criticize the
regulations apart from his broadside attack on the entire
Virginia hospitalization requirements.
Given the plain language of the Virginia
regulations and the history of their adoption, see notes
______ , supra, we see no reason to doubt that an
adequately equipped clinic could, upon proper application,
obtain an outpatient hospital license permitting the
performance of second-trimester abortions.

•r
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SIM13 SALLY-POW
We need not consider each of the regulations
separately.

Despite personal knowledge of the regulations

at least by the time of his tria1, 14 appellant introduced
no medical evidence questioning the reasonableness of any
of the regulations.

This is to be contrasted with the

evidence in City of Akron and Ashcroft, where the
plaintiffs sought at great length to show that particular
requirements as to equipment and services were
unreasonable restraints on
abortions.

women seeking second-trimester

Rather, appellant persisted in arguing broadly

that Virginia's hospitalization requirements are no
different in substance from those we reviewed in the Akron
and Ashcroft cases.

Indeed, not until his reply brief in

...

'.

2.

this Court did appellant criticize the regulations apart
from Virginia's overall requirements.

lfp/ss 03/03/83

Rider A, p. 12 (Simopoulos)

SIMOP12 SALLY-POW
Only the last of these arguments is relevant to the
validity of these statutes and regulations, and appellant
points to no;/ evidence that supports his sweeping claim of
"safety".

We have noted above that the Virginia

requirements are strikingly different from those we
invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft.

Compliance

with the state's requirements will entail costs, but this
can be said of most regulations adopted by governments to
protect the health and safety of people.

Moreover,

ethical physicians are obligated to

'

'I

~viM.- - ~,<~ /.o 11 '-!- 7 (~-~)~
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~
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7.

The regulations were promulgated pursuant

c. 1 , ~4 ~ repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711.
~

t~[l9~7

Va.

Act~ zr-

The State Board ~

gave preliminary approval on December 1, 1976, and a public

hearing was held January 26, 1977.

At this hearing, Dr. William R.

Hill, a member of the Board, presided, and staff present from the
Department included two doctors and the Director of the Bureau of
Medical and Nursing Facilites Services.

Witnesses included the

Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital Association; a
representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the State;
representatives of the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest
Clinic, abortion clinics; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical
School representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and
the Tidewater OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory
Surgical Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, a Division of Medical
Center Hospitals, in Norfolk; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial
Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life;
and a representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center.

See

Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re:
Proposed Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient
Hospitals in Virginia (January 26, 1977).

The Board apparently made

changes in the regulations before giving its final approval on May
11, 1977.

The regulations became effective on June 30, 1977.

abortion for which petitioner was prosecuted was performed on
November 10, 1979, some two years and five months

afte~ hese,

The

-

2.

regulatiens

becarne-e~e~.

In view of the public hearing on

January 26, 1977, attended as noted above bv representatives of
various organizations specifically concerned with abortions, it
cannot be said -- and indeed appellant does not argue -- that he was
not fully aware of the regulations and the statutory requirement
that his clinic be licensed.
Although of no direct relevance to this case, we note that new
but similar regulations now supersede the regulations in effect when
appellant performed the abortion for which he was prosecuted.

See

Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of
Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982).

These new regulations were

promulgated pursuant to Va. Code §§32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in
1979.
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MEMO TO FILE
Abortion Cases
As more Amici briefs have been filed than one
could read, and as they also inevitably are repetitive, I
have focused on several.

This memo will identify their

positions.
SG's Brief
The SG's brief is filed only in the Akron and
Missouri cases, and it does not address the various issues.
Rather, it is a brief articulating principles with
particular emphasis on the deference due legislative
decisions on a subject of social and political controversy.
The brief is well written, and uses our decisions
skillfully.
The Proper Standard
CA6 (Akron) held that any regulation having a
"legally significant impact • • . on a first trimester
abortion decision • • • is invalid".

The SG asserts this is

a new standard not found in our decisions, and would
significantly expand the "abortion right".
Our decisions make clear that the "right of
personal privacy", held in Roe v. Wade to include the
abortion decision, is not an unqualified [right] and must be
considered against important state interests in regulation".
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154.

The correct standard, as

repeatedly articulated in our cases, is whether the

' '...

-..

'

..
'

2.

regulation is "unduly burdensome".

Maherv. Roe, 432

u.s.

464, 473-474 (unduly burdensome interference with [the

woman's right] to decide whether to terminate her
pregnancy): Bellotti I, 428

u.s.

132, 147 (regulation of

first trimester abortions "is not unconstitutional unless it
unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion"): and repeated
in Harris v. McRae, 448

u.s.

297, 314; Beal v. Doe, 432

u.s.

438' 446.

The SG quoted from my opinion in Maher:
"The right in Roe v. Wade can be understood
only by considering both the woman's interest
and the nature of the state's interference
with it. Roe did not declare an unqualified
constitutional right to an abortion."
Informed Consent Approved
As an illustration of a regulation held valid by
this Court, the SG cites Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 66-67, where
we upheld "informed consent" and record keeping
requirements.

The consent provision in Danforth required a

woman to "certify in writing her consent to the procedure
and that her consent is informed and freely given and is not
the result of coercion, 428

u.s.,

at 65 (emphasis added).

The SG observes that Danforth noted the strength of the
state interest furthered by the informed consent regulation,
weighed it against its intrusion upon a woman's unfettered
discretion, and concluded that it did not unduly burden the
abortion decision.

f.' ·o:- i

3.

Substantial Deference Due Legislative Judgment
The greater portion of the SG's brief is a plea
for judicial restraint and deference to legislative
judgments.

He makes the valid argument that the abortion

issue has been, and will continue to be, the "focus of great
national debate".
and complex.
divided.

The sub-issues in the debate are numerous

American citizens are deeply and passionately

In a democracy the legislature is the "primary

authority" with "responsibility to resolve competing policy
views".
As an illustration, the SG notes that "parental
entitlement to notification of or participation in an
immature daughter's decision that could profoundly affect
her life presents competing considerations whose resolution
lie at the very core of what legislators are elected to do.
See H.L. v. Matheson, 450

u.s.,

at 408-410.

The SG notes the basic differences between the
legislative and judicial branches:

first, the superior

capacity of a legislature to hold hearings and find facts.
Second, legislators - elected by the people - must account
periodically to the people for the way they legislate, and
this is the heart of our democratic process that assumes a
"full and uninhibited discussion of public issues".
Finally, legislative decisions can be changed and
constitutional ones cannot.

~.

·.'

..

'.(·

4.

The SG quotes from my opinion in
Richardson, 418

u.s.,

at 188.

u.s.

v.

In footnote 8, p. 13 of his

brief, the SG quotes the usual statements with respect to
judicial restraint.

He relies, for example, on Bickel, The

Least Dangerous Branch, p. 15.

Time for the Judiciary to Allow the Legisative Process to
Function
It is pointed out that "ten years ago", in Roe,
the Court adopted a three-part set of rules with respect to
the stages of pregnancy.

We left many questions unanswered,

and over the intervening decade, litigation has multiplied
with the result that the" rules [have] become increasingly
intricate and substantially more complicated"

Here, the SG

cites Matheson, Harris, Bellotti I and II, Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, Maher, Beal and Danforth.
The final plea is that in applying the "undue
burden standard", we should accord "substantial deference"
to legislative judgment.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss
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Abortion Cases - Professors' Brief
Eighty-five professors have joined in a brief by
Paul Brest and Susan Appleton that is a well written, but
repetitive, argument that - at least for adult women - is
strongly pro-abortion.

The analytical approach of the brief

is straight-forward, and may be consistent with Roe - though
possibly inconsistent with some of our subsequent decisions
{e.g., Maher and Danforth).
Two-Step Analysis
This is emphasized throughout the brief, and
summarized on p. 32 as follows:
"First, a court must examine whether or not
the regulation is state action imposing any
burden at all on the right to obtain an
abortion. The question here is not one of
degree but simply whether the regulation
affirmatively imposes any legally cognizable
burden. If it does not, then the analytical
framework developed in Roe does not govern.
See Danforth~ Maher~ McRae. If, however, the
regulation imposes any burden on the right
recognized in Roe, then as a second step,
strict judicial scrutiny must be applied to
determine whether that burden is undue--that
is, whether it is properly justified by a
compelling state interest and sufficiently
narrowly tailored to further that goal. See
McRae, 468 u.s. at 314~ Maher, 432 u.s. a-t-473-74." p. 32
With respect to the second step, only two state
interests have been identified:

{i) the compelling

character of a state's interest in protecting maternal
health only after the first trimester, and the "compelling

~t
~

~

~

.

~
~

..

,.

2.
character of a state's interest in preserving potential life
only after fetal viability", Roe, 410

u.s.,

at 163-164.

The reason the state's interest in protecting
maternal health is said to be compelling only after the
first trimester, is that medical testimony establishes that
the risk to maternal health during the first trimester is
less than at childbirth.

Void All Regulation before the Court
This brief asserts that "all of the regulations
now before this Court interfere directly with the right
recognized in Roe should be held void".

According to the

records, they significantly burden the abortion decision and
its effectuation by making termination of a pregnancy more
onerous, more costly, more time consuming, and - sometimes
more hazardous".

Brief, p. 33, 34.

Then, the brief delivers the "knockout", by
asserting that "all of the measures applicable to abortions
sought by adult women during the first trimester must fall
because neither state interests identified in Roe is
sufficiently compelling during that stage to support such
restrictions".

p. 34, 35.

Accordingly, all of the first

trimester regulations here are "unduly burdensome".
McRae, 448 U.S., at 314, Maher, 432 U.S., at 473.

Citing

3.

Resort to "Balancing Test" Impermissible
In a subsection commencing at p. 41, the state
argues against "resorting to a balancing test or a sliding
scale analysis".
Its position is summarized as follows:
"Only the 'compelling state interest'
test--applied here and in all fundamental-rights cases--promises adequate protection of
fundamental constitutional rights,
consistency with this Court's precedents, and
elimination of the uncertainly that a
variable standard of review resting on ad hoc
assessment of burdens generates." 41

Unique Status of Children
In a brief concluding section, the professors
concede that children have a unique status.

It also

emphasizes that children have constitutional rights and
quotes at length from Carey, 431 U.S., at 693 (a favorite of
the professors, though not an abortion case).
The brief "explicitly refutes" Judge Kennedy's
dissenting opinion in Akron in which she argues for a
"sliding scale standard of review for all abortion
regulations, whether applicable to minors or adults".
The brief identifes (p. 60) the three concerns
"uniquely relevant to minors":
children~

(i) the vulnerability of

(ii) their inability to make informed

decisions~

and (iii) the importance of the parental role in child
rearing.

Citing my Bellotti opinion, 441

u.s.,

at 634.

'

·.

'h

.
'.

4.
After noting that these special conerns for
children do not support a state-granted parental veto
(Danforth), "a majority of the Justices would approve a more
narrowly drafted statute allowing minors judicially
determined to be mature to make their own abortion
decisions, while requiring immature minors to obtain a
consent substitute, parental permission or judicial
authorization" predicated on the minor's best interests.
Citing Bellotti, at p. 643-644.
It noted that Matheson approved a parental
notification requirement except with respect to mature or
emancipated minors or where best interests to the contrary
can be shown.
The brief states that a "special standard of
review" is appropriate with respect to regulation of minors,
but does not define the standard.

* * *
I would like for my clerk to make an independent
judgment as to the professors' characterizations of our
decisions, particularly with respect to the absolutism of
all restrictions - however slight or inherently reasonable on adult women without meeting the compelling interest
standard.

My recollection is that there is language in

Maher to the contrary, but perhaps I am wrong.
The professors' brief does not address some of the
issues that I believe are raised in one of more of these
cases.

It talks about first trimester abortions by adult

5.

women, and I do not recall that it addresses requirements such as hospitalization - with respect to second trimester
abortions.

Although the brief refers to "approximately the

end of the first trimester" it does not discuss the position
of the American College that physicians should be allowed
flexibility to make a judgment as to when a fetus is viable
without regard to the number of weeks.
Nor, as

I

recall, does the brief consider whether

appropriately trained persons other than physicians might be
allowed to perform abortions during the first trimester, or
whether these may be performed in free standing clinics
approved by the state.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss
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MEMO TO FILE

dr

Abortion rases

more Amici briefs have been ' filed than one
~~

f

could read, and

~s

they also inevitably are repetitive, I

have focused on several.

This memo will identify their

positions.

',1! ••

·.·~

SG' s Brief '; ,.
!;:."'!':'

The SG's brief is filed only in the Akron and
Missouri cases, and it does not address the various issues.
Rather, it is a brief articulating principle,e; ,with,.~
particular emphasis on the rleference due legislative
J~

decisions on a subject of social and political
,,:~<#•

controversy. ~.

The brief is well written, and uses
skillfully.

•

~

CAfi (Akron) held that any

"legally significant impact •• >· . on a first trimester
abortion decision •• .'•I is invalid".
a new standard not found in

ou~

.~

The SG asserts this is

decisions, and would

~-

significantly expand the "abortion right".
Our decisions make clear that the
personal privacy", held in Roe v. Wade to include the ,.
abortion decision, is not an unqualified [right] and must be
considered against important state interests in requlation".
Roe v. Wade, 410

TJ.~.

at 154.

'1'1-te correct standard, as

repeatedly articulated in our cases, is whether the

..

2.

regulation is "unduly burdensome".

Maher v. Roe, 432

u.s.

464, 473-474 (unduly burdensome interference with [the
woman's right] to decide whether to terminate her
pregnancy)

J

Bellotti

!,

428

u.s.

.,j•

132, 147 (regulation of

<;..

'·

first trimester abortions "is not unconstitutional unless it
unduly bur0ens the

ri~ht

to seek an abortion"): and repeated

in Parris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 3141 Beal v. Doe, 432

The
'·,

s~

U.S~

quoted from my opinion i.n MahE>r:

"The ri.ght in Roe v. waoe can be understood
only by considering both the woman's intere.st
and the nnture of the state's interference
with i.t. 'Roe did not decJ.are · an unqu"llified
constitutional ri qht to an abort ion."

Informed Consent Approved
;_~

v

!:.

·~;··~·7

1\s an illustration of a regulation helcl valid by

this Court, the SG cites Danforth, 428

u.s.

~.

we upheld "informed consent" and record keepinq
requirements.

~·

~,,

52, 66-67,'' where 1
k

~: '):'

'.l' '' •,, ;,

The consent provision in Danforth required

woman to "certify in writinq her consent to the

a '~.

procedure~

and that her consent is informed and freely given and is not
' the result of coercion, 428

u.s.,

at 65 (emphasi!? added).

The SG observes"i that Danforth noted the strength of the ,.,•
state interest fuLthered by the

informe~

consent regulation,

weighed f~ against its intrusion upon a woman~s unfet~ered
discretion, and concluned that it did not unduly burden the
abortion decision. ;

•'

.

.

'

'

.

.
.,

3.
I

'

Substantial Oeference Due t.egi.slative ,Judgment
The greater portion of the SG's brief is a plea
for judicial restraint and
judgments.

~efer.ence

to legislative

qe makes the valid argument thBt the abortion

issue has been, and will continue to be, the "focus of great
national debate". · The sub-issues in the debate are numerous
and

comPlex~

American citizens are deeply and passionately

f_.'(i.~: ~·~

-

~

,- ;#:

divided. ' In a democracy the legislature is the "primary
t,l'J

~"

authority"

t~ith

~

"responsibility to resolve competing policy

views".
:nr:·~

· As: an illustration, the SG notes that
· entitlement to notification of or participation in an
immature daughter's decision that could profoundly affect
her life presents competi.ng considerations whose resolution
,,

lie at the very core of what lP.gislators ·':1.are electe'd to do.

"\

legislative '~.··a'nd judicial branchesi•;,,;·fi.rst, the superior
'II

.f~ ~~

{

"{~·r,

capacity of a legislature to hold hearings and
'

.

I

Second, legislators ,.!; 'eolected by the people- must account
periodically to the people for the wav they legislate; and
this .rs the heart of our democrat i.e process
ifr,.<.~

"full and uninhibited discussion of public issues".=·
-~:···,,;""

'·

.

~ :l!\,j ,.,.,,.

Finally)~legisla.tiv~
~'-' '

constitutional ones

decisions can be changed

4.

The SG quotes from my opinion i.n
Richardson, 418

u.s.,

at 188.

u.s.

v.

In foo-tnote 8, p. 13 of his ,,

~'J.¥

·c:·

brief, the SG quotes the usual statements with respect to
judicial restraint.
'/1•

He reJ ies, for example, on Bickel, The

•>',,f\J
r.i

Least Dangerous Branch, p. 15.

il
ij
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';M,,

.,.r~ '~'
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Time for the Judiciary to Allow the Legisative Process to
Functio"l'l
It is pointed out that "ten years ago~, in Roe,
the Court adopted a·,. three-part set of rules wi.th respect to
the stages of pregnancy.

'We left many questions unanswered·

and over the intervening decade, litigation has multiplied '
with the result that the"' rules [have] become increasingly
""f-..

Her~ :,// the SG

intr i.cat'e . and substantially more complicated"

~· -~

cites Matheson, Harris, Bellotti I and II, Colautti v.
Franklin, 439

u.s.

379, Maher, Beal and Danforth.

} he fina:l plea · is that in applying
burden

standard~,

we should accord

"i

~

}!:_

ss
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~sub~tantial
''

,t ..-11

to legislative J> judgment: '
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MEMO TO FILE
81-746 and 81-1172 Akron Abortion Cases
The purpose of this memo is to outli.ne the
provisions of the sections of the Akron ordinance at issue,
together with the holding of CA6.
Section 1.870.05(B): "rhe Consent Provision
As to women under 15 years of age, it i.s a
criminal offense for a physician to perform an abortion
without first obtaining the "informed wri.tten consent 11 of
one of her parents or her legal guardian

11

in accordance with

§1870.06, or having obtained an order from a court having
jurisdiction.
The

h~i~f~

state that the juvenile court is the

only nne havinq iurisdiction, and that Ohio law requires all
complaints filed in such courts to be
parents.

Thus, the effect of

~erved

~1870.05(B)

require notification of parents.

on the minor's

is at least to

For reasons I stated in

Bellotti It - and possibly in H.IJ. v. Matheson, I Probably
would not approve of t.h is.
~herP

also is a standing question with respect to

considering thl.s section of the ordinance.

Respondent's

brief (p. 45) argued that this section is not properly
before the Court because no party with Article III standing
appealed to CA6.

The only parti.es who appealed were parents

(not the city or city officials) whose interest was
unrelated to any specific case.

2.

Section 1870.06(B):

Specific Advice Required.

"In order to ensure that the consent" is
"informed", physicians are forbidden to perform any abortion
until the woman (and one of her parents i.n the abRence of a
court order) is advised by her
specific matters.

phy~i.cian

on a number of

See the full provision pp. 6 and 7,

petitioner's brief.

Included in the required advice is the

"unborn child is a human

li~e

from the moment of

conception"' that the "unborn child may

b~

viable if more

than 22 weeks have elapsed: that an abortion is a "major
surgical procedure that can result in • • • hPrnorrhaqes,
pefor8ted uterus, infection, menstrual. disturbances,
sterility, etc., etc.".
mhe o-p:l.nions belm-1, ana brief':; on the "abortion"
side of this caqe leap on this provision with special fury.
So do the briefs on behalf of medical societies.

parti.cu1arJy briPf of the American College of
and

~yn~cologtsts

See

Ohst~tricians

(hereafter the "College"), a well written

WilMer, Cutler brief, at p. 8, et seq.

emphasizes the uniqueness of

~ach

This brief

patient, and the necessity

that "a physician must be able to exercise discretion in
determining the amount, nature and mode of

pr~seontati.on

the information" for the oarticular patient and her
circumstances.
I am inclined to agree with the foregoing, but
construe it to recoqnize that a physician's advice is

of

3.

required.

This is absent in so many clinics.

See

Simopoulos.
It is to be noted, in this case, that the District
Court found that:
"A patient's contact with the physician who
is to perform the abortion procedure usually
occurs when she is taken into the operating
room. At that time, the physician reviews
the patient's medical chart and asks if she
has any questions. The doctor then performs
a pelvic examination. If (this is negative]
• • • the abortion usually will then be
performed." App. 46a-47a1 also quoted in
petitioner's brief p. 8.
Unless CA6 rejected this finding, it appears that
one or more of these clinics (there are three of them in
this case that together performed 5280 aobrtions in 1977)
provide no real consultative information and advice.

See

also what happened in Simopoulos.
I would affirm CA6's holding with respect to the
invalidity of this section, but make clear - in accordance
with the College's brief - that the physician must provide
advice in accord with generally accepted practice by
qualified physicians.

Section 1870.06(C):

Information as to "Particular" Risks.

This section, expanding on the advice required by
1870.06(B) requi.res that the woman, and one of her parents
or guardian be informed of "the particular risks associated
with her pregnancy and the abortion technique to be

. .-..-----------~

l·.

j

4.

'•

"'1,

employed, providing a general description of the medical
abortion. ~

instructions to be followed subsequent to the

.•

This also was invalidated by CA6, though the DC

.,,.

~.

sustained its constitutionality.

Apparently the debate was

over whether the advice should be given by a physician
rather than some other person in the clinic.

Apart from

this, I would think requiring information on the "risks
associated" with the abortion need not be included in a
statute, althouqh a responsible physician would identy them.
The brief of the College indicates that the risks are not as
serious as a tonsilectomy or anywhere near as serious >as" an
.

~~

r~

. ~~-: zi,

appendectomy.

Secttion 1870.07:

24 Hours Delay.

Except in the event of an emergency need for an
abortion, this section prohibits thls action

11

Until 24 hour

have elapsed from the time the pregnant woman, and one of
her parents or legal guardian, have signed the consent form
required by Sl870.06.".• The physici.an must
accordingly. ·
~he

DC sustained the 24-hour provision, but CA6

held it unconstitutional for the uninformative reason that
it "causes a legally significant impact or consequence on
the abortion decision, it therefore cannot be applied to
first trimester abortions".

CA6 seems to be a bit carried

away by inquiring whether a regulation causes

5.

significant impact or consequence on the abortion decision".
This is not a self-evident analysis.
'll<'(

~umane

Section 1870.16:

Disposal. ,

Requires that the "remains of the unborn child be
disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner".

~
ll

Held

unconstitutional by both courts, by the DC on vaguenss.
..

* * *

~

Respondent's Brief - Second Trimester Abortions.
'

,!,"

y.

,. ·Respondents in this case are the three clinics in

Akron, and a Dr. ' Bliss.:

,.

,,'

They have filed cross petitions (I

i'i.,

am not clear at the mom.e nt as to the i.ssues thereof) , with a
supporting brief prepared by a professor at the Cleveland;''

Mar shal,l Law School, and lawyers from the ACLU. ; :.

11'

...'J'_.

,'

fl

~.

,it

•t:\

~

~1:. O(l

,. Th.e·' first section of thts brief ;;_ . and apparently
'.'j

the primary interest of respondents ,- is the limitation on
second trimester'.."' abortions •

···...

Section 1870.03, according to respondent's brief
(I should ;ead the siction) requires that every abortion

performed subsequent to the end of the
performed in a hospital.

firs~

trimester be

This is defined to mean "a

general ~.

hospital or special hospital devoted to gynecology or
obstetrics which is accredited by the the joint commission
on the accredit'ation of hospitals, or by the American
Osteopathic Association.
statistics and

~(idence

Respondent's brief "relies on
to the effect that no arbitrary line

can be drawn between the trimesters, and contends that

I

v

·~: ~

6•

.. ,
j,

"early second trimester abortions are safely performed in
c•

outpatient

·~\.

It is stated that only 17% of the

clinics~.

public hospitals, and 34% of the private hospitals, do
abortions at all.

And at the time of trial "second
l.'t

trimester abortions were not available in hospitals in
il,t.
:j·,

~.: ll

Akron", with the result that "ambulatory facili~ies" have .~~~
been developed to meet , this special need, and that over 70%
of all abortions were performed in free standing

clinics~ .,
ii

The College's brief, somewhat more restrained,
argued that the limitation on all secondary trimester
'"

f" ··•·• .,

abortions is unconsti. \~ utionally "overbroad ,~"- ~:; Apparently
recognizing that

t.her;~ is language in Roe v. Wade that '·"

supports "ila holding of validity, the Col lege brief. emphasizes
~·~~ .:·i<

language.~,:in

and reads

Wade ·,. t,h at talk's of "present medical knowledge", . ,
having

our ~ dases . as
:!l:,JV.~
..,

permit the states

"declined ~ t9

to establish a ,?_specific point of presumptive viability",
.~

,,,,t.'l>

. :1

;·

has deliberately "left the
rathef >'t t ~- is i:said that this Court,.:
... &
-~ ...

~,

'~;

"'"'
(cornpelting]
poirit flexible for anticipated advancements
' '

.[~0

medical' skill".

lc

.\•.·

U

Citing Colauti v. Franklin, 439

387, with a see also

to~,

410

u.s.,' at

u.s.,

Danforth, 428 U.S., ae1' 61, · 64 • ..
The College brief argues that since Roe
progressed oramat ically". ~~~In '~ th''i' s connect i.on,

.
b~r" ief states that the increased~~::~~fety of
.

~

~~~~~

\

abortions after the first ·trimester result's .'from the
'~!'.

'_.

~~

"wigespread ~· adoption

•'

of dialation ano evacuation {D&E) ", now

,.

7.

an accepted technique for second trimester abortions".
21.

Br.

···'
i'

. It is argued also that "most second trimester ~"
abortions are as safe as or safer than childbirth has led to
r ~·
;'

",r t

. ~~

~~'

a change in the views of many physicians regarding the

Ji:

If

advisability of hospitalization for all second trimester
abortions". 0 Br. 23.

The College refers to its "Standards

for Obstetric-Gynecological Servides", as stating:
~:

·~

~·'~

1l

~'ll\·

fl··lf~~

"{In] a hospital based or in a free standing
ambulatory surgical facility, or in an
outpatient clinic meeting criteria required
for a free standing surgical facility,
abortions should be limited generally to 18
weeks from the last menstral period"
23, 24.
i

~

·~

·c,;.f'

Vf'!

' .. ·~'

,c~·~

,,. ..-"·

In footnote 65, p. 24, the College's standards are
set forth for "free standing surgical facilities" .:
"ACOG, Standara for Obstetric-Gynecologic
Services 54 (5th ed. 1982) ("ACOG
Standards"). ACOG's standards for 'free- "
standing surgical facilities' recommended :: 1
that they 'be licensed to conform to
requirements of state or federal legislation'
and 'maintain the same surgical, anesthetic, ,,
and personal standards a~ recommended for
hospitals.' Id. at 52. 'Surgical procedures
may be performed in those facilities under
general or regional block anesthesia when it
is expected that the postoperative recovery
will permit discharge on the same day. There
should be a written policy requiring the
medical staff to provide for prompt emergency
treatment or hospitalization in the event of
an unanticipated complication.'"

inclined to
the question

..

8.

seen briefed thoroughly, whether the physician must
determine that viability has not commenced before any
abortion may be performed except to preserve the life of the
mother.
4::,..._

,

'!--~'

6'

:o::

f' -~-\}\.:1~t''~ }'

t
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MEMO TO FIT..E

S1-1255 and 81-1623 Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft
Planned Parenthood, a clinic (Reproduction Health
Services), and a couple of doctors, sought injunctive and
declaratory relief against the Missouri abortion statute as ,

~-,

,. -r:l:t
~

!<.

\.· /

'

revised following Danforth.
"~inner",

It is not easy to identify the

although this state prevailed on what appear to be

most of the major issues.

This memo, dictated only to aid

my memory will review - summarily - the opinion of CAS by
Chief Judge Lay.

In doing so, I

folJo\"~

CAS's disposition of the issues.* l•f
.1*

,,

by subject matter
.'

~;

,.

~~ ~,;

,,

•~'

~

I. Second Trimester Hospitalization Requirement.
~;

1\

Section 1S8.025 requires that seconn, and third trimester
·-:~,::'.If

":J4}''J

abortions be pe.rformed in a hospital.
invalidated this: requirement.

'T'he DC had

~~

It had noted that the D&E

•

~-! 'J--3~

*At the beginning, CAS summarizes its disposition of the
District Court's opinion, affirming in part and reversing in
part. A-56-57.

,.

·.

I.

2.
~· ~

I

method was available in Missouri in only one hospital. •
M.oreover, the DC noted that no hospital would admit a woman
under 18 wlthout parental consent, and therefore parents
were given the power to veto minor women's decisions with
respect to second and third trimester abortions.
Parental Consent for Hospitalization
~·.

~"

"

;:
1'·

-.:-;.!:~

iJ..

~~

CAS noted that, unlike the statute in Danforth,

'
the
new statute noes not

r~quire

true even for immature minors?).

~

parental consent (is this
In rejecting the DC's

position, CAB noted that the unavailability of hbspitals was
not state action, but was the action of "private entities".
Morf"over, CA.8 thought that the DC's position woulrt'.,'"force
i
.:, "'T

~'0/t'f

reevaluation of every health-based second trimester ·:
':

rPguJation", and that the state i interest was both concern
I

for the mother's health _.:mo viability of the
'Because of

inadequate .~findings

fetus. ~.!:,;.

by the District

Court, CA.8 remanded on the hospi.tallzation requirement.
,,

noted that "the

centr~l

issue is the relative safety

nonhospitali.zed

D&E ~ and hospitaliz~d methods"~-

In

concluding thls portion of its opi.nion, CAB said:
~In sum, we find that the district court
ailed to properly analyze the
hospitalization requirement. On remand, it
should .first determine if the regulation
creates substantial interference with and
imposes a direct burden on the woman's
decision to have an abortion. If it does,
the district court should evaluate whether
the hosP.italization requirement is ;ustified
by a compelling state interest7 i.e., whether
it is reasonably related to the woman's
health. Missouri bears the burden of
justi.fying the restriction." A-66

It

3.

II.

Parental or Court Consent for Mi.nors. , ·
This section makes it a crime to perform an

abortion on a minor (under age 18) unless (i) the physician
has obtained written consent of the minor and one parent or '
guardian; or (ii) the minor is emancipated and the physician
has informed consent1 or (iii) the minor has been. granted
the right to self-consent to the abortion by a court order, "
obtained by procedure prescribed in the statute; or (iv) the •
minor has

be~n

granted consent by court order.

respondents cross petit loners, p. 5.

·~

CAB began its discussion of this issue by quotinq
the paragraph from my Bellotti II opinion that outlined
requirements with respect to consent.
The DC had invalidated this provision because it
was viewed as allowinq a state court unbridled discretion.
Also the statute had not dealt with emancipation properly.
CAB construed S188.028 differently. ,r' It ruled that a court
·-

could not deny the minor's petition unless it found that
"the minor was not emancipated and was not mature enough to
make her own decision and that an abortion was not in her
best interests".

These are my Bellotti II requirements.

CAS buttressed its holding in this respect by reli.ance on
H.L. v. Matheson.

See A68-69.

. In discussing Matheson
off on a "standing" issue.

~AS

noted that it had gone

But here the plaintiff was not a

young woman seeking abortion.

·~
.s,,

Rather,

corporations and physicians seeking to

•.

;

'

• <

4.

services, and that these plaintiffs had shown that some of
their . r~spective
{t

!•.

patients included mature minors.

1'1
~¥

~

i

Interestingly, the plaintiffs in this case (the

primary. petitioners ' who lost on major points below) argue
,.

that CAS harl no authority to interpret the statute as it
~~

1,, 1 ',~,., __ fi

'If

did, contending that the plain language was otherwise.
'l,,~

CAB then noted that this case presented "the
l

,.:y

,_;

left open;,_in Matheson:

whether

r-!

· ~t;.",

is consti.tuti.onally

'best~· interest'

permissible to require mature or

minors

notify their parent~ prior to a co~rt hearing in which th~y ;~
seck , judicial consent".

A70

Aqain relying on my Be1lottl

IT opini.on, .CAB states that it "advances persuasive .reasons

for conlcuding that parental notice ·is unduly burdensome in
cases involving mature or ; 'best interest ' minors . "

u.s .,

at

.

~-··.

"

~

• ,

-

~

r

r:··

;

;

·443

'

if'~"''f:~: ~·
•y. :.•-

!

,... !!

Planned Parenthood chatl.enged severaJ other
'"

-~

t;

provisi?r:s of §188 . 028 .
~\lff~- 1 •

·~

ThesP do not appear substantial to
~:

M

me -; ,a't;~~iieast at. present. ~.The usual vagueness
-~~:_ ...:'.i!i

i':·.t·~

.. '.

_';

.

madet...~ It a'iso is said that the procedure do~s not

''t-·~

anonym! ty:~.~- Oespi te these arquments, C'A8 concluded that
judicial consent provisionw is constitutional .

But CAB

agreed with Planned Parenthood that "the notice provisions

''

found in subsection 188.028 . 2(2 ) are ' impermissible and
be set

aside." ~

In sum, the judicial consent , construed, was
sustained, but - ln accord with Bellotti II, the requirement.
of parenta1 notification was invalidated •
.'

~"·

!1 •

II!.

Restricti.ons on Abortion A.fter Viabi.l'itv (A73)
CAB first reversed the ocs holding that all of

these restrictions were void for vagueness • . ~ do not think
'!

we granted cert on the vagueness issue.

'.~i"l,:

i

•. '<''

·

·' ' · ·

Second Doctor Requirement
fl.~

,;

CAS affirmed the DC's decision that this unduly

burdened the woman's riqht.

The state agreed that there was

,l:'l

a financial burden, but arqued that under Harris and Maher

\

that · this was a private rather than public matter.

I aqree

with CAS that these casP.s were misconstrued by Missouri.
Thus, there certainly was a state imposed burden that could · "'''",

.,
AJ ,,,
;!,

be iustified onlv by a sho\'rinq of comPelling state

interest.~···

··:;; The interest relied upon by the state was the
~.·

importance of mr\ki.nq sure, where a second , , trimester: abortion
is performeo, that the fetus will not survive.
the DC in conlcudinq that the

state ~ failed

CAS affirmed

to

~.4

'·

"'
0

second i.ioctor 's opinion was necessary. ·, . "
~·.

:n

•I'

CAS ..oiscussed ,,.· the O&E procedure,
..,..

::(('

the conflict

of Dr. Crist' 's testimony with
that of all other doctors.*
·t·r
.,..

~

*My recollection is that Dr. Crist was a party in the Akron
case. He testified that he used n&E successfully on women
pregnant as much as 2S weeks. His testimony was
contradicted by every other phvsictan, the prevailing view
being that a fetus could not survive D&E abortion. I'd like
' t.o fino some wav to check up on Or. Crist. M.y quess is that
he is a professional witness.
1

'·~

'

1,

.

·,,
•!

,,

6•

. ,,.

IV.

Informed Consent
~anforth

that a state may require "informed

hel~

consent" even in the first tr\rnester.
at 64-67.

But Danforth limited this as

u.s.

Danforth, 428
follow~:

"The giving of information to the patient as
to just what would be done as to its
.
consequences {may be required]. To ascribe
more meaning than this might well confine the
attending physician in an unoesired and
uncomfortable straightjacket in the practice
of his profession." At 67.
·, a~·'~ '\:t.if'· ''
,~,

'

f< ...~~-:

1',;

T

f•'

r.:

*·

,,·

~l"l

OJ.:.

;;,

1

f

Section 188.039.2(3) goes well beyond Danforth.

,,ill

It requires that the woman be informed of the "probable .

,,r

anatomical and psychological characteristics of the unborn
child", ' and subsection (4) provides that she must be
'li

;••,,,~,,
~r~

informed of "the : immediate and long range physicial dangers
of abortion and

~Rycholoqical

trauma"• =· ·- .. ~

The DC held this
•.

I

affirmed.
In so doinq,

CAB

said that the DC properly

concluded that "the abortion decision is one to he

!"~de

by a f,''
;,.·,

woman and her physician",i and that the s~lfe•s i~terest is
b·

i''{i

'

adequately served when the woman's ' • decision is maite with
"full knowledge of its nature and consequences".

Danforth,

Section 188.039.1 requries that the "attending
t·:v~-~.,

physicia"n .~.J~J nform

the statute.

the woman of the information ~pecified in

Both the

DC

and

CAB

sustainen this

requirement, despite the argument of Planned Parenthood that

'.l')

~·

7.

nonphysicians are capable of informing the patient, and that
requiring the physician to do it creates scheduling problems
and increased costs.

My

tentative vi.ew is that a qualified
•;

;.::..

person other than a physician could give this information. , ;(
I think a state could require the licensing of such

persons, ~

,

such as practical nurses are licensed.*
,(

v.

f,

Pathological Reports
Sect. ion 188.047 requires that sample of the tissue

removed must be submitted to a certified pathologist, who
must file a report with the state divison of health.
'

~::"if

,,,,

·~

CAS invalidated this provision, holding that the

'

decision whether to obtain pathological reports should be
left to the physician.

CAS noted that

~issouri

"does not

require submission of tissue to a pathologist following
other medical procedures".

A94
:.

'.t.

)'

.~ '~
{;i

*In the sub~ection discussinq advice by the physician (p.
A91), CAS refers to the 48 hours waiting period prescribed.
It appears to sustain this as valid, although the discussion
at this point in the opinion is very brief.

.

f

•l

R.
·~~ In

invalirlating this

requiremen~,

CAS reiterated

that "Missouri law requries that all abortions be peformed
by physicians".
:
.f,

·r,o.ltJ?<f'
~;

,,'

CAS's opinion is lonq and ramblinq, and not

•t\

'"'

. .,.,

(.~

altogether clear.

I hope we can find some way to prevent

courts from havinq to make the multiplicity of judqments
such as those addressed by the

oc and CAS i.n

ss

*cAS's opinion is so long I may have missed it , but I find
no full discussion of the requirement th~t only physicians
may perform first trimester abortions. My guess is that the
Court will hold specially trained p~r~ons other than
physicians may be competent to perform first trimester
abortions.

'

:l.; .,.

lfp/ss 11/22/82

:4

~~·

1

tr

~,: ·~-

··:it~·

l'.

Abortion Cases

~rofessors'

Brief

Eiqhtv-five professors have joined in a brief. by
Paul Brest and Susan Appleton that is a well written, but
repetitive,

arqum~nt

that - at least for adult women - is

strongly pro-abortion.

~he

analytical approach of the brief

is straight-forward, and may be consistent with Roe - though
possibly

inconsist~nt

with some of our subsequent decisions

(e.q., Maher and Danforth).
Two-Step Analysis
'T'his is emphas.ized throughout the brief, and
summarized on p. 32 as follows:
First, a court must examine whether or not 'f~ .,
the regulation is state action i.mposinq anv
burr.en at all on the riqht to obtain an
abortion. 'T'he question here is not one of
degree hut simply whether the regulation
affirmatively imPoses anv Jeqallv coqnizable
burden. If it does not, then the analytical
framework nevelooeo in Roe does not govern.
See DanforthJ Maher, McRae. If, however, the
requlation imposes any huroen on the riqht
"· ·~·
recognized i.n Roe, then as a second step, . ~, ·
,strict iudici.al scrutiny must be appl i.ed to \...... v
determine whether that burden is undue--that
is, whether it is properly justified by a
compelling state interest and sufficiently
narrowly tailored to further that qoal. See•·'
M.c Rae , 46 8 U.S • at 314 7 Maher , 4 3 2 U.S • a-t....

~

y-,)

.I

\

f.··,,

,..

;;·

,·;;
···.'"'
,,,,~. \.;:~ ·~:,;I;

··~

h•
""}

:J•

~t

473-74."

32

'•''
'I; ~-

respect to the second step, only two
t~

'

"

intere'sts·
have been identified:
i_., ....
character of

a' state's

(i)

the compelling

interest in protecting maternal ,,
.

health on1y after the first trimester, and the

..
''·

,.•,
'

2.

of a state's interest in

~h~racter

only after, fetal viabU.ity",

~,

potential life

pr~serving

u.s.,

410

at 163-164.

~.~The reason the state's interest in Protecting

health :is said to be comPellinq only

mat~rnal

first trimester, is that medical

aft~r

the

establishes that
' '
'
' 1!;1
'
,.
the rtsk to maternal health durinq the first ,r. tr'imester , is
t~stimony

All Regulation before the Court

Voi~

This brief asserts that "all of the requlations
now before this Court interfere directlv with the riqht
recognized in Roe shoul(h be held voicl".
,.- ~hev

records,

;I>,•

~.(fe~t_.riation

i. ts

~'the

significantly burde··n

~.i11·

According to t'tle
abortion decision and . ~.

bv making termi ~af i.on of

1: "'

•:.~~

¥~::';1p·~~gnancy

onerous, more :~ co'stly·, more' time consuminq, anrl .J' sometimes
,,,,,,.

1.

··•('i

~~~-.,

more hazardous

1

,.
,,Br i;~f, p.

L~.

1

Then , "th'e brief delivers.;
;

1/~

'(-

,-.,.-...~

:\.

~Hel' 11 ~:knockout",
.

:,;··.f,- - ir~fSt"~;.)';

~~

'rf)

M.,,

by

.~~ ~
' ·,

the :measu:res ,. applicr.tble to aborti..ons

asserting that "all

~t:~~./

!/!;

sought'-; by
'

~-

1

(..:

~~~·~'i~,i·~t
·~~·}ft ·~-~~~:.

33, 34. · ·.

t:r

"<!

:'1-!

~-

"':··:·:i:i

·-.·-\ ·,

\'

ui'iriq the first tr imestP.r must fall

~ )> ~qj~~ >

'il

·~t-\:'

' . ~- ~

·.

becauE;~ J:te i theE , .;_ stf!.te.1 inte~~sts io:.; t if. ieq i!l":,Roe is

sufficiently compelling dur.inq that staae to support
""-·';

•

Jl:

~ Accordinqly, a l\ of the
t
',
_
_
tr if!1ester .~i requ lations here 'i ue "unduly burdensome".

·restric.tions".

p. 34,:%F3

~

~f··

_Y:.Y~

l

. •.

.

Maher, 432

u.s . ,

-~

at

...

f

3.
'

Resort to "Balancing Test" ImPermissible .
In a subsection commencing at p. 41, the state
argues against
.
. ""resorting to a balancing test or a sliding
4.

scale analysis".
~·, Its

position is summarized as follows:

"Only the 'compelling state interest'
test--applied here end in all fundamental-rights cases--promises adequate protection of
fundamental constitutional rights,
consistency with this Court's precedents, and
elimination of the uncertainly that a
variable standard of review resting on ad hoc
assessment of burdens generates . " 41

.,,
~:

UniquP Status of Children
In a brief concluding section, the professors .
·ll.,

."'ll

~~~:&.:,, ~w

concede that children have a unique status:

It also

:~

.
.,:

emphas'izes ' that children have constitutional rights and
quotes at .length f-rom Carey, 431

u.s., at 693 (a favorite of

the professors, though not an abortion case) .
,.

.

~·

The brief "explicitly refutes" Judgi Kennedy's

,;-'"~'

1

dissentinq opl nion

in

\"

'

'A kron in which she argues for ~ ,; ::' ,

"sliding scale standard of review for all abortion
"";,..JI

regulations,

~ whether

. !. · : .-'" ~~r

;

. :: 1'!'he, bf i.ef
~'~~: ~.·':~·~;'''· ~:;:'~(:·~'' ~~~j;l1'~~~t.

applicable to minors or adults " . '

· .· identifes (p . 60) the t ,h ree concerns

"uniquely relevant to minors" :
children;

(ii)

their ~. inability

1;~·

/

( i) the vulner abi 1 i ty of '' "
to make informed decisions :

and (iii ) the importance of the parental role in child

1

~~:

·~

rear inq .

Y.

,,,

Citing my Bellotti opinion , 441 '

<

u. s ., at 634 .

, r
.1.'

...

.

..

' 4;..

~·

,,

'
.•' .
~
~

..

4.
~

After noting that these special conerns for

children do not support a state-granted parental veto
(Danforth) ,

1

'a ,; majority of the Just ices '. would approve a more

narrowly drafte d statute allowing minors jurlicially
,,

determined to be mature to make their own abortion
decisions, while requiring immature minors
'l'

consent substitute; parental permission or
~

'J

authorization" Predicated on the minor's best interests . ,
s

~-~

~:''fy.t:

, .....,...

Citing Bellotti, at p. 6.43-644.
'
.,
,''

'~*'"'

•··

,,,

·.

·.

It . noted that. Matheson al;)proved ··~ a pare ~_tal

~

~'i

notification requirement except with respect to mature or
'. -~

emanc{p~ ted ~ minors or ~h~re best interes ts
~~
' ..12

can be shown.

~ ~fi ~
"'-""' 1~:?"'

• i

;')J

brief states that

review\ . is appropriate with respect
but does not define the standard .
~

,,

t._,

_.!}~; ~-"'

.I

y

" woultiJn ike for my clerk to make
judgment

f\ S:!f?~l~~

professors'' character·,izations of our

decisions, particularly· with \· respect
,-.-.

'

-

II<

all r' ~'str ict ions .?- however s ;l:·ight or
on aoult women vlithout meeting the

comoel ~ ing

interest'
d-'".,1

standard.~ l.~y recoll,e 'c tion is that .:there - i's language t:·~.in
,: '
~~

....

J

Maher to the contrary, but perhaps I am wrong .
>T.~
!:,

The professors' brief does not address some of

issue~ that ~! believe ~;j ,raised in one of more of these
cases .

. '·

~(

It talks about first trimester abo rti on s by

•'

5.

vmmen, ana T do not recall that it addresses requirements
secon~

such as hospitalization- with reqoect to

j';

"'

li

trimester ;.·

abortions." Although the brief refers to "approximately the
end of the first trlmP-ster" it does not discuss the position
of the American C"olleqe that physicians should be allowed , ·:,
'

flexibility to make a

,,

'

'.1

is viable

without regard to the number of weeks.

;.'1''1,.,,

,,-

~;

'

,.

Nor, as I recall, aoes the brief '

consi~er

\'.rhet.her

' ' :W,

appropriately tralned persons other than physicjans miqht be
• .

allowed to perform abortions

duri~g

• J·

the first trimester, or

whether these may be performed in free · standing clinics
approvea hy the state'.

~.

ss

t-

~.t;·

···;·;

;

~

'i

iii

•'
.t'

,.

.

:•

>:

'

'

"i\· . ~~·~ ·~ ·t
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MEMORANDUM "

\

TO:
FROM:

DATE:
Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

"
_f.""

-~ I

Nov. 22, 1982
,~ ~.,

Abortion Cases
··-•-

I have now read the briefs you were good enough to

select for me, including also the brief by the American

.,

College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. ' As I am sure
you have found, the number of issues in these cases is a bit
overwhelming. , I have not tried to sort out which ones we
granted, or whether we took them across the board.

~

~

·A primary objective of the Court at this tlme, 1as
I see it, is to enunciate principles or standards that would
afford clearer guidance to state legislatures and limit the
flow of litigation into the Courts.

The professors' brief

with respect to the major issues, suggests rather positive
standards, and emphasizes the undesirability of "balancing".

\'

These have appeal, but they also probably permit abortions
for adult women during the first trimester quite literally
"at will"

In view of the fees charged (see the Virginia

case), there always will be licensed physicians who will
''{.

make enormous profits out of what have been described as
"abortion mills". I am not at all sure the professors' brief
fairly states some of our holdings.

Perhaps the SG goes too

far the other way.
I now summarize, Jim, tentative views on several
of the major issues in these cases:

2.

Informed Consent Requirement
Danforth recognized that this is not an undue
burden per se.

The Akron provision is unduly burdensome

because it imposes extensive requirements a.s to exactly what
a physician must advise the woman as a predicate to her
"informed" consent.
As to the consent requirement with respect to
minors who are neither mature not emancipated, I joined
Matheson in holding that parental consent of at least one
parent is a valid requirement except where the minor is
mature or emancipated or an independent decision-maker finds
that a non-consented abortion is in the best interests of ,
the minor. ,. In Akron, apparently Ohio law would require the
juvenile court to notify the parents.

Under my opinions in

Bellotti II and Matheson, this would be invalid.

,_-z

24 Hours Oelay(Akron)/48 Hours(Missouri)
~

Although I do not recall (without checking} a

court decision on this issue, I doubt that an arbitrary

.~

•

delay - even with an emergency provision - would meet our
standards.

This normally can be left to the physician,

provided there is some assurance that the physician
adequately inform the woman.

wil~ ~

With respect to immature

minors, there should be time to assure informed consent.

We

have never considered the extent of a doctor' s :f",

·-·~:

r

responsibility in determining whether a minor l s mature.

,.

I

suppose a state validly could require with respect to minors

.·

..
•.

'•' ··~

•.:.!

.

.

'·

..

~

3.

of tender age (under 15) that an independent decision maker
determine maturity and best interest issues.

Such a

requirement inevitably would produce some delay.

·~

Second Trimester Abortions
"·

My recollection is that Roe drew no bright line,

.,,

referring only to approximate stages in the development of a
fetus.

Akron, respondents argue that "early second

~~ In

trimester abortions are safely performed [even in]
outpatient clinics, and CA6 apparently would invalidate any
'

"arbitrary line between
~r.:.(,
zy;.

,!";

·.:~
·~

·.~

trimesters" ~

The American College seems to agree, relying on

the argument that "medical knowledge {since Doe] has ·
progressed dramatically", particularly in the use of
procedures~

Yet, the evidence in the Missouri case"

persuaded CAS (and possibly the DC also) that D&E procedure
invariably destroys the fetus.

Thus, in view of the

compelling state interest once viability exists a state
'1

\

lawfully could insist that the decision as to viability be
"'::

; '

made by a physician.

t:.,. ,

~

,..,1 As the College brief relies on "current

knowledge", it would appear that it
physician is the only person likely to possess such
knowledge'· and therefore the viability decision
delegated to a less qualified person.

~·.,.

4.

Free Standing Clinics
.A

major issue, in view of the extensive use of

ctincis and the apparent unavailability of hospitals willing
to do abortions, is what sort of facilities - if any - would
be lawful. . .
·'!,<

~~,

T.

j.,

am favorably inclined toward the views in the '~·
(

amicus brief of the College.

See pages 23, 24.

#

I\

particularly like footnote 65 on p. 24 that describes the .
College's standards for "free standing surgical

facilities~

as requiring them to "maintain the same surgical, ·

{,1

anesthetic, personal (maybe this is personnel) standards as
recommended for hospitals."

Clearly, I would think, clincis

should be regulated and approved by state law,
periodically inspected.

[.':&
'fl.'·','

.,;·• It is not clear whether the College would require
this type of clinic for first trimester abortions.
.~·'

The

record - or perhaps one of the briefs - has the full text of
the College's standard as to abortions.

Take a look, and

identify (or xerox) anything helpful •

•••

,,;;

Jim, I have dictated the foregoing summary of
tentative views.

When we go into Conference on three cases,

involving three different sets of regulations, it will be
+!

.~

"

helpful to have a somewhat similar summary from you,
identifying the issue

a~d

~k

the case. ; Where we differ, we can

prior to Conference.

...

,
·,
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MEMORANDUM

DATE:

TO:

Jim

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Nov. 22, 1982

Abortion Cases
I have now read the briefs you were good enough to
select for me, including also the brief by the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.

As I am sure

you have found, the number of issues in these cases is a bit
overwhelming.

I have not tried to sort out which ones we

granted, or whether we took them across the board.
A primary objective of the Court at this time, as
I see it, is to enunciate principles or standards that would
afford clearer guidance to state legislatures and limit the
flow of litigation into the Courts.

The professors' brief

with respect to the major issues, suggests rather positive
standards, and emphasizes the undesirability of "balancing".
These have appeal, but they also probably permit abortions
for adult women during the first trimester quite literally
•at will".

In view of the fees charged (see the Virginia

case), there always will be licensed physicians who will
make enormous profits out of what have been described as
"abortion mills". I am not at all sure the professors' brief
fairly states some of our holdings.

Perhaps the SG goes too

far the other way.
I now summarize, Jim, tentative views on several
of the major issues in these cases:

Informed Consent Requirement
Danforth recognized that this is not an undue
burden per se.

The Akron provision is unduly burdensome

because it imposes extensive requirements as to exactly what
a physician must advise the woman as a predicate to her
•informed• consent.
As to the consent requirement with respect to
minors who are neither mature not emancipated, I joined
Matheson in holding that parental consent of at least one
parent is a valid requirement except where the minor is
mature or emancipated or an independent decision-maker finds
that a non-consented abortion is in the best interests of
the minor.

In Akron, apparently Ohio law would require the

juvenile court to notify the parents.

Under my opinions in

Bellotti II and Matheson, this would be invalid.

24 Hours Delai(Akron)/48 Hours(Missouri)
Although I do not recall (without checking) a
court decision on this issue, I doubt that an arbitrary
delay - even with an emergency provision - would meet our
standards.

This normally can be left to the physician,

provided there is some assurance that the physician will
adequately inform the woman.

With respect to immature

minors, there should be time to assure informed consent.

We

have never considered the extent of a doctor's
responsibility in determining whether a minor is mature.

I

suppose a state validly could require with respect to minors

·~

.

3.

of tender age (under 15) that an independent decision maker
determine maturity and best interest issues.

Such a

requirement inevitably would produce some delay.

Second Trimester Abortions
My recollection is that Roe drew no bright line,
referring only to approximate stages in the development of a
fetus.

In Akron, respondents argue that "early second

trimester abortions are safely performed [even in]
outpatient clinics, and CA6 apparently would invalidate any
"arbitrary line between trimesters".
The American College seems to agree, relying on
the argument that "medical knowledge [since Doe] has
progressed dramatically", particularly in the use of D&E
procedures.

Yet, the evidence in the Missouri case

persuaded CAB (and possibly the DC also) that D&E procedure
invariably destroys the fetus.

Thus, in view of the

compelling state interest once viability exists a state
lawfully could insist that the decision as to viability be
made by a physician.
As the College brief relies on "current medical
knowledge", it would appear that it agrees a qualified
physician is the only person likely to possess such
knowledge, and therefore the viability decision cannot be
delegated to a less qualified person.

4.

Free Standing Clinics
A major issue, in view of the extensive use of
clincis and the apparent unavailability of hospitals willing
to do abortions, is what sort of facilities - if any - would
be lawful.
I am favorably inclined toward the views in the
amicus brief of the College.

See pages 23, 24.

I

particularly like footnote 65 on p. 24 that describes the
College's standards for "free standing surgical facilities"
as requiring them to •maintain the same surgical,
anesthetic, personal (maybe this is personnel) standards as
recommended for hospitals.•

Clearly, I would think, clincis

should be regulated and approved by state law, and
periodically inspected.
It is not clear whether the College would require
this type of clinic for first trimester abortions.

The

record - or perhaps one of the briefs - has the full text of
the College's standard as to abortions.

Take a look, and

identify (or xerox) anything helpful.

* * *
Jim, I have dictated the foregoing summary of
tentative views.

When we go into Conference on three cases,

involving three different sets of regulations, it will be
helpful to have a somewhat similar summary from you,
identifying the issue and the case.
reconcile these prior to Conference.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

Where we differ, we can
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FIRST DRAFT: Simopoulos v. Virginia, No. 81-185
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The

principal

issue

here

is

whether

Virginia's

mandatory hospitalization requirement for second-trimester
abortions is constitutional.
I

~~s
His

practice

practice
four

in

local

in

November,

Woodbridge,
hospitals

practice

at

American

Women's

room,

a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist.

his

resuscitation

hospital

surgery

centers,

in

Clinic.

operating-room

Falls
The

clinic

relevant
.
d
1 1cense

to
.
1n

office

practice

has

an

at

~

and
known

1

as

the

operating

facilities

for

1

of

treatment

CA-uL~~
S'
Petitioner ~ pek form~ firstat

his

this

case,

the

any

fo-1

Jl
nor

~~~~

of

Replacement and stabilization

~

abortions

and

emergency

cardiac/respiratory arrest.

trimester

Church,

lighting,

and

fluids are on hand.

consisted

Virginia,
or

clinic

1979

way,

)=>

clinic.

/'

During

the

time

clinic was not certified or
had

. .
pet1t1oner

soug h t

2

any

\..'

J?~~--~~ ~~

~ ~~J ~ ~~4~ .J.o~

;;;:"~~~
C¥-

q~1·

I

P.M.

was

she

.~~ same

~~~~
~er-~ ,

petitioner's clinic on
petitioner

that

she

was

about

She /\told

1979.

22

2

h~~~~ ~~~,_,_~
Petitioner

testified

that

he

encouraged

her

to confide

with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of

~
continuing the pregnancy to term.

She did ..g..o. horne,

but

-1

never advised her parents.

·~hf'
~

7

o days later, P.M. returned for a saline injection,

. .
pet1t1oner

~

facility.

d. . d. / 1. .

a rn1n1stere

Although

instructed

to

meet

labor began,

P.M.
"\

~ 1\

1 l~able

to

recall

being

when

the

here was testimony that petitioner provided
instructions as to when to report

then went to a motel

motel

bathroom

injection.

Alone,

instructions,
boyfriend

~~~-

w~~

opera t '10n

c 1n1c

~ ue

~ >4 7ts> ,4D
petitioner at any hospital
1\

post-injection

~ .M.

1n

took

and
her

a~

forty-eight
she
pain
horne.

left

aborted her fetus in

hours

after

the

fetus,

medication

at

Police

found

the
the

3

the

saline

follow-up
motel.
fetus

Her
later

that day and opened an investigation. 1

Footnote(s} 1 will appear on following pages.

~

3.

Petitioner was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside
of a licensed hospital and was convicted by a Judge of the
Circuit Court of Fairfax County sitting without a

jury.

The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed his case and,

in a

unanimous decision,
v.

Commonwealth,

affirmed his conviction.

221

This appeal followed.

Va.

1059,

277

S.E.2d

Simopoulos
194

(1981).

We now affirm.

5

II

1 Except as permitted by statute, persons performing
an abortion are guilty of a felony under Virginia law and
subject to mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§18.271, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2 (1982). See Simopoulos
v. Virginia State Board of Medicine, 644 F.2d 321, 322-323
(CA4 1981) .
2The indictment alleges
§18.2-71, which provides:

a

violation

4

of

Va.

Code

Except as provided in other sections of
t hi s a r t i c 1 e , i f any per son a dm in i s t e r to , or
cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other
thing, or use means, with intent to destroy her
unborn
child,
or
to
produce
abort ion
or
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or
produce such abortion or miscarriage, he shall
be guilty of a Class 4 felony.
In the four following sections the ·virginia Code sets
forth exceptions to this statute: there is no criminal
liability (i) if the abortion is performed within the
first
trimester,
§18.2-72~
(ii)
if the abortion is
performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester,
§18.2-73~
(iii) if necessary to save the woman's life,
§18.2-74.1~
and (iv) during the third trimester under
certain circumstances, §18. 2-74.1.
The indictment here
alleged a violation of §18.2-71 and expressly negated any
defenses of hospitalization under §18.2-73 and any firsttrimester defense under §18.2-72. The indictment did not,
however, rebut the other defenses.

4.

!I
Petitioner

contends

that

-th-e-

5

Virginia

statutory

f"'\

y

hospital requirement sharply restricts the availability of
abortions after the first trimester by granting a monopoly
to

the

trimester

few

licensed

abortions. 3

hospitals

that

will

He also argues that

permit

mid-

the Virginia

3 Petitioner raises two issues on his appeal that do
not ~.QQSQ.rve extended treatment.
H:i& first conten ~ ~
that Va. Code §18.2-71 was unconstitutionally applied to
him, because lack of medical necessity for the abort ion
was not alleged in the indi...st_~nt, fto-t addressed in the
prosecution's case, ~t7'mentioned by the trier of
fact.
Petitioner contends that this failure creates two
constitutional issues: (i) whether the State failed to
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment,
as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 u.s. 62
(1971); and (ii) whether the prosecution failed to meet
its burden of persuasion, as required by Patterson v. New
York, 432 u.s. 197 (1977).
--The authoritative construct ion of §18. 2-71 by the
Supreme Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least
with regard to the defense of medical necessity, the
prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical
necessity beyond a reasonable doubt until petitioner
invoked medical necessity as a defense.
See 221 Va., at
1069, 277 S.E.2d, at 200. Petitioner's reliance on Vuitch
thus is misplaced, ~ecause the Virginia statute, as
construed by the state court, does not require that the
State allege lack of medical necessity; the District of
Columbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court,
did require the prosecut1on to so allege.
See 403 U.S.,
at 70.
Placing upon the defendant the burden of going
forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is
normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 102 s.ct. 1558,
1567-1568 & n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 u.s.
684, 701-703 nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975). ri'hus, we agree wi
~me state court that the prosecution did not bear the
burden of alleging or proving lack of medical necessity in
t is case because petitioner failed to invoke the defense.
Petitioner also contends that e·h e Sl:ip£-Sme Cottrt . of
V~ja~n=ocl3:Pkeld=i~
his .g~i:OA-- beee:ttse t;.be
prosecutio
·
rove that his acts in fact caused
the de se of the fetus.
e S a e
cas ,
ere
e ~ ence that (i) P.M. wen to petitioner specifically for
abortion and that she advised him that she was twentyo weeks pregnant, App. 264, 268; (ii) two days later
ti tioner injected P.M. with a saline solution without
mplication, id., at 271; (iii) after the procedure was
rformed he tOTO P.M. that the fetus would be destroyed,
(iv) she then went to a motel and stayed two
otnote continued on next page.
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~h-~

requirement c£eates negative health consequences and,

as

applied to him and the abortions that he performs in his
well-equipped
contribut[e]
as

does
to the

justification

Population
(1977)

(WHITE,

J.,

"measurably

purposes which the State advances
for

Services

not

the

restriction."

International,
concurring

431

u.s.

Carey

v.

678,

702

in part and concurring

6

in

the result).
We need not pause long here to consider the standard

6

of review, for we have set it out at length today in City
of Akron v.

u.s .
..,

~

~... .

•

Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Although the Court found

~1 ~ ),

IJC

a

~~~~ woman

{0'

in Roe v. Wade,

410

the woman's right to ~decide to abort to

fundamental

right,

we

rejected

the

notion

that

a

has an absolute right to an abortion without any

~~ interference
~

Inc.,

recognized,

from

the

State.

We

and we reaffirm today,

consistently

that,

have

"since a State

days, id., at 273-277; (v) that she did not
medication
but
the
pain pills
that petit·
r
prescribed, id., at 286; (vi) P.M.
abor at the
motel, id., ~276-277; and (vii
was born dead
and was of the approximat
ational age of five and onehalf months, id.,
232-233, 236.
We believe this
evidence
is
su
cient
to
support
a
finding
that
petitioner caused the abortion and demise of the fetus.

?...

7

6.

has

a

legitimate

undergo abortions,
interests

in

concern

with

health

of

women who

'a State may properly assert important

safeguarding

medical

standards.'"

(quoting

Roe,

410

the

health

City

U.S.,

[and]

of

at

in

maintaining

u.s. '

Akron,

154).

As

7

JUSTICE

at

BLACKMUM

stated for the Court in Roe:
The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to
it
that
abortion,
like
any other
medical
procedure, is performed under circumstances that
insure maximum safety for the patient.
This
interest obviously extends at least to the
performing physician and his staff, to the
facilities involved,
to the availability of
after-care, and to adequate provision for any
complication or emergency that might arise.

8

9

410 U.S., at 150.

The issue here is whether the Virginia

hospitalization requirement is reasonably related to the
promotion

of

the

Commonwealth's

compelling

interest

in

maternal health and safety. 4

c

A

Before

examining

the

medical

hospitalization requirement, it is

basis

for

~to

Virginia's
understand

4
Peti tioner also argu.es that the State has no
compelling interest in impos1ng criminal penalties on the
performance of safe non-hospital abortions in the second
trimester and that criminal penalties to enforce total
hospitalization is not a narrowly drawn requirement.
Similar arguments in prior cases have not been persuasive.

' 7.

c-r=

first

the

nature

proposition,

of

that

physicians'

Virginia law. 5

As

requirement.

a

general

offices are not regulated under

Virginia law does not, however,

permit a

10

physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery
to

perform

pregnancy

an

abortion

unless

"such

during

the

procedure

second
is

trimester

performed

in

hospital licensed by the State Department of Health."
Code §18.2-73

~Att~ ...:

J
11

(1982).

of
a
Va.

~

The Virginia abortion statute does

Hc.b ~ .-( H.-.. ~

10

""

notA defiAe hospital , ~§32.i~23.i defines "hospital" to

include

"outpatient

hospitals."

Section 20.2.11 of

5 A physician's . office is explicitly excluded from
the hospital 1 icens ~ statutes and regulations, unless
the off ice is used pr' incipally for performing surgery.
See Va. Code §32.1-124(5).
Surgery is not defined.
Petitioner contends that whether his facility principally
performs surgery is a question of fact that has not be£s..t-) v
~ resolved and that it is 1\Unu• fa.L frgm ol.e-.r whether 'his
clinic may be 1 icensed as a "hospital."
He notes that,
after he went to trial, he requested a certificate of
neea~
but was informed by the Off ice of the Attorney
General that his "office-clinic cannot be licensed as a
hospital" and that "if you wish to perform this type of
procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do
it."
App.
to Reply Brief
for
Petitioner
3a,
4a.
Petitioner did not seek any license before his indictment p
~ thus tfie ....f-4u::t.ual
iem:te whether his partic~::~le:-r
facility would qualify , as ~ Aos~ital is irrelevant ~to ou Fd~
..... ~ t,/...., L.tlfU.4r
.Petitioner also notes that the Commonwealth does not
that he should have procured a hospital 1 icense
under Part III of the Rules and Re9ulations for the
Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in V1rginia to perform
first-trimester
abortions
and
that,
until
now,
the
Commonwealth has cons ide red the Falls Church facility to
be a physician's office beyond the reach of the hospital
licensure regulations.
The legality of petitioner's
actions in performing other abortions at the clinic, and
the
constitutionality
of
Virginia's
first-trimester
abortion clinic regulations, is not before us, however.

8.

the Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the
Licensure

of

Outpatient

(hereinafter
pertinent
provide

Rules}

part

as

facilities

procedures

on

Hospitals

defines

for

the

outpatients" 6

second-trimester

abortion

Virginia

which

performance
and

(1977}

hospital

outpatient

"[i)nstitutions

"outpatient abortion clinics." 7
a

in

in

primarily

of

surgical

expressly

includes

Thus, under Virginia law,
may

be

performed

in

an

1:

outpatient surgical clinic provided that clinic has been
licensed as a hospital by the Commonwealth.
It

is

readily

apparent

that

u

Virginia's

second-

....

6section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person
shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this
Commonwealth any hospital ... unless such hospital ... is
licensed as provided in this article."
See also Rules
§30.1
(similar provision specifically for outpatient
hospitals}.

~

~ fr/

7 "outpatient abortion clinics" refers specifically
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part
III of the Rules, see Rules, at i, §62.1.2 of which
provides that "[a) ny procedure performed to terminate a
pregnancy shall be performed prior to the end of the first
trimester (12th week amenorrhea}." Petitioner argues from
this that outpatient hospitals that provide abortion
services cannot provide second-trimester abortions.
A
more plausible reading, however, is that Part III sets
minimum standards for first-trimester abortion clinics,
with part II setting m1n1mum standards for outpatient
surgical hospitals
that may perform second-trimester
abortions.
This interpretation is confirmed by several
sections in Part II, i. e., §§43.6.2, 43.6.3, 43.7.3(c},
43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion
services.
Moreover, the Commonwealth's counsel at oral
argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to
Part I I leg ally COI:il-d ~r form second-trimester abort ions.

A.:

Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.

y~

~·r
S'.. w~ ~~'
~
w..u..
~
(/~ ~~~.,~~...,_IIIJel!!~~
1-<A-

~

,,4 ~ -1-y~ bj La si;ai p-w-f-~~
~!YV ~. ~~ ''ar ~&A-~ ~~v}l-tV~
t'

-

9.

trimester

hospitalization

requirement

is

significantly

different from those that we invalidated today in City of
Akron

and

Planned

u.s.

Parenthood

Association

v.

1~

Ashcroft,

In those cases, the laws at issue "require[d]

all second-trimester abortions to be performed in general,
acute-care facilities."
a

requirement,

by

Id., at

preventing

We found that such
the

'~
1n
non h.
osp1ta· l.
sett1ngs,

abortions

performance

of

D&E

1~

"imposed a heavy, and

1\

~

relatively
abortion

burden

unnecessary,
inexpensive,

procedure."

on

otherwise

City

of

women's

access

accessible,

and

u.s.,

Akron,

to

a

safe

at

The Court therefore held invalid the laws there as ~

no~ states'

"'

maternal health.

interest in

~~':"'-.--1!-l ~ ~w.,. ~~

_....._....--.,--,i:"'..

----

---

most important factors in our analysis in
City of Akron was the medical fact
be performed as safely

u.s. '

hospital."

;~"D&E

abor l ions may

in an outpatient clinic as

in a

at
not

that

second-trimester

exclusively

in

acute-care,

abortions
general

be

require

performed

hospitals.

Under

1:

' 10.

Virginia's

licens~

~I
~es,

outpatient

clinics

may

qualify

for

1·

as hospitals in which second trimester abortions

lawfully may be performed.

Thus,

~

our aetermiRat:i-ons

City of Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling

here ~

in

aRd

B

We

do not dispute petitioner's contention that

Virginia hospital regulations

impose

right to privacy.

No doubt there are some costs encur d

in

the

complying

will

be

with

some

fewer

challenged

qualified

second-trimester abortions. 8
Virginia's

hospital

regulations

facilities

and

available

We nonetheless conclude

requirement

for

8 Petitioner
suggests
that
the
hospitalizatio
requirement
is
not
reasonably
related
to
the
Commonwealth's health interest because it effectively
leaves the Commonwealth's pregnant women at the mercy of
local hospital governing boards that may prohibit the
procedure altogether or require parental consent in the
case of minors.
Cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 57 (finding n
evidence that an outpatient surgical facility in Virgini
has
ever
performed
a
second-trimester
abortion).
Petitioner points to no evidence in the record, however,
that a qualified outpatient surgical center has been
denied a hospital license, and without such evidence, we
do not think his argument is relevant to the issue
presented here--whether the state licensing regulations
are
reasonably
related the Commonwealth's compelling
interests.

1'

~~~--L4-~

F~rst:,

-w.e

~

ow: p.U,Qr heldiAg..s. that the State

1~

interest in protecting maternal health becomes compelling
at

approximately

the

beginning

See City of Akron, _ _

3

16!~

of

the

u.s., at _ _;
1 '"ft&#k:n ~ s

second-trimester.
Roe,

'-r

410

.J·. 6

H

u.s.,
C

at

di"EOl'l;;

·=~~)

Second-trimester abortion~may give rise to serious

complications, 9

and

in

the

later

weeks

of

pregnancy

especially,

~~~
~~.
., .
.
certain
methods ) 1\
y
Increase

the

risks. 10

Although

and

relative

safety of

.

the
the

increasingly

common

use

11

dilatation and evacuation method

(D&E), see City of Akron,

u.s.,

at _ _ , may make the

need for particular equipment in and designs of a facility

9Between 1972 and 1978,
trimester abortions in this
the abortion procedure.
See
Abortion Surveillance, at 48

79 women undergoing secondcountry died as a result of
Centers for Disease Control,
(1980).

1 °For example,
the majority of second-trimester
abortions after the sixteenth week of gestation are
performed by means of intrauterine instillation of saline,
see Grimes & Cates, The Brief for Hypertonic Saline, 15
Contemporary Ob/Gyn 29, 30 (1980), even though the rate of
death for abortions done by instillation procedures are
greater than for D&E, see also ACOG Technical Bulletin No.
37, Hypertonic Saline Amnio-Infusion 1 (1976) (mortality
rate of 18 per 100,000 women); Cates, et al., The Risk of
Dying from Legal Abortion in the United States, 1972-1975,
15 Int'l J. Gynaeco1. Obstet. 172, 175 (1977).
Less
serious complications include hypertremia, fever, retained
placenta, hemorrhage, premature rupture of the membranes,
immediate labor, disseminated intravascular coagulation
(DIC), cervicovaginal laceration, failed amniocentesis,
failed labor, and sepsis. See ACOG Technical Bulletin No.
37, supra, at 2-3.

11
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~

sf±M?:bl

~ ·~

less

compelling,

they have

not

eliminated

J'i!l&

the

need

for

~~
reasonable standards.

D&E, despite its safety, may cause

""'

complications, 11 and States have a legitimate interest in
ensuring

that

prevention,

d

meet
detection,

complications.

m.-1{ s an ar s
and

treatment

of

for
those

1~

That interest is compelling throughout the

second-trimester, and the State may,

"from and after the

end of the first trimester, adopt standards for licensing
all facilities where abortions may be performed so long as

1~

those standards are legitimately related to the objective
the State seeks to accomplish."
179, 194-195 (1973)
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Doe v. Bolton, 410

u.s.

(emphasis added). A

'1{' Ac ute-care,
general
hospitalization do ~ not enhance the safety of D&E
abortions . ~ ~ major cause of complications-infection--does not arise until 24 to 72 hours after the
procedure has taken place, by which time the woman will
have been discharged from either a hospital or a clinic.
See Ashcroft, 664 F.2d 687, 690 n. 6 (CA8 1981), rev'd in
part & aff'd in part, _ _ u.s. __ (1983).
That fact,
however,
does not alleviate the need for standards •
designed to prevent infection. Tfie otber ~ a~ng cause of
death and complications in D&E abortion patients is
hemo'rrhage, which can be prevented, detected, and treated
during or soon after the procedure.
See Cates & Grimes,
Deaths from Second Trimester Abortion by Dilatation and
Evacuation: Causes Preventiona Facilities, 58 Obstetrics
& Gynecology 401,
03 (1981) (-lso showing ane c;;Jeath ..from
cCH:-di~ --c..oJd.apse
£rem
toM-ic
reaetion
to
. ) •
Other potential complications
of this procedure are uterine perforation and cervical
tears, which are significantly increased in comparison to
other second-trimester procedures.
See ACOG Technical
Bulletion No. 56, at 78 (1979).
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The
from

~ -7-~L.)-

profession "'\ ~s

medical

licensing

requirements

abortion services.
of

Obstetricians

for

notA ~k

an

facilities

exemption

that

provide

The standards of the American College
and

Gynecologists

(ACOG)

provide

ll

that

"[a]mbulatory care facilities providing abortion services
should

meet

the

same

standards

of

care

as

those

recommended for other surgical procedures performed in the
physician • s
standing

office

and

and

outpatient

hospital-based

clinic

ambulatory

or

the

setting."

Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54
1982)

(hereinafter

Standards) .

The

free-

11

ACOG,

(5th ed.

profession

olea.rly-

acknowledges the State's role in promulgating and policing
those

"Free-standing

standards:

ambulatory

surgical

facilities

hospital-based

or

should

be

conform to requirements of state or federal
Such

facilities

anesthetic,

and

should

maintain

personnel

hospitals."

Id.,

Virginia's

licensing

at

54.

the

standards
The

as

issue

requirements

licensed

legislation.

same

surgical,

recommended
here

to

is

for

whether

~e

~

restra.iRts,

further~

1\

the

state's

compelling

interest

~ ~t.f-l.rj d j ~
without unduly burdenin ~ w~meR's • i~ht to an abortion.

1~

~~~~
c ~·vu-~ ~,
grouped

for

purposes

of

discussion into three main categories.

~~~-------------/

The

first

management,

sections

grouping

policies,

relates

procedures,

organization,

to
and

Some

staffing.

resemble the requirements for a

J.

;:o~tion

in

that they call for some governing authority, §§40.1, 40.3
(governing body shall provide facilities,

personnel,

I

20

and

resources "necessary to meet patient and program needs"),
an administrative officer, §40.6, disclosure of ownership,
§40.2, by-laws, §40.5, and a policy and procedures manual,
licensed
services

and

perform

physician

~

surgical

must

supervise

procedures,

clinical

§42.1

'and

21

a

1-t:>

registered nurse shait be on duty at all times while the
facility is in use, §42.2.
The

second

construction

category

standards

for

of

requirements

new hospitals,

and

outlines
additions

1 2The manual must describe emergency and elective
procedures that may be performed at the facility, §41.2.1;
the anesthesia that may be used, §42.2.2; the criteria and
procedure for admissions and discharge, §41. 2. 4; written
informed consent, §41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping
and infection control, §41.2.5.

21

' 15.

and alterations to existing ones. 13

The Rules require the

facility to provide a brief narrative of requirements and
information

relating

institution's

to

objectives,

the

fulfillment

§50.1.1,

and

of

the

provide

that

"deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be
approved
• minimum
Guidance

if

it

is

determined

that

requirements

have

is

parking,

given

on

been

the purposes
fulfilled,"

safety

and

of

2~

the

§50.2.1.

fire

codes,

zoning, site, and location. 14 There are also construction
requirements,
areas, 15

which

clinical

set

forth

areas,

standards
laboratory

for
and

the public
radiology

13 section
50.7.1
permits
conversion
only
of
buildings that can be remodeled to meet the requirements
of the State Uniform Building Code, but, when the
licensing agency finds the special requirements of Part II
would be impractical, it may waive the enforcement of
those requirements, provided patient care and safety to
life from fire is not adversely affected.
14 see Rules §50.6.1 (building must "conform to state
and local codes, zoning and building ordinances, and the
State Uniform Building Code requirements applicable to
type of occupancy"): id., §50.8.1 ("The site shall meet
local zoning regulations."): id., §50.8.4 (sanitation,
water supply, sewage, and disposal facilities must comply
with applicable state and local codes and ordinances): and
id., §50.8.5 (adequate fire protection).
15 See, e. g., Rules §52.1.2 (room may serve more
than one function): id., §52.1.4 (lobby area must have
space for one friend or family member per patient and must
provide public toilets, a public telephone, a water
fountain, and wheelchair storage): id., §52.1.6 (private
space for counseling if program requires it): id., §52.1.7
• (nourishment room optional).
--

2~
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services,

16

The

and general building.

most

important

group

-A.../4~~

of - ~EJ.a-l:.ds

for

our

1
purposes

relate/ to patient care services.

~~

.e____l:>-b.~e.G~H!t"--e-:~·:-f:!1:Ht~~

the

r equ i r erne n t s

'Fhe bulk - e.f
for

v a r i o us

23

1\

services

that

anesthesia, 17

the

facility

laboratory, 18

offer,

may
and

such

pathology. 19

as
Some

~ rLe>
laundry,
plant.
are

and

the

physical

See, e. g., Rules§§ 43.2, 43.10, 43.12.6.

also

guidelines

on

medical

records,

16These
services
may
be
provided
outpatient surgical hospital if the services
applicable requirements of the Department
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of
Special Hospitals or through a contractual
with nearby facilities. See Rules §52.3.1.

§43.7,

There
pre-

within
the
comply with
of Health's
General and
arrangement

17 see,
(service must be
e.
g.,
Rules §43.1.1
directed by licensed physician); id., §43.1.2 {physician
be
present
for
responsible
for
anesthesia
must
administration and recovery) .
18Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate
routine"
laboratory
testing.
See
Rules
§43.6.1.
Outpatient surgical hospitals providing abortion services
also must
conduct
pregnancy
testing,
hemoglobin or
hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing, Coomb' s
testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger
and albumin, culture for gonorrheal infect ion, § 6 4 .1. 3,
and where medically indicated, serologic testing for
syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, §64.1.4.
19 section 4 3 . 6 . 3 r eq u i r e s that a 11 t i s sue s h a 11 be
submitted for a pathology examination, with pathology
abortion patients meeting
the m1n1mum
services
for
requirements
of
§64.2.4
(must
be
submitted
"for
histological examination by a pathologist in all cases
where gross examination by the attending physician does
not confirm presence of fetal parts") .
See Ashcroft,
u.s., at

23
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.
opera t 1ve

Finally,

.
.
20
a d m1Ss1on,

post-operative

recovery.

21

the Rules mandates some emergency services and

.
22
.
evacua t 10n
p 1 ann1ng.

we

and

~.

I II

" M, -!J!1i~~ t~eguli!ft ~ ns

&1'\dc

r:e"

/
20 section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and
physical examination before initiating any procedure.
Sufficient
time
must
be
allowed
between
initial
examination and intitiation of any procedure to permit
review of laboratory tests.
See id., §43.8.3.
In an
outpatient surgical hospital providing abortion services,
the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the
performing physician. See id., §43.8.4.
Section 43.8.5 provides that the facility performing
abortions "shall offer each patient appropriate counseling
and instruction in the abortion procedure and in birth
control methods."
Virginia does not require that the
doctor personally provide this counseling or specify the
means by which this counseling is performed.
Under this
requirement, it remains true that "it is for the woman, in
conjunction
with
her
physician,
to
decide
what
considerations are relevant to [her] decision." See City
of Ashcroft,
U.S., at
21 Each patient shall be observed for post-operative
complications for one hour under the direct supervision of
a nurse trained in resuscitation techniques and other
emergency procedures.
See Rules §§43.9.1, 43.9.2.
A
licensed physician must be present on the premises until
the patient is discharged on his written orders. See id.,
§§43.9.3, 43.9.4.
--22see Rules §43.4.1 (written evacuation plan); id.,
§43.5.1 (shall maintain "adequate monitoring equipment,
suction apparatus, oxygen, and related items necessary for
resuscitation
and
control
of
hemorrhage
and
other
complications");
id.,
§43.5.2
(requiring
a
written
agreement ensuring ambulance service to a licensed general
hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides:
A written agreement shall be executed with a
general hospital to ensure that any patient of
the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive
needed emergency treatment. The agreement shall
be with a 1 icensed general hospital capable of
providing full surgical anesthesia, clinical
laboratory, and diagnostic radiology service on
thirty (30) minutes notice and which has a
physician in the hospital and available for
emergency service at all times.

are
of

abortion

reasonably

related

24

to

ser

first category of requirements need little
discussion. 23
regulating

?

1

States

have

organizations

jurisdiction,

and

as

a

legitimate

organizations

organizations

interest
within

primarily

providing abortion services are no different.

their

devoted
24

in

to

24

Virginia

requires little more or different than it does from other
associations and groups holding out their services for a
fee. 25

~

G:, nstruction or

renovation requirements can

23The ACOG's standards discuss much of Virginia's
concerns about proper management and policies under the
appropriate
heading
of
"Quality
Assurance."
See
Standards, supra, at 55 ("Each physician's office and
outpatient clinic should assess whether effective and
efficient
management
of
health
care
has
been
accomplished.").
Like Virginia's narrative requirement,
see supra, at __ , the ACOG's standards suggest that the
"outpatient clinic evaluation of patient care should
assess the completeness of medical records, the accuracy
of diagnosis, appropriateness of use of laboratory and
other services, and other outcome of care."
Standards,
supra, at 55-56.
24 The ACOG advises that each ambulatory body should
have a "governing body" that has the final authority and
responsibility for the appointment of the medical staff.
Id., at 60.
Cf. supra, at
.
It also states that
"""TWJ ritten policies describingspecific responsibilities
of each member of the team are desirable, and should be
reviewed and revised periodically." Id., at 60.
25 See, e. g., Va. Const.
create private corporations).
[to be written]

art.

IV, §14 (17)

(power to

25
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discourage doctors
~

tbe¥ must be

from providing outpatient facilities,

~arefnlly

sc:rutiRh:ed._

The requirements

~

here, however, merely require the facility to follow some
general

design 26

and

safety standards for

provide

basic

equipment. 27

The

the most part merely refer to local

2!

codes, 28 and many are not specific requirements, requiring
only

that

the

facility

be

adequate

for

the

services

26 The ACOG recommends that even physicians' offices
and clinics provide at least a patient reception room,
consultation room, at least two examining rooms, a utility
room, and storage.
See Standards, supra, at 57-59.
~ J~
standards for an ambulatory surgical facility are more
detailed,
providing
space
for
reception,
waiting,
administrative activities,
patient dressing,
lockers,
preoperative evaluation, physical examination, laboratory
testing,
preparation
of
anesthesia,
performance
of
surgical procedures, preparation and sterilization of
instruments, storage of equipment, storage of drugs and
fluids, postanesthetic recovery, staff activities, and
janitorial and utility support. See id., at 61. The ACOG
_,A/ ~· details the equipment to be found in the various rooms and
ff
~
areas. See id., at 57-58, 61.
27 The ACOG lists the equipment that a clinic's
~
examining room should contain, including instruments for
vaginal and rectal examinations, obtaining cultures and
~
smears, and diagnostic studies and operative procedures.
See id., at 57. When local anesthesia is used, the clinic
' ~r doctor's office should have emergency resuscitation
~ :quipment, inlcuding postive pressure oxygen, intravenous
equipment and fluids, suction, and a cardiac monitor. See
ibid. Ambulatory surgical centers should, in addition to
oxygen, suction, and resuscitation equipment, provide for
mergency lighting and intercommunications.
See id., at

rY

r/

Yv

~

-

28 see n. 14, supra.
The ACOG provides that both
.J.AJ
/1, clinics and ambulatory facilities should meet all state
7
and
local
building,
safety,
and
fire
codes.
See
[D
Standards, supra, at 58, 61.
Specific plans should be
developed to evacuate patients in case of an emergency.
~ _J) \
See id. , at 59, 6 2.
Procedures should also be made for
(Y
~~~rgency transfers to a nearby hospital.
See id. at 58,

u

fJr

q r .;.;7

Y1pf; , ~ ~ ~
JV' . v>~~~~ /
I

~~~
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offered.
limited
available

Cf.
to

Standards,

those

that

medications

participating

at

51

("Procedures

can

be

performed

and

personnel

equipment
are

and

trained.").

should

safely

for

which

The

be

with
the

26

medical

profession seeks no immunity from local building laws, and

Our

~~oncern

requirement,

for

is

with

the

patient
most

they

services
clearly

relate to health, yet may be unreasonable when considered
as conditions for · abortion procedures.
and

recordkeeping

unreasonable

in

standards 30

detail.

The

are

The sani tation 29
typical

laboratory

and

services

not

~

29 rnfection can be a serious complication with any
abortion procedure.
See nn. 10 & 11, supra. Significant
portions of the Virginia Regulations are designed to
assure
that
outpatient
surgical
hospitals
practice
stringent infection control, including sterile processing,
appropriate
waste
disposal
and
laundry
practices,
isolation of nonpotable water, and protection of the
integrity of the operating suite. See Va. Reg. §§41.2.5,
43.2.1, 43.2.2, 43.10.1, 43.11, 43.12.3, 43.12.5, 52.2.5,
52.2.6, 52.2.7 & 52.2.13.
The ACOG recommends that all
facilities
develop
procedures
for
controlling
and
disposing of needles, syringes, glass, knife blades, and
contaminated waste supplies. See Standards, supra, at 58,
62.
30The Virginia record keeping requirements are v.ery {
similar to those detailed by the ACOG, see Standards,
supra,
at
54-55,
59-60,
and
we
have
found
such
requirements, "if not abused or overdone," impose a
legally insignifkant burden on the Roe right. See Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 u.s. 52,
81 (1976).

26

________- -
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~~- ~t!Yf~~ ~~ ,Lo -~14u.
9ilO£ed ..J:.o

the-

pH>visio ~ -Qf

medical services., 31 a-RoEl

post-operative recovery standards

~

2~

follows~ical
1\

practice. 32

The

equipment

services are minima1

33

requirements

for

emergency

and are further prefaced with the

word "adequate."34
We are impressed by the means Virginia has

hs>

~ ~ ~

pHu..r

~ 2~

~ ~ UL/J:z;J!~)-.

its requirements to en ~ s that it seeks to meet.

This is

31 The risks of hemorrhage, are reduced by requiring
an outpatient surgical hospital to make hemoglobin or
hematocrit determinations before initiating instillation.
See Standards, supra, at 59 ("The laboratory data should
include hemoglobin or hematocrit, urinalysis .•.. "}.
32Anesthesia
complications
are
allevieated
by
requiring a physician to be present for monitoring
functions during the administration of anesthetics and in
the recovery period.
See Standards, supra, at 53.
Less
serious complications can be monitored by the registered
nurse on duty.
See ibid. ("During the recovery period,
the patient should be under continuous observation by a
qualified member of the health care team."}. The required
one-hour recovery period is intended to permit detection
of these problems. See Kerenyi, Mandelman & Sherman, Five
Thousand Consecutive Saline Inductions, 116 Am. J. Obstet.
& Gynecol. 593 (1973}: Standards, supra, at 53: App. 37
(defense witness concedes waiting period necessary}.

-

33 The arrangements for emergency transfer to an
acute-care, general hospital are clearly reasonable.
See
Cates & Grimes, supra n. 11, at 407 (even for nonhospital
facilities providing D&E, "arrangements for emergency care
should be established with hospitals near the nonhospital
facility
~
'

~.~t1:: '~

~A A.J/.L~~petU..in;~ --w.e~~perating

f.V}Vr-"'--; ~

---------

t:l1e

room

fa~at

contains
practically 4a~l of
· d d
m
the
emergency se v1c ~ equipment required by the Commonwealth.
The record indicates that it has excellent lighting, wall
outlets for
oxygen,
suction apparatus,
resuscitation
equipment, a defibrillator, an EKG machine, IV fluids,
complete anesthesia equipment, and drugs , to be used in
emergencies. See App. 21-22, 375-376. ~~
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especially so given
~'

simply

We

a particular

because

asserted

that,

find

"is not unconstitutional
not perfectly correspond

interest."

the

s

--1\

it does

State

in the regulation of abortion

City

correspondence

of

the

u.s.,

Akron,

here

to

reasonable

to

at

2~

pass

constitutional muster. 35
We

believe

contained

in

recognition

of

abortions

may

necessary

in

abortions. 36

that

the

§18.2-73
the

The

nothing

medical

require
the

is

hospitalization

fact

certain

that

than

does

safer
not

statutory

second-trimester

technological

relatively
statute

more

requirement

support

not

first-trimester
require

that

the

3 5we indicated in City of Akron that the ACOG
recommends that abortions performed in a physician's
office or outpatient clinic be limited to fourteen-weeks
gestation,
but
it
indicates
that abortions may be
performed safely in a hospital-based or in a free-standing
ambulatory facility until eighteen weeks gestations. See
City of Akron, _ _ u.s. __ (citing Standards, supra, at
52}.
Virginia's Rules easily correspond to the ACOG
requirements for a free-standing clinic and thus are
reasonably related to the State's compelling interest in
maternal health and safety for the period after fourteen
weeks.
But we are also impressed by the fact that, even
though the Rules apply to two weeks in which abortions
could be performed safely in a doctor's office or a
clinic, they do not impose requirements that significantly
deviate from those that ACOG would require of a wellequipped office or clinic performing thirteenth and
fourteenth week abortions.
See nn. 23-30. We think that
Virginia has done well to tailor its requirements to
promote the ends that it seeks.
36Petitioner argues that Part III of the Rules,
covering first-trimester abortion clinics requires the
Footnote continued on next page.
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patient

be

hospitalized

abortion be performed

as

in a

an

inpatient

full-scale

or

that

the

general hospital.

The Virginia hospitalization requirement,

2~

in conjunction

with the Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of OutPatient

Hospitals

in

Virginia,

accommodates

medical

advances and leaves the type and timing of the abortion
precisely where it belongs--between the physician and his
patient.

Petitioner's

hospital

licensure

Commonwealth's

failure
provisions

minimal

to

avail
does

himself
not

hospitalization

of

make

2~

the
the

requirement

unconstitutional.37

same services and equipment as Part II.
In fact, part
Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in
Part
II.
See,
e.
g.,
Rules
§63.l.l{b},
§63.3,
§§64.2.5{a}-{m}.
Petitioner argues that, given these
extensive
regulations
for
first-trimester
abortion
hospitals, the only way to require more technological
support
for
second-trimester
abortions would
be
to
restrict them to acute-care, general hospitals. The only
regulations before us, however, relate to second-trimester
abortions, and we find those requirements reasonably
related to the state's compelling interest in maternal
health and safety.

37 Petitioner argues that, even if he could have}
obtained an outpatient hospital license to provide secondtrimester abortions at his Falls Church office, he woul~
~/
also be required to obtain a certificate of public need. / /
See Va. Code §32.1-102.1.
He contends that this arduous
process consumes several months and requires that a public
hearing be held.
See id., §32.1-102.6.A.
It is not at
all clear that an outpatient surgical center would need a
certificate. See id., §32.1-102.1.6{a} ~ §32.2-102.2.~ see
Rules §§30.5.
In any case, the statute itself does not
indicate the process is particularly difficult, and in the
absence of any record evidence, we are unwilling to assume
that this licensing procedure will actually burden women s
Footnote continued on next page.
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III
Roe clearly permits States to impose some reasonable
health

requirements

on

second-trimester

abortions

insure protection of a woman's physical health.

to

Although

there has been impressive advancements in medical science
since 1973, eliminating in some circumstances the need for
caution

that

the medical

community was

3(

then expressing,

the same medical community does not advise that any or all
second-trimester
should

eradicate
We

effectuation.
such

procedures

abortions

outpatient

all

are so safe

health

regulations

~~~at
Virginia's
A

must

clines

be
is

that

performed

in

reasonably

this Court

guiding

their

requirement that

properly

equipped

related

to

the

Commonwealth's compelling interest in maternal health and
safety.
IV
We

hold

that

3)

Virginia's

second-trimester
/

hospitalization

requirement

is

constitutional.

judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia therefore is

right to decide to have an abortion.

The
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Affirmed.
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The principal issue here is whether Virginia's mandatory
hospitalization requirement for second-trimester abortions is
constitutional.
I

Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology.

His practice in

November, 1979 consisted of office practice in Woodbridge, Virginia,
hospital practice at four local hospitals or surgery centers, and
practice at his clinic in .Falls Church.

The .Falls Church clinic has

an operating room, operating-room lighting, and facilities for
resuscitation and emergency treatment of cardiac/respiratory arrest.
Replacement and stabilization fluids are on hand.

Appellant

customarily performs first-trimester abortions at his clinic.
During the time relevant to this case, the clinic was not licensed,
nor had appellant sought any license for it.
P.M. was a seventeen-year old, high school student when she
went to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979.

She was unmarried,

and told appellant that she was approximately twenty-two weeks
pregnant.
know.

She requested an abortion but did not want her parents to

Examination by appellant confirmed that P.M. was five months

pregnant, well into the second trimester.

Appellant testified that

he encouraged her to confide with her parents and discussed with her
the alternative of continuing the pregnancy to term.
home, but never advised her parents of her decision.

,..~l;, .......

'

She did return

2.

Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy
friend.

The abortion was performed by an injection of saline

solution.

P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the fetus

in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course.

Appellant

gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a "Post-Injection
Information" sheet that stated that she had undergone "a surgical
procedure" and warned of a "wide range of normal reactions."
199.

App.

The sheet also advised that she call the doctor if "heavy"

bleeding began.

Although P.M. does not recall being advised to go

to a hospital when labor began, this was listed in the instruction
sheet.

Id., at 200.

P.M. went to a motel.

Alone, she aborted her fetus in the

motel bathroom forty-eight hours after the saline injection.

She

left the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the
wastebasket the motel.

Her boy friend took her home.

Police found

the fetus later that day and began an investigation. 1
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an abortion

1 Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an
abortion are guilty of a felony under Virginia law and subject to
mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§18.2-71, 54-316(3}, 54317(1}, 54.321.2 (1982}. The felony is punishable by a sentence
of two to ten years in prison. Va. Code §18.2-lO(d}.
2 The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code §18.2-71,
which provides:
"Except as provided in other sections of this
article, if any person administer to, or cause to be
taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to
produce abortion or miscarriage, and thereby destroy
such child, or produce such abortion or miscarriage, he
shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony."
Footnote continued on next page.
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during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of a licensed
hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of Fairfax County
sitting without a jury.

The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed

appellant's case and unanimously affirmed his conviction.
Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S.E.2d 194 (1981).
This appeal followed.

We noted probable jurisdiction, ___

u.s. ___ ,

and now affirm.
II
Appellant broadly attacks Virginia's hospitalization
requirements. 3

He contends that they sharply restrict the

In the four following sections the Virginia Code sets forth
exceptions to this statute: there is no criminal liability (i) if
the abortion is performed within the first trimester, §18.2-72:
(ii) if the abortion is performed in a licensed hospital in the
second trimester, §18.2-73: (iii) if necessary to save the
woman's life, §18.2-74.1: and (iv) during the third trimester
under certain circumstances, §18.2-74.1. The indictment here
alleged a violation of §18.2-71 and expressly negated any
defenses of hospitalization under §18.2-73 and any firsttrimester defense under §18.2-72. The indictment did not,
however, rebut the other defenses.
3Questions raised particularly with respect to Virginia's
outpatient surgical clinics are considered in Part III, infra.
Appellant also raises two issues on his appeal that do not
require extended treatment. He first contends that Va. Code
§18.2-71 was applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of
medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the
indictment, addressed in the prosecution's case, nor mentioned by
the trier of fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders
the indictment unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State
failed to meet its burden of alleging necessity in the
indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 u.s. 62
(1971): and (ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of
persuasion, as required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197
(1977).
The authoritative construction of §18.2-71 by the Supreme
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with regard to
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not
obligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reasonable
doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a defense.
Footnote continued on next page.
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availability of abortions after the first trimester by granting a
monopoly to the few licensed hospitals that will permit midtrimester abortions.

He also argues that the Virginia requirements

result in negative health consequences and, as applied to him and
the abortions he performs in his well-equipped non-licensed clinic,
do not "measurably contribut[e] to the ..• purposes which the State
advances as justification for the restriction."
Services International, 431

u.s.

678, 702 (1977)

Carey v. Population
(WHITE, J.,

concurring in part and concurring in the result).
We need not pause long here to consider the guiding principles,
for we have set them out at length today in City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. ___ .
410

u.s.

In Roe v. Wade,

113 (1973), the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's

concept of personal liberty was "broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy," id., at 153.
We rejected, however, the notion that a woman has an absolute right
to an abortion.

We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today

See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S.E.2d, at 200. Appellant's reliance
on Vuitch thus is misplaced. The Virginia statute, as construed
by the state court, does not require that the State allege lack
of medical necessity; the District of Columbia statute in Vuitch,
as construed by this Court, required the prosecution to make th1s
allegation. See 402 u.s., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the
burden of going forward with evidence on an affirmative defense
is normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, ___ U.S. ___ ,
and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701-703, nn.
28, 30,31 (1975).
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to prove
that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus.
In view of
the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized above, this
contention is frivolous. See 221 Va., at 1069-1070, 277 S.E.2d,
at 200-201.

5.

that, "because a State has a legitimate concern with the health of
women who undergo abortions,

'a State may properly assert important

interests in safeguarding health [and]
standards.'"
154).

in maintaining medical

City of Akron, ante, at 10 (quoting Roe, 410

u.s.,

at

This "important and legitimate interest in the health of the

mother" becomes "'compelling' ... at approximately the end of the
first trimester,"

Roe, 410 U.S., at 163, and is compelling

throughout the remainder of the pregnancy.
The State's interest in the health of the pregnant woman
includes an interest in the safety of facilities that perform
abortions.

As the Court stated in Roe:

"The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that
abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed
under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the
patient. This interest obviously extends at least to the
performing physician and his staff, to the facilities
involved, to the availability of after-care, and to
adequate provision for any complication or emergency that
might arise." 410 u.s., at 150.
To protect this compelling interest, the State may, "from and after
the end of the first trimester, adopt standards for licensing all
facilities where abortions may be performed so long as those
standards are legitimately related to the objective the State seeks
to accomplish."
(emphasis added).

Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 194-195 (1973)
Specifically, the State may regulate "as to the

facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether
it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of
less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and
the like."

Roe, 410 U.S., at 163.
A

6.
It is in furtherance of this compelling interest in maternal
health that Virginia has enacted its hospitalization requirement for
abortions performed during the second trimester.

As a general

proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under Virginia
law. 4

Virginia law does not, however, permit a physician licensed

in the practice of medicine and surgery to perform an abortion
during the second trimester of pregnancy unless "such procedure is
performed in a hospital licensed by the State Department of Health."
Va. Code §18.2-73 {1982).

The Virginia abortion statute itself does

not contain the definition of the term "hospital."

This definition

is found in Va. Code §32.1-123.1, which defines "hospital" to
include "outpatient ... hospitals."

Section 20.2.11 of the

Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia {1977)

{"regulations") 5 defines

4 A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the
hospital licensing statutes and regulations unless the office is
used principally for performing surgery. Va. Code §32.1-124{5).
Surgery is not defined. Appellant contends that whether his
facility principally performs surgery is a question of fact that
has not been resolved and that it is uncertain whether his
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that, after he
performed the abortion on P.M., he requested a certificate of
need, see also id., §32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office
of the Attorney General that his "clinic-office cannot be
licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to perform this
type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did
not seek any license before he performed the abortion at issue
here. Thus, without record evidence whether appellant's facility
qualifies as a surgical outpatient clinic and that he was denied
a hospital license, whether the Falls Chur~facility would
qualify under Virginia law is irrelevant to our determination in
this case. Seen. 7, infra {noting State's interpretation of the
Virginia regulations).
5 The regulations were promulgated pursuant to 1947 Va.
Acts, c. 15, §1514-a5, repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711. Although
Footnote continued on next page.
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outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions •.• which
primarily provide facilities for the performance of surgical
procedures on outpatients"6 and provides that second-trimester
abortions may be performed in these clinics. 7

Thus, under Virginia

law, a second-trimester abortion may be performed in an outpatient
surgical clinicS provided that clinic has been licensed as a
"hospital" by the State.
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester

not relevant to our determination here, we note that new but
similar regulations now supersede the regulations in effect when
appellant performed the abortion for which he has been
prosecuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for
the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982).
6 section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall
establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any
hospital ... unless such hospital •.. is licensed as provided in
this article." See also Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30 .1
(similar provision specifically governing outpatient surgical
clinics).
7 Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for
outpatient surgical clinics that may perform second-trimester
abortions. This interpretation is confirmed by several sections
in Part II, i. e., §§43.6.2, 43.6.3, 43.7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5,
43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services. Moreover, the
State's counsel at oral argument represented that facilities
licensed pursuant to Part II legally may perform second-trimester
abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
"Outpatient abortion clinics" refers specifically to those
facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the
regulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. "These
facilities limit the operative procedures to termination of
pregnancy during the first trimester." Ibid. See id. , § 6 2 .1. 2
("Any procedure performed to terminate a pregnancy shall be
performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week
amenorrhea).").
8we herein usually refer to the outpatient "hospitals" in
Virginia that legally may perform second-trimester abortions as
"outpatient surgical clinics."

"r, .

8.

hospitalization requirement is significantly ·different from those at
issue in City of Akron, ante, p. 13, and Planned Parenthood
Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, p.
In those cases, the regulations required "all second-trimester
abortions [to] be performed in general, acute-care facilities."
Ashcroft, ante, at

We found that such a requirement, by

preventing the use of the dilatation and evacuation method (D&E) of
performing abortions in appropriate nonhospital settings, "imposed a
heavy, and unnecessary, burden on women's access to a relatively
inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure."
City of Akron, ante, at 20.

The Court held these laws invalid

because they did not reasonably further the States' interest in
maternal health.
One of the most important factors in our analysis in City of
Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during the early weeks of
the second trimester[,) D&E abortions may be performed as safely in
an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital."

Ante, at 19.

In contrast, the Virginia statutes and regulations do not require
that second-trimester abortions be performed exclusively in acutecare, general hospitals.

Under Virginia's regulations, outpatient

surgical clinics may qualify for licensing as hospitals in which
second trimester abortions lawfully may be performed.

Thus, our

decisions in City of Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here.
B

Second-trimester abortions may give rise to serious
complications, 9 and certain procedures significantly increase the

Footnote(s) 9 will appear on following pages.

9•

risks. 10

Although the increasingly common use and relative safety

of the D&E method, see City of Akron, ante, at

, may make the need

for particular equipment in and designs of a facility less
compelling, the need for reasonable regulations has not been
eliminated.

D&E, despite its relative safety early in the second

trimester, still may cause complications. 11

9 Between 1972 and 1978, at least 67 women undergoing

second-trimester abortions in this country died as a result of
the abortion procedure. See Department of Health and Human
Services, Centers for Disease Control, Abortion Surveillance:
Annual Summary 1978, at 48 (1980). See also Cadesky, Ravinsky &
Lyons, Dilation and Evacuation: A Preferred Method of
Midtrimester Abortion, 129 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 329, 331
(1981) (6.9% complication rate for second-trimester D&E
abortions; 55% complication rate for second-trimester
prostaglandin instillation) •
1 °For example, the majority of second-trimester abortions
after the sixteenth week of gestation are performed by means of
intrauterine instillation of saline, see Grimes & Cates, The
Brief for Hypertonic Saline, 15 Contemporary Ob/Gyn 29, 3-0-(1980), even though there is on the whole a greater death rate
for instillation abortions than there is for D&E. See also
Cates, et al., The Risk of Dying from Legal Abortion in the
United States, 1972-1975, 15 Int'l J. Gynaecol. Obstet. 172, 175
(1977). For identification of less serious complications, see
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG),
Technical Bulletin No. 37, Hypertonic Saline Amnia-Infusion 1, 23 (1976) (now replaced by ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, Methods
of Midtrimester Abortion 75 (1979)).
11A leading cause of death and complications in D&E
abortion patients is hemorrhage, see Cates & Grimes, Deaths from
Second Trimester Abortion by Dilatation and Evacuation: Causes,
Prevention, Facilities, 58 Obstetrics & Gynecology 401, 401-402
(1981), that can be prevented, detected, and treated during or
soon after the procedure. Other potential complications of this
procedure are uterine perforation and cervical tears, which are
significantly increased in comparison to other second-trimester
procedures. See ACOG Technical Bulletion No. 56, supra n. 10, at
78.

A major potential complication for all abortion techniques-infection--does not arise until 24 to 72 hours after the
procedure has taken place, by which time the woman usually will
have been discharged from any facility. See Ashcroft, 664 F.2d
Footnote continued on next page.
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The American Public Health Association (APHA), although
recognizing "that greater use of the dilatation and evacuation
procedure make[s] it possible to perform the vast majority of second
trimester abortions during or prior to the 16th [w]eek after the
last menstrual period," still "[u]rges endorsement of the provision
of second trimester abortion in free-standing qualified clinics that
meet the state standards required for certification."
Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2 (1979)

APHA, The

(emphasis added).

Those standards need not be relaxed merely because the facility
performs abortions: "Ambulatory care facilities providing abortion
services should meet the same standards of care as those recommended
for other surgical procedures performed in the physician's office
and outpatient clinic or the free-standing and hospital-based
ambulatory setting."

American College of Obstetricians and

Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services
54 (5th ed. 1982)

(hereinafter ACOG Standards).

See also id., at 52

("Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities
should be licensed to conform to requirements of state or federal
legislation.").

Indeed, the medical profession's standards for

outpatient surgical facilities are stringent: "Such facilities
should maintain the same surgical, anesthetic, and personnel
standards as recommended for hospitals."

Ibid.

Although the State's interest in licensing medical facilities

687, 690 n. 6 (CAS 1981), rev'd in part & aff'd in part, ante, p.
Thus the relative safety of the D&E procedure does not
alleviate the need for standards designed to prevent infection.

' 11.

is compelling, the State's discretion to regulate on this basis does
not "permit it to adopt abortion regulations that depart from sound
medical practice."

City of Akron, ante, at 12.

"If a State

requires licensing or undertakes to regulate the performance of
abortions during [the second trimester], the health standards
adopted must be 'legitimately related to the objective the State
seeks to accomplish.'
at 12.

Doe, 410 U.S., at 195."

City of Akron, ante,

The issue here is whether Virginia's licensing requirements

for outpatient surgical clinics performing second-trimester
abortions are reasonable means of furthering the State's compelling
interest in the woman's health.

c
The Virginia regulations applicable to outpatient surgical
clinics performing second-trimester abortions are, with few
exceptions, the same regulations applicable to all outpatient
surgical clinics in Virginia.

Those regulations may be grouped for

purposes of discussion into three main categories.
The first grouping relates to organization, management,
policies, procedures, and staffing--matters not particularly
relevant.

These require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet

patient and program needs."
see also §40.1.

Va. Regs.

(Outpatient Hospitals)

§40.3~

They also require a policy and procedures manual,

§43.212, an administrative officer, §40.6, a licensed physician who
12 The manual must describe emergency and elective
procedures that may be performed at the facility, §41.2.1~ the
anesthesia that may be used, §41.2.2~ the criteria and procedures
for admissions and discharge, §41.2.4~ written informed consent,
§41.2.4~ and procedures for housekeeping and infection control,
Footnote continued on next page.
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must supervise clinical services and perform surgical procedures,
§42.1, and a registered nurse to be on duty at all times while the
facility is in use, §42.2.

The second category of requirements

outlines construction standards for outpatient surgical clinics, but
also provides that "deviations from the requirements prescribed
herein may be approved if it is determined that the purposes of the
minimum requirements have been fulfilled," §50.2.1.

There are also

construction requirements that set forth standards for the public
areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology services, 1 3 and
general building.l4
The most important group of regulations for our purposes
relates to patient care services.

Most of these set the

requirements for various services that the facility may offer, such
as anesthesia, 1 5 laboratory, 1 6 and pathology. 1 7

Some of the

§41.2.5.
l3These services may be provided within the outpatient
surgical clinic if the services comply with applicable
requirements of the Department of Health's Rules and Regulations
for the Licensure of General and Special Hospitals or through a
contractual arrangement with nearby facilities. Va. Regs.
{Outpatient Hospitals} §52.3.1.
14 The regulations contain customary provisions with respect
to meeting building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See
Va. Regs. {Outpatient Hospitals} §§50.6.1, 50.7.1, 50.8.1,
50.8.4.
15 see, e. g., Va. Regs. {Outpatient Hospitals} §43.1.1
{service must be directed by licensed physician}; id., §43.1.2
{physician responsible for anesthesia must be present for
administration and recovery}.
16Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine
laboratory testing." See Va. Regs. {Outpatient Hospitals}
§43.6.1. Outpatient surgical clinics providing abortion services
Footnote continued on next page.
Footnote{s} 17 will appear on following pages.

13.
requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant.
See, e. g., Va. Regs.
43.12.6.

(Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 43.2, 43.10, 43.11,

There are also guidelines on medical records, §43.7, pre-

operative admission, 18 and post-operative recovery. 19

Finally, the

regulations mandate some emergency services and evacuation

also must conduct pregnancy testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit
determinations, blood and Rh typing, Coomb's testing where woman
is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and albumin, culture for
gonorrheal infection, §64.1.3, and where medically indicated,
serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, §64.1.4.
17 section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue shall be
submitted for a pathology examination, with pathology services
for abortion patients meeting the minimum requirements of §64.2.4
(must be "submitted for histological examination by a pathologist
in all cases where gross examination by the attending physician
does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See Ashcroft, ante,
at
18 section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and
physical examination before initiating any procedure. Sufficient
time to permit review of laboratory tests must be allowed between
initial examination and initiation of any procedure. Id.,
§43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical clinic providing abortion
services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the
performing physician. Id., §43.8.4.
Section 43.8.5 provides that the facility performing
abortions "shall offer each patient appropriate counseling and
instruction in the abortion procedure and in birth control
methods." (emphasis added) Virginia does not require that the
doctor personally provide this counseling or specify the means by
which this counseling is performed. Under this requirement, it
is, unlike in City of Akron, for the woman, in conjunction with
her physician, to decide what considerations are relevant to her
decision. See ante, at 27-28.
l9Each patient shall be observed for post-operative
complications for one hour under the direct supervision of a
nurse trained in resuscitation techniques and other emergency
procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§43.9.1, 43.9.2.
A licensed physician must be present on the premises until the
patient is discharged on his written orders. Id., §§43.9.3,
43.9.4. For a discussion of similar standards by various medical
organizations, see n 32, infra.

' 14.
planning. 20
III
Appellant does not attack expressly these regulations in his
jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief.

In those, he

emphasizes that Virginia requires hospitalization for secondtrimester abortions without alluding to the fact that the statutory
term "hospital" is defined to include outpatient surgical clinics
that may perform second-trimester abortions.

As appellant had not

sought a license for his clinic, he appears to argue that the
Virginia hospitalization requirements are comparable to those we
have considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft.
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations
on various grounds.

He argues that, even if he had applied for a

license, it is uncertain whether it would have been granted: that
Virginia courts have had no opportunity to construe the "licensing
statutes and regulations": that Part II of the regulations does not

20 see Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.4.1 (written
evacuation plan): id., §43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment,
suction apparatus,-oxygen, and related items necessary for
resuscitation and control of hemorrhage and other
complications"): id., §43.5.2 (ambulance service to a licensed
general hospital)-.--Section 43.5.3 provides:
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general
hospital to ensure that any patient of the outpatient
surgical hospital shall receive needed emergency
treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed
general hospital capable of providing full surgical,
anesthesia, clinical laboratory, and diagnostic
radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and
which has a physician in the hospital and available for
emergency service at all times."

15.
cover an outpatient surgical facility where second trimester
abortions are performed, but see n. 8, supra; and that medical
evidence rebuts the view "that it is safer to perform second
trimester abortions in hospitals."

Reply Brief for Appellant 1.

None of these contentions finds support in this Court's prior
opinions, and the Virginia requirements are strikingly different
from those we invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft.

Indeed, it

is evident that Virginia has adopted statutes and regulations
compatible with our decisions.

We are convinced that the Virginia

provisions are reasonably related to and further the State's
compelling interest in protecting the health of the pregnant woman
during the second trimester.21
The requirements of the first 22 and second categories 23 of

21No doubt there are costs incurred in complying with
Virginia's requirements, but these are not burdens that
necessarily invalidate the regulations. As an empirical matter,
we have no reason to believe these costs will result in fewer
appropriate facilities for performing second-trimester abortions.
Ethical physicians are obligated to provide facilities consistent
with the standards set by their profession. And appellant has
not identified any significant differences between professional
standards and the Virginia requirements.
2 2ACOG's standards discuss many of Virginia's concerns
about proper management and policies under the appropriate
heading of "Quality Assurance." See ACOG Standards, supra, at 55
("Each physician's office and outpatient clinic should assess
whether effective and efficient management of health care has
been accomplished."). Like Virginia's "narrative" requirement,
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§50.1.1, 50.2.1, ACOG's
standards suggest that the "outpatient clinic evaluation of
patient care should assess the completeness of medical records,
the accuracy of diagnoses, appropriateness of use of laboratory
and other services, and outcome of care." ACOG Standards, supra,
at 55-56. See National Abortion Federation (NAF), National
Abortion Federation Standards 11 (1981) (hereinafter NAF
Standards) (requiring written descriptions of procedures and
Footnote continued on next page.
Footnote(s) 23 will appear on following pages .
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regulations discussed in Part II-C above have little relevance to

policies in each area of care). Cf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus
Curiae 29 n. 6. {supporting the NAF Standards for non-hospital
abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards").
ACOG also advises that each ambulatory body should have a
"governing body" that has the final authority and responsibility
for the appointment of the medical staff, ACOG Standards, supra,
at 60; cf. Va. Regs. {Outpatient Hospitals) §40.3, and that
"[w]ritten policies describing specific responsibilities of each
member of the team are desirable, and should be reviewed and
revised periodically," ACOG Standards, supra, at 60. Cf. NAF
Standards, supra, at 12 {responsibilities of chief administrative
officer); Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, D.C.,
Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance and Evaluation
of First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 1 {hereinafter
"Planned Parenthood Guidelines") {duties of administrator) .
23 This second category of Virginia regulations is
consistent with those set forth by ACOG. ACOG recommends that
even physicians' offices provide at least a patient reception
room, consultation room, two examining rooms, a utility room, and
storage. ACOG Standards, supra, at 56-58. Cf. Planned
Parenthood Guidelines, supra n. 22, at 1-3 {detailing extensive
physical requirements for first-trimester abortion clinics).
ACOG's standards for an ambulatory surgical facility are more
detailed, providing space for reception, waiting, administrative
activities, patient dressing, lockers, preoperative evaluation,
physical examination, laboratory testing, preparation of
anesthesia, performance of surgical procedures, preparation and
sterilization of instruments, storage of equipment, storage of
drugs and fluids, postanesthetic recovery, staff activities, and
janitorial and utility support. See ACOG Standards, supra, at
61. Cf. S. Neubardt & H. Schulman, Techniques of Abortion 110111 {2d ed. 1977) {similar list of facilities needed for model
abortion care unit).
ACOG details the equipment to be found in the various rooms
and areas. ACOG Standards, supra, at 57-58, 61. Cf. APHA
Recommended Program Guide for Abortion Services, 70 Am. J. Pub.
Health 652, 655 {1980) {hereinafter "APHA Guide") {any abortion
facility should have "[a]n operating table, or conventional
gynecologic examining table with accessories, located in a room
which is adequately lighted and ventilated and meets all other
environmental standards for surgical procedures"); Planned
Parenthood Guidelines, supra, at 2. A doctor's examining room
should contain instruments for vaginal examinations, supplies for
obtaining cultures and smears, and equipment for diagnostic
studies and operative procedures. ACOG Standards, supra, at 57.
Cf. Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, at 2. When local
anesthesia is used, the clinic or doctor's office should have
emergency resuscitation equipment, including positive pressure
Footnote continued on next page.
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this case.

They have not been challenged by appellant beyond his

general condemnation of any requirement that second-trimester
abortions--even those during the twenty-second week of pregnancy--be
performed in hospitals, however defined and whether outpatient or
not.

In any event, as appears from the recommendations of ACOG and

the American Public Health Association (APHA) set forth in the
margin, see nn. 22, 23 & 24, Virginia's requirements, although more
detailed with respect to specific facilities, 24 equipment, and
personnel than the ACOG and APHA standards, are compatible with
generally accepted medical standards and do not unreasonably burden
the abortion decision.
Our concern centers on the patient services requirements of the
Virginia regulations and whether they further the State's interest
in the health and safety of the pregnant woman.
clearly do.

We think they

Again, we have compared them to the standards used by

oxygen, intravenous equipment and fluids, suction, and a cardiac
monitor. ACOG Standards, supra, at 57. Ambulatory surgical
centers should, in addition to oxygen, suction, and resuscitation
equipment, provide for emergency lighting and
intercommunications. Id., at 61. Cf. APHA Guide, supra, at 655
(requiring oxygen, and equipment for artificial ventilation and
resuscitation); NAF Standards, supra n. 22, at 9 (requiring all
facilities performing second-trimester abortions to have
resuscitation bag, oxygen, and defibrillator if general
anesthesia is administered); Planned Parenthood Guidelines,
supra, at 2 (even first-trimester abortion clinics should have
parenteral fluids, resuscitation equipment, and oxygen).
24 ACOG provides that both clinics and ambulatory facilities
should meet all state and local building, safety, and fire codes.
ACOG Standards, supra, at 58, 61. Specific plans should be
developed to evacuate patients in case of an emergency. Id., at
59, 62. Cf. NAF Standards, supra n. 22, at 8, 11; Planned
Parenthood Guidelines, supra n. 22, at 10.

18.
ACOG and APHA, and we are impressed with the scrupulousness with
which Virginia has drawn regulations reasonably related to its
interest in protecting the pregnant woman's health.

The

sanitation 25 and record-keeping standards 26 are typical and not

25rnfection can be a serious complication with any abortion
procedure. See nn. 11 & 12, supra. Significant portions of the
Virginia regulations are designed to assure that outpatient
surgical clinics take appropriate steps to control infection,
including sterile processing, appropriate waste disposal and
laundry practices, isolation of nonpotable water, and protection
of the integrity of the operating suite. See Va. Regs.
(Outpatient Hospitals) §§41.2.5, 43.2.1, 43.2.2, 43.10.1, 43.11,
43.12.3, 43.12.5, 52.2.5, 52.2.6, 52.2.7 & 52.2.13. ACOG
recommends that all facilities develop procedures for controlling
and disposing of needles, syringes, glass, knife blades, and
contaminated waste supplies. ACOG Standards, supra, at 58, 62.
APHA Guide, supra n. 23, at 655; NAF Standards~ supra n. 22, at 7
("Surgical instruments must be sufficient in number to permit
individual sterilization of the instruments used for each
procedure .... ");Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra n. 22, at
2.

2 6The Virginia record-keeping requirements are similar to
those detailed by ACOG for a physician's office, ACOG Standards,
supra, at 54-55, 59-60, which require at the initial visit a
comprehensive data base including information on reason for
visit, menstrual history, obstetric history, gynecologic history,
sexual history, past medical and surgical history, current
medications, allergies, social history, and family history. For
ambulatory surgical facilities, ACOG recommends that the
patient's record contain sufficient information to justify the
preoperative diagnosis and the operative procedure, and should at
least contain patient identification data, history and physical
examination, provisional diagnosis, diagnostic and therapeutic
orders, surgeons' and nurses' notes, laboratory data, operative
consent, operative report, anesthesia report, tissue report,
medications record, and discharge summary and instructions. Id.,
at 59. See also id., at 60 ("On the day of surgery a
preanesthetic evaluation, including an interval history, medical
record review, and a heart and lung examination should be
performed by a physician and the findings should be noted in the
record."). We have found such requirements, "if not abused or
overdone," impose a legally insignificant burden on the Roe
right. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danrorth,
428 U.S. 52, 81 (1976). We do not think V1rginia's requirements
are excessive. Cf. APHA Guide, supra n. 23, at 655-656
(recommended reporting requirements); Planned Parenthood
Footnote continued on next page.
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The laboratory services 27 support--and
often are essential to--the direct medical services 28 performed by
unreasonable in detail.

the physician29 and nurse.30

The post-operative recovery

Guidelines, supra n. 22, at 13 {record-keeping and reporting
requirements) •
27 The risk of hemorrhage is reduced by requiring an
outpatient surgical clinic to make hemoglobin or hematocrit
determinations before initiating instillation. See ACOG
Standards, supra, at 59 {"The laboratory data should include
hemoglobin or hematocrit, urinalysis, and, in certain selected
patients, other studies such as a chest x-ray, electrocardiogram,
and electrolytes."). See also APHA Guide, supra n. 23, at 654
{"Appropriate laboratory procedures must include determination of
hematocrit and Rh factor in every case. The value of other
laboratory procedures will depend upon the population served~
these may include sickle cell testing~ endocervical and anal
culture for gonorrhea~ urinalysis~ serologic testing for
syphilis~ and, when indicated cytologic screening for cancer.")~
NAF Standards, su~ra n. 22, at 7 {"Rh-immune globulin must be
explained and administered to Rh-negative patients.")~ Planned
Parenthood Guidelines, supra n. 22, at 8 {requiring lab
facilities to be available on premises for pregnancy tests, urine
protein and sugar, hematocrit or hemoglobin determination, and Rh
typing) .
28 see ACOG Standards, supra, at 59 {"The appropriate
records should be completed and laboratory data recorded prior to
surgery.") {emphasis added). ACOG also recommends that "[t] he
physician should strive to identify pre-existing or concurrent
illness, medications, and adverse drug reactions that may have a
bearing on the operative procedure or anesthesia. All records
should be reviewed before any surgery is performed." Id., at 60
{emphasis added). APHA Guide, supra n. 23, at 654~ Planned
Parenthood Guidelines, supra n. 22, at 8.
29 For example, the ACOG requires careful laboratory work
before anesthesia is administered, and even then, it must be
given only by or under the supervision of a doctor: "Any
ambulatory surgical unit that utilizes general, epidural, or
spinal anesthesia should do so under the direction of an
anesthesiologist. These anesthetics should be administered by a
qualified anesthesiologist, another qualified physician, or a
certified nurse-anesthetist under the supervision of an
anesthesiologist. When any form of anesthesia is used, trained
personnel and proper equipment for cardiopulmonary resuscitation
must be available." ACOG Standards, supra, at 53. Cf. APHA
Footnote continued on next page.
Footnote{s) 30 will appear on following pages.
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standards 31 also comport with accepted medical practice. 32

The

Guide, supra n. 23, at 655: Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra
n. 22, at 10.
30The ACOG Standards do not specifically require nurses for
physicians' offices or for ambulatory surgical facilities, but
note: "The efficient operation of an ambulatory surgical facility
requires adequate staffing with administrative and professional
personnel. The assignment of personnel should be based on the
number of patients, patient profiles, type of procedures, and
facility design." ACOG Standards, supra, at 60. Cf. id., at 56
("Administrative and professional personnel requirements will
vary considerably in each physician's office and outpatient
clinic depending on the patient load, pattern of practice, and
type of facility."): Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra n. 22,
at 7 (nurses): id., at 7-8 (head laboratory technician): id., at
9 ("It is strongly recommended that three staff persons bepresent in the procedure room: the operating physician, the
physician's assistant and a counselor to assist the patient.").
31 See n. 1 9, supra.
32complications resulting from anesthesia are alleviated by
requiring a physician to be present during the recovery period.
See ACOG Standards, supra, at 53 ("The supervising
anesthesiologist, or another physician qualified in
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, should be present in the
ambulatory surgical facility until all surgical patients have
been discharged. This physician should oversee the
postanesthetic recovery area and should share with the surgeon
responsibility for discharging patients or transferring them to
the back-up hospital."): Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra n.
22, at 11: see also APHA Guide, supra n. 23, at 655 ("[I]t will
be necessary to periodically observe the temperature, pulse rate,
blood pressure, and the amount of bleeding. In addition, the
abdomen should be examined for evidence of intra-abdominal
bleeding or injury."). Less serious complications can be
monitored by the registered nurse on duty. See ACOG Standards,
supra, at 53 ("During the recovery period, the patient should be
under continuous observation by a qualified member of the health
care team. This person should maintain a complete record of the
patient's general condition including vital signs, blood loss,
and occurrence of complications."): NAF Standards, supra n. 22,
at 6 ("The recovery area must be supervised by a licensed nurse
or physician who is immediately available to the recovery
area."): Planned Parenthood Guidelines, su~ra, at 11. The
required one-hour recovery period is inten ed to permit detection
of these complications. See APHA Guide, supra, at 655 (requiring
post-operative observations "over a period of two or more hours,
depending upon the type of anesthesia used"): Kerenyi, Mandelman
Footnote continued on next page.
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equipment requirements for emergency services are minima1 33 and are
further prefaced with the word "adequate."34
We do not suggest that all of the Virginia requirements are
necessary for every second-trimester abortion.

But a State simply

cannot adopt regulations that serve every case with the same degree
of relevance; "a State necessarily must have some latitude in
adopting regulations of general applicability in this sensitive
area."

City of Akron, ante at 16.

Although a State's general

licensing regulations must be drawn to further the State's interests
in women's health for all reasonable periods of time within the
second-trimester, a particular requirement "is not unconstitutional

& Sherman, Five Thousand Consecutive Saline Inductions, 116 Am.
J. Obstet. & Gynecol. 593, 597 (1973); ACOG Standards, supra, at
53; App. 37 (defense expert witness concedes waiting period
desirable) •
33 The arrangements for emergency transfer to an acute-care,
general hospital are clearly reasonable. See APHA Guide, supra
n. 23, at 655; ACOG Standards, supra, at 52 ("There should be a
written policy requiring the medical staff to provide for prompt
emergency treatment or hospitalization in the event of an
unanticipated complication."); id., at 58, 62; Cates & Grimes,
supra n. 11, at 407 (even for nonhospital facilities providing
D&E, "arrangements for emergency care should be established with
hospitals near the nonhospital facility"); NAF Standards, supra
n. 22, at 7; Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra n. 22, at 10
("Each facility must have a functioning arrangement for emergency
transport to a local accredited hospital.").
34 Appellant's operating room contains practically all of
the emergency services equipment required by the State. The
record indicates that it has excellent lighting, wall outlets for
oxygen, suction apparatus, resuscitation equipment, a
defibrillator, an EKG machine, intravenous fluids, and complete
anesthesia equipment. App. 21-22, 375-376. Although appellant
sought a "certificate of need" from the Virginia Bureau of
Resources Development, see n. 4, supra, he makes no contention
that his office's facilities, personnel, or care conform fully to
the requirements for an outpatient surgical clinic.

22.
simply because it does not correspond perfectly to the asserted
state interest" every day of the trimester.

Ante, at 20.

We therefore conclude, at least on the record before us in this
case, that Virginia's regulations concerning second-trimester
abortions are reasonably related to and further the State's
compelling interest in "protecting the woman's own health and
safety."

Roe, 410 u.S . , at 15 0 . 35

As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he

State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like
any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that
insure maximum safety for the patient."

Ibid.

Unlike Akron in City

of Akron or Missouri in Ashcroft, Virginia does not require that the
patient be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be
performed in a full-service, acute-care hospital.

Rather, the

State's requirements--the statutes and the regulations--accommodate
accepted medical practice, and leave the method and timing of the
abortion precisely where they belong--between the physician and the
patient.
IV
We hold that Virginia's requirement that second-trimester

35Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations,
covering first-trimester abortion clinics requires the same
services and equipment as Part II. In fact, part Part III has
detailed regulations that do not appear in Part II. See, e. g.,
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals} §§63.l.l(b}, §63.3, 64.2.5(a}(m}. Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require
more technological support for second-trimester abortions would
be to restrict them to acute-care, general hospitals. The only
regulations before us, however, relate to second-trimester
abortions, and we find those requirements reasonably related to
the state's compelling interest.
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abortions be performed in properly equipped outpatient clinics is
constitutional.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia
therefore is
Affirmed.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The

principal

issue

here

is

whether

Virginia's

mandatory hospitalization requirement for second-trimester

----·

abortions is constitutional.
I

Appellant
certified

by

Gynecology.

is
the

a

practicing
American

obstetrician-gynecologist

Board

of

Obstetrics

and

His practice in November, 1979 consisted of

office practice in Woodbridge, Virginia, hospital practice
at four local " hospitals or surgery centers, and practice
at

his
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Church,
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known
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as

an

the

American

operating
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emergency
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stabilization
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at his clinic.
clinic

treatment

not

fluids

are

first-trimester

on

arrest.
hand.

abortions

During the time relevant to this case, the
nor

had

appellant

2.

sought any license for it.
P.M.

was a

seventeen-year old,

high school

student

when she went to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979.
She was unmarried, and told appellant that she was about
twenty-two weeks pregnant.
did

not

want

her

She requested an abortion and

parents

to

know.

Examination

by

~~Hc.v~~
"
appellant confirmed that P.M. was five months pregnant1 1\
Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confide with
her

parents

and

discussed

with

her

continuing the pregnancy to term.

the

alternative

of

She did return home,

but never advised her parents.
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her
II

boy

\\

friend.

The

abortion was performed by

injection of a saline solution.
she

planned

understood

to
that

deliver

the

an

P.M. told appellant that

fetus

in

~

~t

mea% e.f

agreed

a

this

motel,
was

and

all

she

right.
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Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a
"Post-Injection
undergone

"a

Information"

sheet

surgical procedure"

range of normal reactions."

that

stated

and warned

of

she
a

had

"wide

The sheet also advised that

she call the doctor if "heavy" bleeding began.

Although

3.

P.M.

does not

when labor

recall being advised

began,

to go to a hospital

this was specified

in the

instruction

sheet.
P.M. ~

the

motel

~

went to a motel and aborted her fetus

bathroom

She

injection.
instructions,
boYjt- r iend

forty-eight

took

and
her

pain
home.

left

hours

after

the

fetus,

medication

at

Police

found

the
the

the

1

in

saline

follow-up
motel.
fetus

Her
later

that day and opened an investigation. 1
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an

1 Except as permitted by statute, persons performing
an abortion are guilty of a felony under Virginia law and
subject to mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§18.271, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2 (1982). See Simopoulos
v. Virginia State Board of Medicine, 644 F.2d 321, 322-323
(CA4 1981) •
2The indictment alleges
§18.2-71, which provides:

a

violation

of

Va.

Code

Except as provided in other sections of
this article, if 'Ciny person administer to, or
cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other
thing, or use means, with intent to destroy her
unborn
child,
or
to
produce
abortion
or
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or
produce such abortion or miscarriage, he shall
be guilty of a Class 4 felony.
In the four following sections the Virginia Code sets
forth exceptions to this statute: there is no criminal
liability (i) if the abortion is performed within the
first
trimester,
§18.2-72;
(ii)
if the abortion is
performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester,
§18.2-73; (iii) if necessary to save the woman's life,
§18.2-74.1; and (iv) during the third trimester under
certain circumstances, § 18. 2-7 4 .1.
The indictment here
alleged a violation of §18.2-71 and expressly negated any
defenses of hospitalization under §18.2-73 and any firstFootnote continued on next page.
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abortion during the second trimester of pregnancv outside
of a 1 icensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit
Court

of

Fairfax

County

sitting

without

a

jury.

The

Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed appellant's case and,
in

a

unanimous

Simopoulos v.
(1981).

affirmed

decision,

Commonwealth,

221 Va.

This appeal followed.

his

1059,

conviction.

277 S.E.2d 194

We now affirm.

II

Appe 11ant

~~ ~
h V1rg1n1a
. . . • s~.~
1
EW~eflU'b

t~

1~

S.L_/1<-~~~

requiremen ~

) sharply

restricts

the

.1\,

availability

of

abortions after the first trimester by granting a monopoly
to

the

trimester

few

licensed

abort ions. 3

hospitals

that

He also argues

will

permit

mid-

that the Virginia

rimester defense under §18.2-72. The indictment did not,
however, rebut the other defenses .

.----ll_:__________)Z ppellantf;'~

two issues on his appeal that do
not require extended treatment.
He first contends that
Va. Code §18.2-71 was applied unconstitutionally to him,
because lack of medical necessity for the abortion was not
alleged in the indictment, addressed in the prosecution's
case, nor mentioned by the trier of fact.
Appellant
contends that this failure creates two constitutional
issues: (i) whether the State failed to meet its burden of
alleging necessity in the indictment, as required by
United States v. Vuitch, 402 u.s. 62 (1971) ~ and (ii)
whether the prosecution failed to meet its burden of
persuasion, as required by Patterson v. New York, 432 u.s.
197 (1977).
The authoritative construction of §18.2-71 by the
Supreme Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least
with regard to the defense of medical necessity, the
prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical
Footnote continued on next page.

5.

$

requirement results
/'

in negative health consequences and,

as applied to him and the abortions that he performs in
his

well-equipped

"measurably
State

non-licensed

contr ibut [ e]

advances

as

to

purposes

the

justification

for

the

not

do~

clinic,

which

the

restriction."

Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678,
702

(1977)

(WHITE, J., concurring in part an<l concurring

in the result).
We need not pause long here to consider the standard
of review, for we have set it out at length today in City
of Akron v.

Akron Center for Reproductive Health,

Inc.,

..._
u.s.
1\

u.s.

113

( 197 3) , I( the

Fourteenth Amendment's

concept

of

necessity beyond a
reasonable doubt until appellant
invoked medical necessity as a defense.
See 221 Va., at
1069, 277 S.E.2d, at 200. Appellant's reliance on Vuitch
thus is misplaced, because the Virginia statute, as
construed by the state court, does not require that the
State allege lack of medical necessity; the District of
Columbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court,
did require the prosecution to so allege.
See 403 u.s.,
at 70.
Placing upon the defendant the burden of going
forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is
normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 102 S.Ct. 1558,
1567-1568 & n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 u.s.
684, 701-703 nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975).
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed
to prove that his acts in fact caused the demise of the
fetus.
In view of the undisputed facts proved at trial,
summarized above, this contention is frivolous.
See 221
Va., at 1069-1070, 277 S.E.2d, at 200-201.

6

0

~

personal

liberty

"broad

enough

to
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a

woman's

'\
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy," id.,
at

153~

absolute

We

;~J
rejected

right

to

from the State.
reaffirm

t1

an

the

notion

abortion

that

without

We consistently have

tod ~

tha ').

"since

a

a

woman

any

an

interference

recogni ~

State

has
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a

and

~

legitimate

concern with the health of women who undergo abortions,

'a

State

in

may

properly

safeguarding
standards. '"
Roe,

410

health

assert
[and]

important
in

City of Akron,

u.s.,

at 154).

interests

maintaining
U.S.,

at

medical

_ _ (quoting

As

The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to
it
that
abortion,
like
any other
medical
procedure, is performed under circumstances that
insure maximum safety for the patient.
This
interest obviously extends at least to the
performing physician and his staff, to the
facilities involved,
to the availability of
after-care, and to adequate provision for any
complication or emergency that might arise.
1

410

u.s.,

at 150.

The issue here is whether the Virginia
1\

hospitalization requirement is reasonably related to
promotion

of

the

Commonwealth's

maternal health and safety. 4

Footnote(s) 4 will

compelling

interest
1

7.

A

Before

examining

the

medical

hospitalization requirement,

bas is

for

Virginia's

it is helpful to understand

the nature of that requirement.

As a general proposition,

physicians' offices are not regulated under Virginia law. 5
Virginia

law

licensed

in

perform
pregnancy

an

does
the

not,

practice

abortion
unless

however,
of

during

"such

permit

medicine
the

procedure

and

second
is

a

physician
surgery

to

trimester

of

performed

in

hospital licensed by the State Department of Health."
Code

§18.2-73

{1982}.

The

Virginia

1

abortion

a
Va.

statute

4Appellant also argues that the State has no
compelling interest in imposing criminal penalties on the
performance of safe nonhospi tal abortions in the second
trimester and that criminal penalties to enforce total: ~
hospitalization is not a narrowly drawn requirement.
Similar arguments in prior cases have not been persuasive.
SA physician's off ice is explicitly excluded from
the hospital licensing statutes and regulation ~ ss
/
the off ice is used principally for performing - surg ery:-,'
See Va. Code §32.1-124{5}.
Surgery is not defined.
Appellant contends that whether his facility principally
performs surgery is a question of fact that has not been
resolved and that it is uncertain whether his clinic may
be licensed as a "hospital."
He notes that, after he
performed the abortion on P.M., he requested a certificate
of need, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney
General that his "office-clinic cannot be licensed as a
hospital" and that "if you wish to perform this type of
procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant
did not seek any license before he performed the abortion
at issue here.
Thus, whether his facility would qualify
under Virginia law is irrelevant to our determination.

1

8

itself

does

not

contain

the

definition

This

is

term

w.R-i-erh

defines

"hospital" to include "outpatient ... hospitals."

Section

20.2.11

of

Regulations

the
for

found

the

1-k}-

[..Nl-

"hospital."

of

0

"

§32.1-123.1,

Department

of

Health's

Rules

and

1

the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in

(~~~'')

Virginia
hospital

(1977)

(h~s)

in pertinent part as

primarily

provide

facilities

surgical

procedures

includes

"outpatient

on

defines

"[i]nstitutions
for

the

•..

which

performance

outpatients" 6

abortion

outpatient

clinics." 7

and

of

expressly

Thus,

under

Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may be performed

6 section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person
shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this
Commonwealth any hospital ... unless such hospital •.. is
1 icensed as provided in this article."
See also Rules
§30.1
(similar provision specifically for outpatient
surgical clinics).
7 "0utpatient abortion clinics" refers specifically
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part
III of the Rules, see Rules, at i, §62.1.2 of which
provides that "[a] ny procedure performed to terminate a
pregnancy shall be performed prior to the end of the first
trimester (12th week amenorrhea)." Appellant argues from
this
that outpatient
surgical
clinics
that provide
abortion
services
cannot A previae
second-trimester
abortions.
A more plausible reading, however, is that
Part III sets m1n1mum standards for
first-trimester
abortion clinics, with part II setting minimum standards
for outpatient surgical clinics that may perform secondtrimester abortions.
This interpretation is confirmed by
several sections in Part II, i. e., §§43.6.2, 43.6.3,
43.7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to
abortion services.
Moreover, the Commonwealth's counsel
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed
pursuant to Part II legally may perform second-trimester
abortions. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.

1

9.

in an outpatient surgical clinic 8 provided that clinic has
been licensed as a "hospital" by the Commonwealth.
It

is

trimester

~~
~

0
~vr·.
.1

~~

·~
S~ ~/
.

J/~·~

y..r-

D-~

&.

apparent

hospitalization

that

Virginia's

requirement

is

second-

1

significantly

different from those that we invalidated today in City of
Akron

and

~ all

Planned

Parenthood

~k~f- .

- - u.s.

In those cases,

acute-care facilities."

UJL
a

Ashcroft,

the laws at issue "require[d]

UA-4-

requirement,

Id., at

heavy,

and

relatively
abortion

reasonably

We found that such .

nonhospital settings, "im: :ed a

unnecessary,

burden on

inexpensive,

otherwise

procedure."

Court

1

ot-- ~/--6-~~ ~~14d_ .
by preventing 1\ tl>& pe~:~e <1f { D&E)

Ja~propriate

The

v.

Association

second-trimester abortions to be performed in general,

~~kU

~Y.:

readily

therefore
furthering

City
held
the

of

women • s

accessible,

states'

the

and

u.s. ,

Akron,

invalid

access

laws

interest

a

safe

1

at

there
in

to

as not

maternal

health.
One of the most important factors in our analysis in

8 we
herein
usually
refer
to
the
outpatient
"hospitals" in Virginia that legally may perform secondtrimester abortions as "outpatient surgical clinics."

1

10.

City of Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during
the early weeks of the second trimester[,]

D&E abortions

may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a

u.s.,

full-service hospital."

at

In contrast,

the Virginia statutes and regulations do not require that
second-trimester
acute-care,

abortions

general

be

performed

hospitals.

exclusively

Under

1

in

Virginia's

regulations, outpatient surgical clinics may qualify for
licensing as hospitals in which second trimester abortions
lawfully may be performed.

Thus, our decisions in City of

1

Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here.
B

a.-~~~1

Our

1\

desi~n~

~¥9

9Stablisnea

tn-t

the

State's

interest in protecting maternal health becomes compelling
at

approximately

the

See City of Akron,
163.

beginning of

u.s.,

the

at ___;

second-trimester.
Roe,

410

u.s.,

at

Second-trimester abortions may give rise to serious

complications, 9

and

certain

9 Between 1972 and 1978,
trimester abortions in this
the abortion procedure.
See
Abortion Surveillance, at 48

procedures

significantly

79 women undergoing secondcountry died as a result of
Centers for Disease Control,
(1980).

1

11.

increase

risks. 10

the

Although

the

increasingly common

~~E

use and relative safety of the -6 :H:atation-and evae ua e-i on

1

A

~,

method

u.s.,

see City of Akron,

at ___ ,

may

make the need for particular equipment in and designs of a

'~

u.,~t: 41•, JI,..,.,J: ~
facility
need

less

for

~~

7

compelling,

l:la v~)\

')1-L~~
reasonabl ef ~ standards.

not

eliminated

the

D&E,

despite

its

~~~z~~.)

compa ~ e safet~, may cause complications . 11 ~ States

1 °For example,
the
abortions after the

;:::

f

they

J

~

t

j~

lj

1JJ

majority

1

of

Technical Bulletin No. 37, supra, at 2-3.
J1A...-.:f

11A leading cause of death a r\d ~ omplications in D&E
abortion patients is hemorrhage, ~ h can be prevented,
detected, and treated during or soon after the procedure.
See Cates & Grimes, Deaths from Second Trimester Abortion
b
Dilatation
and
Evacuation:
Causes
Prevention
ac1 1t1es,
stetr1cs & yneco ogy
,
Other potential complications of this procedure are
uterine
perforation
and
cervical
tears,
which
are
significantly increased in comparison to other secondtrimester procedures.
See ACOG Technical Bullet ion No.
56, Methods of Midtrimester Abortion, at 78 (1979).
A major potential complication for all abortion
techniques--infection--does not arise until 24 to 72 hours
after the procedure has taken place, by which time the
woman will have been discharged from any facility, see
Ashcro t, 664 F.2d 687, 690 n. 6 (CA8 1981), rev'd in part
& aff'
in part,
u.s.
(1983) 6 "th us the safety of
the
&E procedure- does not alleviat e the/ need for
stand rds designed to prevent infection.

~

v
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~timate

interest

in

ensuring

that

facilities

I\

used

for

standards
those

second-trimester
for

prevention,

complications.

abortions
detection,

That

meet

appropriate

and

interest

treatment

of

compelling

is

throughout the second-trimester, and the State may,

11

from

1

and after the end of the first trimester, adopt standards
for

licensing

all

facilities

abortions

where

may

be

[~]
performed

so

long

as

those

standards

are

legitimately

related to the objective the State seeks to accomplish ...
Doe

v.

Bolton,

u.s.

410

179,

194-195

(1973)

the State may regulate

(emphasis

added).

Specifically,

facility

in which the procedure is to be performed, that

11

1

as to the

is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or
some other place of less-than-hospital status;
licensing of the facility; and the like ...

as to the

Roe, 410 U.S.,

1

at 163.
The medical profession has
from

1 icens ing

requirements

abortion services.
of
11

Obstetricians

for

not

sought an exemption

facilities

that

provide

The standards of the American College
and

Gynecologists

(ACOG)

provide

that

[a]mbulatory care facilities providing abortion services

1

13.

should

meet

the

same

standards

of

care

as

those

recommended for other surgical procedures performed in the
physician's
standing

office

and

and

outpatient

hospital-based

clinic

ambulatory

or

the

(hereinafter

Standards).

The

ACOG,

setting."

Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54
1982)

free1

(5th ed.

profession

clearly

acknowledges the State's role in promulgating and policing
standards:

those

ambulatory

"Free-standing

surgical

facilities

or

should

hospital-based
be

licensed

to

c
2

conform to requirements of state or federal legislation.
Such

facilities

anesthetic,
hospitals."

and

should
personnel

Id.,

at

Virginia's licensing

-

$ tate's compelling

r

~ht

maintain

the

standards
The

54.

as

issue

same

surgical,

recommended
here

is

for

whether

requirements reasonably further

the

2

1./v&-~~Uu .

interest w..itaout U+lGYl.y eurEieRiRog the

of .a ,JWliia.D to an abort-4.oR.

c
applicable
clinics
~

A

few

performing

exceptions,

outpatient

second-trimester

the

surgical

same

outpatient

to

abortions

regulations

clinics

in

surgical
are,

applicable
Virginia.

with

to all
Those

2

14.

regulations may be grouped for purposes of discussion into
three main categories.
first

The
management,

grouping

policies,

relates

procedures,

not presently relevant.

. t.1on, 12
organ1za

to
and

2

staffing--matters

These do require personnel and

facilities "necessary to meet patient and program needs."
Rules

§§40.1,

procedures
§40.6,

They

40.3.

manual,

also

§ 4 3. 213 ,

an

require

a

policy

admini str at ive

and

officer,

2

a licensed physician who must supervise clinical

services and perform surgical procedures,

§ 4 2 .1,

and a

registered nurse to be on duty at all times while the
facility

is

in

requirements
outpatient

use,

§42.2.

outlines
surgical

The

second

construction

clinics,

but

also

category

of

standards

for

provides

that

"deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be
approved

if

it

is determined

that

the purposes of

the

owners ~ eeeiae .
corporation,
See Rules
13The manual must describe emergency and elective
procedures that may be performed at the facility, §41.2.1;
the anesthesia that may be used, §42.2.2; the criteria and
procedures for admissions and discharge, §41.2.4; written
informed consent, §41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping
and infection control, §41.2.5.

2
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minimum requirements have been fulfilled," §50.2.1.

There

are

forth

also

construction

requirements

that

set

2

standards for the public areas, clinical areas, laboratory
and radiology services, 14 and general building. 15
The

most

important

group

of

regulations

purposes relates to patient care services.
set

the

facility
and

requirements
may offer,

pathology. 18

for

such as
Some

of

various

the

our

Most of these

services

anesthesia, 16

for

that

the

laboratory,

requirements

14 These
services
may
be
provided
outpatient surgical clinic if the services
applicable requirements of the Department
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of
Special Hospitals or through a contractual
with nearby facilities. See Rules §52.3.1.

relate

17

to

within
the
comply with
of Health's
General and
arrangement

15 The regulations ~ contain customary provisions
with respect to meeting building codes, zoning ordinances,
and the like. See Rules §§50.6.1, 50.7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4.
16see,
e.
g.,
Rules §43.1.1
{service must be
directed by licensed physician)~ id., §43.1.2 (physician
res~onsible
for
anesthesia
must
be
present
for
administration and recovery).
17 Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate
routine"
laboratory
testing.
See
Rules
§43.6.1.
Outpatient surgical clinics providing abortion services
also must conduct pregnancy testing,
hemoglobin or
hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing, Coomb' s
testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger
and albumin, culture for gonorrheal infect ion, § 6 4 .1. 3,
and where medically indicated, serologic testing for
syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, §64.1.4.
18 section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue shall be
submitted for a pathology examination, with pathology
services
for
abortion patients meeting
the m1n1mum
requirements
of
§64.2.4
{must
be
submitted
"for
histological examination by a pathologist in all cases
where gross examination by the attending physician does
Footnote continued on next page.

2
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sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant.
Rules §§ 43.2, 43.10, 43.12.6.

See, e. g.,

There are also guidelines

19 an d
. 1 recor d s, § 4 3 • 7 , pre-opera t.1ve a d m1ss1on,
.
.
on me d 1ca
post-operative

recovery. 20

Finally,

the

Rules

mandates

.
.
.
21
some emergency serv1ces
an d evacuat1on
p 1 ann1ng.

not

u.s.,

confirm presence
at
•

of

fetal

parts") •

See

Ashcroft,

19

section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and
physical examination before initiating any procedure.
Sufficient
time
must
be
allowed
between
initial
examination and initiation of any procedure to permit
review of laboratory tests.
See id., §43.8.3.
In an
outpatient surgical clinic providi~abortion services,
the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the
performin9 physician. See id., §43.8.4.
Sect1on 43.8.5 provideS:that the facility performing
abortions "shall offer each patient appropriate counseling
and instruction in the abortion procedure and in birth
control methods."
Virginia does not require that the
doctor personally provide this counseling or specify the
means by which this counseling is performed.
Under this
requirement, it remains true that "it is for the woman, in
conjunction
with
her
physician,
to
decide
what
considerations are relevant to [her] decision." See City
of Ashcroft,
U.S., at
20 Each patient shall be observed for post-operative
complications for one hour under the direct supervision of
a nurse trained in resuscitation techniques and other
emergency procedures.
See Rules §§43.9.1, 43.9.2.
A
licensed physician must be present on the premises until
the patient is discharged on his written orders. See id.,
§§43.9.3, 43.9.4.
21

see Rules §43.4.1 (written evacuation plan): id.,
§4 3. 5 .1 (shall maintain "adequate monitoring equipment,
suction apparatus, oxygen, and related items necessary for
resuscitation
and
control
of
hemorrhage
and
other
complications"):
id.,
§43.5.2
(requiring
a
written
agreement ensuring ambulance service to a licensed general
hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides:
A written agreement shall be executed with a
general hospital to ensure that any patient of
the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive
needed emergency treatment. The agreement shall
be with a licensed general hospital capable of
providing full surgical anesthesia, clinical
Footnote continued on next page.
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III
Appellant does not attack these regulations as such
either in his jurisdictional statement or in his principal
In

brief.

those,

hospitalization

he

for

emphasizes

that

second-trimester

Virginia

requires

abortions

without

2

alluding to the fact that the statutory term "hospital" is
defined

to

include outpatient

surgical clinics

perform second-trimester abortions.
sought

a

license

for

his

clinic,

1-,r; ~dry
~
A neg.ess-a:ryroa
=to eqtiate
(:, the

hospitalization

t he

that may

As appellant had not

~er'Aa~

v·1rg 1n1a
· ·

he

2

,~

I\

·
prmn· s1ons

-w,_· th

~~-1-c~
requirements we have cons ide red in

A

City of Akron and Ashcroft.
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia
regulations on various grounds.
he had applied for a license,

2

He argues that, even if
it is uncertain whether it

would have been granted; that Virginia courts have had no
opportunity
regulations";

to

construe

that Part I I

the

"licensing

statutes

~7~

and

of the Rules do not cover an

laboratory, and diagnostic radiology service on
thirty (30) minutes notice and which has a
physician in the hospital and available for
emergency service at all times.

2

18.

outpatient

surgical

abortions

are performed,

medical

evidence

perform trimester
for

Appellant

facility

rebuts

but
the

abortions

9-13.

where

see n.
view

second
7,

that

supra;
it

of

these

and

is

in hospitals."

None

trimester
that

"safer

to

Reply Brief

contentions

finds

2

support in this Court's prior opinions, and the Virginia
requirements

are

strikingly

different

from

invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft.
evident
adopt

that

statutes

decisions.
are

Virginia
and

has

made

a

regulations

those

we

Indeed, it is

thoughtful

effort

compatible

with

to
our

2

We are convinced that the Virginia provisions

reasonably

compelling

related

interest

in

to

and

protecting

further
the

the

health

State's
of

the

pregnant woman during the second trimester, and that they

~
do not ~ly burden her right to an abortion. 22
1\

empir1cal matter,
fewer
appropriate
secondtrimester abortions than without the regulations . . Bec eeP s
are obligated to provide facilities consistent with the
standards set by their nrofession. ~~~ee~~~~~~~UQ€
t

•

•

•

I

...

44~~
~-;:-d.., ~~

2
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The
categories

requirements
24

of

the

first 23

and

second

of regulations discussed in Part II-C above

23 The ACOG' s standards discuss much of Virginia's
concerns about proper management and policies under the
appropriate
heading
of
"Quality
Assurance."
See
Standards, supra, at 55 ("Each physician's office and
outpatient clinic should assess whether effective and
efficient
management
of
health
care
has
been
accomplished.").
Like Virginia's narrative requirement,
see Rules §§50.1.1, 50.2.1, the ACOG's standards suggest
that the "outpatient clinic evaluation of patient care
should assess the completeness of medical records, the
accuracy
of
diagnosis,
appropriateness
of
use
of
laboratory and other services, and other outcome of care."
Standards,
supra,
at
55-56.
See National Abortion
Federation,
Standards
11
(1981)
(hereinafter
NAF
Standards) (requiring written descriptions of procedures
and policies in each area of care).
The ACOG also advises that each ambulatory body
should have a
"governing body" that has the final
authority and responsibility for the appointment of the
medical staff, id., at 60; cf. Rules §40.3, and that
"[w] ritten polic""I'eS describing specific responsibilities
of each member of the team are desirable, and should be
reviewed and revised periodically." Id., at 60. Cf. NAF
Standards, supra, at 12 (detailing responsibilities of
chief administrative officer).
24The ACOG recommends that even physicians' offices
provide at least a patient reception room, consultation
room, two examining rooms, a utility room, and storage.
See Standards, supra, at 57-59.
Its standards for an
ambulatory surgical facility are more detailed, providing
space for reception, waiting, administrative activities,
patient
dressing,
lockers,
preoperative
evaluation,
physical examination, laboratory testing, preparation of
anesthesia,
performance
of
surgical
procedures,
preparation and sterilization of instruments, storage of
equipment, storage of drugs and fluids, postanesthetic
recovery, staff activities, and janitorial and utility
support. See id., at 61.
The ACOGdetails the equipment to be found in the
various rooms and areas.
See id., at 57-58, 61.
A
doctor's examining room should contain instruments for
vaginal and rectal examinations, obtaining cultures and
smears, and diagnostic studies and operative procedures.
See id., at 57. When local anesthesia is used, the clinic
or doctor's office should have emergency resuscitation
equipment, including positive pressure oxygen, intravenous
equipment and fluids, suction, and a cardiac monitor. See
ibid. Ambulatory surgical centers should, in addition to
oxygen, suction, and resuscitation equipment, provide for
emergency lighting and intercommunications.
See id., at
61.
Cf. NAF Standards, supra n. 23, at 9 (requiring all
facilities performing second-trimester abortions to have
Footnote continued on next page.
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have little relevancy in this case.

They have not been

challenged by appellant beyond his general condemnation of
any
those

requirement
during

performed

in

outpatient or

that

the

second-trimester

twenty-second

hospitals,
not.

recommendations

of

In

week

however
any

the

of

as

and

2

pregnancy--be

defined

event,

ACOG

abortions--even

and

appears
National

whether
from

the

Abortion

Federation (NAF} 25 set forth in the margin below, see nn.

2

23, 24 & 26, Virginia's requirements with respect to the
facilities, 26 equipment, and personnel are compatible with
generally

accepted

medical

standards,

and

further

the

State's legitimate interest.
Appellant's

argument

centers

essentially

on

the

patient services requirements of the Virginia regulations.

resuscitation bag, oxygen, and defibrillator
anesthesia is administered}.

if

general

25 see n.23, supra. See Brief of the American Public
Health Association as Amicus Curiae 29 n. 6 in Nos. 81185, 81-746 & 81-1172 (supporting the NAF Standards for
nonhospital abortion facilities as constituting "minimum
standards"}.
26 The ACOG provides that both clinics and ambulatory
facilities should meet all state and local building,
safety, and fire codes. See Standards, supra, at 58, 61.
Specific plans should be developed to evacuate patients in
case of an emergency.
See id., at 59, 62. See also NAF
Standards, supra n. 23, at 8~1.

2
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He contends that they do not further the State's interest
~

in the helth of the pregnant woman.

We think they clearly

'\.

do.

The sani tation 27 and record-keeping standards

typical

and not unreasonable

in detail.

The

28

are

laboratory

services support--and often are essential to--the direct
medical services performed by the physician and nurse.
The

post-operative

recovery

accepted medical practice. 30

standards

also comport

29

with

The equipment requirements

27 Infection can be a serious complication with any
abortion procedure.
See nn. 10 & 11, supra. Significant
portions of the Virginia Rules are designed to assure th~t
outpatient surgical clinics practice -ire£ i.-Agent infect ion
control, including sterile processing, appropriate waste
disposal and laundry practices, isolation of nonpotable
water, and protection of the integrity of the operating
suite.
See Rules §§41.2.5, 43.2.1, 43.2.2, 43.10.1,
43.11, 43.12.3, 43.12.5, 52.2.5, 52.2.6, 52.2.7 & 52.2.13.
The ACOG recommends that all facilities develop procedures
for controlling and disposing of needles, syringes, glass,
knife blades,
and contaminated waste supplies.
See
Standards, supra, at 58, 62.
See also NAF Standards,
supra n. 23, at 7.
28 The Virginia record-keeping requirements are ~
similar to those detailed by the ACOG, see Standards,
supra,
at
54-55,
59-60,
and
we
have
found
such
requirements,
"if not abused or overdone,"
impose a
legally insignificant burden on the Roe right.
See
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri ~Danforth, 428
u.s. 52, 81 (1976}.
29The risks of hemorrhage are reduced by requiring
an outpatient surgical clinic to make hemoglobin or
hematocrit determinations before initiating instillation.
See Standards, supra, at 59 ("The laboratory data should
include hemoglobin or hematocrit, urinalysis •..• "}.
See
also NAF Standards, supra n. 23, at 7 ("Rh-immune globulin
must
be
explained
and
administered
to
Rh-negative
patients."}.
30Anesthesia
complications
are
allevieated
by
requiring a physician to be present for monitoring
functions during the administration of anesthetics and in
Footnote continued on next page.
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for

emergency

services

are

minima1 31

and

are

further

3

prefaced with the word "adequate. .. 32
We

do

requirements
abortion.
serve

not

suggest

that

are

necessary

for

all
every

of

Virginia

the

second-trimester

A State simply cannot adopt regulations

every

case

with

the

same

degree

of

that

relevance.

Following, as we must, Roe and subsequent precedents, we
adhere

to

the

trimester

periods

as

providing

general

the recovery period.
See Standards, supra, at 53.
Less
serious complications can be monitored by the registered
nurse on duty.
See ibid. ("During the recovery period,
the patient should be under continuous observation by a
qualified
member
of
the
health
care
team."):
NAF
Standards, supra n. 23, at 6 ("The recovery area must be
supervised by a licensed nurse or physician who is
immediately available to the recovery area.").
The
required one-hour recovery period is intended to permit
detection of these problems.
See Kerenyi, Mandelman &
Sherman, Five Thousand Consecutive Saline Inductions, 116
Am. J. Obstet. & Gynecol. 593 (1973): Standards, supra, at
53: App. 37 (defense witness concedes waiting period
necessary) •
31The arrangements for emergency transfer to an
acute-care, general hospital are clearly reasonable.
See
ACOG Standards, supra, at 58, 62: Cates & Grimes, supra n.
11, at 407 (even for nonhospital facilities providing D&E,
"arrangements for emergency care should be established
with hospitals near the nonhospital facility"):
NAF
Standards, supra n. 23, at 7.
32

.5 .faX.- .

Appel nt's operating room contains practically
d .. ,all of the
mergency services equipment required by the
Y~~"" CommeR~ieal:-t
The record indicates that it has excellent
lighting, w 11 outlets for oxygen, suction apparatus,
resuscitation equipment, a defibrillator, an EKG machine,
IV fluids, complete anesthesia equipment, and drugs to be
used in emergencies.
See App. 21-22, 375-376. Appellant
makes
no
contention,
however,
that
his
office's
facilities, personnel, or care conform to the other
requirements for an outpatient surgical clinic.

3

23.

guidance as to the validity of state abortion regulations
in accord with medical

knowledge and generally accepted

standards.

a

Although

State's

general

licensing

3

regulations must be drawn to further the State's interests

7

in women's health and safety for all reasonable periods of
time within the second-trimester, a particular requirement
"is

not

unconstitutional

simply

because

it

does

not

perfectly correspond to the asserted state interest" every
day of the trimester.

City of Akron, __

u.s.,

at __ . 33

We therefore conclude, at least on the record before
us

in this case,

that Virginia's regulations of second-

trimester abortions are reasonably related to and further

33 we i~die~ A~~
in City of Akron that the ACOG
recommends that abortions performed in a physician's
office or outpatient clinic be limited to fourteen-weeks
~
gestation,
but
it
indicates
that abortions may be
~
performed safely in a hospital-based or in a free-standing
'"' :.Av ~
ambulatory facility until eighteen-weeks gestation.
See
y~; _
City of Akron, __ U.S. __ (citing Standards, supra, at
~~ ,.J-'
52}.
Virginia's Rules s,aei 1¥ correspond to the ACOG
~
requirements for a free-standing clinic and thus are
~ f9 · ~~~ reasonably related to the State's compelling interest in
~:~f
maternal health and safety for the period after fourteen
~~~ t ~
weeks.
But we are also impressed by the fact that, even
q.
4
~
though the Rules apply to two weeks in which abortions
1
~~ could be performed safely in a doctor's office or a
~.~
clinic, they do not impose requirements that significantly
1
~1M
deviate from those that ACOG would require of a well.
L.
equipped off ice or clinic performing thirteenth and
~ !L\. t.PO
fourteenth week abortions.
See nn. 23-24, 26-31.
See
~~2
also NAF Standards, supra n. 23, at 5-7.
We think that
~~,~~ ~Virginia has done well to draw its requirements to promote
~~~~~
the ends that it seeks.
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34 Appellant argues that Part III of the Rules,
covering first-trimester abortion clinics requires, the
same services and equipment as Part II.
In fact, part
Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in
Part
II.
See,
e.
g.,
Rules
§63.l.l(b),
§63.3,
§§64.2.5(a)-(m).
Appellant contends that, given these
extensive
regulations
for
first-trimester
abortion
clinics, the only way to require more technological
support
for
second-trimester
abortions would
be
to
restrict them to acute-care, general hospitals. The only
regulations before us, however, relate to second-trimester
abortions, and we find those requirements reasonably
related to the state • s compelling interest . /
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-185

CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, APPELLANT v. VIRGINIA
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
[March - , 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The principal issue here is whether Virginia's mandatory
hospitalization requirement for second-trimester abortions is
constitutional.
I
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. His
practice in November, 1979 consisted of office practice in
Woodbridge, Virginia, hospital practice at four local hospitals
or surgery centers, and practice at his clinic in Falls Church.
The Falls Church clinic has an operating room, operatingroom lighting, and facilities for resuscitation and emergency
treatment of cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and
stabilization fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time
relevant to this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant sought any license for it.
P.M. was a seventeen-year old, high school student when
she went to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was
unmarried, and told appellant that she was approximately
twenty-two weeks pregnant. She requested an abortion but
did not want her parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that P.M. was five months pregnant, well into
the second trimester. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confide with her parents and discussed with her

81-185-0PINION
SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA

2

the alternative of continuing the pregnancy to term. She did
return home, but never advised her parents of her decision.
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course.
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also advised that she call the doctw- if "heavy" bleeding began. Although P.M. does not r~all being advised to go to a hospital
when labor began, this was lie-ted in the instruction sheet.
/\
!d., at 200.
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the
motel bathroom forty-eight hours after the saline injection.
She left the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication
in the wastebasket the motel. Her boy friend took her
home. Police found the fetus later that day and began an
investigation. 1
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of
1

Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are
guilty of a felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2 (1982). The
felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in prison. Va. Code
§ 18.2-10(d).
2
The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which
provides:
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person administer to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony."
In the four following sections the Virginia Code sets forth exceptions to
this statute: there is no criminal liability (i) if the abortion is performed
within the first trimester, § 18.2-72; (ii) if the abortion is performed in a
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court
of Virginia reviewed appellant's case and unanimously affirmed his conviction. Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221
Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194 (1981). This appeal followed.
We noted probable jurisdiction, U. S. - - , and now affirm.
II
Appellant broadly attacks Virginia's hospitalization requirements. 3 He contends that they sharply restrict the
licensed hospital in the second trimester, § 18.2-73; (iii) if necessary to save
the woman's life,§ 18.2-74.1; and (iv) during the third trimester under certain circumstances,§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of
§ 18.2-71 and expressly negated any defenses of hospitalization under
§ 18.2-73 and any first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment
did not, however, rebut the other defenses.
3
Questions Taised particularly with respect to Virginia's outpatient surgical clinics are considered in Part III, infra. Appellant also raises two
issues on his appeal that do not require extended treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, addressed in the prosecution's case, nor mentioned by the trier
of fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders the indictment unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to meet its burden of alleging
necessity in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402
U. S. 62 (1971); and (ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977).
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with~ to the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not oblig~ted to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity
as a defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced. The Virginia statute, as construed by
the state court, does not require that the State allege lack of medical necessity; the District of Columbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court,
required the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402 U. S., at 70.
Placing upon the defendant the burden of going forward with evidence on
an affirmative defense is normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, U. S.
--,and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 701-703, nn. 28,
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availability of abortions after the first trimester by granting
a monopoly to the few licensed hospitals that will permit midtrimester abortions. He also argues that the Virginia requirements result in negative health consequences and, as
applied to him and the abortions he performs in his wellequipped non-licensed clinic, do not "measurably contribut[e]
to the ... purposes which the State advances as justification
for the restriction." Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 702 (1977) (WHITE, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the result).
We need not pause long here to consider the guiding principles, for we have set them out at length today in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p.
- - . In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court held
that the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty
was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy," id., at 153. We rejected, however, the notion that a woman has an absolute
right to an abortion. We consistently have recognized and
reaffirm today that, "because a State has a legitimate concern with the health of women who undergo abortions, 'a
State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health [and] in maintaining medical standards.'" City of
Akron, ante, at 10 (quoting Roe, 410 U. S., at 154). This
"important and legitimate interest in the health of the
mother" becomes "'compelling' ... at approximately the end
of the first trimester," Roe, 410 U.S., at 163, and is compelling throughout the remainder of the pregnancy.
The State's interest in the health of the pregnant woman
includes an interest in the sa;Wty 6f facilitiesp at ~9ri0rm1
a~. As the Court stated in Roe:
-

e$(8~~~

30, 31 (1975).
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to prove that his acts
in fact caused the death of the fetus. In view of the undisputed facts
proved at trial, summarized above, this contention is frivolous. See 221
Va., at 1069-1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201.

...
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"The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that
abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed
under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the
patient. This interest obviously extends at least to the
performing physician and his staff, to the facilities involved, to the availability of after-care, and to adequate
provision for any complication or emergency that might
arise." 410 U. S., at 150.
To protect this compelling interest, the State may, "from and
after the end of the first trimester, adopt standards for licensing all facilities where abortions may be performed so
long as those standards are legitimately related to the objective the State seeks to accomplish." Doe v. Bolton, 410
U. S. 179, 194-195 (1973) (emphasis added). Specifically,
the State may regulate "as to the facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital
or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-hospital
status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like." Roe,
410 U. S., at 163.
A
It is in furtherance of this compelling interest in maternal
health that Virginia has enacted its hospitalization requirement for abortions performed during the second trimester.
As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated
under Virginia law. 4 Virginia law does not, however, per'A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). Surgery is not defined. Appellant
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a question of fact that has not been resolved and that it is uncertain whether his
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that, after he performed
the abortion on P.M., he requested a certificate of need, see also id.,
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek any
license before he performed the abortion at issue here. Thus, without

'·
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mit a physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to perform an abortion during the second trimester of
pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital
licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does
not contain the definition of the term "hospital." This definition is found in Va. Code § 32.1-123.1, which defines "hospital" to include "outpatient ... hospitals." Section 20.2.11 of
the Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 5 defines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions . . . which primarily provide facilities for the
performance of surgical procedures on outpatients" 6 and provides that second-trimester abortions may be performed in
these clinics. 7 Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester
record evidence whether appellant's facility qualifies as a surgical outpatient clinic and that he was denied a hospital license, whether the Falls
Church facility would qualify under Virginia law is irrelevant to .our determination in this case. See n. 7, infra (noting State's interpretation of the
Virginia regulations).
5
The regulations were promulgated pursuant to 1947 Va. Acts, c. 15,
§ 1514-a5, repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711. Although not relevant to our
determination here, we note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations in effect when appellant performed the abortion for
which he has been prosecuted. See Department of Health, Rules and
Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982).
6
Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital . . . unless
such hospital ... is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va.
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically governing outpatient surgical clinics).
7
Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgical clinics that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpretation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3,
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services.
Moreover, the State's counsel at oral argument represented that facilities
licensed pursuant to Part II legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
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abortion may be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic 8
provided that clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the
State.
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hospitalization requirement is significantly different from those
at issue in City of Akron, ante, p. 13, and Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. v. Ashcroft,
ante, p. - - . In those cases, the regulations required "all
second-trimester abortions [to] be performed in general,
acute-care facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at - - . We found
that such a requirement, by preventing the use of the dilatation and evacuation method (D&E) of performing abortions in
appropriate nonhospital settings, "imposed a heavy, and unnecessary, burden on wol!len's access to a relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure."
City of Akron, ante, at 20. The Court held these laws
invalid because they did not reasonably further the States' interest in maternal health.
One of the most important factors in our analysis in City of
Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during the early
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital." Ante, at 19. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be
performed exclusively in acute-care, general hospitals.
Under Virginia's regulations, outpatient surgical clinics may
"Outpatient abortion clinics" refers specifically to those facilities meeting
the minimum standards of Part III of the regulations. See Va. Regs.
(Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. "These facilities limit the operative procedures to termination of pregnancy during the first trimester." Ibid. See
id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure performed to terminate a pregnancy shall be
performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week
amenorrhea).").
8
We herein usually refer to the outpatient "hospitals" in Virginia that
legally may perform second-trimester abortions as "outpatient surgical
clinics."

...
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qualify for licensing as hospitals in which second trimester
abortions lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in
City of Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here.
B
Second-trimester abortions may give rise to serious complications, 9 and certain procedures significantly increase the
risks. 10 Although the increasingly common use and relative
safety of the D&E method, see City of Akron, ante, at - - ,
may make the need for particular equipment in and designs of
a facility less compelling, the need for reasonable regulations
has not been eliminated. D&E, despite its relative safety
early in the second trimester, still may cause complications. 11
9

Between 1972 and 1978, at least 67 women undergoing second-trimester abortions in this country died as a result of the abortion procedure.
See Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control, Abortion Surveillance: Annual Summary 1978, at 48 (1980). See also
Cadesky, Ravinsky & Lyons, Dilation and Evacuation: A Preferred ·
Method of Midtrimester Abortion, 129 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 329, 331
(1981) (6.9% complication rate for second-trimester D&E abortions; 55%
complication rate for second-trimester prostaglandin instillation).
1
°For example, the majority of second-trimester abortions after the sixteenth week of gestation are performed by means of intrauterine instillation of saline, see Grimes & Cates, The Brief for Hypertonic Saline, 15
Contemporary Ob/Gyn 29, 30 (1980), even though there is on the whole a
greater death rate for instillation abortions than there is for D&E. See
also Cates, et al., The Risk of Dying from Legal Abortion in the United
States, 1972-1975, 15 Int'l J. Gynaecol. Obstet. 172, 175 (1977). For identification of less serious complications, see American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Technical Bulletin No. 37, Hypertonic
Saline Amnia-Infusion 1, 2-3 (1976) (now replaced by ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 75 (1979)).
11
A leading cause of death and complications in D&E abortion patients is
hemorrhage, see Cates & Grimes, Deaths from Second Trimester Abortion
by Dilatation and Evacuation: Causes, Prevention, Facilities, 58 Obstetrics & Gynecology 401, 401-402 (1981), that can be prevented, detected,
and treated during or soon after the procedure. Other potential complications of this procedure are uterine perforation and cervical tears, which are
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The American Public Health Association (APHA), although recognizing "that greater use of the dilatation and
evacuation procedure make[s] it possible to perform the vast
majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the
16th [w]eek after the last menstrual period," still "[u]rges endorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in
free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state standards
required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second
Trimester Abortion 1, 2 (1979) (emphasis added). Those
standards need not be relaxed merely because the facility
performs abortions: "Ambulatory care facilities providing
abortion services should meet the same standards of care as
those recommended for other surgical procedures performed
in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the freestanding and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 1982)
(hereinafter ACOG Standards). See also id., at 52 ("Freestanding or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities
should be licensed to conform to requirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facilities are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same surgical, anesthetic, and
personnel standards as recommended for hospitals." Ibid.
t ough the State's interest in licensing medical facilitie
s com ellin the St te's dis r tion tore late n this bas·
does not "permit it to adopt abortion regulations that depart
from sound medical practice." City of Akron, ante, at 12.

~

_
--

significantly increased in comparison to other second-trimester procedures. See ACOG Technical Bulletion No. 56, supra, n. 10, at 78.
A major potential complication for all abortion techniques-infectiondoes not arise until 24 to 72 hours after the procedure has taken place, by
which time the woman usually will have been discharged from any facility.
See Ashcroft, 664 F. 2d 687, 690 n. 6 (CA8 1981), rev'd in part & aff'd in
part, ante, p. - . Thus the relative safety of the D&E procedure does
not alleviate the need for standards designed to prevent infection.

11 y/k
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"If a State requires licensing or undertakes to regulate the
performance of abortions during [the second trimester], the
health standards adopted must be 'legitimately related to the
objective the State seeks to accomplish.' Doe, 410 U. S., at
195." City of Akron, ante, at 12. The issue here is whether
Virginia's licensing requirements for outpatient surgical clinics performing second-trimester abortions are reasonable
means of furthering the State's compelling interest in the
woman's health.

c

The Virginia regulations applicable to outpatient surgical
clinics performing second-trimester abortions are, with few
exceptions, the same regulations applicable to all outpatient
surgical clinics in Virginia. Those regulations may be
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main
categories.
The first grouping relates to organization, management,
policies, procedures, artd staffing matt-ers Hat -partietllarly 11
~· These require personnel and facilities "necessary
to meet patient and program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient
Hospitals) § 40.3; see also § 40.1. They also require a policy
and procedures manual, § 43.2 12 , an administrative officer,
§40.6, a licensed physician who must supervise clinical services and perform surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered
nurse to be on duty at all times while the facility is in use,
§ 42.2. The second category of requirements outlines construction standards for outpatient surgical clinics, but also
provides that "deviations from the requirements prescribed
herein may be approved if it is determined that the purposes
of the minimum requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1.

-

12

The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used,
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4;
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and
infection control, § 41.2.5.

~
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There are also construction requirements that set forth
standards for the public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and
radiology services, 13 and general building. 14
The most important group of regulations for our purposes
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the requirements for various services that the facility may offer,
such as anesthesia/ 5 laboratory, 16 and pathologyY Some of
the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 18 and postThese services may be provided within the outpatient surgical clinic if
the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities.
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§ 52.3.1.
14
The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§§ 50.6.1, 50.7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4.
15
See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1. 2 (physician responsible for anesthesia must be present for administration and recovery).
6
' Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.6.1. Outpatient surgical clinics providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing,
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and albumin, culture for gonorrheal infection,§ 64.1.3, and where medically indicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4.
17
Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue shall be submitted for a pathology examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See
Ashcroft, ante, at - - .
18
Section 43. 8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of laboratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of
any procedure. !d., §43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical clinic providing
13

'•
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operative recovery. 19 Finally, the regulations mandate some
emergency services and evacuation planning. 20

III
Appellant does not attack § resgx these regulations) in
his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief. ''rn
those, he emphasizes that Virginia requires hospitalization
for second-trimester abortions without alluding to the fact
that the statutory term "hospital" is defined to include outpatient surgical clinics that may perform second-trimester aborabortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the
performing physician. !d., § 43.8.4.
Section 43.8.5 provides that the facility performing abortions "shall offer
each patient appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion procedure and in birth control methods." (emphasis added) Virginia does not
require that the doctor personally provide this counseling or specify the
means by which this counseling is performed. Under this requirement, ~
~ unlike in City of Akron, for the woman, in conjunction with her physician, to decide what conside'rations are relevant to her decision. See ante,
at 27-28.
19
Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation techniques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 43.9.1, 43.9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d. ,
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4. For a discussion of similar standards by various medical
organizations, seen. 32, infra.
20
See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus,
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemorrhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a licensed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides:
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general
-hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory,
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all
times."

,_f ~
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tions. As appellant had not sought a license for his clinic, he
appears to argue that the Virginia hospitalization requirements are comparable to those we have considered in City of
Akron and Ashcroft.
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations on various grounds. He argues that, even if he had applied for a license, it is uncertain whether it would have been
granted; that Virginia courts have had no opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and regulations;" that Part II of
the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical facility
where second trimester abortions are performed, but see n.
8, supra; and that medical evidence rebuts the view "that it is
safer to perform second trimester abortions in hospitals."
eply Brief for Appellant 1. None of these contentions finds
support in this Court's prior opinions, and the Virginia requirements are strikingly different from those we invalidated
~ _~ ~
in City of Akron and Ashcroft. Ulldeed, it is evident that 2 1;._ ~ ~· b/A-Virginia has ado ted statutes and regulations compatible J ~ ~
with our decisions:f We are convmce that the Virginia pro~..,.a
visions are reasonably related to and further the State's com~ ~ _
pelling interest in protecting the health of the pregnant
~
woman during the second trimester. 21
~r-~
The requirements of the first 22 and second categories 23 of
~ ... ~
~
11
regulations discussed in Part II-C above have little relevance
'~,
:J

f

No doubt there are costs incurred in complying with Virginia's requirements, but these are not burdens that necessarily invalidate the regulations. As an empirical matter, we have no reason to believe these costs
will result in fewer appropriate facilities for performing second-trimester
abortions. Ethical physicians are obligated to provide facilities consistent
with the standards set by their profession. And appellant has not identified any significant differences between professional standards and the Virginia requirements.
22
ACOG's standards discuss many of Virginia's concerns about proper
management and policies under the appropriate heading of "Quality Assurance." See ACOG Standards, supra, at 55 ("Each physician's office and
[Footnote 23 appears on p. 14]
21

~~

~
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to this case. They have not been challenged by appellant beyond his ~l condemnation of any requirement that second-trimester abortions-even those during the twenty-second week of pregnancy-be performed in hospitals, however
defined and whether outpatient or not. In any event, as appears from the recommendations of AGOG and the American
Public Health Association (APHA) set forth in the margin,
see nn. 22, 23 and 24, Virginia's requirements, although more
detailed with respect to specific facilities, 24 equipment, and
outpatient clinic should assess whether effective and efficient management
of health care has been accomplished."). Like Virginia's "narrative" requirement, Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 50.1.1, 50.2.1, AGOG's
standards suggest that the "outpatient clinic evaluation of patient care
should assess the completeness of medical records, the accuracy of diagnoses, appropriateness of use of laboratory and other services, and outcome of care." ACOG Standards, supra, at 55--56. See National Abortion Federation (NAF), National Abortion Federation Standards 11 (1981)
(hereinafter NAF Standards) (requiring written descriptions of procedures
and policies in each area of care). Cf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae 29 n. 6. (supporting the NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards").
ACOG also advises that each ambulatory body should have a "governing
body" that has the final authority and responsibility for the appointment of
the medical staff, ACOG Standards, supra, at 60; cf. Va. Regs. (Outpatient
Hospitals) § 40.3, and that "[w]ritten policies describing specific responsibilities of each member of the team are desirable, and should be reviewed
and revised periodically," ACOG Standards, supra, at 60. Cf. NAF
Standards, supra, at 12 (responsibilities of chief administrative officer);
Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance and Evaluation of First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 1 (hereinafter "Planned Parenthood Guidelines")
(duties of administrator).
23
This second category of Virginia regulations is consistent with those
set forth by ACOG. ACOG recommends that even physicians' offices provide at least a patient reception room, consultation room, two examining
rooms, a utility room, and storage. ACOG Standards, supra, at 56-58.
Cf. Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 1--3 (detailing extensive physical requirements for first-trimester abortion clinics). AGOG's
[Footnote 24 appears on p. 15]
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personnel than the AGOG and APHA standards, are compatible with generally accepted medical standards and do not unreasonably burden the abortion decision.
standards for an ambulatory surgical facility are more detailed, providing
space for reception, waiting, administrative activities, patient dressing,
lockers, preoperative evaluation, physical examination, laboratory testing,
preparation of anesthesia, performance of surgical procedures, preparation
and sterilization of instruments, storage of equipment, storage of drugs
and fluids, postanesthetic recovery, staff activities, and janitorial and utility support. See ACOG Standards, supra, at 61. Cf. S. Neubardt & H.
Schulman, Techniques of Abortion 110-111 (2d ed. 1977) (similar list of facilities needed for model abortion care unit).
ACOG details the equipment to be found in the various rooms and areas.
ACOG Standards, supra, at 57-58, 61. Cf. APHA Recommended Program Guide for Abortion Services, 70 Am. J. Pub. Health 652, 655 (1980)
(hereinafter "APHA Guide") (any abortion facility should have "[a]n operating table, or conventional gynecologic examining table with accessories, located in a room which is adequately lighted and ventilated and
meets all other environmental standards for surgical procedures"); Planned
Parenthood Guidelines, supra, at 2. A doctor's examining room should
contain instruments for vaginal examinations, supplies for obtaining cultures and smears, and equipment for diagnostic studies and operative procedures. ACOG Standards, supra, at 57. Cf. Planned Parenthood
Guidelines, supra, at 2. When local anesthesia is used, the clinic or doctor's office should have emergency resuscitation equipment, including positive pressure oxygen, intravenous equipment and fluids, suction, and a cardiac monitor. ACOG Standards, supra, at 57. Ambulatory surgical
centers should, in addition to oxygen, suction, and resuscitation equipment, provide for emergency lighting and intercommunications. I d., at
61. Cf. APHA Guide, supra, at 655 (requiring oxygen, and equipment for
artificial ventilation and resuscitation); NAF Standards, supra, n. 22, at 9
(requiring all facilities performing second-trimester abortions to have
resuscitation bag, oxygen, and defibrillator if general anesthesia is administered); Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, at 2 (even first-trimester
abortion clinics should have parenteral fluids, resuscitation equipment, and
oxygen).
24
ACOG provides that both clinics and ambulatory facilities should meet
all state and local building, safety, and fire codes. ACOG Standards,
supra, at 58, 61. Specific plans should be developed to evacuate patients
in case of an emergency. Id., at 59, 62. Cf. NAF Standards, supra, n.
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Our concern centers on the patient services requirements
of the Virginia regulations and whether they further the
State's interest in the health and safety of the pregnant
woman. We think they clearly do. Again, we have compared them to the standards used by ACOG and APHA, and
we are impressed with the scrupulousness with which Virginia has drawn regulations reasonably related to its interest
in protecting the pregnant woman's health. The sanitation 25
and record-keeping standards 26 are typical and not unreason22, at 8, 11; Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 10.
25
Infection can be a serious complication with any abortion procedure.
See nn. 11 and 12, supra. Significant portions of the Virginia regulations
are designed to assure that outpatient surgical clinics take appropriate
steps to control infection, including sterile processing, appropriate waste
disposal and laundry practices, isolation of nonpotable water, and protection of the integrity of the operating suite. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient
Hospitals)§§ 41.2.5, 43.2.1, 43.2.2, 43.10.1, 43.11, 43.12.3, 43.12.5, 52.2.5,
52.2.6, 52.2.7 & 52.2.13. ACOG recommends that all facilities develop
procedures for controlling and disposing of needles, syringes, glass, knife
blades, and contaminated waste supplies. ACOG Standards, supra, at 58,
62. APHA Guide, supra, n. 23, at 655; NAF Standards, supra, n. 22, at 7
("Surgical instruments must be sufficient in number to permit individual
sterilization of the instruments used for each procedure.. . ."); Planned
Parenthood Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 2.
26
The Virginia record-keeping requirements are similar to those detailed
by ACOG for a physician's office, ACOG Standards, supra, at 54-55,
59-60, which require at the initial visit a comprehensive data base including information on reason for visit, menstrual history, obstetric history,
gynecologic history, sexual history, past medical and surgical history, current medications, allergies, social history, and family history. For ambulatory surgical facilities, ACOG recommends that the patient's record
contain sufficient information to justify the preoperative diagnosis and the
operative procedure, and should at least contain patient identification data,
history and physical examination, provisional diagnosis, diagnostic and
therapeutic orders, surgeons' and nurses' notes, laboratory data, operative
consent, operative report, anesthesia report, tissue report, medications
record, and discharge summary and instructions. !d., at 59. See also id.,
at 60 ("On the day of surgery a preanesthetic evaluation, including an interval history, medical record review, and a heart and lung examination
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able in detail. The laboratory services 27 support-and often
are essential to-the direct medical services 28 performed by
the physician 29 and nurse. 30 The post-operative recovery
standards 31 also comport with accepted medical practice. 32
should be performed by a physician and the findings should be noted in the
record."). We have found such requirements, "if not abused or overdone,"
impose a legally insignificant burden on the Roe right. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 81 (1976). We do
not think Virginia's requirements are excessive. Cf. APHA Guide, supra,
n. 23, at 655-656 (recommended reporting requirements); Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 13 (record-keeping and reporting
requirements).
27
The risk of hemorrhage is reduced by requiring an outpatient surgical
clinic to make hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations before initiating
instillation. See ACOG Standards, supra, at 59 ("The laboratory data
should include hemoglobin or hematocrit, urinalysis, and, in certain selected patients, other studies such as a chest x-ray, electrocardiogram, and
electrolytes."). See also APHA Guide, supra, n. 23, at 654 ("Appropriate
laboratory procedures must include determination of hematocrit and Rh
factor in every case. The value of other laboratory procedures will depend
upon the population served; these may include sickle cell testing;
endocervical and anal culture for gonorrhea; urinalysis; serologic testing
for syphilis; and, when indicated cytologic screening for cancer."); NAF
Standards, supra, n. 22, at 7 ("Rh-immune globulin must be explained and
administered to Rh-negative patients."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines,
supra, n. 22, at 8 (requiring lab facilities to be available on premises for
pregnancy tests, urine protein and sugar, hematocrit or hemoglobin determination, and Rh typing).
28
See ACOG Standards, supra, at 59 ("The appropriate records should
be completed and laboratory data recorded prior to surgery.") (emphasis
added). ACOG also recommends that "[t]he physician should strive to
identify pre-existing or concurrent illness, medications, and adverse drug
reactions that may have a bearing on the operative procedure or anesthesia. All records should be reviewed before any surgery is performed."
Id., at 60 (emphasis added). APHA Guide, supra, n. 23, at 654; Planned
Parenthood Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 8.
29
For example, the ACOG requires careful laboratory work before anesthesia is administered, and even then, it must be given only by or under
the supervision of a doctor: "Any ambulatory surgical unit that utilizes gen[Footnotes 30, 31, and 32 appear on p. 18]
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The equipment requirements for emergency services are
minimal 33 and are further prefaced with the word
"adequate." 34
eral, epidural, or spinal anesthesia should do so under the direction of an
anesthesiologist. These anesthetics should be administered by a qualified
anesthesiologist, another qualified physician, or a certified nurse-anesthetist under the supervision of an anesthesiologist. When any form of anesthesia is used, trained personnel and proper equipment for cardiopulmonary resuscitation must be available." ACOG Standards, supra, at 53.
Cf. APHA Guide, supra, n. 23, at 655; Planned Parenthood Guidelines,
supra, n. 22, at 10.
30
The ACOG Standards do not specifically require nurses for physicians'
offices or for ambulatory surgical facilities, but note: "The efficient operation of an ambulatory surgical facility requires adequate staffing with administrative and professional personnel. The assignment of personnel
should be based on the number of patients, patient profiles, type of procedures, and facility design." ACOG Standards, supra, at 60. Cf. id., at 56
("Administrative and professional personnel requirements will Vary considerably in each physician's office and outpatient clinic depending on the patient load, pattern of practice, and type of facility."); Planned Parenthood
Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 7 (nurses); id., at 7-8 (head laboratory technician); id., at 9 ("It is strongly recommended that three staff persons be
present in the procedure room: the operating physician, the physician's assistant and a counselor to assist the patient.").
31
See n. 19, supra.
32
Complications resulting from anesthesia are alleviated by requiring a
physician to be present during the recovery period. See ACOG Standards, supra, at 53 ("The supervising anesthesiologist, or another physician
qualified in cardiopulmonary resuscitation, should be present in the ambulatory surgical facility until all surgical patients have been discharged.
This physician should oversee the postanesthetic recovery area and should
share with the surgeon responsibility for discharging patients or transferring them to the back-up hospital."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines,
supra, n. 22, at 11; see also APHA Guide, supra, n. 23, at 655 ("[I]t will be
necessary to periodically observe the temperature, pulse rate, blood pressure, and the amount of bleeding. In addition, the abdomen should be examined for evidence of intra-abdominal bleeding or injury."). Less serious
complications can be monitored by the registered nurse on duty. See
ACOG Standards, supra, at 53 ("During the recovery period, the patient
[Footnote$ 33 and 34 appear on p. 19]
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We do not suggest that all of the Virginia requirements are
necessary for every second-trimester abortion. But a State
simply cannot adopt regulations that serve every case with
the same degree of relevance; "a State necessarily must have
some latitude in adopting regulations of general applicability
in this sensitive area." City of Akron, ante, at 16. Although a State's general licensing regulations must be drawn
to further the State's interests in women's health for all reasonable periods of time within the second-trimester, a particular requirement "is not unconstitutional simply because it
does not co~espond perfectly to the asserted state interest"
every day of the trimester. Ante, at 20.
should be under continuous observation by a qualified member of the
health care team. This person should maintain a complete record of the
patient's general condition including vital signs, blood loss, and occurrence
of complications."); NAF Standards, supra, n. 22, at 6 ("The recovery area
must be supervised by a licensed nurse or physician who is immediately
available to the recovery area."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, at
11. The required one-hour recovery period is intended to permit detection
of these complications. See APHA Guide, supra, at 655 (requiring postoperative observations "over a period of two or more hours, depending
upon the type of anesthesia used"); Kerenyi, Mandelman & Sherman, Five
Thousand Consecutive Saline Inductions, 116 Am. J . Obstet. & Gynecol.
593, 597 (1973); ACOG Standards, supra, at 53; App. 37 (defense expert
witness concedes waiting period desirable).
33
The arrangements for emergency transfer to an acute-care, general
hospital are clearly reasonable. See APHA Guide, supra, n. 23, at 655;
ACOG Standards, supra, at 52 ("There should be a written policy requiring
the medical staff to provide for prompt emergency treatment or hospitalization in the event of an unanticipated complication."); id., at 58, 62; Cates
& Grimes, supra, n. 11, at 407 (even for nonhospital facilities providing
D&E, "arrangements for emergency care should be established with hospitals near the nonhospital facility"); NAF Standards, supra, n. 22, at 7;
Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 10 ("Each facility must
have a functioning arrangement for emergency transport to a local accredited hospital.").
34
Appellant's operating room contains practically all of the emergency
services equipment required by the State. The record indicates that it has
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We therefore conclude, at least on the record before us in
this case, that Virginia's regulations concerning second-trimester abortions are reasonably related to and further the
State's compelling interest in "protecting the woman's own
health and safety." Roe, 410 U. S., at 150. 35 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a legitimate interest in seeing to
it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for
the patient." Ibid. Unlike Akron in City of Akron or Missouri in Ashcroft, Virginia does not require that the patient
be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be performed in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the
State's requirements-the statutes and the regulations-accommodate accepted medical practice, and leave the method
and timing of the abortion precisely where they belong-between the physician and the patient.
IV
We hold that Virginia's requirement that second-trimester
abortions be performed in properly equipped outpatient clinexcellent lighting, wall outlets for oxygen, suction apparatus, resuscitation
equipment, a defibrillator, an EKG machine, intravenous fluids , and complete anesthesia equipment. App. 21-22, 375--376. Although appellant
sought a "certificate of need" from the Virginia Bureau of Resources
Development, see n. 4, supra, he makes no contention that his office's facilities, personnel, or care conform fully to the requirements for an outpatient
surgical clinic.
30
Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-trimester abortion clinics requires the same services and equipment as Part
II. In fact, part Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 63.1.1(b), § 63.3,
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more technological support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however,
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements reasonably related to the state's compelling interest.
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ics is constitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court of
Virginia therefore is
Affirmed.
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[March - , 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization requirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - ,
and Planned Parenthood Ass'n. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, ante, p. - - . The principal issue here is whether
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitutional.
·
I
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In
November, 1979 he practiced at his office in Woodbridge,
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room, and
facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant
sought any license for it.
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmarried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that

'
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimester. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but
never advised her parents of her decision.
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course.
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also advised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began.
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet.
Id., at 200.
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home.
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investigation.1
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of
1
Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2
(1982). The Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years
in prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d).
2
The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which
provides:
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person administer to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdiction, - - U. S. - - , and now affirm.
II
Appellant broadly attacks Virginia's hospitalization requirements. 3 He contends that they restrict the availability
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony."
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester,
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester,
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is necessary to save the woman's life, § 18.2-74.1; and (iv) is
performed during the third trimester under certain circumstances,
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and expressly negated any defenses of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however,
rebut the other defenses.
3
Questions raised particularly with respect to Virginia's outpatient surgical clinics are considered in Part III, infra. Appellant raises two additional issues that do not require extended treatment. He first contends
that Va. Code§ 18.2-71 was applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack
of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, addressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders the indictment unconstitutional
for two reasons: (i) the State failed to meet its burden of alleging necessity
in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62
(1971); and (ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977).
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to the defense of medical
necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity
as a defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Columbia statute in
Vuitch, as construed by this Court, required the prosecution to make this
allegation. See 402 U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden

'•
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of abortions after the first trimester by granting a monopoly
to the few licensed hospitals that will permit mid-trimester
abortions. He also argues that the Virginia requirements
result in negative health consequences and, as applied to him
and the abortions he performs in his well-equipped non-licensed clinic, do not further the State's interests.
pari aHel eoneu1"f'ing iH tae l"esultj.
We need not pause long here to consider the guiding principles, for we have set them out at length today in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p.
ForAetW purposes fte!oe , the critical point is that we
consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a State
has an "important and legitimate interest in the health of the
mother" that becomes "'compelling' ... at approximately the
end of the first trimester," Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 163
(1973), and is compelling throughout the remainder of the

A
It is in furtherance of this compelling interest in maternal
health that Virginia has enacted its hospitalization requiremEmt for abortions performed during the second trimester.
As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated
under Virginia law. 4 Virginia law does not, however, perof going forward with evidence on an affinnative defense is normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 120-121, and n. 20 (1982);
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975).
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to prove that his acts
in fact caused the death of the fetus. In view of the undisputed facts
proved at trial, summarized above, this contention is meritless. See 221
Va., at 1069-1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201.
'A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). Surgery is not defined. Appellant
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mit a physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to perform an abortion during the second trimester of
pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital
licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1, which defines "hospital" to include
"outpatient ... hospitals." Section 20.2.11 of the Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 5 defines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions
... which primarily provide facilities for the performance of
surgical procedures on outpatients" 6 and provides that seccontends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a question of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id.,
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a
license before he performed the abortion at issue here. Thus, without
record evidence that appellant's facility qualifies as a surgical outpatient
clinic and that he was denied a hospital license, the issue of whether the
Falls Church facility would qualify under Virginia law is irrelevant to our
determination in this case. Seen. 7, irifra (noting State's interpretation of
the Virginia regulations).
5
The regulations were promulgated pursuant to 1947 Va. Acts, c. 15,
§ 1514-a5, repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711. Although not relevant to our
determination here, we note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations in effect when appellant performed the abortion for
which he has been prosecuted. See Department of Health, Rules and
Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982).
6
Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital ... unless
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va.
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically governing outpatient surgical clinics).
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ond-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 7
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may
be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic 8 provided that
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State.
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hospitalization requirement is significantly different from those
at issue in City of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. v. Ashcroft,
ante, at 5. In those cases, the regulations required that "all
second-trimester abortions must be performed in general,
acute-care facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. We found that
such a requirement, by preventing the use of the dilatation
and evacuation method (D&E) of performing abortions in appropriate non-hospital settings, "imposed a heavy, and unnecessary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure."
City of Akron, ante, at 20. The Court invalidated these laws
~ because they did not reasonably further the States' interest in maternal health.
Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgical clinics that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpretation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3,
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services.
Moreover, the State's counsel at oral argument represented that facilities
licensed pursuant to Part II legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
Virginia uses the term "[O]utpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the regulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure performed to terminate a pregnancyfin an outpatient abortion clini~shall be
performed prior to the end of th e first trimester (12th week amenorrhea).").
8
We herein usually refer to the outpatient "hospitals" in Virginia that
legally may perform second-trimester abortions as "outpatient surgical
clinics."
7

A
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One of the most important factors in our analysis in City of
Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during the early
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital." Ante, at 19. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Virginia's regulations, outpatient surgical clinics may qualify for
licensing as hospitals in which second trimester abortions
lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in City of
Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here.
B
Second-trimester abortions may give rise to serious complications, 9 and certain procedures significantly increase the
risks. Although the increasingly common use and relative
safety of the D&E method, see City of Akron, ante, at - - ,
may make the need for particular equipment in and designs of
a facility less imperative, the need for reasonable regulations
has not been eliminated. D&E, despite its safety early in
the second trimester, still may cause complications.'0
9
See Cadesky, Ravinsky & Lyons, Dilation and Evacuation: A Preferred Method ofMidtrimester Abortion, 129 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 329,
331 (1981) Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease
Control, Abortion Surveillance: Annual Summary 1978, at 48 (1980).
10
Hemorrhaging is a leading cause of death and complications in D&E
abortion patients. Other potential complications are uterine perforation
and cervical tears, which are significantly increased in comparison to other
second-trimester procedures. See ACOG Technical Bulletion No. 56,
Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 75 (1979).
A major potential complication for all abortion techniques-infectionnormally does not arise until 24 to 72 hours after the procedure has taken
place, by which time the woman usually will have been discharged from
any facility. See Ashcroft, 664 F. 2d 687, 690, n. 6 (CA8 1981), rev'd in
part and aff'd in part, ante, p. - - . Thus the relative safety of the D&E
procedure does not alleviate the need for standards designed to prevent
infection.
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The American Public Health Association (APHA), although recognizing "that greater use of the dilatation and
evacuation procedure make[s] it possible to perform the vast
majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the
16th [w]eek after the last menstrual period," still "[u]rges endorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in
free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state standards
required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Tri' ~bortion 1, 2 (1979) (emphasis added). The medical
oprofessio~ has not thought the standards need be relaxed
merely because the facility performs abortions: "Ambulatory
care facilities providing abortion services should meet the
same standards of care as those recommended for other surgical procedures performed in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the free-standing and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic
Services 54 (5th ed. 1982) (hereinafter ACOG Standards).
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to requirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facilities are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recommended for hospitals." Ibid.
In view of its interest, the State necessarily has considerable discretion in determining standards for the licensing of
medical facilities, but its discretion does not "permit it to
adopt abortion regulations that depart from sound medical
practice." City of Akron, ante, at 12. "If a State requires
licensing or undertakes to regulate the performance of abortions during [the second trimester], the health standards
adopted must be 'legitimately related to the objective the
State seeks to accomplish.' Doe, 410 U. S., at 195." City of
Akron, ante, at 12. The issue here is whether Virginia's licensing requirements for outpatient surgical clinics perform-
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ing second-trimester abortions are reasonable means of furthering the State's compelling interest in the woman's health.

c
The Virginia regulations applicable to outpatient surgical
clinics performing second-trimester abortions are, with few
exceptions, the same regulations applicable to all outpatient
surgical clinics in Virginia.K"' These regulations may be
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main categorIes.
The first grouping relates to organization, management,
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §40.3;
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures
manual, 11 § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed
physician who must supervise clinical services and perform
surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to be on
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The second category of requirements outlines construction standards
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be approved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also
construction requirements that set forth standards for the
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology services, 12 and general building. 13
11

The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used,
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4;
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and
infection control, § 41.2.5.
12
These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical clinic if
the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities.
q ·,

Y'

/.14-

[Footnote 13 is on p. 10}
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The most important group of regulations for our purposes
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the requirements for various services that the facility may offer,
such as anesthesia, 14 laboratory, 15 and pathology. 16 Some of
the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§§ 43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12. 6. There are also guidelines on
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 17 and postoperative recovery: 18 Finally, the regulations mandate some
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1.
13
The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 50.6.1, 50. 7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4.
14
See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for anesthesia must be present for administration and recovery).
15
Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.6.1. Outpatient surgical clinics providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing,
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and albumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically indicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4.
16
Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See
Ashcroft, ante, at - - .
17
Section 43. 8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of laboratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of
any procedure. !d., § 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical clinic providing
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the
performing physician. !d., § 43.8.4.
Section 43.8.5 provides that the facility performing abortions "shall offer
each patient appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion procedure and in birth control methods." Virginia does not require that the
doctor personally provide this counseling or specify the means by which
this counseling is performed. Under this requirement, unlike in City of
[Footnote 19 is on p. 11}
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emergency services and evacuation planning. 19

III
Appellant does not attack these regulations expressly in
his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief. Instead, he challenges Virginia's requirement of hospitalization
for second-trimester abortions without alluding to the fact
that the statutory term "hospital" is defined to include outpatient surgical clinics that may perform second-trimester abortions. As appeliant had not sought a license for his clinic at
the time he was indicted, he appears to argue that the Virginia hospitalization requirements are comparable to those
we have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus
invalid.
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations on various grounds. He argues that even if he had applied for a license, it is uncertain whether it would have been
Akron, it is for the woman, in conjunction with her physician, to decide
what considerations are relevant to her decision. See ante, at 27-28.
18
Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation techniques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 43.9.1, 43.9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d.,
§§ 43. 9.3, 43. 9.4. For a discussion of similar standards by various medical
organizations, see n. 32, infra.
19
See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus,
oxyg-en, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemorrhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a licensed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides:
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory,
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all
times."

~
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granted; that Virgin· courts have had no opportunity to construe the "licensing sta utes and regulations;" that Part II of
the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical facility
where second trimester ai:J rtions are performed, but see n.
8, supra; and that medical evt ence rebuts the view "that it is
safer to perform second tri ster abortions in hospitals."
Reply Brief for Appellant 1. ~GII~~~~~tet.tmi~.,l

20

cr

AGOG's standards discuss many of Virginia's concerns about proper
management and policies under the appropriate heading of "Quality Assurance." See AGOG Standards,.a~1oe , at 55 ("Each physician's office and
outpat1ent clmic should assess whether effective and efficient management
of health care has been accomplished."). Like Virginia's "narrative" requirement, Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 50.1.1, 50.2.1, AGOG's
standards suggest that the "outpatient clinic evaluation of patient care
should assess the completeness of medical records, the accuracy of diagnoses, appropriateness of use of laboratory and other services, and outcome of care." AGOG Standards 55-56. See National Abortion Federation (NAF), National Abortion Federation Standards 11 (1981) (hereinafter
NAF Standards) (requiring written descriptions of procedures and policies
in each area of care). Gf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae 29, n. 6.
(supporting the NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards").
.1

... '

•

[Footnote 21 is on p. 1J}
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to this case. They have not been challenged by appellant beyond his sweeping condemnation of any requirement that second-trimester abortions-even those during the twenty-second week of pregnancy-be performed in hospitals, however
defined and whether outpatient or not. In any event, as appears from the recommendations of ACOG and the American
Public Health Association (APHA) set forth in the margin,
see nn. 22, 23, and 24, Virginia's requirements, although
more detailed with respect to specific facilities, 22 equipment,
ACOG also advises that each ambulatory body should have a "governing
body" that has the final authority and responsibility for the appointment of
the medical staff, ACOG Standards 60; cf. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 40.3, and that "[w)ritten policies describing specific responsibilities
of each member of the team are desirable, and should be reviewed and revised periodically," ACOG Standards 60. Cf. NAF Standards 12 (responsibilities of chief administrative officer); Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance
and Evaluation of First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 1 (hereinafter "Planned Parenthood Guidelines") (duties of administrator).
21
This second category of Virginia regulations is consistent with those
set forth by ACOG. ACOG recommends that even physicians' offices provide at least a patient reception room, consultation room, two examining
rooms, a utility room, and storage. ACOG Standards 56-58. Cf. Planned
Parenthood Guidelines, 1-3 (detailing extensive physical requirements for
first-trimester abortion clinics). ACOG's standards for an ambulatory
surgical facility are more detailed, providing space for reception, waiting,
administrative activities, patient dressing, lockers, preoperative evaluation, physical examination, laboratory testing, preparation of anesthesia,
performance of surgical procedures, preparation and sterilization of instruments, storage of equipment, storage of drugs and fluids, postanesthetic
recovery, staff activities, and janitorial and utility support. See ACOG
Standards 61.
ACOG details the equipment to be found in the various rooms and areas.
ACOG Standards 57-58, 61. Cf. APHA Recommended Program Guide for
Abortion Services, 70 Am. J. Pub. Health 652, 655 (1980) (hereinafter
"APHA Guide") (any abortion facility should have "[a]n operating table, or
conventional gynecologic examining table with accessories, located in a
room which is adequately lighted and ventilated and meets all other environmental standards for surgical procedures"); Planned Parenthood Guide-

[Footnote 22 is on p. 14}
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and personnel than the ACOG and APHA standards, are
compatible with generally accepted medical standar~
Our concern centers on whether the patient services requirements of the Virginia regulations further the State's interest in the health and safety of the pregnant woman. We
think they clearly do. Again, we have compared them to the
standards used by ACOG and APHA, and we are impressed
with the scrupulousness with which Virginia has drawn regulations reasonably related to its interest in protecting the
pregnant woman's health. The sanitation 23 and record-keeplines 2. A doctor's examining room should contain instruments for vaginal
examinations, supplies for obtaining cultures and smears, and equipment
for diagnostic studies and operative procedures. ACOG Standards 57.
Cf. Planned Parenthood Guidelines 2. When local anesthesia is used, the
clinic or doctor's office should have emergency resuscitation equipment, including positive pressure oxygen, intravenous equipment and fluids, suction, and a cardiac monitor. ACOG Standards 57. Ambulatory surgical
centers should, in addition to oxygen, suction, and resuscitation equipment, provide for emergency lighting and intercommunications. I d., at
61. Cf. APHA Guide 655 (requiring oxygen, and equipment for artificial
ventilation and resuscitation); NAF Standards 9 (requiring all facilities
performing second-trimester abortions to have resuscitation bag, oxygen,
and defibrillator if general anesthesia is administered); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 2 (even first-trimester abortion clinics should have parenteral fluids, resuscitation equipment, and oxygen).
22
ACOG provides that both clinics and ambulatory facilities should meet
all state and local building, safety, and fire codes. ACOG Standards 58,
61. Specific plans should be developed to evacuate patients in case of an
emergency. Id., at 59, 62. Cf. NAF Standards 8, 11; Planned Parenthood Guidelines 10.
23
Infection can be a serious complication with any abortion procedure.
See nn. 11 and 12, supra. Significant portions of the Virginia regulations
are designed to assure that outpatient surgical clinics take appropriate
steps to control infection, including sterile processing, appropriate wastedisposal and laundry practices, isolation of nonpotable water, and protection of the integrity of the operating suite. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient
Hospitals) §§ 41.2.5, 43.2.1, 43.2.2, 43.10.1, 43.11, 43.12.3, 43.12.5, 52.2.5,
52.2.6, 52.2.7 & 52.2.13. ACOG recommends that all facilities develop
procedures for controlling and disposing of needles, syringes, glass, knife
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ing standards 24 are typical and not unreasonable in detail.
The laboratory services 25 support-and often are essential
to-the direct medical services 26 performed by the physician 27 and nurse. 28 The post-operative recovery standards 29 also comport with accepted medical practice, 30 and the
blades, and contaminated waste supplies. ACOG Standards 58, 62.
APHA Guide 655; NAF Standards 7 ("Surgical instruments must be sufficient in number to permit individual sterilization of the instruments used
for each procedure .... ").
2
' The Virginia record-keeping requirements are similar to those detailed
by ACOG for a physician's office, ACOG Standards 54-55, 59-60, which require at the initial visit a comprehensive data base including information on
reason for visit, menstrual history, obstetric history, gynecologic history,
sexual history, past medical and surgical history, current medications, allergies, social history, and family history. For ambulatory surgical facilities, ACOG recommends that the patient's record contain sufficient information to justify the preoperative diagnosis and the operative
procedure, and should at least contain patient identification data, history
and physical examination, provisional diagnosis, diagnostic and therapeutic
orders, surgeons' and nurses' notes, laboratory data, operative consent,
operative report, anesthesia report, tissue report, medications record, and
discharge summary and instructions. !d., at 59. See also id., at 60 ("On
the day of surgery a preanesthetic evaluation, including an interval history, medical record review, and a heart and lung examination should be
performed by a physician and the findings should be noted in the record.").
We have found that such requirements, "if not abused or overdone," impose a legally insignificant burden on the Roe right. See Planned Parenthood ofCentml Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 81 (1976). We do not think
Virginia's requirements are excessive. Cf. APHA Guide 655--656 (recommended reporting requirements); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 13
(record-keeping and reporting requirements).
25
The risk of hemorrhage is reduced by requiring an outpatient surgical
clinic to make hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations before initiating
instillation. See ACOG Standards 59 ("The laboratory data should include
hemoglobin or hematocrit, urinalysis, and, in certain selected patients,
other studies such as a chest x-ray, electrocardiogram, and electrolytes.").
See also APHA Guide 654 ("Appropriate laboratory procedures must include determination of hematocrit and Rh factor in every case. The value
of other laboratory procedures will depend upon the population served;
these may include sickle cell testing; endocervical and anal culture for gon-

[Footnotes 26 through JO are on pp. 16 and 17}
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equipment requirements for emergency services are
minimal. 31
We do not suggest that all of the Virginia requirements are
necessary for every second-trimester abortion. But a State
simply cannot adopt regulations that serve every case with
orrhea; urinalysis; serologic testing for syphilis; and, when indicated cytologic screening for cancer."); NAF Standards 7 ("Rh-immune globulin must
be explained and administered to Rh-negative patients."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 8 (requiring lab facilities to be available on premises for
pregnancy tests, urine protein and sugar, hematocrit or hemoglobin determination, and Rh typing).
26
See ACOG Standards 59 ("The appropriate records should be completed and laboratory data recorded prior to surgery.") (emphasis added).
ACOG also recommends that "[t]he physician should strive to identify preexisting or concurrent illness, medications, and adverse drug reactions that
may have a bearing on the operative procedure or anesthesia. All records
should be reviewed before any surgery is performed." I d., at 60 (emphasis
added). APHA Guide 654; Planned Parenthood Guidelines 8.
~For example, the ACOG requires careful laboratory work before anesthesia is administered, and even then, it must be given only by or under
the supervision of a doctor: "Any ambulatory surgical unit that utilizes general, epidural, or spinal anesthesia should do so under the direction of an
anesthesiologist. These anesthetics should be administered by a qualified
anesthesiologist, another qualified physician, or a certified nurse:.anesthetist under the supervision of an anesthesiologist. When any form of anesthesia is used, trained personnel and proper equipment for cardiopulmonary resuscitation must be available." ACOG Standards 53. Cf. APHA
Guide 655; Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra., n. 22, at 10.
28
The ACOG Standards do not specifically require nurses for physicians'
offices or for ambulatory surgical facilities, but note: "The efficient operation of an ambulatory surgical facility requires adequate staffing with administrative and professional personnel. The assignment of personnel
should be based on the number of patients, patient profiles, type of procedures, and facility design." ACOG Standards 60. Cf. id., at 56 ("Administrative and professional personnel requirements will vary considerably in
each physician's office and outpatient clinic depending on the patient load,
pattern of practice, and type of facility."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines
7-8 (head laboratory technician); id., at 9 ("It is strongly recommended
that three staff persons be present in the procedure room: the operating
physician, the physician's assistant and a counselor to assist the patient.").
29
See n. 19, supra.
[Footnotes JO and Jl m·e on pp. 17}
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the same degree of relevance; "[a] State necessarily must
have some latitude in adopting regulations of general applicability in this sensitive area." City of Akron, ante, at 16.
Although a State's general licensing regulations must be
drawn to further the State's interests in women's health for
all reasonable periods of time within the second-trimester, a
particular requirement "is not unconstitutional simply because it does not correspond perfectly in all cases to the asserted state interest." City of Akron, ante, at 20.
30

Complications resulting from anesthesia are alleviated by requiring a
physician to be present during the recovery period. See ACOG Standards
53 ("The supervising anesthesiologist, or another physician qualified in cardiopulmonary resuscitation, should be present in the ambulatory surgical
facility until all surgical patients have been discharged. This physician
should oversee the postanesthetic recovery area and should share with the
surgeon responsibility for discharging patients or transferring them to the
back-up hospital."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 11; see also APHA
Guide 655 ("[I]t will be necessary to periodically observe the temperature,
pulse rate, blood pressure, and the amount of bleeding. In addition, the
abdomen should be examined for evidence of intra-abdominal bleeding or
injury."). Less serious complications can be monitored by the registered
nurse on duty. See ACOG Standards 53 ("During the recovery period, the
patient should be under continuous observation by a qualified member of
the health care team. This person should maintain a complete record of
the patient's general condition including vital signs, blood loss, and occurrence of complications."); NAF Standards 6 ("The recovery area must be
supervised by a licensed nurse or physician who is immediately available to
the recovery area."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 11. The required
one-hour recovery period is intended to permit detection of these complications. See APHA Guide 655 (requiring post-operative observations "over
a period of two or more hours, depending upon the type of anesthesia
used"); Kerenyi, Mandelman & Sherman, Five Thousand Consecutive Saline Inductions, 116 Am. J. Obstet. & Gynecol. 593, 597 (1973); ACOG
Standards 53; App. 37 (defense expert witness concedes waiting period
desirable).
3
' The arrangements for emergency transfer to an acute-care, general
hospital are clearly reasonable. See APHA Guide 655; ACOG Standards
52 ("There should be a written policy requiring the medical staff to provide
for prompt emergency treatment or hospitalization in the event of an unan-
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We therefore conclude, at least on the record before us in
this case, that Virginia's regulations concerning second-trimester abortions are reasonably related to and further the
State's compelling interest in "protecting the woman's own
health and safety." Roe, 410 U. S., at 150. 32 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a legitimate interest in seeing to
it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for
the patient." Ibid. Unlike Akron in City of Akron or Missouri in Ashcroft, Virginia does not require that the patient
be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be performed in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the
State's requirements-the statutes and the regulations-accommodate accepted medical practice, and leave the method
and timing of the abortion precisely where they belong-between the physician and the patient.
IV
We hold that Virginia's requirement that second-trimester
abortions be performed in, properly equipped outpatient
clinic is constitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court
of Virginia is
Affirmed.
ticipated complication."); id., at 58, 62; NAF Standards, supra, n. 22, at 7;
Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 10 ("Each facility must
have a functioning arrangement for emergency transport to a local accredited hospital.").
32
Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-trimester abortion clinics requires the same services and equipment as Part
II. In fact, part Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§63.l.l(b), §63.3,
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more technological support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however,
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements reasonably related to the state's compelling interest.

o~

l C:~

ice
tl

11
un

tist

..

or

ce Powell

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-185

CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, APPE.LLANT v. VIRGINIA
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
[April - , 1983]

JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization requirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - ,
and Planned Parenthood Ass'n. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, ante, p. - - . The principal issue here is whether
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitutional.
I
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In
November, 1979 he practiced at his office in Woodbridge,
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room
and facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs firsttrimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant
sought any license for it.
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmarried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimester. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but
never advised her parents of her decision.
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course.
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also advised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began.
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet.
Id., at 200.
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home.
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investigation.1
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of
1
Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d).
2
The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which
provides:
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person administer to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony."

81-185--0PINION
SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA

3

a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdiction, - - U. S. - - , and now affirm.
II
Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, addressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders the indictment unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977).
The authoritative construction of § 18.2-71 by the Supreme
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a
defense. See 221Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Columbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, reThe Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester,
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester,
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is necessary to save the woman's life, § 18.2-74.1; and (iv)
is performed during the third trimester under certain circumstances,
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and expressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however,
rebut the other defenses.
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quired the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of going forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107,
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684,
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975).
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 10691070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201.

III
Appellant argues that Virginia's statutory hospital requirement prohibits all non-hospital second-trimester abortions and that such a requirement imposes an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy and has negative health
consequences. Appellant contends that this prohibition
sharply restricts the availability of abortions after the first
trimester by granting a monopoly to the few licensed hospitals that will permit the post 12-week abortions. Appellant
contends that the hospital monopoly is an unreasonable restraint on a woman's right to an abortion and that the State
has not shown that the requirement furthers any compelling
interest.
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health
of the mother" that· becomes "'compelling' . . . at approximately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). This interest, of course, embraces the
facilities and circumstances in which abortions are performed. See id., at 150. The State here argues that its hospitalization requirement is significantly different from the
hospitalization requirements considered in City of Akron and
Ashcroft and that it reasonably promotes the State's interests. It thus becomes necessary to determine whether Vir-
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ginia's hospitalization requirement is different from those
considered earlier, or whether we should consider our decision in City of Akron controlling.

A
It is in furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal
health that Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for abortions performed during the second trimester.
As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated
under Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to perform an abortion during the second trimester of
pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital
licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does
not define the term "hospital." · This definition is found in
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1/ that defines "hospital" to include
A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). Surgery is not defined. Appellant
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a question of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id.,
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hospitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus,
the issue before us is the validity of those requirements, not whether appellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with them. See
n. 8, infra (noting State's interpretation of the Virginia regulations).
'The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in § 18.2-73
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Vir8
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"outpatient .
hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 defines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions
ginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health
laws:
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical procedures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospitals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling interest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075,
277 S. E. 2d, at 204.
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifically in § 32.1-123.1. Seen. 5, infra.
5
Section 32.1-123.1 provides:
"'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provision of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgical or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospitals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums,
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and
maternity hospitals."
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711).
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing
surgery)."
6
The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing minimum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and requirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter,
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due regard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene,
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profes-

81-185-0PINION
SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA

7

. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that second-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may
sion and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assistants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711)
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12
.
and 32.1-127 (1979)).
The first draft of the regulations was considerably different from the
regulations that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health,
Draft I, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in
Virginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that the
requirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpatient clinics in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the trimester. Thus, no distinction was made between first- and second-trimester abortions with respect to the appropriateness of and need for state
regulation.
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January
26, 1977. At this hearing, Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board,
presided, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services.
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the
State; representatives of the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest
Clinic, abortion clinics; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical School
representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the Tidewater OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial
Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and a
representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and
have our support." ld., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, however, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics aclmowledged that
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] procedure in the interest of maternal health." ld., at 7. But the clinics specifi[Footnotes 7 and 8 are on page 8]
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be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic 9 provided that
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State.
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hospitalization requirement is significantly different from those
at issue in City of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft,
cally ''propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high
standards for outpatient surgical clinics in the State, agreed that the Board
should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient surgical clinics in order to include outpatient abortion clinics within the same set
of regulations. See id., at 30. Following the hearing, the Board added
Part III, the regulations of which apply only to clinics doing first-trimester
abortions. It therefore is clear that Virginia has recognized the need for
discrete and different sets of regulations for the two periods. The Board
gave its final approval to the regulations before us on May 11, 1977.
The regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979,
some two years and five months after the effective date of the regulations.
In view of the public hearing on January 26, 1977, attended as noted above
by representatives of various organizations specifically concerned with
abortions, it cannot be said-and indeed appellant does not argue-that he
was not fully aware of the regulations and the statutory requirement that
his clinic be licensed.
Although of no direct relevance to this case, we note that new but similar
regulations now supersede the regulations in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prosecuted. See Department of
Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia,
pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were promulgated pursuant to Va.
Code §§ 32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979.
7
Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital .. . unless
such hospital ... is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va.
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically governing outpatient surgical clinics).
8
Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgical clinics that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpretation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3,
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and
[Footnote 9 is on page 9]
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ante, at 4-5. In those cases, the regulations required that
"all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, acute-care facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. We found
that such a requirement, by preventing the use of the dilatation and evacuation method (D&E) of performing abortions in
appropriate non-hospital settings, "imposed a heavy, and unnecessary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure."
City of Akron, ante, at 20. The Court invalidated these laws
because they did not reasonably further the state interest in
maternal health.
One of the most important factors in our analysis in City of
Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during the early
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be per- . ~ ~ ~
formed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hos- ~ tf~ ~. -_ .
pital." Ante, at 19. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and
/ ~ l4.regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be
LA-~~ ~
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Vir~ ~-7-~
ginia's regulations, outpatient surgical clinics may qualify for
~ ,4,
licensing as hospitals in which second-trimester abortions
JJ~~ )-~
lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in City of
.
Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here.
v ~ ....,.... • 'f

J

7G

by the history of Part III, see n. 6, infra. Moreover, the State's counsel
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the regulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure performed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic]
shall be performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week
amenorrhea).").
9
We herein usually refer to the outpatient "hospitals" in Virginia that
legally may perform second-trimester abortions as "outpatient surgical
clinics."

...

~~i~-

~~-~~t4
~k

~~~,
~t-w~

t;f~~
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B
Second-trimester abortions may give rise to serious complications, 10 and certain procedures significantly increase the
risks. Although the increasingly common use and relative
safety of the D&E method, see City of Akron, ante, at 17-19,
may make the need for particular equipment in and designs of
a facility less imperative, the need for reasonable regulations
has not been eliminated. D&E, despite its safety early in
the second trimester, still may cause complications. 11
The American Public Health Association (APHA), although recognizing "that greater use of the dilatation and
evacuation procedure make[s] it possible to perform the vast
majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the
16th [w ]eek after the last menstrual period," still "[u]rges endorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in
free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state standards
required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2 (1979) (emphasis added). The medical
profession has not thought the standards need be relaxed
merely because the facility performs abortions: "Ambulatory
care facilities providing abortion services should meet the
10

See Cadesky, Ravinsky & Lyons, Dilation and Evacuation: A Preferred Method ofMidtrimester Abortion, 129 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 329,
331 (1981); Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control, Abortion Surveillance: Annual Summary 1978, at 48 (1980).
11
Hemorrhaging is a leading cause of death and complications in D&E
abortion patients. Other potential complications are uterine perforation
and cervical tears, which are significantly increased in comparison to
other second-trimester procedures. See ACOG Technical Bulletion No.
56, Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 75 (1979).
A major potential complication for all abortion techniques-infectionnormally does not arise until 24 to 72 hours after the procedure has taken
place, by which time the woman usually will have been discharged from
any facility. See Ashcroft, 664 F. 2d 687, 690, n. 6 (CA8 1981), rev'd in
part and affd in part, ante, p. - - . Thus the relative safety of the D&E
procedure does not alleviate the need for standards designed to prevent
infection.
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same standards of care as those recommended for other surgical procedures performed in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the free-standing and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (AGOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic
Services 54 (5th ed. 1982) (hereinafter AGOG Standards).
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to requirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facilities are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recommended for hospitals." Ibid.
In view of its interest, the State necessarily has considerable discretion in determining standards for the licensing of
medical facilities, but its discretion does not "permit it to
adopt abortion regulations that depart from sound medical
practice." City of Akron, ante, at 12. "If a State requires
licensing or undertakes to regulate the performance of abortions during [the second trimester], the health standards
adopted must be 'legitimately related to the objective the
State seeks to accomplish.' Doe, 410 U. S., at 195." City of
Akron, ante, at 12. The issue here is the validity of Virginia's requirement that second-trimester abortions be performed in a licensed "hospital" given that the term "hospital"
is defined to include "outpatient hospitals."

c
It is necessary to describe briefly the Virginia regulations
applicable to outpatient surgical clinics performing secondtrimester abortions in order to understand appellant's constitutional challenge and determine the validity of Virginia's
hospitalization requirement. Those Virginia regulations applicable to outpatient surgical clinics performing second-trimester abortions are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to all outpatient surgical clinics in Virginia,

,.

,
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and may be grouped for purposes of discussion into three
main categories.
The first grouping re.lates to organization, management,
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §40.3;
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures
manual, 12 § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40. 6, a licensed
physician who must supervise clinical services and perform
surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to be on
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The second category of requirements outlines construction standards
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be approved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also
construction requirements that set forth standards for the
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology services,'3 and general building. 14
The most important group of regulations for our purposes
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the requirements for various services that the facility may offer,
such as anesthesia, 15 laboratory, 16 and pathology. 17 Some of
12
The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used,
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4;
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and
infection control, § 41.2.5.
13
These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical clinic if
the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities.
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1.
" The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 50.6.1, 50. 7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4.
16
See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.1.1 (service must be

[Footnotes 15 and 16 are on page 13]
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the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 18 and postoperative recovery. 19 Finally, the regulations mandate some
emergency services and evacuation planning. 20
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for anesthesia must be present for administration and recovery).
16
Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§ 43.6.1. Outpatient surgical clinics providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy
testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing,
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and albumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically indicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4.
17
Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11.
8
' Section 43. 8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of laboratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of
any procedure. I d., § 43. 8. 3. In an outpatient surgical clinic providing
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the
performing physician. I d., § 43.8.4.
Section 43.8.5 provides that the facility performing abortions "shall offer
each patient appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion procedure and in birth control methods." Virginia does not require that the
doctor personally provide this counseling or specify the means by which
this counseling is performed. Under this requirement, unlike in City of
Akron, it is for the woman, in conjunction with her physician, to decide
what considerations are relevant to her decision. See ante, at 27.
19
Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation techniques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§43.9.1, 43.9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d.,
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4.
20
See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation

,·
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IV
Appellant does not attack these regulations expressly in
his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief. Instead, he challenges Virginia's requirement of hospitalization
for second-trimester abortions without alluding to the fact
that the statutory term "hospital" is defined to include outpatient surgical clinics tW ma)' perfQwn econd- rimes era orIOn
As appellant had not sought a license for his clinic at
• the time he was indicted, he appears to argue that the Virginia hospitalization requirements are comparable to those
we have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus
also invalid.
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations on various grounds. He argues that the record is silent
on the applicability of those regulations to his facility; that
the record does not show whether any outpatient surgical
clinics exist in Virginia or whether, if they exist, they allow
second-trimester abortions; that the record is silent on the
reasonableness of the regulations; that he had no opportunity
to defend against the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain
whether, if he had applied for an outpatient clinic license, it
would have been granted; that obtaining a license is an arduous process; that Virginia courts have had no opportunity to
construe the "licensing statutes and regulations"; and that
Part II of the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgiplan); id., §43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus,
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemorrhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a licensed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides:
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory,
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all
times."

r,
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cal clinic where second-trimester abo ons are performed.
Some of these arguments are simply
, see n. 8, supra,
and others are irrelevant, see n. 3, s ra. And certainly appellant cannot argue that the State has no right to require appellant to meet some facility and equipment standards merely
because they impose some costs and burdens. Compliance
with the State's requirements will entail costs, but this can
be said of most regulations adopted by governments to protect the health and safety of people.
What is perhaps most important about appellant's constitutional challenges is what they do not challenge: Appellant has
not argued that individual regulations are unreasonable.
Despite full knowledge of the regulations at the time of his
trial, 21 appellant has elected to treat the Virginia hospitalization requirement as no different from those we reviewed in
City of Akron and Ashcroft. Any silence of the record on
the reasonableness of the regulations must be attributed to
his failure to show their invalidity, for he has not produced
any medical evidence, as the plaintiffs in City of Akron and
Ashcroft~au~ Q8fl.e, to show that certain equipment or services required by the State are unreasonable requirements to
impose on women seeking second-trimester abortions. In a
word, he has not shown why the Virginia regulations do not
further the State's compelling interest in the health and
safety of the pregnant woman.
It is therefore unnecessary for this Court to review those
regulations individually to determine whether alone or as a
group they impose unreasonable conditions ·on outpatient
hospital licensing in Virginia. Our task is much simpler, and
that is to assure ourselves that the Virginia hospitalization
requirement is not of the same nature as those invalidated in
21

See nn. 3, 6, supra; Record Vol. 5, pp. 55-56 (appellant acknowledging
existence of the outpatient clinic regulations; stating that he was seeking a
license; but denying that he knew of the regulations when the abortion was
performed).

·-
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City of Akron and Ashcroft. As we noted earlier, they are
not. Nor do they appear to impose different, but also unreasonable requirements for second-trimester abortions. We
have looked to the recommendations of ACOG and the American Public Health Association (APHA), 22 and although Virginia's requirements may be more detailed with respect to
specific facilities, equipment, and personnel, we believe that
they are generally compatible with the medical standards set
forth there for outpatient facilities performing second-trimester abortions. Certainly appellant has given us no reason to
assume that they are unreasonable health and safety
requirements.
We therefore conclude, at least on the record before us in
this case, that appellant has not shown the Virginia regulations concerning second-trimester abortions to be an unreasonable means of furthering the State's compelling interest in
"protecting the woman's own health and safety." Roe, 410
U. S., at 150. 23 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a
legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other
medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. Unlike Akron
in City of Akron or Missouri in Ashcroft, Virginia does not
See APHA Recommended Program Guide for Abortion Services, 70
Am. J. Pub. Health 652, 655 (1980). See also National Abortion Federation, National Abortion Federation Standards (1981). Cf. Brief of the
APHA as Amicus Curiae 29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF Standards for nonhospital abortion facilities as consitituting "minimum standards").
zs Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering firsttrimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as
Part II. In fact, part Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear
in Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 63.1.1(b),
§ 63.3, 64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive
regulations for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require
more technological support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before
us, however, relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements reasonably related to the State's compelling interest.
22

...'
'

81-185---0PINION
SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA

17

require that the patient be hospitalized as an inpatient or that
the abortion be performed in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the State's requirements-the statutes and the
regulations-seem to accommodate accepted medical practice, and leave the method and timing of the abortion precisely where they belong-between the physician and the
patient.

v
We hold that, on the record before us, Virginia's requirement for second-trimester abortions is constitutional. The
judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is
Affirmed.
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JuSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization requirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - ,
and Planned Parenthood Ass'n. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, ante, p. - - . The principal issue here is whether
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitutional.
I
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In
November, 1979 he practiced at his office in Woodbridge,
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room
and facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs firsttrimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant
sought any license for it.
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmarried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that

'
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimester. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but
never advised her parents of her decision.
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course.
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also advised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began.
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet.
ld., at 200.
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home.
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investigation.1
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of
'Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d).
2
The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which
provides:
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person administer to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony."
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdiction, - - U. S. - - , and now affirm.
II
Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, addressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders the indictment unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977).
The authoritative construction of § 18.2-71 by the Supreme
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Columbia · statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, reThe Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester,
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester,
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain circumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life,
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and expressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however,
rebut the other defenses.
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quired the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of going forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107,
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684,
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975).
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 10691070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201.

III
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' . . . at approximately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). This interest embraces the facilities
and circumstances in which abortions are performed. See
id., at 150. Appellant argues, however, that Virginia's statutory hospitalization requirement prohibits all non-hospital
second-trimester abortions and that such a requirement imposes an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In
City of Akron and Ashcroft, we today have found this argument persuasive when made in constitutional challenges to
the acute-care, general hospital requirements at issue there.
The State of Virginia argues here that its hospitalization requirement is significantly different from the hospitalization
requirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests.
A
In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under

.'
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Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to
perform an abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1, 4 that defines "hospital" to include
A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing
surgery. Va. Code §32.1-124(5). Surgery is not defined. Appellant
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a question of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id.,
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hospitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus,
the issue before us is the validity of those requirements, not whether appellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with them. See
n. 8, infra (noting State's interpretation of the Virginia regulations).
4
The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in§ 18.2-73
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Virginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health
laws:
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical procedures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospitals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling interest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075,
3
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"outpatient .
hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 defines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions
277 S. E. 2d, at 204.
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifically in § 32.1-123.1. See n. 5, infra.
• Section 32.1-123.1 provides:
" 'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provision of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgical or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospitals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums,
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and
maternity hospitals."
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711).
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing
surgery)."
6
The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing minimum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and requirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter,
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due regard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene,
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profession and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assistants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711)
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12
and 32.1-127 (1979)).
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regulations that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I,
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that the requirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-
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. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that second-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may
tient facilities in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the
trimester. Thus, no distinction was made between first- and second-trimester abortions with respect to the appropriateness of and need for state
regulation.
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January
26, 1977. Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at this
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services.
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the
State; representatives of the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest
Clinic, abortion clinics; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical School
representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the Tidewater OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial
Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and a
representative of the Northern Virginia Me\lical Center. See Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and
have our support." Id., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, however, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] procedure in the interest of maternal health." I d., at 7. But the clinics specifically "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the
Board should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient
surgical hospitals in order to include these outpatient abortion clinics
within the same set of regulations. See id., at 30. Following the hearing,
the Board added Part III, the regulations of which apply only to clinics doing first-trimester abortions. See nn. 9, 28, irifra. It therefore is clear
[Footnotes 7 and 8 are on page 8]
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be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic provided that
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State.
The Virginia regulations applicable to the performance of
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to
that Virginia has recognized the need for discrete and different sets of
regulations for the two periods. The Board gave its final approval to the
regulations before us on May 11, 1977.
The regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979,
some two years and five months later. In view of the public hearing on
January 26, 1977, attended as noted above by representatives of various
organizations specifically concerned with abortions, it cannot be said-and
indeed appellant does not argue-that he was not fully aware of the regulations and the statutory requirement that his clinic be licensed.
We note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations
in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prosecuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were
promulgated pursuant to Va. Code §§32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979.
7
Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital . . . unless
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va.
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically governing outpatient surgical clinics).
8
Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgical hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpretation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3,
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and
by the history of Part III, seen. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the regulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure performed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic]
shall be performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week
amenorrhea).").
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all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main
categories.
The first grouping relates to organization, management,
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 40.3;
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures
manuaV §43.2, an administrative officer, §40.6, a licensed
physician who must supervise clinical services and perform
surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to be on
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The second category of requirements outlines construction standards
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be approved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also
construction requirements that set forth standards for the
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology services, 10 and general building. 11
The most important group of regulations for our purposes
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the requirements for various services that the facility may offer,
9

The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used,
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4;
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and
infection control, § 41.2.5.
10
These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical hospital
if the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of
Health's Rules and Regalations for the Licensure of General and Special
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities.
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1.
11
The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§§ 50.6.1, 50.7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4.

'
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such as anesthesia,l2 laboratory, 13 and pathology. 14 Some of
the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§§ 43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12. 6. There are also guidelines on
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 15 and postoperative recovery. 16 Finally, the regulations mandate some
emergency services and evacuation planning. 17
12
See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be
directed by licensed physician); i d., § 43.1. 2 (physician responsible for anesthesia must be present for administration and recovery).
13
Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.6.1. Outpatient surgical hospitals providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy
testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing,
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative , urinalysis for suger and albumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically indicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4.
14
Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11.
15
Section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of laboratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of
any procedure. I d. ; § 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical hospital providing
abortio~ services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the
performing physician. I d., § 43.8.4.
Section 43.8.5 provides that the facility performing abortions "shall offer
each patient appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion procedure and in birth control methods."
16
Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation techniques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 43.9.1, 43. 9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d. ,
§§ 43. 9.3, 43. 9.4.
17
See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation
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B

It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hospitalization requirement is significantly different from those
at issue in City of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft,
ante, at 4-5. In those cases, the regulations required that
"all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, acute-care facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. We found
that such a requirement, by preventing the use of the dilatation and evacuation method (D&E) of performing abortions in
appropriate non-hospital settings, "imposed a heavy, and unnecessary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure."
City of Akron, ante, at 20. The Court invalidated these laws
because they did not reasonably further the state interest in
maternal health.
One of the most important factors in our analysis in City of
Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during the early
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital." Ante, at 19. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Virginia's regulations, outpatient surgical clinics may qualify for
plan); i d., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus,
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemorrhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a licensed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides:
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory,
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all
times."
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licensing as hospitals in which second-trimester abortions
lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in City of
Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here.

c
The remaining question is the constitutionality of Virginia's regulations. Second-trimester abortions may give rise
to serious complications, 18 and certain procedures significantly increase the risks. Although the increasingly common use and relative safety of the D&E method, see City of
Akron, ante, at 17-19, may make the need for particular
equipment in and designs of a facility less imperative, the
need for reasonable regulations has not been eliminated.
D&E, despite its safety in most cases early in the second trimester, still may cause complications. 19
The American Public Health Association (APHA), although recognizing "that greater use of the dilatation and
evacuation procedure make[s] it possible to perform the vast
majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the
16th [w]eek after the last menstrual period," still "[u]rges enSee Cadesky, Ravinsky & Lyons, Dilation and Evacuation: A Preferred Method ofMidtrimester Abortion, 129 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 329,
331 (1981); Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control, Abortion Surveillance: Annual Summary 1978, at 48 (1980).
19
Medical evidence indicates that hemorrhaging is a leading cause of
death and complications in D&E abortion patients. Other potential complications are uterine perforation and cervical tears, which are significantly
increased
in
comparison
to
other second-trimester procedures. See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56,
Methods of Midtrimester Abortion (1979).
The Court of Appeals in Ashcroft, 664 F. 2d 687, 690, n. 6 (CA8 1981),
rev'd in part and aff'd in part, ante, p. --that major potential complication for all abortion techniques-infection-normally does not arise until 24
to 72 hours after the procedure has taken place, by which time the woman
usually will have been discharged from any facility. Thus, the medical evidence makes clear that the relative safety of the D&E procedure does not
alleviate the need for standards designed to prevent infection.
18
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dorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in
free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state standards
required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2 (1979) (emphasis added). The medical
profession has not thought the standards need be relaxed
merely because the facility performs abortions: "Ambulatory
care facilities providing abortion services should meet the
same standards of care as those recommended for other surgical procedures performed in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the free-standing and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic
Services 54 (5th ed. 1982). See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities should be
licensed to conform to requirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facilities are stringent; "Such facilities should
maintain the same surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recommended for hospitals." Ibid.
In view of its interest, the State necessarily has considerable discretion in determining standards for the licensing of
medical facilities, but its discretion does not "permit it to
adopt abortion regulations that depart from sound medical
practice." City of Akron, ante, at 12. "If a State requires
licensing or undertakes to regulate the performance of abortions during [the second trimester], the health standards
adopted must be 'legitimately related to the objective the
State seeks to accomplish.' Doe, 410 U. S., at 195." City of
Akron, ante, at 12. On their face, these Virginia regulations
appear to be generally compatible with accepted medical
standards governing outpatient second-trimester abortions. 20
20
See American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Stardards
for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52-54 (5th ed. 1982); APHA Recommended Program Guide for Abortion Services, 70 Am. J . Pub. Health 652,
655 (1980). See also National Abortion Federation, National Abortion
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We need not decide whether certain individual regulations
are unreasonable on their face or invalid as applied to him.
Despite full knowledge of the regulations at the time of his
trial, 21 appellant has elected to treat the Virginia hospitalization requirement as no different from those we reviewed in
City of Akron and Ashcroft. To the extent the record is silent, the lack of evidence on the reasonableness of the regulations must be attributed to his failure to produce any medical
evidence, as the plaintiffs in City of Akron and Ashcroft did
at great length, to show that certain equipment or services
required by the State are unreasonable requirements to impose on women seeking second-trimester abortions. 22 In a
Federation Standards (1981). Cf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae
29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities
as consitituting "minimum standards").
21
See nn. 3, 6, supra; Record Vol. 5, pp. 55-56 (appellant acknowledging
existence of the outpatient hospital regulations; stating that he was seeking a license; but denying that he knew of the regulations when the abortion was performed).
22
Appellant has presented no evidence challenging the validity of the
regulations as distinguished from his attack on this hospitalization requirement in§ 18.2-73. Indeed, appellant does not attack these regulations expressly in his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief, instead arguing that the Virginia hospitalization requirements are comparable to those
we have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus also invalid.
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations instead making only facial challenges in the broadest language and in conclusory terms:
but not individually or on specific grounds the record is silent on the applicability of those regulations to his facility; that the record does not show
whether any outpatient surgical clinics exist in Virginia or whether, if they
exist, they allow second-trimester abortions; that the record is silent on the
reasonableness of the regulations; that he had no opportunity to defend
against the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain whether, if he had applied for an outpatient clinic license, it would have been granted; that obtaining a license is an arduous process; that Virginia courts have had no
opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and regulations"; and that
Part II of the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical clinic where
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word, he has not shown why the Virginia regulations do not
further the State's compelling interest in the health and
safety of the pregnant woman.
We therefore conclude, on the record before us in this case,
that appellant has not shown the Virginia regulations concerning second-trimester abortions to be an unreasonable
means of furthering the State's compelling interest in "protecting the woman's own health and safety." Roe, 410
U. S., at 150. 23 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a
legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other
medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. Unlike Akron
in City of Akron or Missouri in Ashcroft, Virginia does not
require that the patient be hospitalized as an inpatient or that
the abortion be performed in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the State's requirements-the statutes and the
regulations-seem to accommodate accepted medical pracsecond-trimester abortions are performed. Some of these arguments are
simply meritless, see n. 8, supra, and others are irrelevant, see n. 3,
supra. And certainly appellant cannot argue that the State has no right to
require appellant to meet reasonable facility and equipment standards
merely because they impose some costs and burdens. As City of Akron
makes clear, see ante, at 12, in view of the State's compelling interest in
the pregnant woman's health, it may adapt reasonable regulations. Compliance with the State's requirements certainly will entail costs, but this
can be said of most regulations adopted by governments to protect the
health and safety of people.
23
Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering firsttrimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as
Part II. In fact, Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§§ 63.l.l(b), § 63.3,
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more technological support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however,
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements reasonably related to the State's compelling interest .

...
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tice, and leave the method and timing of the abortion precisely where they belong-with the physician and the
patient.

v
We hold that, on the record before us, Virginia's hospitalization requirement for second-trimester abortions is constitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia
is
Affirmed.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization requirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - ,
and Planned Parenthood Ass'n. of Kansas City, Mo. , Inc. v.
Ashcroft, ante, p. - - . The principal issue here is whether
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitutional.
I
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In
November, 1979 he practiced at his office in Woodbridge,
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room
and facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs firsttrimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant
sought any license for it.
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmarried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimester. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but
never advised her parents of her decision.
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course.
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also advised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began.
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet.
Id., at 200.
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home.
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investigation.'
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of
'Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54--317(1), 54.321.2
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d).
2
The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which
provides:
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person administer to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony."
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdiction, - - U. S. - - , and now affirm.
II
Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, addressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders the indictment unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and
(ii) the prosec.ution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977).
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Columbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, reThe Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester,
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester,
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain circumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life,
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and expressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however,
rebut the other defenses.
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quired the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of going forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107,
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684,
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975).
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 1069-1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201.

III
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' . . . at approximately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). This interest embraces the facilities
and circumstances in which abortions are performed. See
id., at 150. Appellant argues, however, that Virginia's statutory hospitalization requirement prohibits all non-hospital
second-trimester abortions and that such a requirement imposes an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In
City of Akron and Ashcroft, we today have found this argument persuasive when made in constitutional challenges to
the acute-care, general hospital requirements at issue there.
The State of Virginia argues here that its hospitalization requirement is significantly different from the hospitalization
requirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests.
A
In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under

..
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Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to
perform an abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1, 4 that defines "hospital" to include
3

A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). Surgery is not defined. Appellant
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a question of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id.,
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hospitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus,
the issue before us is the validity of those requirements, not whether appellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with them. See
n. 8, infra (noting State's interpretation of the Virginia regulations).
•The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in§ 18.2-73
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Virginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health
laws:
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical procedures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospitals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling interest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075,
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"outpatient .
hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 defines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions
277 S. E. 2d, at 204.
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifically in § 32.1-123.1. Seen. 5, infra.
5
Section 32.1-123.1 provides:
"'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provision of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgical or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospitals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums,
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and
maternity hospitals."
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711).
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing
surgery)."
6
The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing minimum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and requirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter,
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due regard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene,
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profession and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assistants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711)
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12
and 32.1-127 (1979)).
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regulations that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I,
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that therequirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-
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. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that second-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may
tient facilities in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the
trimester. Thus, no distinction was made between first- and second-trimester abortions with respect to the appropriateness of and need for state
regulation.
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January
26, 1977. Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at this
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services.
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the
State; representatives of the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest
Clinic, abortipn clinics; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical School
representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the Tidewater OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial
Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and a
representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and
have our support." Id., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, however, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] procedure in the interest of maternal health." I d., at 7. But the clinics specifically "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the
Board should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient
surgical hospitals in order to include these outpatient abortion clinics
within the same set of regulations. See id., at 30. Following the hearing,
the Board added Part III, the regulations of which apply only to clinics doing first-trimester abortions. See nn.
?j,, infra. It therefore is clear
A A

!.,

[Footnotes 7 and 8 are on page 8]
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be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic provided that
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State.
The Virginia regulations applicable to the performance of
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to
that Virginia has recognized the need for discrete and different sets of
regulations for the two periods. The Board gave its final approval to the
regulations before us on May 11, 1977.
The regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979,
some two years and five months later. In view of the public hearing on
January 26, 1977, attended as noted above by representatives of various
organizations specifically concerned with abortions, it cannot be said-and
indeed appellant does not argue-that he was not fully aware of the regulations and the statutory requirement that his clinic be licensed.
We note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations
in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prosecuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were
promulgated pursuant to Va. Code§§ 32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979.
7
Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital . . . unless
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va.
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically governing outpatient surgical clinics).
8
Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgical hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpretation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e. , §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3,
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and
by the history of Part III, seen. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the regulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure performed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic]
shall be performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week
amenorrhea).").

I
t
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all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main
categories.
The first grouping relates to organization, management,
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 40.3;
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures
manual,9 § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed
physician who must supervise clinical services and perform
surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to be on
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The second category of requirements outlines construction standards
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be approved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also
construction requirements that set forth standards for the
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology services, 10 and general building. 11
The most important group of regulations for our purposes
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the requirements for various services that the facility may offer,
The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used,
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4;
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and
infection control, § 41.2.5.
10
These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical hospital
if the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities.
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1.
11
The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§§ 50.6.1, 50.7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4.
9
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such as anesthesia, 12 laboratory, 13 and pathology. 14 Some of
the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 15 and postoperative recovery. 16 Finally, the regulations mandate some
emergency services and evacuation planning. n
12

See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for anesthesia must be present for administration and recovery).
13
Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.6.1. Outpatient surgical hospitals providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy
testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing,
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and albumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically indicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4.
"Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11.
15
Section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of laboratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of
any procedure. /d., § 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical hospital providing
abortio~ services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the
a
performing physicia~ /d., § 43.8.-h ai1d.
O' geetiOH 48.8.8 ~pr,pfiQ~S ~the fa'cility J'eifOtllliRg aaef'ti~ "shall Offer
each patient appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion procedure and in birth control methods~' i.9, .1 • ~ 41 .S5
16
Each patient shall be observed' for post-operative complications for one
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation techniques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§43.9.1, 43.9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the
premises until the patient is discharged on his written ·orders. I d.,
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4.
17
See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation
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B
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hospitalization requirement is significantly different from those
at issue in City of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parent-

hood Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft,
ante, at 4-5. In those cases, the regulations required that
"all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, acute-care facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. We found
that such a requirement, by preventing the use of the dilatation and evacuation method (D&E) of performing abortions in
appropriate non-hospital settings, "imposed a heavy, and unnecessary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure."
City of Akron, ante, at 20. The Court invalidated these laws
because they did not reasonably further the state interest in
maternal health.
One of the most important factors in our analysis in City of
Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during the early
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital." Ante, at 19. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Virginia's regulations, outpatient surgical clinics may qualify for
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus,
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemorrhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a licensed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides:
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory,
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all
times."
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licensing as hospitals in which second-trimester abortions
lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in City of
Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here.

c
The remaining uestion is the constitutionality of Virginia's re at10ns. Secon -trimester abortions may gwe rise
to serious complications, 18 and certain procedures significantly increase the risks. Although the increasingly common use and relative safety of the D&E method, see City of
Akron, ante, at 17-19, may make the need for particular
equipment in and designs of a facility less imperative, the
need for reasonable regulations has not been eliminated.
D&E, despite its safety in most cases earl in the second trimester, still may cause complications. 19
The American Public ea
ssociation (APHA), although recognizing "that greater use of the dilatation and
evacuation procedure make[s] it possible to perform the vast
majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the
16th [w]eek after the last menstrual period," still "[u]rges en- _ / See Cadesky, Ravinsky & Lyons, Dilation and Evacuation: A Pre- ~
ferred Method of Mid trimester Abortion, 129 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 329,
331 (1981); Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control, Abortion Surveillance: Annual Summary 1978, at 48 (1980).
19
Medical evidence indicates that hemorrhaging is a leading cause of
death and complications in D&E abortion patients. Other potential complications are uterine perforation and cervical tears, which are significantly
in
comparison
to
increased
other second-trimester procedures. See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56,
Methods of Midtrimester Abortion (1979).
The Court of Appeals in Ashcroft, 664 F. 2d 687, 690, n. 6 (CA8 1981),
rev'd in part and affd in part, ante, p. - - that major potential complication for all abortion techniques-infection-normally does not arise until 24
to 72 hours after the procedure has taken place, by which time the woman
usually will have been discharged from any facility. Thus, the medical evidence makes clear that the relative safety of the D&E procedure does not
alleviate the need for standards designed to prevent infection. J

I'

18

J
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dorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in
free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state standards
required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2 (1979) (emphasis added). The medical
profession has not thought the standards need be relaxed
merely because the facility performs abortions: "Ambulatory
care facilities providing abortion services should meet the
same standards of care as those recommended for other surgical procedures performed in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the free-standing and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic
Services 54 (5th ed. 1982). See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities should be
licensed to conform to requirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facilities are stringent: "Such facilities should
maintain the same surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recommended for hospitals." Ibid.
In view of its interest, the State necessarily has considerable discretion in determining standards for the licensing of
medical facilities, but its discretion does not "permit it to
adopt abortion regulations that depart from sound medical
practice." City of Akron, ante, at 12. "If a State requires
licensing or undertakes to regulate the performance of abortions during [the second trimester], the health standards
adopted must be 'legitimately related to the objective the
State seeks to accomplish.' Doe, 410 U. S., at 195." City of
Akron, ante, at 12. On their face, the~ Virginia regulations
appear to be generally compatible with accepted medical
standards governing outpatient second-trimester abortions.~

I~

Jd' See American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Staf dards
for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52-54 (5th ed. 1982); APHA Recommended Program Guide for Abortion Services, 70 Am. J. Pub. Health 652,
655 (1980). See also National Abortion Federation, National Abortion

18

"
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We need not decide,
ertain individual regulations
are unreasonable on t e ace or invalid as applied to~ ~~~~..)
Despite full knowledge of the regulations at the time of his
';. trial, ~ appellant has elected to treat the Virginia hospitalization requirement as no different from those we reviewed in
City of Akron and Ashcroft. To the extent the record is silent, the lack of evidence on the reasonableness of the regulations must be attributed to his failure to produce any medical
Y evidence, as ~plaintiffs in City of Akron and Ashcroft did
at great length, to show that certain equipment or services
required by the State are unreasonable requirements to im1. 2-1 pose on women seeking second-trimester abortions. ~ In a

20

A

Federation Standards (1981). Cf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae
29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities
as consitituting "minimum standards").
! See nn. 3, 6, supra; Record Vol. 5, pp. 55-56 (appellant acknowledging
existence of the outpatient hospital regulations; stating that he was seeking a license; but denying that he knew of the regulations when the abortion was performed).
I Appellant has presented no evidence challenging the validity of the
regulations as distinguished from his attack on thilhospitalization requirement in§ 18.2-73. Indeed, appellant does not atG ck these regulations expressly in his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief, instead arguing that the Virginia hospitalization requirements are comparable to those
we have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus also invalid.
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulation~nstead making only facial challenges in the broadest language and in conclusory terms:
~i mlivia~ally or on speei;ig ~6ttHS... the record is silent on the applicability of those regulations to his facility; that the record does not show
whether any outpatient surgica~~ exist in Virginia or whether, if they
exist, they allow second-trimester abortions; that the record is silent on the
reasonableness of the regulations; that he had no opportunity to defend
against the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain whether, if he had applied for an outpatient ~ license, it would have been granted; that obtaining a license is an ar3'-uous process; that Virginia courts have had no
opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and regulations"; and that
Part II of the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical ~ where

"

,

..

e

"

t::~j
"
~
,..
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word, he has not shown why the Virginia regulations do not
further the State's compelling interest in the health and
safety of the pregnant woman.
We therefore conclude, on the record before us in this case,
that appellant has not shown the Virginia regulations concerning second-trimester abortions to be an unreasonable
means of furthering the State's compelling interest in "protecting the woman's own health and safety." Roe, 410
~ U. S., at 150. ~ As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a
legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other
medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. Unlike Akron
in City of Akron or Missouri in Ashcroft, Virginia does not
require that the patient be hospitalized as an inpatient or that
the abortion be performed in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the State's requirements-the statutes and the
regulations-seem to accommodate accepted medical prac-

.2.1

"

second-trimester abortions are performed. Some of these arguments are
simply meritless, see n. 8, supra, and others are irrelevant, see n. 3,
supra. And certainly appellant cannot argue that the State has no right to
require appellant to meet reasonable facility and equipment standards
merely because they impose some costs and burdens. As City of Akron
makes clear, see ante, at 12, in view of the State's compelling interest in
the pregnant woman's health, it may adt pt reasonable regulations. Compliance with the State's requirements ~rtainly will entail costs, but this
can be said of most regulations adopted by governments to protect the
health and safety of people .
~Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering firsttrimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as
Part II. In fact, Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§§ 63.1.1(b), § 63.3,
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more technological support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however,
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements reasonably related to the State's compelling interest.

,..
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tice, and leave the method and timing of the abortion precisely where they belong-with the physician and the
patient.

I

v
We hold that, on the record before us, Virginia's hospital- ~
ization requirement for second-trimester abortions is constitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia
is
Affirmed.
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CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, APPELLANT v. VIRGINIA
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
[April - , 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization requirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - ,
and Planned Parenthood Ass'n. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, ante, p. - - . The principal issue here is whether
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitutional.
I
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In
November, 1979 he practiced at his office in Woodbridge,
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room
and facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs firsttrimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant
sought any license for it.
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmarried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that

__,
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimester. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but
never advised her parents of her decision.
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course.
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also advised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began.
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet.
Id., at 200.
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home.
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investigation.1
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of
1
Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d).
2
The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which
provides:
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person administer to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony."
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdiction,-- U.S.--, and now affirm.
II
Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, addressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders the indictment unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977).
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Columbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, reThe Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester,
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester,
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain circumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life,
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and expressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however,
rebut the other defenses.
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quired the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of going forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107,
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684,
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975).
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 10691070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201.

III
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' . . . at approximately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). This interest embraces the facilities
and circumstances in which abortions are performed. See
id., at 150. Appellant argues, however, that Virginia's statutory hospitalization requirement prohibits all non-hospital
second-trimester abortions and that such a requirement imposes an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In
City of Akron and Ashcroft, we today have found this argument persuasive when made in constitutional challenges to
the acute-care, general hospital requirements at issue there.
The State of Virginia argues here that its hospitalization requirement is significantly different from the hospitalization
requirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests.
A
In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under

.... b~
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Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to
perform an abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1, 4 that defines "hospital" to include
3
A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). Surgery is not defined. Appellant
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a question of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id.,
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hospitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus,
the issue before us is the validity of those requirements, not whether appellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with them. See
n. 8, infra (noting State's interpretation of the Virginia regulations).
•The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in§ 18.2-73
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Virginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health
laws:
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical procedures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospitals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling interest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075,
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"outpatient .
hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 defines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions
277 S. E. 2d, at 204.
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifically in § 32.1-123.1. Seen. 5, infra.
• Section 32.1-123.1 provides:
" 'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provision of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgical or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospitals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums,
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and
maternity hospitals."
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711).
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physl.cians or
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing
surgery)."
6
The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing minimum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and requirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter,
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due regard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene,
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profession and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assistants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711)
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12
and 32.1-127 (1979)).
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regulations that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I,
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that therequirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-
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. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that second-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may
tient facilities in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the
trimester. Thus, no distinction was made between first- and second-trimester abortions with respect to the appropriateness of and need for state
regulation.
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January
26, 1977. Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at this
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services.
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the
State; representatives of the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest
Clinic, abortion clinics; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical School
representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the Tidewater OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial
Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and a
representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and
have our support." I d., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, however, about the imposition of the regillations on outpatient abortion clinics
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] procedure in the interest of maternal health." I d., at 7. But the clinics specifically "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the
Board should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient
surgical hospitals in order to include these outpatient abortion clinics
within the same set of regulations. See id., at 30. Following the hearing,
the Board added Part III, the regulations of which apply only to clinics do[Footnotes 7 and 8 are on p. 8]
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be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic provided that
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State.
The Virginia regulations applicable to the performance of
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to
ing first-trimester abortions. See nn. 8, 23, infra. It therefore is clear
that Virginia has recognized the need for discrete and different sets of
regulations for the two periods. The Board gave its final approval to the
regulations before us on May 11, 1977.
The regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979,
some two years and five months later. In view of the public hearing on
January 26, 1977, attended as noted above by representatives of various
organizations specifically concerned with abortions, it cannot be said-and
indeed appellant does not argue-that he was not fully aware of the regulations and the statutory requirement that his clinic be licensed.
We note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations
in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prosecuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were
7
Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital . . . unless
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va.
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically governing outpatient surgical clinics).
8
Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgical hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpretation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3,
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and
by the history of Part III, seen. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the regulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., §62.1.2 ("Any procedure performed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic]
shall be performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week
amenorrhea).").
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all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main
categories.
The first grouping relates to organization, management,
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 40.3;
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures
manuai,S § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed
physician who must supervise clinical services and perform
surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to be on
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The second category of requirements outlines construction standards
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be approved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also
construction requirements that set forth standards for the
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology services, 10 and general building. 11
· The most important group of regulations for our purposes
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the requirements for various services that the facility may offer,
• The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used,
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4;
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and
infection control, § 41.2.5.
0
' These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical hospital
if the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities.
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §52.3.1.
11
The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§50.6.1, 50.7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4.
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such as anesthesia, 12 laboratory, 13 and pathology. 14 Some of
the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 15 and postoperative recovery. 16 Finally, the regulations mandate some
emergency services and evacuation planning. 17
See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for anesthesia must be present for administration and recovery).
13
Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§ 43.6.1. Outpatient surgical hospitals providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy
testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing,
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and albumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically indicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4.
14
Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11.
15
Section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of laboratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of
any procedure. I d., § 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical hospital providing
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the
performing physician, id., § 43. 8.4, and
the facility "shall offer each patient appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion procedure and in birth control methods, id., § 43.85."
16
Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation techniques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§43.9.1, 43.9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d.,
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4.
17
See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus,
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hem or12
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B
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hospitalization requirement is significantly different from those
at issue in City of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft,
ante, at 4-5. In those cases, the regulations required that
"all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, acute-care facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. We found
that such a requirement, by preventing the use of the dilatation and evacuation method (D&E) of performing abortions in
appropriate non-hospital settings, "imposed a heavy, and unnecessary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure."
City of Akron, ante, at 20. The Court invalidated these laws
because they did not reasonably further the state interest in
maternal health.
One of the most important factors in our analysis in City of
Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during the early
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital." Ante, at 19. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Virginia's regulations, outpatient surgical clinics may qualify for
licensing as hospitals in which second-trimester abortions
lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in City of
Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here.
rhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a licensed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides:
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory,
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all
times."
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c
The remaining question is the constitutionality of Virginia's regulations. The American Public Health Association
(APHA), although recognizing "that greater use of the dilatation and evacuation procedure make[s] it possible to perform
the vast majority of second trimester abortions during or
prior to the 16th [w]eek after the last menstrual period," still
"[u]rges endorsement of the provision of second trimester
abortion in free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state
standards required for certification." APHA, The Right to
Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2 (1979) (emphasis added).
The medical profession has not thought tJ:ieA_standards need
be relaxed merely because the facility per-forms abortions:
"Ambulatory care facilities providing abortion services
should meet the same standards of care as those recommended for other surgical procedures performed in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the free-standing and
hospital-based ambulatory setting." American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 1982). See also id.,
at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical
facilities should be licensed to conform to requirements of
state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facilities are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recommended for
hospitals." Ibid.
In view of its interest, the State necessarily has considerable discretion in determining standards for the licensing of
medical facilities, but its discretion does not "permit it to
1 adopt abortion regulations that depart from sound medical
' practice." City of Akron, ante, at 12. "If a State requires
licensing or undertakes ·to regulate the performance of abortions during [the second trimester], the health standards
adopted must be 'legitimately related to the objective the
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State seeks to acco.~plish.' Doe, 410 U. S., at 195." {f;ity of
Akron, ante, at 12J On their face, the Virginia regulations
appear to be generally compatible with accepted medical
standards governing outpatient second-trimester abortions. 18
e need not decide, however, whether certain individual
regulations are unreasonable on their face or invalid as aplied to appellant. Despite full knowledge of the regulations
at he time of his trial, 19 appellant has elected to treat the Virgmia hospitalization requiremen( as no different from those
we reviewed in City of Akron and Ashcroft. To the extent
the record is silent, the lack of evidence on the reasonableness of the regulations must be attributed to his failure to
produce any medical evidence, as plaintiffs in City of Akron
and Ashcroft did at great length, to show that certain equipment or services required by the State are unreasonable requirements to impose on women seeking second-trimester
ortions. 20 In a word, he has not shown why the Virginia
18
See American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Standards
for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52-54 (5th ed. 1982); APHA Recommended Program Guide for Abortion Services, 70 Am. J. Pub. Health 652,
655 (1980). See also National Abortion Federation, National Abortion
Federation Standards (1981). Cf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae
29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities
as consitituting "minimum standards").
19
See nn. 3, 6, supra; Record Vol. 5, pp. 55-56 (appellant acknowledging
existence of the outpatient hospital regulations; stating that he was seeking a license; but denying that he knew of the regulations when the abortion was performed).
20
Appellant has presented no evidence challenging the validity of the
regulations as distinguished from his attack on the hospitalization requirement in§ 18.2-73. Indeed, appellant does not attack these regulations expressly in his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief, instead arguing that the Virginia hospitalization requirements are comparable to those
we have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus also invalid.
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations, but not individually or on specific grounds, instead making only facial challenges in the
broadest language and in conclusory terms: but the record is silent on the
applicability of those regulations to his facility; that the record does not

14
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regulations do not further the State's compelling interest in
the health and safety of the pregnant woman.
We therefore conclude, on the record before us in this case,
that appellant has not shown the Virginia regulations concerning second-trimester abortions to be an unreasonable
means of furthering the State's compelling interest in "protecting the woman's own health and safety." Roe, 410
U. S., at 150. 21 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a
legitimate interest in seeing te-itAhat abortion, like any other
medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. Unlike Akron
show whether any outpatient surgical hospitals exist in Virginia or
whether, if they exist, they allow second-trimester abortions; that the
record is silent on the reasonableness of the regulations; that he had no
opportunity to defend against the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain
whether, if he had applied for an outpatient hospital license, it would have
been granted; that obtaining a license is an arduous process; that Virginia
courts have had no opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and
regulations"; and that Part II of the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical hospital where second-trimester abortions are performed.
Some of these arguments are simply meritless, see n. 8, supra, and others
are irrelevant, see n. 3, supra. And certainly appellant cannot argue that
the State has no right to require appellant to meet reasonable facility and
equipment standards merely because they impose some costs and burdens.
As City of Akron makes clear, see ante, at 12, in view of the State's compelling interest in the pregnant woman's health, it may adopt reasonable
regulations. Compliance with the State's requirements certainly will entail costs, but this can be said of most regulations adopted by governments
to protect the health and safety of people.
21
Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering firsttrimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as
Part II. In fact, Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§§ 63.1.1(b), § 63.3,
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more technological support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however,
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements reasonably related to the State's compelling interest.
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in City of Akron or Missouri in Ashcroft, Virginia does not
require that the patient be hospitalized as an inpatient or that
the abortion be performed in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the State's requirements-the statutes and the
regulations-seem to accommodate accepted medical practice, and leave the method and timing of the abortion precisely where they belong-with the physician and the
patient.

v

We hold .that, on the record before us, Virginia's hospitalization requiremen~ for second-trimester abortions is constitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia
is
Affirmed.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-185

CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, APPELLANT v. VIRGINIA
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
[March-, 1983]

JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization requirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc ., ante, p. - - ,
and Planned Parenthood Ass'n. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, ante, p. - - . The principal issue here is whether
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitutional.
I
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In
November, 1979 he practiced at his office in Woodbridge,
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room and
facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant
sought any license for it.
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmarried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimester. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but
never advised her parents of her decision.
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course.
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also advised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began.
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet.
Id., at 200.
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home.
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investigation.'
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of
1

Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-lO(d).
2
The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which
provides:
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person administer to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdiction, - - U. S. - - , and now affirm.
II
Appellant broadly attacks Virginia's hospitalization requirements. 3 He contends that they restrict the availability
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony."
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester,
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester,
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is necessary to save the woman's life, § 18.2-74.1; and (iv) is
performed during the third trimester under certain circumstances,
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and expressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however,
rebut the other defenses.
3
Questions raised particularly with respect to Virginia's outpatient surgical clinics are considered in Part III, infra. Appellant raises two additional issues that do not require extended treatment. He first contends
that Va. Code§ 18.2-71 was applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack
of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, addressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders the indictment unconstitutional
for two reasons: (i) the State failed to meet its burden of alleging necessity
in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62
(1971); and (ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977).
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to the defense of medical
necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity
as a defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Columbia statute in
Vuitch, as construed by this Court, required the prosecution to make this
allegation. See 402 U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden
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of abortions after the first trimester by granting a monopoly
to the few licensed hospitals that will permit mid-trimester
abortions. He also argues that the Virginia requirements
result in negative health consequences and, as applied to him
and the abortions he performs in his well-equipped non-licensed clinic, do not further the State's interests.
We need not pause long here to consider the guiding principles, for we have set them out at length today in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, at
9-12, 14--16. For present purposes here, the critical point is
that we consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that
a State has an "important and legitimate interest in the
health of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' ... at approximately the end of the first trimester," Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113, 163 (1973), and is compelling throughout the remainder of the pregnancy. This interest, of course, embraces the facilities and circumstances in which abortions are
performed. I d., at 150.
A
It is in furtherance of this compelling interest in maternal
health that Virginia has enacted its hospitalization requirement for abortions performed during the second trimester.
As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated
under Virginia law. 4 Virginia law does not, however, perof going forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 120-121, and n. 20 (1982);
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975).
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to prove that his acts
in fact caused the death of the fetus. In view of the undisputed facts
proved at trial, summarized above, this contention is meritless. See 221
Va., at 106~1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201.
'A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing
surgery. Va. Code §32.1-124(5). Surgery is not defined. Appellant
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a ques-
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mit a physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to perform an abortion during the second trimester of
pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital
licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1, which defines "hospital" to include
"outpatient ... hospitals." Section 20.2.11 of the Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 5 defines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "(i]nstitutions
... which primarily provide facilities for the performance of
surgical procedures on outpatients" 6 and provides that second-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 7
tion of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id.,
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a
license before he performed the abortion at issue here. Thus, without
record evidence that appellant's facility qualifies as a surgical outpatient
clinic and that he was denied a hospital license, the issue of whether the
Falls Church facility would qualify under Virginia law is irrelevant to our
determination in this case. Seen. 7, infra (noting State's interpretation of
the Virginia regulations).
5
The regulations were promulgated pursuant to 1947 Va. Acts, c. 15,
§ 1514-a5, repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711. Although not relevant to our
determination here, we note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations in effect when appellant performed the abortion for
which he has been prosecuted. See Department of Health, Rules and
Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982).
6
Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital ... unless
such hospital ... is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va.
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically governing outpatient surgical clinics).
7
Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgi-
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Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may
be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic 8 provided that
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State.
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hospitalization requirement is significantly different from those
at issue in City of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft,
ante, at 45. In those cases, the regulations required that "all
second-trimester abortions must be performed in general,
acute-care facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. We found that
such a requirement, by preventing the use of the dilatation
and evacuation method (D&E) of performing abortions in appropriate non-hospital settings, "imposed a heavy, and unnecessary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure."
City of Akron, ante, at 20. The Court invalidated these laws
invalid because they did not reasonably further the state interest in maternal health.
One of the most important factors in our analysis in City of
Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during the early
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be percal clinics that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpretation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§43.6.2, 43.6.3,
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services.
Moreover, the State's counsel at oral argument represented that facilities
licensed pursuant to Part II legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the regulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure performed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] shall be
performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week amenorrhea).").
8
We herein usually refer to the outpatient "hospitals" in Virginia that
legally may perform second-trimester abortions as "outpatient surgical
clinics."
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formed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital." Ante, at 19. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Virginia's regulations, outpatient surgical clinics may qualify for
licensing as hospitals in which second-trimester abortions
lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in City of
Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here.
B

Second-trimester abortions may give rise to serious complications, 9 and certain procedures significantly increase the
risks. Although the increasingly common use and relative
safety of the D&E method, see City of Akron, ante, at 17-19
may make the need for particular equipment in and designs of
a facility less imperative, the need for reasonable regulations
has not been eliminated. D&E, despite its safety early in
the second trimester, still may cause complications. 10
The American Public Health Association (APHA), although recognizing "that greater use of the dilatation and
evacuation procedure make[s] it possible to perform the vast
9

See Cadesky, Ravinsky & Lyons, Dilation and Evacuation: A Preferred Method ofMidtrimester Abortion, 129 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 329,
331 (1981), Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control, Abortion Surveillance: Annual Summary 1978, at 48 (1980).
10
Hemorrhaging is a leading cause of death and complications in D&E
abortion patients. Other potential complications are uterine perforation
and cervical tears, which are significantly increased in comparison to other
second-trimester procedures. See ACOG Technical Bulletion No. 56,
Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 75 (1979).
A major potential complication for all abortion techniques-infectionnormally does not arise until 24 to 72 hours after the procedure has taken
place, by which time the woman usually will have been discharged from
any facility. See Ashcroft, 664 F. 2d 687, 690, n. 6 (CA8 1981), rev'd in
part and aff'd in part, ante, p. - - . Thus the relative safety of the D&E
procedure does not alleviate the need for standards designed to prevent
infection.
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majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the
16th [w]eek after the last menstrual period," still "[u]rges endorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in
free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state standards
required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2 (1979) (emphasis added). The medical
profession has not thought the standards need be relaxed
merely because the facility performs abortions: "Ambulatory
care facilities providing abortion services should meet the
same standards of care as those recommended for other surgical procedures performed in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the free-standing and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic
Services 54 (5th ed. 1982) (hereinafter ACOG Standards).
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to requirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facilities are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recommended for hospitals." Ibid.
In view of its interest, the State necessarily has considerable discretion in determining standards for the licensing of
medical facilities, but its discretion does not "permit it to
adopt abortion regulations that depart from sound medical
practice." City of Akron, ante, at 12. "If a State requires
licensing or undertakes to regulate the performance of abortions during [the second trimester], the health standards
adopted must be 'legitimately related to the objective the
State seeks to accomplish.' Doe, 410 U. S., at 195.'' City of
Akron, ante, at 12. The issue here is whether Virginia's licensing requirements for outpatient surgical clinics performing second-trimester abortions are reasonable means of furthering the State's compelling interest in the woman's health.
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c
The Virginia regulations applicable to outpatient surgical
clinics performing second-trimester abortions are, with few
exceptions, the same regulations applicable to all outpatient
surgical clinics in Virginia. These regulations may be
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main categories.
The first grouping relates to organization, management,
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §40.3;
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures
manual, 11 § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed
physician who must supervise clinical services and perform
surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to be on
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The second category of requirements outlines construction standards
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be approved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also
construction requirements that set forth standards for the
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology services, 12 and general building. 13
The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used,
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4;
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and
infection control, § 41.2.5.
12
These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical clinic if
the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities.
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§ 52.3.1.
13
The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpa11
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The most important group of regulations for our purposes
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the requirements for various services that the facility may offer,
such as anesthesia, 14 laboratory, 15 and pathology. 16 Some of
the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 17 and postoperative recovery. 18 Finally, the regulations mandate some
emergency services and evacuation planning. 19
tient Hospitals) §§ 50.6.1, 50. 7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4.
"See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for anesthesia must be present for administration and recovery).
15
Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.6.1. Outpatient surgical clinics providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing,
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and albumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically indicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4.
16
Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the
attending physician does not confinn presence of fetal parts"). See
Ashcroft, ante, at - - .
17
Section 43. 8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of laboratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of
any procedure. I d., § 43. 8. 3. In an outpatient surgical clinic providing
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the
performing physician. I d., § 43.8.4.
Section 43.8.5 provides that the facility performing abortions "shall offer
each patient appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion procedure and in birth control methods." Virginia does not require that the
doctor personally provide this counseling or specify the means by which
this counseling is performed. Under this requirement, unlike in City of
Akron, it is for the woman, in conjunction with her physician, to decide
what considerations are relevant to her decision. See ante, at 27-28.
18
Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one
[Footnote 19 is on p. 11}

'I
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III
Appellant does not attack these regulations expressly in
his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief. Instead, he challenges Virginia's requirement of hospitalization
for second-trimester abortions without alluding to the fact
that the statutory term "hospital" is defined to include outpatient surgical clinics that may perform second-trimester abortions. As appellant had not sought a license for his clinic at
the time he was indicted, he appears to argue that the Virginia hospitalization requirements are comparable to those
we have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus
invalid.
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations on various grounds. He argues that even if he had applied for a license, it is uncertain whether it would have been
granted; that Virginia courts have had no opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and regulations;" that Part II of
the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical facility
where second trimester abortions are performed, but see n.
8, supra; and that medical evidence rebuts the view "that it is
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation techniques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 43. 9.1, 43. 9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d.,
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4. For a discussion of similar standards by various medical
organizations, see n. 32, infra.
19
See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus,
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemorrhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a licensed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides:
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory,
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all
times."
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safer to perform second trimester abortions in hospitals."
Reply Brief for Appellant 1. Only the last of these arguments is relevant to the validity of these statutes and regulations, and appellant points to no evidence that supports his
generalized claim of "safety." We have noted above that the
Virginia requirements are strikingly different from those we
invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft. Compliance with
the state's requirements will entail costs, but this can be said
of most regulations adopted by governments to protect the
health and safety of people. Moreover, ethical physicians
are obligated to provide facilities consistent with the standards set by their profession, and appellant has not identified
any significant differences between professional standards
and the Virginia requirements. We are convinced, at least
on the record before us, that the Virginia provisions are reasonably related to and further the State's compelling interest
in protecting the health of the pregnant woman during the
second trimester.
The requirements of the first 20 and second categories 21 of
regulations discussed in Part 11-C above have little relevance
to this case. They have not been challenged by appellant be20
AGOG's standards discuss many of Virginia's concerns about proper
management and policies under the appropriate heading of "Quality Assurance." See AGOG Standards 55 ("Each physician's office and outpatient
clinic should assess whether effective and efficient management of health
care has been accomplished."). Like Virginia's "narrative" requirement,
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§§ 50.1.1, 50.2.1, AGOG's standards suggest that the "outpatient clinic evaluation of patient care should assess the
completeness of medical records, the accuracy of diagnoses, appropriateness of use of laboratory and other services, and outcome of care." AGOG
Standards 55-56. See National Abortion Federation (NAF), National
Abortion Federation Standards 11 (1981) (hereinafter NAF Standards) (requiring written descriptions of procedures and policies in each area of
care). Gf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae 29, n. 6. (supporting the
NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards").
AGOG also advises that each ambulatory body should have a "governing
body" that has the final authority and responsibility for the appointment of
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yond his sweeping condemnation of any requirement that second-trimester abortions-even those during the twenty-second week of pregnancy-be performed in hospitals, however
defined and whether outpatient or not. In any event, as appears from the recommendations of ACOG and the American
Public Health Association (APHA) set forth in the margin,
see nn. 22, 23, and 24, Virginia's requirements, although
more detailed with respect to specific facilities, 22 equipment,
the medical staff, ACOG Standards 60; cf. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 40.3, and that "[w]ritten policies describing specific responsibilities
of each member of the team are desirable, and should be reviewed and revised periodically," ACOG Standards 60. Cf. NAF Standards 12 (responsibilities of chief administrative officer); Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance
and Evaluation of First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 1 (hereinafter "Planned Parenthood Guidelines") (duties of administrator).
21
This second category of Virginia regulations is consistent with those
set forth by ACOG. ACOG recommends that even physicians' offices provide at least a patient reception room, consultation room, two examining
rooms, a utility room, and storage. ACOG Standards 5&-58. Cf. Planned
Parenthood Guidelines, 1--3 (detailing extensive physical requirements for
first-trimester abortion clinics). AGOG's standards for an ambulatory
surgical facility are more detailed, providing space for reception, waiting,
administrative activities, patient dressing, lockers, preoperative evaluation, physical examination, laboratory testing, preparation of anesthesia,
performance of surgical procedures, preparation and sterilization of instruments, storage of equipment, storage of drugs and fluids, postanesthetic
recovery, staff activities, and janitorial and utility support. See ACOG
Standards 61.
ACOG details the equipment to be found in the various rooms and areas.
ACOG Standards 57-58, 61. Cf. APHA Recommended Program Guide for
Abortion Services, 70 Am. J. Pub. Health 652, 655 (1980) (hereinafter
"APHA Guide") (any abortion facility should have "[a]n operating table, or
conventional gynecologic examining table with accessories, located in a
room which is adequately lighted and ventilated and meets all other environmental standards for surgical procedures"); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 2. A doctor's examining room should contain instruments for vaginal
examinations, supplies for obtaining cultures and smears, and equipment
for diagnostic studies and operative procedures. ACOG Standards 57.
Cf. Planned Parenthood Guidelines 2. When local anesthesia is used, the
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and personnel than the AGOG and APHA standards, are
compatible with generally accepted medical standard.
Our concern centers on whether the patient services requirements of the Virginia regulations further the State's interest in the health and safety of the pregnant woman. We
think they clearly do. Again, we have compared them to the
standards used by AGOG and APHA, and we are impressed
with the scrupulousness with which Virginia has drawn regulations reasonably related to its interest in protecting the
pregnant woman's health. The sanitation 23 and record-keeping standards 24 are typical and not unreasonable in detail.
clinic or doctor's office should have emergency resuscitation equipment, including positive pressure oxygen, intravenous equipment and fluids, suction, and a cardiac monitor. ACOG Standards 57. Ambulatory surgical
centers should, in addition to oxygen, suction, and resuscitation equipment, provide for emergency lighting and intercommunications. I d., at
61. Cf. APHA Guide 655 (requiring oxygen, and equipment for artificial
ventilation and resuscitation); NAF Standards 9 (requiring all facilities
performing second-trimester abortions to have resuscitation bag, oxygen,
and defibrillator if general anesthesia is administered); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 2 (even first-trimester abortion clinics should have parenteral fluids, resuscitation equipment, and oxygen).
22
ACOG provides that both clinics and ambulatory facilities should meet
all state and local building, safety, and fire codes. ACOG Standards 58,
61. Specific plans should be developed to evacuate patients in case of an
emergency. Id., at 59, 62. Cf. NAF Standards 8, 11; Planned Parenthood Guidelines 10.
23
Infection can be a serious complication with any abortion procedure.
See nn. 11 and 12, supra. Significant portions of the Virginia regulations
are designed to assure that outpatient surgical clinics take appropriate
steps to control infection, including sterile processing, appropriate wastedisposal and laundry practices, isolation of nonpotable water, and protection of the integrity of the operating suite. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient
Hospitals) §§ 41.2.5, 43.2.1, 43.2.2, 43.10.1, 43.11, 43.12.3, 43.12.5, 52.2.5,
52.2.6, 52.2. 7 & 52.2.13. ACOG recommends that all facilities develop
procedures for controlling and disposing of needles, syringes, glass, knife
blades, and contaminated waste supplies. ACOG Standards 58, 62.
APHA Guide 655; NAF Standards 7 ("Surgical instruments must be sufficient in number to permit individual sterilization of the instruments used
for each procedure .... ").
24
The Virginia record-keeping requirements are similar to those detailed

81-18&--0PINION
SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA

15

The laboratory services 25 support-and often are essential
to-the direct medical services 26 performed by the physician 2:1 and nurse. 28 The post-operative recovery standards 29 also comport with accepted medical practice, 30 and the
by ACOG for a physician's office, ACOG Standards 54-55, 59-60, which require at the initial visit a comprehensive data base including information on
reason for visit, menstrual history, obstetric history, gynecologic history,
sexual history, past medical and surgical history, current medications, allergies, social history, and family history. For ambulatory surgical facilities, ACOG recommends that the patient's record contain sufficient information to justify the preoperative diagnosis and the operative
procedure, and should at least contain patient identification data, history
and physical examination, provisional diagnosis, diagnostic and therapeutic
orders, surgeons' and nurses' notes, laboratory data, operative consent,
operative report, anesthesia report, tissue report, medications record, and
discharge summary and instructions. Id., at 59. See also id., at 60 ("On
the day of surgery a preanesthetic evaluation, including an interval history, medical record review, and a heart and lung examination should be
performed by a physician and the findings should be noted in the record.").
We have found that such requirements, "if not abused or overdone," impose a legally insignificant burden on the Roe right. See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 81 (1976). We do not think
Virginia's requirements are excessive. Cf. APHA Guide 655-656 (recommended reporting requirements); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 13
(record-keeping and reporting requirements).
25
The risk of hemorrhage is reduced by requiring an outpatient surgical
clinic to make hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations before initiating
instillation. See ACOG Standards 59 ("The laboratory data should include
hemoglobin or hematocrit, urinalysis, and, in certain selected patients,
other studies such as a chest x-ray, electrocardiogram, and electrolytes.").
See also APHA Guide 654 ("Appropriate laboratory procedures must include determination of hematocrit and Rh factor in every case. The value
of other laboratory procedures will depend upon the population served;
may include sickle cell testing; endocervical and anal culture for gonorrhea;
urinalysis; serologic testing for syphilis; and, when indicated cytologic
screening for cancer."); NAF Standards 7 ("Rh-immune globulin must be
explained and administered to Rh-negative patients."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 8 (requiring lab facilities to be available on premises for
pregnancy tests,' urine protein and sugar, hematocrit or hemoglobin determination, and Rh typing).
25
See ACOG Standards 59 ("The appropriate records should be completed and laboratory data recorded prior to surgery.") (emphasis added).
[Footnotes 27 throngh J1 a1·e on pp. 16 and 17]
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equipment requirements for emergency services are
minimal. 31
We do not suggest that all of the Virginia requirements are
necessary for every second-trimester abortion. But a State
simply cannot adopt regulations that serve every case with
ACOG also recommends that "[t]he physician should strive to identify preexisting or concurrent illness, medications, and adverse drug reactions that
may have a bearing on the operative procedure or anesthesia. All records
should be reviewed before any surgery is performed." !d., at 60 (emphasis
added). APHA Guide 654; Planned Parenthood Guidelines 8.
27
For example, the ACOG requires careful laboratory work before anesthesia is administered, and even then, it must be given only by or under
the supervision of a doctor: "Any ambulatory surgical unit that utilizes general, epidural, or spinal anesthesia should do so under the direction of an
anesthesiologist. These anesthetics should be administered by a qualified
anesthesiologist, another qualified physician, or a certified nurse-anesthetist under the supervision of an anesthesiologist. When any form of anesthesia is used, trained personnel and proper equipment for cardiopulmonary resuscitation must be available." ACOG Standards 53. Cf. APHA
Guide 655; Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 10.
28
The ACOG Standards do not specifically require nurses for physicians'
offices or for ambulatory surgical facilities, but note: "The efficient operation of an ambulatory surgical facility requires adequate staffing with administrative and professional personnel. The assignment of personnel
should be based on the number of patients, patient profiles, type of procedures, and facility design." ACOG Standards 60. Cf. id., at 56 ("Administrative and professional personnel requirements will vary considerably in
each physician's office and outpatient clinic depending on the patient load,
pattern of practice, and type of facility."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines
7-8 (head laboratory technician); id., at 9 ("It is strongly recommended
that three staff persons be present in the procedure room: the operating
physician, the physician's assistant and a counselor to assist the patient.").
29
See n. 19, supra.
30
Complications resulting from anesthesia are alleviated by requiring a
physician to be present during the recovery period. See ACOG Standards
53 ("The supervising anesthesiologist, or another physician qualified in cardiopulmonary resuscitation, should be present in the ambulatory surgical
facility until all surgical patients have been discharged. This physician
should oversee the postanesthetic recovery area and should share with the
surgeon responsibility for discharging patients or transferring them to the
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the same degree of relevance; "[a] State necessarily must
have some latitude in adopting regulations of general applicability in this sensitive area." City of Akron, ante, at 16.
Although a State's general licensing regulations must be
drawn to further the State's interests in women's health for
all reasonable periods of time within the second-trimester, a
particular requirement "is not unconstitutional simply because it does not correspond perfectly in all cases to the asserted state interest." City of Akron, ante, at 20.
We therefore conclude, at least on the record before us in
this case, that Virginia's regulations concerning second-trimester abortions are reasonably related to and further the
back-up hospital."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 11; see also APHA
Guide 655 ("[I]t will be necessary to periodically observe the temperature,
pulse rate, blood pressure, and the amount of bleeding. In addition, the
abdomen should be examined for evidence of intra-abdominal bleeding or
injury."). Less serious complications can be monitored by the registered
nurse on duty. See ACOG Standards 53 ("During the recovery period, the
patient should be under continuous observation by a qualified member of
the health care team. This person should maintain a complete record of
the patient's general condition including vital signs, blood loss, and occurrence of complications."); NAF Standards 6 ("The recovery area must be
supervised by a licensed nurse or physician who is immediately available to
the recovery area."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 11. The required
one-hour recovery period is intended to permit detection of these complications. See APHA Guide 655 (requiring post-operative observations "over
a period of two or more hours, depending upon the type of anesthesia
used"); Kerenyi, Mandelman & Sherman, Five Thousand Consecutive Saline Inductions, 116 Am. J . Obstet. & Gynecol. 593, 597 (1973); ACOG
Standards 53; App. 37 (defense expert witness concedes waiting period
desirable).
31
The arrangements for emergency transfer to an acute-care, general
hospital are clearly reasonable. See APHA Guide 655; ACOG Standards
52 ("There should be a written policy requiring the medical staff to provide
for prompt emergency treatment or hospitalization in the event of an unanticipated complication."); id., at 58, 62; NAF Standards, supra, n. 22, at 7;
Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 10 ("Each facility must
have a functioning arrangement for emergency transport to a local accredited hospital.").
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State's compelling interest in "protecting the woman's own
health and safety." Roe, 410 U. S., at 150. 32 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a legitimate interest in seeing to
it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for
the patient." Ibid. Unlike Akron in City of Akron or Missouri in Ashcroft, Virginia does not require that the patient
be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be performed in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the
State's requirements-the statutes and the regulations-accommodate accepted medical practice, and leave the method
and timing of the abortion precisely where they belong-between the physician and the patient.
IV
We hold that Virginia's requirement that second-trimester
abortions be performed in, properly equipped outpatient
clinic is constitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court
of Virginia is
Affirmed.

32
Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-trimester abortion clinics requires the same services and equipment as Part
II. In fact, part Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§§ 63.1.1(b), § 63.3,
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more technological support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however,
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements reasonably related to the state's compelling interest.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court:
These cases, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - , and Simopoulos v.
Virginia, post, p. - - , present questions as to the validity of
state statutes regulating the performance of abortions.

I
Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., two
physicians who perform abortions, and an abortion clinic
("plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the District Court for the
Western District of Missouri challenging, as unconstitutional,

~
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several sections of the Missouri statutes regulating the performance of abortions. The sections relevant here include
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 (Supp. 1982), requiring that abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy be performed in a hospital; 1 § 188. 04 7, requiring a pathology report for each abortion
performed; 2 § 188.030, requiring the presence of a second
physician during abortions performed after viability; 3 and
§ 188.028, requiring minors to secure parental or judicial
consent. 4
'Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 provides: "Every abortion performed subsequent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be performed in a
hospital."
2
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.047 provides:
"A representative sample of tissue removed at the time of abortion shall
be submitted to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall file a
copy of the tissue report with the state division of health, and who shall
provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the
abortion was performed or induced and the pathologist's report shall be
made a part of the patient's permanent record."
3
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 provides:
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only
when there is in attendance a physician other than the physician performing or adducing the abortion who shall take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion. During the
performance of the abortion, the physician performing it, and subsequent
to the abortion, the physician required by this section to be in attendance,
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice, consistent with the procedure used, to preserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life
or health of the woman."
• Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 provides:
"1. No person shall knowingly perform an abortion upon a pregnant
woman under the age of eighteen years unless:
"(1) The attending physician has secured the informed written consent
of the minor and one parent or guardian; or
"(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician has received
the informed written consent of the minor; or
"(3) The minor has been granted the right to self-consent to the abortion
by court order pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and the attending
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After hearing testimony from a number of expert witnesses, the District Court invalidated all of these sections except the pathology requirement. 483 F. Supp. 679, 69~701
(1980). 5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rephysician has received the informed written consent of the minor; or
"(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order,
and the court has given its informed written consent in accordance with
subsection 2 of this section, and the minor is having the abortion willingly,
in compliance with subsection 3 of this section.
"2. The right of a minor to self-consent to an abortion under subdivision
(3) of subsection 1 of this section or court consent under subdivision (4) of
subsection 1 of this section may be granted by a court pursuant to the
following procedures:
"(1) The minor or next friend shall make an application to the juvenile
court which shall assist the minor or next friend in preparing the petition
and notices required pursuant to this section. The minor or the next
friend of the minor shall thereafter file a petition setting forth the initials of
the minor; the age of the minor; the names and addresses of each parent,
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are deceased and no guardian has been
appointed, any other person standing in loco parentis of the minor; that the
minor has been fully informed of the risks and consequences of the abortion; that the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity
to consent to the abortion; that , if the court does not grant the minor majority rights for the purpose of consent to the abortion, the court should
find that the abortion is in the best interest of the minor and give judicial
consent to the abortion; that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of
the child; and if the minor does not have private counsel, that the court
should appoint counsel. The petition shall be signed by the minor or the
next friend;
"(3) A hearing on the merits of the petition, to be held on the record,
shall be held as soon as possible within five days of the filing of the petition.
. . . At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating to the emotional development , maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor; the
nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; and any
other evidence that the court may find useful in determining whether the
minor should be granted majority rights for the purpose of consenting to
the abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interests of the minor;
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting
[Footnote 5 is on p. 41

(
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versed the District Court's judgment with respect to
§ 188.028, thereby upholding the requirement that a minor
secure parental or judicial consent to an abortion. It also
held that the District Court erred in sustaining§ 188.047, the
pathology requirement. The District Court's judgment with
respect to the second-physician requirement was affirmed,
and the case was remanded for further proceedings and findings relating to the second-trimester hospitalization requirement. 655 F. 2d 848, 872-873 (1981). On remand, the District Court affirmed its holding that the second-trimester
hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional.
The
Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 664 F. 2d 687, 691
(1981). We granted certiorari. U. S. (1982).
The Court today in City of Akron, ante, at 8-12, has stated
fully the principles that govern judicial review of state statutes regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated
here. With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes
at issue.
II
to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give
judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is
denied;
"3. If a minor desires an abortion, then she shall be orally informed of
and, if possible, sign the written consent required by section 188.039 in the
same manner as an adult person. No abortion shall be performed on any
minor against her will, except that an abortion may be performed against
the will of a minor pursuant to a court order described in subdivision (4) of
subsection 1 of this section that the abortion is necessary to preserve the
life of the minor."
5
The District Court also awarded attorney's fees for all hours claimed by
the plaintiffs' attorneys. The Court of Appeals affirmed this allocation of
fees. See 655 F. 2d 848, 872 (CA8 1981). The petition for certiorari
raises the issue whether an award of attorney's fees, made pursuant to 42
U. S. C. § 1988, should be proportioned to reflect the extent to which plaintiffs prevailed.

81-1255 & 81-1623-0PINION
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT

5

In City of Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring
physicians to perform all second-trimester abortions at general or special hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or by the American Osteopathic Association. Ante, at 13. Missouri's hospitalization requirements are similar to those enacted by Akron, as
all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general,
acute-care facilities. 6 For the reasons stated in City of
Akron, we held that such a requirement "unreasonably infringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an
abortion." Ante, at 20-21. For the same reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment that § 188.025 is
unconstitutional.
III
We turn now to the State's second-physician requirement.
6

Missouri does not define the term "hospital" in its statutory provisions
regulating abortions. We therefore must assume, as did the courts below,
see 483 F. Supp., at 686, n. 10; 664 F. 2d, at 689--690, and nn. 3, 5 and 6,
that the term has its common meaning of a general, acute-care facility.
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.015(2) (Supp. 1982) (defining "abortion facility" as
"a clinic, physician's office, or any other place or facility in which abortions
are performed other than a hospital"). Section 197.020.2 (1978), part of
Missouri's hospital licensing laws, reads:
"'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than
twenty-four hours in any week of three or more nonrelated individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, deformity or other abnormal physical
conditions; or a place devoted primarily to provide for not less than twentyfour hours in any week medical ... care for three or more nonrelated individuals .... "
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 197.200(1) (1978) (defining "ambulatory surgical center" to include facilities "with an organized medical staff of physicians" and
"with continuous physician services and registered professional nursing
services whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 Mo. Admin. Code
50-30.010(1)(A) (1977) (same). The regulations for the Department of Social Services establish standards for the construction, physical facilities,
and administration of hospitals. ld., 50-20.010 to 50-20.030 (1977).
These are not unlike those set by JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at 13,
and n. 16.
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In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized
that the State has a compelling interest in the life of a viable
fetus: "[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of
the mother." Id., at 164-165. See Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U. S. 379, 38&-387 (1979); Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438,
445-446 (1977). Several of the Missouri statutes undertake
such regulation. Post-viability abortions are proscribed except when necessary to preserve the life or the health of the
woman. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (Supp. 1982). The
State also forbids the use of abortion procedures fatal to the
viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a greater risk
to the health of the woman. § 188.030.2.
The statutory provision at issue in this case requires the
attendance of a second physician at the abortion of a viable
fetus. § 188.030.3. This section requires that the second
physician "take all reasonable steps in keeping with good
medical practice ... to preserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased
risk to the life or health of the woman." See n. 3, supra. It
also provides that the second physician "shall take control of
and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion."
The lower courts invalidated § 188.030.3. 7 The plaintiffs,
respondents here on this issue, urge affirmance on the
The courts below found that there is no possible justification for a second-physician requirement whenever D&E is used since no viable fetus can
survive a D&E procedure. 483 F . Supp., at 694; 655 F . 2d, at 865. Accordingly, they found the provision overbroad. As the Court of Appeals
noted, however, the choice of D&E after viability is subject to the requirements of§ 188.030.2. See id., at 865, and n. 28. Thus, D&E is not to be
used when the fetus is viable; when other methods are more likely to preserve its life; and when alternative procedures do not pose a greater risk to
the woman's life or health. Cf. id., at 865 (some physicians testified they
7
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grounds that the second-physician requirement distorts the
traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is both impractical and costly. They note that Missouri does not require two
physicians in attendance for any other medical or surgical
procedure, including childbirth or delivery of a premature infant. These are not insubstantial arguments, and we view
the issue as a close one.
The first physician's primary concern will be the life and
health of the woman. Many third-trimester abortions in
Missouri will be emergency operations, 8 as the State only
permits these late abortions when they are necessary to preserve the life or the health of the woman. It is not unreasonable for the State to assume that during the operation the
first physician's attention and skills will be directed to preserving the woman's .eei'\SitiaR, and not to protecting the actual life of those fetuses who survive the abortion procedure.
would not use D&E in third-trimester); American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists (ACOG) Technical Bulletin No. 56, Methods of
Midtrimester Abortion 4 (1979) (mortality rate for D&E less than or similar to that of instillation abortions up to 20 weeks). There is nothing in the
record to indicate that D&E will be the method that poses the least risk to
the woman in every situation in which there are compelling medical reasons for performing an abortion after viability. Cf. 655 F. 2d, at 865 (experts disagree whether D&E should ever be used after viability). We
therefore cannot assume that all third-trimester abortions will be D&E
abortions, or that there will be no live births. Thus, the State's compelling interest in preserving the life of the fetus when there is a live birth
justifies the State in requiring a second physician at every third-trimester
abortion.
8
There is no clearly expressed exception on the face of the statute for
the performance of an abortion of a viable fetus without the second physician in attendance. There may be emergency situations where, for example, the woman's health may be endangered by delay. Section§ 188.030.3
is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase "provided that it does not pose
an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." This clause reasonably could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H .L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 407, n. 14 (1981) (rejecting argument that Utah statute
might apply to individuals with emergency health care needs).
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Viable fetuses will be in immediate and grave danger because
of their premature birth. A second physician, in situations
where Missouri permits third-trimester abortions, may be of
assistance to the woman's physician in preserving the health
and life of the child.
By giving immediate medical attention to a fetus that is delivered alive, the second physician will assure that the State's
interests are protected more fully than the first physician
alone would be able to do. And given the compelling interest that the State has in preserving life, we cannot say that
the Missouri requirement of a second physician in those unusual circumstances where Missouri permits a third-trimester abortion is unconstitutional. Preserving the life of a viable fetus that is aborted may not often be possible/ but the
State legitimately may choose to provide safeguards for the
comparatively few instances of live birth that occur. We believe the second-physician requirement furthers the State's
compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses,
and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding
that § 188.030.3 is unconstitutional.
IV
Section 188.047 requires a pathology report for every abortion performed. Even in the early weeks of pregnancy,
however, "[c]ertain regulations that have no significant impact on the woman's exercise of her right to decide to have an
abortion may be permissible where justified by important
state health objectives." City of Akron, at 11. See
9
See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, supra n. 7, at 4 (as high as 7%
live-birth rate for intrauterine instillation of uterotonic agents); Stroh &
Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Induced Abortion: Two and OneHalf Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol.
83, ~ (1976) (26 live births following saline induced-abortions; 9
following hysterotomy; 1 following oxtyocin-induced abortion) (one survival out of 38 live births).)

',9
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Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S.
52, 80--81 (1976). The question is whether § 188.047 unconstitutionally burdens a woman's abortion decision. We hold
that it does not.
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed, with the exception of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and
prepuces, shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the
premises or by arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo.
Admin. Code 50-20.030(3)(A)7 (1977). Although Missouri
apparently does not require pathology reports in all procedures, this does not mean that such a requirement is invalid
simply because it touches on the woman's abortion right during the first weeks of pregnancy. Rather, the specific issue
here is whether § 188.047, which on its face and in effect is
reasonably related to generally accepted medical standards
and maternal health, '0 "further[s] important health-related
A pathological examination is designed to assist in the detection of
fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or other precancerous
growths, and a variety of other problems that can only be discovered
through a pathological examination. The District Court noted that several
medical experts testified that pathology should be done in every case of
abortion. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 49. Moreover, the ACOG standards
for abortion services state that for all surgical services performed on an
ambulatory outpatient basis: "Tissue removed should be subsmitted to a
pathologist for an examination. . . . In the situation of elective termination of pregnancy, the attending physician should record a description of
the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identified, the products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted
to a pathologist for gross and microscopic examination." ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th ed. 1982) (emphasis added).
The standards of the National Abortion Federation (NAF), whose members include the institutional plaintiffs in this case, itself provides: "All tissue must be examined grossly at the time of the abortion procedure by a
physician or trained assistant and the results recorded in the chart. In
the absence of visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination, obtained tissue may be examined under a low power microscope . . . . If this
10
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State concerns," City of Akron, ante, at 12, without interfering with the woman's decision to have an abortion.
As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examinations are clearly "useful and even necessary in some cases,"
because "abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious,
possibly fatal disorders." 655 F. 2d, at 870. Examining tissue removed during an abortion provides a State with an
opportunity to further its interest in promoting the health of
its citizens. Additionally, questions about the long-range
complications of abortions and their effect on subsequent
pregnancies remain. See App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Willard Cates, Jr.); Levin, et al., Association of Induced Abortion with Subsequent Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M. A. 2495,
2499 (1980). Recorded pathology reports, in concert with
abortion complication reports, provide a statistical basis for
studying those complications.U Cf. Danforth, 428 U. S., at
81.

In light of these factors, we think the small additional cost 12
examination is inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest suitable pathology laboratory for microscopic examination." NAF, National
Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) (emphasis in original) (compliance
with standards obligatory for NAF member facilities to remain in good
standing). See Brief of the American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae in Nos. 81-185, 81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the
NAF standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards"). Cf. Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington,
D. C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance and Evaluation of
First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 10 ("Gross examination
must be performed on all specimens. Microscopic tissue analysis must be
done for all cases when immediate gross evaluation is inadequate or does
not confirm a normal gestation.").
11
Section 188.047 requires that a copy of the report be sent to the State's
division of health.
12
The estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health
Services was $19.40 per abortion performed. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48.
There was testimony in the District Court that the additional cost of
pathology would range from $10.00 to $40.00. See ibid.
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of a tissue examination 13 does not significantly burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision. In Danforth, this Court
unanimously upheld Missouri's recordkeeping requirement as
"useful to the State's interest in protecting the health of its
female citizens, and [as] a resource that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and judgment," 428 U. S.,
at 81. 14 We view the requirement for a pathology report as
comparable and as a relatively insignificant burden. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on
this point.

v
As we noted in City of Akron, the relevant legal standards
with respect to parental consent requirements are not in dispute. See ante, at 21; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622,
640-642, 643-644 (1979) (plurality opinion) (Bellotti II); id.,
at 656--657 (WHITE, J., dissenting). A State's interest in
protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a
consent substitute, either parental or judicial. It is clear,
however, that "the State must provide an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is
sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or
that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her
Plaintiffs also note that § 188.047 does not specify whether the pathologist must make a microscopic examination. State regulations, however,
state: "All reports shall contain the findings of a gross examination. If fetal parts or placenta are not identified, then an accompanying microscopic
tissue report must also be filed with the Division of Health." 13 Mo.
Admin. Code 50-151.030(1) (1981).
14
The Danforth Court also noted that "[t]he added requirements for confidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, and for retention for seven years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and persuade us in our determination of the constitutional limits." 428 U. S.,
at 81. Missouri extends the identical safeguards found reassuring in
Danforth to the pathology reports at issue here. See Mo. Rev. Stat.
§§ 188.055.2, 188.060 (Supp. 1982).
13
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best interests." 15 City of Akron, ante, at 21-22. 16 The issue
here is one purely of statutory construction: whether Missouri provides a judicial alternative that is consistent with
these established legal standards. 17
The Missouri statute, § 188.028.2, 18 in relevant part,
provides:
The plurality in Bellotti II also required that the alternative to parental consent must "assure" that the resolution of this issue "will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective
opportunity for an abortion to be obtained." I d., at 644. Confidentiality
here is assured by the statutory requirement that allows the minor to use
her initials on the petition. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982).
As to expedition of appeals, § 188.028.2(6) provides in relevant part:
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from
the date of issuance of the order. The record on appeal shall be completed
and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice
to appeal. Because time may be of the essence regarding the performance
of the abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide
for expedited appellate review of cases appealed under this section."
We believe this section provides the framework for a constitutionally
sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. Immediately after the
effective date of this statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined enforcement. No unemancipated pregnant minor has been required to comply with this section. Thus, to this point in time, there has been no need
for the state supreme court to promulgate rules concerning appellate review. There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not expedite any
appeal consistent with the mandate in our prior opinions.
16
Cf. H.L . v. Matheson, 450 U.S., at 406-407, and n. 14, 411 (upholding
a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to mature or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such notification detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts found that
§ 188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional. 655 F. 2d, at 873; 483
F . Supp. , at 701. The State has not sought review of that judgment here.
Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this Court for review,
§ 188.028 contains no requirement for parental notification.
17
The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" women under the
age of 18 both from the requirement of parental consent and from the alternative requirement of a judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that the
word "emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but we disagree.
Cf. H.L . v. Matheson, supra, at 407 (using word to describe a minor). Al15

81-1255 & 81-1623-0PINION
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT

13

"(4) In the decree, the court sha)l for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting
forth the grounds for so finding; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on
which the petition is denied[.]"
On its face, § 188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courts 19 to
choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section.
The Court of Appeals concluded that a denial of the petition
permitted in subsection (c) "would initially require the court
to find that the minor was not emancipated and was not mature enough to make her own decision and that an abortion
was not in her best interests." 655 F. 2d, at 858. Plaintiffs
contend that this interpretation is unreasonable. We do not
agree.
though the question whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the facts
and circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts have
adopted general rules to guide that determination, and the term is one of
general usage and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black
v. Cole, 626 S. W. 2d 397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 C. J. S. Parent
and Child § 86, at 811 (1950)); In re the Marriage of Heddy, 535 S. W. 2d
276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S. W. 2d 161, 164
(Mo. App. 1958) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S. W. 2d 745 (Mo.
1959).
18
See n. 4, supra. This Court in Danforth held unconstitutional Missouri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried minors under the age of
18. 428 U. S., at 75. In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the
section challenged here. This new statute became effective shortly before
our decision in Bellotti II.
19
We have indicated in prior opinions that a minor should have access to
an "independent decisionmaker." H.L . v. Matheson, supra, at 420 (PowELL, J., concurring). Missouri has provided for a judicial decisionmaker.
We therefore need not consider whether a qualified and independent nonjudicial decisionmaker would be appropriate. Cf. Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at
643, n. 22.
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Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to
avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. The Court of Appeals
was aware, if the statute provides discretion to deny permission to a minor for any "good cause," that arguably it would
violate the principles that this Court has set forth. Ibid. It
recognized, however, that before exercising any option, the
juvenile court must receive evidence on "the emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor."
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(3) (Supp. 1982). The court then
reached the logical conclusion that "findings and the ultimate
denial of the petition must be supported by a showing of 'good
cause."' 655 F. 2d, at 858. The Court of Appeals reasonably found that a court could not deny a petition "for good
cause" unless it first found-after having received the required evidence-that the minor was not mature enough to
make her own decision. See Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at
643-644, 647-648 (plurality opinion). We conclude that the
Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the statute and that
§ 188.028, as interpreted, avoids any constitutional
infirmities.
VI
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invali2{)

Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ambiguity of§ 188.028.2(4), as
evidenced by the differing interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate
course of judicial restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an
approach appropriate. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 14&-147
(1976) (Bellotti D. Plaintiffs did not, however, argue in the Court of Appeals that the court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification procedure whereby this Court can refer questions of state statutory construction
to the state supreme court. See 655 F. 2d, at 861, n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A.
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4248, at 525, n. 29
(1978 and Supp. 1982). Such a procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analysis in Bellotti I , supra, at 151. Moreover, where, as here, a statute is susceptible to a fair construction that obviates the need to have the state
courts render the saving construction, there is no reason for federal courts
to abstain.
20
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dated Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization requirement and upheld the State's parental consent provision, is affirmed. The judgment invalidating the requirement of a
pathology report for all abortions and the requirement that a
second physician attend the abortion of any viable fetus is
reversed. We vacate the judgment upholding an award of
attorney's fees for all hours expended by plaintiffs' attorneys
and remand for proceedings consistent with Hensley v. Eckerhart, U.S.- (1983).
It is so ordered.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization requirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - ,
and Planned Parenthood Ass'n. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, ante, p. - - . The principal issue here is whether
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitutional.
I
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In
November, 1979 he practiced at his office in Woodbridge,
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room and
facilities for resuscitatioh and emergency treatment of
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant
sought any license for it.
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmarried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimester. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but
never advised her parents of her decision.
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course.
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also advised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began.
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet.
Id., at 200.
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home.
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investiga~
tion. 1
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of
1

Except as pennitted by statute, persons perfonning an abortion are
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-lO(d).
2
The indictment alleges a Violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which
provides:
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person administer to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdiction, - - U. S. - - , and now affirm.
II
Appellant broadly attacks Virginia's hospitalization requirements. 8 He contends that they restrict the availability
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony."
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is perfonned within the first trimester,
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is perfonned in a licensed hospital in the second trimester,
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is necessary to save the woman's life, § 18.2-74.1; and (iv) is
perfonned during the third trimester under certain circumstances,
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and expressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however,
rebut the other defenses.
3
Questions raised particularly with respect to Virginia's outpatient surgical clinics are considered in Part III, infra. Appellant raises two additional issues that do not require extended treatment. He first contends
that Va. Code§ 18.2-71 was applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack
of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, addressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders the indictment unconstitutional
for two reasons: (i) the State failed to meet its burden of alleging necessity
in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62
(1971); and (ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977).
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to the defense of medical
necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity
as a defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Columbia statute in
Vuitch, as construed by this Court, required the prosecution to make this
allegation. See 402 U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden
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of abortions after the first trimester by granting a monopoly
to the few licensed hospitals that will perniit mid-trimester
abortions. He also argues that the Virginia requirements
result in negative health consequences and, as applied to him
and the abortions he performs in his well-equipped non-licensed clinic, do not further the State's interests.
We need not pause long here to consider the guiding principles, for we have set them out at length today in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, at
9-12, 14-16. For present purposes, the critical point is that
we consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' . . . at approximately the end of the first trimester," Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113, 163 (1973), and is compelling throughout the remainder of the pregnancy. This interest, of course, embraces the facilities and circumstances in which abortions are
performed. ld., at 150.
A
It is in furtherance of this compelling interest in maternal
health that Virginia has enacted its hospitalization requirement for abortions performed during the second trimester.
As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated
under Virginia law. 4 Virginia law does not, however, perof going forward with evidence on an affinnative defense is normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 120-121, and n. 20 (1982);
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975).
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to prove that his acts
in fact caused the death of the fetus. In view of the undisputed facts
proved at trial, summarized above, this contention is meritless. See 221
Va., at 1069-1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201.
• A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). Surgery is not defined. Appellant
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a question of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his
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mit a physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to perform an abortion during the second trimester of
pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital
licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1,5 that defines "hospital" to include
"outpatient ... hospitals." 6 Section 20.2.11 of the Departclinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id.,
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hospitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus,
the issue before us is the validity of those requirements, not whether appellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with them. See n.
9, infra (noting State's interpretation of the Virginia regulations).
6
The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in§ 18.2-73
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Virginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health
laws:
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical procedures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospitals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling interest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075,
277 S. E. 2d, at 204.
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in
§ 18.2-73 any differently tban itia itt'serpritee in title 32.1, and specifically
)
in § 32.1-123.1. Seen. 6, infra.
6
Section 32.1-123.1 provides:
(.~ ~ ~~·.,e.,..-;~LL ~~
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ment of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 7 defines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions
.. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of

y

"'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provision of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgical or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospitals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums,
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and maternity hospitals."
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711).
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing
surgery)."
7
The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing minimum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to
~ classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or
~
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and requirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter,
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due regard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene,
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profession and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assistants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to
V
the patients. ''
Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711) (similar
rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12 and
7
32.1-127 (1979))1/ The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval--=-- -1'1
December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January 26, 1977. At
this hearing, Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided, and
staff present from the Department included two doctors and the Director
of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facili~s Services. Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of tlie Virginia Hospital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the State; representatives of the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest Clinic,
abortion clinics; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical School repre-
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surgical procedures on outpatients" 8 and provides that second-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 9
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may
be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic 10 provided that
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State.
senting Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the Tidewater
OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical Center
of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and a representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Commonwealth
of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed Rules
and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (January 26, 1977). The primary topic discussed at the hearing was the effect
the new regulations would have on abortion clinics in the State. The
Board apparently made changes in the regulations before giving its final
approval on May 11, 1977~ The regulations became effective on June 30,
1977. The abortion for which ~titiMlet: was prosecuted was performed on
November 10, 1979, some two years and five months after the effective
date of the regulations. In view of the public hearing on January 26, 1977,
attended as noted above by representatives of various organizations specifically concerned with abortions, it cannot be said-and indeed appellant
does not argue-that he was not fully aware of the regulations and the statutory requirement that his clinic be licensed.
Although of no direct relevance to this case, we note that new but similar
regulations now supersede the regulations in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prosecuted. See Department of
Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia,
pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were promulgated pursuant to Va.
Code §§32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979.
8
Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital ... unless
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va.
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically governing outpatient surgical clinics) . .
9
Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgical clinics that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpretation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3,
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services.
Moreover, the State's counsel at oral argument represented that facilities
[Footnote 10 is on p. 8]
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It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hospitalization requirement is significantly different from those
at issue in City of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft,
ante, at 4--5. In those cases, the regulations required that
"all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, acute-care facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. We found
that such a requirement, by preventing the use of the dilatation and evacuation method (D&E) of performing abortions in
appropriate non-hospital settings, "imposed a heavy, and unnecessary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure."
City of Akron, ante, at 20. The Court invalidated these laws
because they did not reasonably further the state interest in
maternal health.
One of the most important factors in our analysis in City of
Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during the early
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital." Ante, at 19. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Virginia's regulations, outpatient surgical clinics may qualify for
licensed pursuant to Part II legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the regulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure performed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] shall be
performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week amenorrhea).").
10
We herein usually refer to the outpatient "hospitals" in Virginia that
legally may perform second-trimester abortions as "outpatient surgical
clinics."
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licensing as hospitals in which second-trimester abortions
lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in City of
Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here.
B

Second-trimester abortions may give rise to serious complications, 11 and certain procedures significantly increase the
risks. Although the increasingly common use and relative
safety ofthe D&E method, see City of Akron, ante, at 17-19,
may make the need for particular equipment in and designs of
a facility less imperative, the need for reasonable regulations
has not been eliminated. D&E, despite its safety early in
the second trimester, still may cause complications. 12
The American Public Health Association (APHA), although recognizing "that greater use of the dilatation and
evacuation procedure make[s] it possible to perform the vast
majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the
16th [w]eek after the last menstrual period," still "[u]rges endorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in
free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state standards
required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Tri11
See Cadesky, Ravinsky & Lyons, Dilation and Evacuation: A Preferred Method ofMidtrirnester Abortion, 129 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 329,
331 (1981); Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control, Abortion Surveillance: Annual Summary 1978, at 48 (1980).
12
Hemorrhaging is a leading cause of death and complications in D&E
abortion patients. Other potential complications are uterine perforation
and cervical tears, which are significantly increased in comparison to other
second-trimester procedures. See ACOG Technical Bulletion No. 56,
Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 75 (1979).
A major potential complication for all abortion techniques-infectionnormally does not arise until 24 to 72 hours after the procedure has taken
place, by which time the woman usually will have been discharged from
any facility. See Ashcroft, 664 F. 2d 687, 690, n. 6 (CA8 1981), rev'd in
part and aff'd in part, ante, p. - . Thus the relative safety of the D&E
procedure does not alleviate the need for standards designed to prevent
infection.
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mester Abortion 1, 2 (1979) (emphasis added). The medical
profession has not thought the standards need be relaxed
merely because the facility performs abortions: "Ambulatory
care facilities providing abortion services should meet the
same standards of care as those recommended for other surgical procedures performed in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the free-standing and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic
Services 54 (5th ed. 1982) (hereinafter ACOG Standards).
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to requirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facilities are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recommended for hospitals." Ibid.
In view of its interest, the State necessarily has considerable discretion in determining standards for the licensing of
medical facilities, but its discretion does not "permit it to
adopt abortion regulations that depart from sound medical
practice." City of Akron, ante, at 12. "If a State requires
licensing or undertakes to regulate the performance of abortions during [the second trimester], the health standards
adopted must be 'legitimately related to the objective the
State seeks to accomplish.' Doe, 410 U. S., at 195." City of
Akron, ante, at 12. The issue here is whether Virginia's licensing requirements for outpatient surgical clinics performing second-trimester abortions are reasonable means of furthering the State's compelling interest in the woman's health.

c
The Virginia regulations applicable to outpatient surgical
clinics performing second-trimester abortions are, with few
exceptions, the same regulations applicable to all outpatient
surgical clinics in Virginia. These regulations may be

..
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grouped for purposes of discussion into three main categorIes.
The first grouping relates to organization, management,
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 40.3;
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures
manual, 13 § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed
physician who must supervise clinical services and perform
surgical procedures, §42.1, and a registered nurse to be on
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The second category of requirements outlines construction standards
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be approved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also
construction requirements that set forth standards for the
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology services, 14 and general building. 15
The most important group of regulations for our purposes
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the requirements for various services that the facility may offer,
13

The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used,
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4;
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and
infection control, § 41.2.5.
14
These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical clinic if
the services comply with appliaable requirements of the Department of
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities.
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1.
15
The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§50.6.1, 50.7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4.
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such as anesthesia, 16 laboratory, 17 and pathology. 18 Some of
the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on
medical records, § 43.7, pre-operative admission, 19 and postoperative recovery. 20 Finally, the regulations mandate some
emergency services and evacuation planning. 21
See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for anesthesia must be present for administration and recovery).
17
Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.6.1. Outpatient surgical clinics providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing,
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and albumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically indicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4.
18
Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11.
19
Section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of laboratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of
any procedure. !d., § 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical clinic providing
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the
performing physician. I d., § 43.8.4.
Section 43.8.5 provides that the facility performing abortions "shall offer
each patient appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion procedure and in birth control methods." Virginia does not require that the
doctor personally provide this <;ounseling or specify the means by which
this counseling is performed. Under this requirement, unlike in City of
Akron, it is for the woman, in conjunction with her physician, to decide
what considerations are relevant to her decision. See ante, at 27.
00
Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation tech[Footnote 21 is on p. 13]
16
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III
Appellant does not attack these regulations expressly in
his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief. Instead, he challenges Virginia's requirement of hospitalization
for second-trimester abortions without alluding to the fact
that the statutory term "hospital" is defined to include outpatient surgical clinics that may perform second-trimester abortions. As appellant had not sought a license for his clinic at
the time he was indicted, he appears to argue that the Virginia hospitalization requirements are comparable to those
we have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus
also invalid.
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations on various grounds. He argues that even if he had applied for a license, it is uncertain whether it would have been
granted; that Virginia courts have had no opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and regulations"; that Part II of
the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical facility
where secon<k.trimester abortions are performed, but see n. A
9, supra; and' that medical evidence rebuts the view "that it is I
niques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 43.9.1, 43.9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. Id.,
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4. For a discussion of similar standards by various medical
organizations, seen. 30, infra.
21
See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus,
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemorrhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a licensed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides:
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory,
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all
times."

• f
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safer to perform second trimester abortions in hospitals."
Reply Brief for Appellant 1. Only the last of these arguments is relevant to the validity of these statutes and regulations, and appellant points to no evidence that supports his
generalized claim of "safety." We have noted above that the
Virginia requirements are strikingly different from those we
invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft. Compliance with
the State's requirements will entail costs, but this can be said
of most regulations adopted by governments to protect the
health and safety of people. Moreover, ethical physicians
are obligated to provide facilities consistent with the standards set by their profession, and appellant has not identified
any significant differences between professional standards
and the Virginia requirements. We are convinced, at least
on the record before us, that the Virginia provisions are reasonably related to and further the State's compelling interest
in protecting the health of the pregnant woman during the
second trimester.
The requirements of the first 22 and second categories 23 of
regulations discussed in Part II-C above have little relevance
22
AGOG's standards discuss many of Virginia's concerns about proper
management and policies under the appropriate heading of "Quality Assurance." See AGOG Standards 55 ("Each physician's office and outpatient
clinic should assess whether effective and efficient management of health
care has been accomplished."). Like Virginia's "narrative" requirement,
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 50.1.1, 50.2.1, AGOG's standards suggest that the "outpatient clinic evaluation of patient care should assess the
completeness of medical records, the accuracy of diagnoses, appropriateness of use of laboratory and other services, and outcome of care." AGOG
Standards 55--56. See National Abortion Federation (NAF), National
Abortion Federation Standards 11 (1981) (hereinafter NAF Standards) (requiring written descriptions of procedures and policies in each area of
care). Gf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae 29, n. 6. (supporting the
NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards").
AGOG also advises that each ambulatory body should have a "governing
[Footnote 23 is on p. 15]
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to this case. They have not been challenged by appellant beyond his sweeping condemnation of any requirement that second-trimester abortions-even those during the twenty-second week of pregnancy-be performed in hospitals, however
defined and whether outpatient or not. In any event, as appears from the recommendations of ACOG and the American
Public Health Association (APHA) set forth in the margin,
see nn. 22-24, Virginia's requirements, although more detailed with respect to specific facilities, 24 equipment, and perbody'' that has the final authority and responsibility for the appointment of
the medical staff, ACOG Standards 60; cf. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 40.3, and that "[w]ritten policies describing specific responsibilities
of each member of the team are desirable, and should be reviewed and revised periodically," ACOG Standards 60. Cf. NAF Standards 12 (responsibilities of chief administrative officer); Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance
and Evaluation of First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 1 (hereinafter Planned Parenthood Guidelines) (duties of administrator).
·
23
This second category of Virginia regulations is consistent with those
set forth by ACOG. ACOG recommends that even physicians' offices provide at least a patient reception room, consultation room, two examining
rooms, a utility room, and storage. ACOG Standards 5&-58. Cf. Planned
Parenthood Guidelines 1-3 (detailing extensive physical requirements for
first-trimester abortion clinics). ACOG's standards for an ambulatory
surgical facility are more detailed, providing space for reception, waiting,
administrative activities, patient dressing, lockers, preoperative evaluation, physical examination, laboratory testing, preparation of anesthesia,
performance of surgical procedures, preparation and sterilization of instruments, storage of equipment, storage of drugs and fluids, postanesthetic
recovery, staff activities, and janitorial and utility support. See ACOG
Standards 61.
ACOG details the equipment to be found in the various rooms and areas.
ACOG Standards 57-58, 61. Cf. APHA Recommended Program Guide for
Abortion Services, 70 Am. J. Pub. Health 652, 655 (1980) (hereinafter
APHA Guide) (any abortion facility should have "[a]n operating table, or
conventional gynecologic examining table with accessories, located in a
room which is adequately lighted and ventilated and meets all other environmental standards for surgical procedures"); Planned Parenthood Guide[Footnote 24

is

on p. 16]
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sonnel than the ACOG and APHA standards, are compatible
with generally accepted medical standards.
Our concern centers on whether the patient services requirements of the Virginia regulations further t,Pe State's interest in the health and safety of the pregnant woman. We
think they clearly do. Again, we have compared them to the
standards used by ACOG and APHA, and we are impressed
with the scrupulousness with which Virginia has drawn regulations reasonably related to its interest in protecting the
pregnant woman's health. The sanitation 25 and recordkeeplines 2. A doctor's examining room should contain instruments for vaginal
examinations, supplies for obtaining cultures and smears, and equipment
for diagnostic studies and operative procedures. ACOG Standards 57.
Cf. Planned Parenthood Guidelines 2. When local anesthesia is used, the
clinic or doctor's office should have emergency resuscitation equipment, including positive pressure oxygen, intravenous equipment and fluids, suction, and a cardiac monitor. ACOG Standards 57. Ambulatory surgical
centers should, in addition to oxygen, suction, and resuscitation equipment, provide for emergency lighting and intercommunications. I d., at
61. Cf. APHA Guide 655 (requiring oxygen, and equipment for artificial
ventilation and resuscitation); NAF Standards 9 (requiring all facilities
performing second-trimester abortions to have resuscitation bag, oxygen,
and defibrillator if general anesthesia is administered); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 2 (even first-trimester abortion clinics should have parenteral fluids, resuscitation equipment, and oxygen).
24
ACOG provides that both clinics and ambulatory facilities should meet
all state and local building, safety, and fire codes. ACOG Standards 58,
61. Specific plans should be developed to evacuate patients in case of an
emergency. ld., at 59, 62. Cf. NAF Standards 8, 11; Planned Parenthood Guidelines 10.
26
Infection can be a serious complication with any abortion procedure.
See n. 12, supra. Significant portions of the Virginia regulations are designed to assure that outpatient surgical clinics take appropriate steps to
control infection, including sterile processing, appropriate waste-disposal
and laundry practices, isolation of nonpotable water, and protection of the
integrity of the operating suite. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§§41.2.5, 43.2.1, 43.2.2, 43.10.1, 43.11, 43.12.3, 43.12.5, 52.2.5, 52.2.6,
52.2. 7 & 52.2.13. ACOG recommends that all facilities develop procedures
for controlling and disposing of needles, syringes, glass, knife blades, and
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ing standards 26 are typical and not unreasonable in detail.
The laboratory services '1:1 support-and often are essential
to-the direct medical services 28 performed by the physician 29 and nurse. 30 The post-operative recovery standards 31 also comport with accepted medical practice, 32 and the
contaminated waste supplies. ACOG Standards 58, 62. APHA Guide
655; NAF Standards 7 ("Surgical instruments must be sufficient in number
to permit individual sterilization of the instruments used for each procedure .... ").
26
The Virginia recordkeeping requirements are similar to those detailed
by ACOG for a physician's office, ACOG Standards 54-55, 59-60, which require at the initial visit a comprehensive data base including information on
reason for visit, menstrual history, obstetric history, gynecologic history,
sexual history, past medical and surgical history, current medications, allergies, social history, and family history. For ambulatory surgical facilities, ACOG recommends that the patient's record contain sufficient information to justify the preoperative diagnosis and the operative
procedure, and should at least contain patient identification data, history
and physical examination, provisional diagnosis, diagnostic and therapeutic
orders, surgeons' and nurses' notes, laboratory data, operative consent,
operative report, anesthesia report, tissue report, medications record, and
discharge summary and instructions. Id., at 59. See also id., at 60 ("On
the day of surgery a preanesthetic evaluation, including an interval history, medical record review, and a heart and lung examination should be
performed by a physician and the findings should be noted in the record.").
We have found that such requirements, "if not abused or overdone," impose a legally insignificant burden on the Roe right. See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 81 (1976). We do not think
Virginia's requirements are excessive. Cf. APHA Guide 655-656 (recommended reporting requirements); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 13
(recordkeeping and reporting requirements).
27
The risk of hemorrhage is reduced by requiring an outpatient surgical
clinic to make hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations before initiating
instillation. See ACOG Standru;ds 59 ("The laboratory data should include
hemoglobin or hematocrit, urinalysis, and, in certain selected patients,
other studies such as a chest x-ray, electrocardiogram, and electrolytes.").
See also APHA Guide 654 ("Appropriate laboratory procedures must include determination of hematocrit and Rh factor in every case. The value
of other laboratory procedures will depend upon the population served;
[Footnotes 28, 29, and 30 are on p. 18]
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equipment requirements for emergency services are
minimal. 33
We do not suggest that all of the Virginia requirements are
necessary for every second-trimester abortion. But a State
simply cannot adopt regulations that serve every case with
may include sickle cell testing; endocervical and anal culture for gonorrhea;
urinalysis; serologic testing for syphilis; and, when indicated cytologic
screening for cancer."); NAF Standards 7 ("Rh-immune globulin must be
explained and administered to Rh-negative patients."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 8 (requiring lab facilities to be available on premises for
pregnancy tests, urine protein and sugar, hematocrit or hemoglobin determination, and Rh typing).
28
See ACOG Standards 59 ("The appropriate records should be completed and laboratory data recorded prior to surgery.") (emphasis added).
ACOG also recommends that "[t]he physician should strive to identify preexisting or concurrent illness, medications, and adverse drug reactions that
may have a bearing on the operative procedure or anesthesia. All records
should be reviewed before any surgery is peiformed." !d., at 60 (emphasis
added). APHA Guide 654; Planned Parenthood Guidelines 8.
29
For example, the ACOG requires careful laboratory work before anesthesia is administered, and even then, it must be given only by or under
the supervision of a doctor: "Any ambulatory surgical unit that utilizes general, epidural, or spinal anesthesia should do so under the direction of an
anesthesiologist. These anesthetics should be administered by a qualified
anesthesiologist, another qualified physician, or a certified nurse-anesthetist under the supervision of an anesthesiologist. When any form of anesthesia is used, trained personnel and proper equipment for cardiopulmonary resuscitation must be available." ACOG Standards 53. Cf. APHA
Guide 655; Planned Parenthood Guidelines 10.
30
The ACOG Standards do not specifically require nurses for physicians'
offices or for ambulatory surgical facilities, but note: "The efficient operation of an ambulatory surgical facility requires adequate staffing with administrative and professional personnel. The assignment of personnel
should be based on the number of patients, patient profiles, type of procedures, and facility design." ACOG Standards 60. Cf. id., at 56 ("Administrative and professional personnel requirements will vary considerably in
each physician's office and outpatient clinic depending on the patient load,
pattern of practice, and type of facility."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines
7--8 (head laboratory technician); id., at 9 ("It is strongly recommended
[Footnotes 31, 32 and 33 are on p. 19]
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the same degree of relevance; "[a] State necessarily must
have some latitude in adopting regulations of general applicability in this sensitive area." City of Akron, ante, at 15--16.
Although a State's general licensing regulations must be
drawn to further the State's interests in women's health for
all reasonable periods of time within the second-trimester, a
particular requirement "is not unconstitutional simply because it does not correspond perfectly in all cases to the asserted state interest." City of Akron, ante, at 20.
that three staff persons be present in the procedure room: the operating
physician, the physician's assistant and a counselor to assist the patient.").
81
See n. 20, supra.
32
Complications resulting from anesthesia are alleviated by requiring a
physician to be present during the recovery period. See ACOG Standards
53 ("The supervising anesthesiologist, or another physician qualified in cardiopulmonary resuscitation, should be present in the ambulatory surgical
facility until all surgical patients have been discharged. This physician
should oversee the postanesthetic recovery area and should share with the
surgeon responsibility for discharging patients or transferring them to the
back-up hospital."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 11; see also APHA
Guide 655 ("[I]t will be necessary to periodically observe the temperature,
pulse rate, blood pressure, and the amount of bleeding. In addition, the
abdomen should be examined for evidence of intra-abdominal bleeding or
injury."). Less serious complications can be monitored by the registered
nurse on duty. See ACOG Standards 53 ("During the recovery period, the
patient should be under continuous observation by a qualified member of
the health care team. This person should maintain a complete record of
the patient's general condition including vital signs, blood loss, and occurrence of complications."); NAF Standards 6 ("The recovery area must be
supervised by a licensed nurse or physician who is immediately available to
the recovery area."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 11. The required
one-hour recovery period is intended to permit detection of these complications. See APHA Guide 655 (requiring post-operative observations "over
a period of two or more hours, depending upon the type of anesthesia
used"); Kerenyi, Mandelman & Sherman, Five Thousand Consecutive Saline Inductions, 116 Am. J. Obstet. & Gynecol. 593, 597 (1973); ACOG
Standards 53; App. 37 (defense expert witness concedes waiting period
desirable).
88
The arrangements for emergency transfer to an acute-care, general
hospital are clearly reasonable. See APHA Guide 655; ACOG Standards
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We therefore conclude, at least on the record before us in
this case, that Virginia's regulations concerning second-trimester abortions are reasonably related to and further the
State's compelling interest in "protecting the woman's own
health and safety." Roe, 410 U. S., at 150. 34 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a legitimate interest in seeing to
it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for
the patient." Ibid. Unlike Akron in City of Akron or Missouri in Ashcroft, Virginia does not require that the patient
be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be performed in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the
State's requirements-the statutes and the regulations-accommodate accepted medical practice, and leave the method
and timing of the abortion precisely where they belong-between the physician and the patient.
IV
We hold that Virginia's requirement that second-trimester
abortions be performed in properly equipped outpatient clinics is constitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court of
Virginia is
Affirmed.
52 ("There should be a written policy requiring the medical staff to provide
for prompt emergency treatment or hospitalization in the event of an unanticipated complication."); id., at 58, 62; NAF Standards 7; Planned Parenthood Guidelines 10 ("Each facility must have a functioning arrangement for
emergency transport to a local accredited hospital.").
34
Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-trimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as Part
II. In fact, part Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§63.1.1(b), §63.3,
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, ·given these extensive regulations
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more technological support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however,
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements reasonably related to the State's compelling interest.
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CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, APPELLANT v. VIRGINIA
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
[March - , 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization requirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - ,
and Planned Parenthood Ass'n. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, ante, p. - - . The principal issue here is whether
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitutional.
I
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In
November, 1979 he practiced at his office in Woodbridge,
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room and
facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant
sought any license for it.
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmarried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that

'•
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimester. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but
never advised her parents of her decision.
.
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course.
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also advised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began.
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet.
Id., at 200.
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left
the fetus, follow-up iJ!structions, and pain medication in the
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home.
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investiga~
tion. 1
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of
1
Except as pennitted by statute, persons perfonning an abortion are
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-lO(d) ..
2
The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which
provides:
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person administer to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdiction, - - U. S. - - , and now affirm.
II

Appellant broadly attacks Virginia's hospitalization requirements. 3 He contends that they restrict the availability
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony."
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester,
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester,
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is necessary to save the woman's life, § 18.2-74.1; and (iv) is
performed during the third trimester under certain circumstances,
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and expressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any
first-trimester defense under § 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however,
rebut the other defenses.
3
Questions raised particularly with respect to Virginia's outpatient surgical clinics are considered in Part III, infra. Appellant raises two additional issues that do not require extended treatment. He first contends
that Va. Code§ 18.2-71 was applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack
of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, addressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders the indictment unconstitutional
for two reasons: (i) the State failed to meet its burden of alleging necessity
in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62
(1971); and (ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977).
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to the defense of medical
necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity
as a defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Columbia statute in
Vuitch, as construed by this Court, required the prosecution to make this
allegation. See 402 U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden

81-185-0PINION
4

SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA

of abortions after the first trimester by granting a monopoly
to the few licensed hospitals that will permit mid-trimester
abortions. He also argues that the Virginia requirements
result in negative health consequences and, as applied to him
and the abortions he performs in his well-equipped non-li. censed clinic, do not further the State's interests.
We need not pause long here to consider the guiding principles, for we have set them out at length today in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, at
9-12, 14-16. For present purposes, the critical point is that
we consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' . . . at approximately the end of the first trimester," Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113, 163 (1973), and is compelling throughout the remainder of the pregnancy. This interest, of course, embraces the facilities and circumstances in which abortions are
performed. ld., at 150.
A
It is in furtherance of this compelling interest in maternal
health that Virginia has enacted its hospitalization requirement for abortions performed during the second trimester.
As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated
under Virginia law. 4 Virginia law does not, however, perof going forward with evidence on an affinnative defense is normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 120-121, and n. 20 (1982);
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975).
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to prove that his acts
in fact caused the death of the fetus. In view of the undisputed facts
proved at trial, summarized above, this contention is meritless. See 221
Va., at 1069-1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201.
• A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). Surgery is not defined. Appellant
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a question of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his
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mit a physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to perform an abortion during the second trimester of
pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital
licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in
Va. Code §32.1-123.1, 5 that defines "hospital" to include
"outpatient ... hospitals." 6 Section 20.2.11 of the Departclinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id.,
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hospitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus,
the issue before us is the validity of those requirements, not whether appellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with them. See n.
9, infra (noting State's interpretation of the Virginia regulations).
6
The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in § 18.2-73
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Virginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health
laws:
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical procedures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospitals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling interest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075,
277 S. E. 2d, at 204.
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifically in § 32.1-123.1. Seen. 6, infra.
6
Section 32.1-123.1 provides:
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ment of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 7 defines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions
. . . which primarily provide facilities for the performance of
"'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provision of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgical or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospitals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums,
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and maternity hospitals."
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711).
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing
surgery)."
7
The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing minimum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and requirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter,
witll, the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due regard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene,
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profession and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assistants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711)
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12
and 32.1-127 (1979)).
The first draft of the regulations ~"considerably 8iffep~ from the
regulations that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health,
Draft I, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in
Virginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that the
requirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpatient ~in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the trimester. Thus, no distinction was made between first- and second-trimester abortions with respect to the appropriateness of and need for state
regulation.

·~
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surgical procedures on outpatients" 8 and provides that second-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 9
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may
be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic 10 provided that
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State.
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January
26, 1977. At this hearing, Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board,
presided, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and
the Director of the Bureau of Medical' and Nursing Facilities Services.
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the
State; representatives of the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest
Clinic, abortion clinics; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical School
representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the Tidewater OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial
Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and a
representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and
have our support." Id., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, however, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] procedure in the interest of maternal health." I d., at 7. But the clinics specifically "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high
standards for outpatient surgical clinics in the State, agreed that the Board
should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient surgical clinics in order to include outpatient abortion clinics within the same set
of regulations. See id., at 30. Following the hearing, the Board added
Part III, the regulations of which apply only to clinics doing first-trimester
abortions. It therefore is clear that Virginia has recognized the need for
1scre e and different sets of regulations for the two periods. The Board
[Footnotes 8 and 9 are on p. 8]
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It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hospitalization requirement is significantly different from those
at issue in City of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft,
ante, at 4-5. In those cases, the regulations required that
"all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, acute-care facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. We found
that such a requirement, by preventing the use of the dilatation and evacuation method (D&E) of performing abortions in
appropriate non-hospital settings, "imposed a heavy, and unnecessary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure."
City of Akron, ante, at 20. The Court invalidated these laws
because they did not reasonably further the state interest in
maternal health.
gave its final approval to the regulations before us on May 11, 1977.
The regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979,
some two years and five months after the effective date of the regulations.
In view of the public hearing on January 26, 1977, attended as noted above
by representatives of various organizations specifically concerned with
abortions, it cannot be said-and indeed appellant does not argue-that he
was not fully aware of the regulations and the statutory requirement that
his clinic be licensed.
Although of no direct relevance to this case, we note that new but similar
regulations now supersede the regulations in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prosecuted. See Department of
Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia,
pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were promulgated pursuant to Va.
Code §§ 32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979.
8
Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in t~is Commonwealth any hospital ... unless
such hospital ... is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va.
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically governing outpatient surgical clinics).
9
Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgical clinics that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpretation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3,
[Footnote 10

is on p. 9]

·~

81-1~PINION

SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA

9

One of the most important factors in our analysis in City of
Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during the early
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital." Ante, at 19. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Virginia's regulations, outpatient surgical clinics may qualify for
licensing as hospitals in which second-trimester abortions
lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in City of
Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here.
B
Second-trimester abortions may give rise to serious complications, 11 and certain procedures significantly increase the
risks. Although the increasingly common use and relative
safety of the D&E method, see City of Akron, ante, at 17-19,
may make the need for particular equipment in and designs of
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and
by the history of Part III, seen. 7, infra. Moreover, the State's counsel
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the regulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure performed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] shall be
performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week amenorrhea).").
10
We herein usually refer to the outpatient "hospitals" in Virginia that
legally may perform second-trimester abortions as "outpatient surgical
clinics."
11
See Cadesky, Ravinsky &' Lyons, Dilation and Evacuation: A Preferred Method ofMidtrimester Abortion, 129 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 329,
331 (1981); Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control, Abortion Surveillance: Annual Summary 1978, at 48 (1980).

·.:...
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a facility less imperative, the need for reasonable re lations
has not been eliminated. D&E, despite its safety arly in
the second trimester, still may cause complic1tions. 1
The American Public Health Association (APHA), although recognizing "that greater use of the dilatation and
evacuation procedure make[s] it possible to perform the vast
majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the
16th [w]eek after the last menstrual period," still "[u]rges endorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in
free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state standards
required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2 (1979) (emphasis added). The medical
profession has not thought the standards need be relaxed
merely because the facility performs abortions: "Ambulatory
care facilities providing abortion services should meet the
same standards of care as those recommended for other surgical procedures performed in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the free-standing and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic
Services 54 (5th ed. 1982) (hereinafter ACOG Standards).
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to requirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the
Hemorrhaging is a leading cause of death and complications in D&E
abortion patients. Other potential complications are uterine perforation
and cervical tears, which are significantly increased in comparison to other
second-trimester procedures. See ACOG Technical Bulletion No. 56,
Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 75 (1979).
A major potential complication for all abortion techniques-infectionnormally does not arise until 24 to 72 hours after the procedure has taken
place, by which time the woman usually will have been discharged from
any facility. See Ashcroft, 664 F. 2d 687, 690, n. 6 (CA8 1981), rev'd in
part and aff'd in part, ante, p. - .· Thus the relative safety of the D&E
procedure does not alleviate the need for standards designed to prevent
infection.
12

.....
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medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facilities are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recommended for hospitals." Ibid.
In view of its interest, the State necessarily has considerable discretion in determining standards for the licensing of
medical facilities, but its discretion does not "permit it to
adopt abortion regulations that depart from sound medical
practice." City of Akron, ante, at 12. "If a State requires
licensing or undertakes to regulate the performance of abortions during [the second trimester], the health standards
adopted must be 'legitimately related to the objective the
State seeks to accomplish.' Doe, 410 U. S., at 195." City of
Akron, ante, at 12. The issue here is whether Virginia's licensing requirements for outpatient surgical clinics performing second-trimester abortions are reasonable means of furthering the State's compelling interest in the woman's health.

c
The Virginia regulations applicable to outpatient surgical
clinics performing second-trimester abortions are, with few
exceptions, the same regulations applicable to all outpatient
surgical clinics in Virginia. These regulations may be
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main categories.
The first grouping relates to organization, management,
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §40.3;
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures
manual, 13 § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed
13
The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that
may.be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used,
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4;
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and

.'
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physician who must supervise clinical services and perform
surgical procedures, §42.1, and a registered nurse to be on
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The second category of requirements outlines construction standards
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be approved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also
construction requirements that set forth standards for the
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology services, 14 and general building. 15
The most important group of regulations for our purposes
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the requirements for various services that the facility may offer,
such as anesthesia, 16 laboratory, 17 and pathology. 18 Some of
infection control, § 41.2.5.
14
These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical clinic if
the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities.
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1.
" The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 50.6.1, 50. 7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4.
16
See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for anesthesia must be present for administration and recovery).
17
Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§ 43.6.1. Outpatient surgical clinics providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing,
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and albumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically indicated, serologic testing for SY.Philis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4.
18
Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological
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the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 19 and postoperative recovery. 20 Finally, the regulations mandate some
emergency services and evacuation planning. 21
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the
attending physician does not confinn presence of fetal parts"). See
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11.
19
Section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of laboratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of
any procedure. !d., § 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical clinic providing
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the
performing physician. !d., §43.8.4.
Section 43.8.5 provides that the facility performing abortions "shall offer
each patient appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion procedure and in birth control methods." Virginia does not require that the
doctor personally provide this counseling or specify the means by which
this counseling is performed. Under this requirement, unlike in City of
Akron, it is for the woman, in conjunction with her physician, to decide
what considerations are relevant to her decision. See ante, at 27.
20
Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation techniques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 43.9.1, 43.9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d.,
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4. For a discussion of similar standards by various medical
organizations, see n. 30, infra.
21
See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus,
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemorrhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a licensed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides:
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory,
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all
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III
Appellant does not attack these regulations expressly in
his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief. Instead, he challenges Virginia's requirement of hospitalization
for second-trimester abortions without alluding to the fact
that the statutory term "hospital" is defined to include outpatient surgical clinics that may perform second-trimester abortions. As appellant had not sought a license for his clinic at
the time he was indicted, he appears to argue that the Virginia hospitalization requirements are comparable to those
we have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus
also invalid.
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulaIOns
·
grounds. He argues that even if he had applied or a license, it is uncertain whether it would have been
granted; that Virginia courts have had no opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and regulations"; that Part II of
the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical facility
where second-trimester abortions are performed, but see n.
9, supra; and that medical evidence rebuts the view "that it is
safer to perform second trimester abortions in hospitals."
Reply Brief for Appellant 1. Only the last of these arguments is relevant to the validity of these statutes and regulations, and appellant points to no evidence that supports his
generalized claim of "safety." We have noted above that the
Virginia requirements are strikingly different from those we
invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft. Compliance with
the State's requirements will entail costs, but this can be said
of most regulations adopted by governments to protect the
health and safety of people. Moreover, ethical physicians
are obligated to provide facilities consistent with the standards set by their profession, and appellant has not identified
any significant differences between professional standards
times."

I
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and the Virginia requirements. We are convinced, at least
on the record before us, that the Virginia provisions are reasonably related to and further the State's compelling interest
in protecting the health of the pregnant woman during the
second trimester.
The requirements of the first 22 and second categories 23 of
regulations discussed in Part II-C above have little relevance
22

ACOG's standards discuss many of Virginia's concerns about proper
management and policies under the appropriate heading of "Quality Assurance." See ACOG Standards 55 ("Each physician's office and outpatient
clinic should assess whether effective and efficient management of health
care has been accomplished."). Like Virginia's "narrative" requirement,
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§§ 50.1.1, 50.2.1, ACOG's standards suggest that the "outpatient clinic evaluation of patient care should assess the
completeness of medical records, the accuracy of diagnoses, appropriateness of use of laboratory and other services, and outcome of care." ACOG
Standards 55-56. See National Abortion Federation (NAF), National
Abortion Federation Standards 11 (1981) (hereinafter NAF Standards) (requiring written descriptions of procedures and policies in each area of
care). Cf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae 29, n. 6. (supporting the
NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards").
ACOG also advises that each ambulatory body should have a "governing
body" that has the final authority and responsibility for the appointment of
the medical staff, ACOG Standards 60; cf. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §40.3, and that "[w]ritten policies describing specific responsibilities
of each member of the team are desirable, and should be reviewed and revised periodically," ACOG Standards 60. Cf. NAF Standards 12 (responsibilities of chief administrative officer); Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance
and Evaluation of First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 1 (hereinafter Planned Parenthood Guidelines) (duties of administrator).
23
This second category of Virginia regulations is consistent with those
set forth by ACOG. ACOG recommends that even physicians' offices provide at least a patient reception room, consultation room, two examining
rooms, a utility room, and storage. ACOG Standards 56-58. Cf. Planned
Parenthood Guidelines 1-3 (detailing extensive physical requirements for
first-trimester abortion clinics). ACOG's standards for an ambulatory
surgical facility are more detailed, providing space for reception, waiting,
administrative activities, patient dressing, lockers, preoperative evalua-

...
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to this case. They have not been challenged by appellant beyond his sweeping condemnation of any requirement that second-trimester abortions-even those during the twenty-second week of pregnancy-be performed in hospitals, however
defined and whether outpatient or not. In any event, as appears from the recommendations of ACOG and the American
Public Health Association (APHA) set forth in the margin,
see nn. 22-24, Virginia's requirements, although more detailed with respect to specific facilities, 24 equipment, and pertion, physical examination, laboratory testing, preparation of anesthesia,
perfonnance of surgical procedures, preparation and sterilization of instruments, storage of equipment, storage of drugs and fluids, postanesthetic
recovery, staff activities, and janitorial and utility support. See ACOG
Standards 61.
ACOG details the equipment to be found in the various rooms and areas.
ACOG Standards 57-58, 61. Cf. APHA Recommended Program Guide for
Abortion Services, 70 Am. J. Pub. Health 652, 655 (1980) (hereinafter
APHA Guide) (any abortion facility should have "[a]n operating table, or
conventional gynecologic examining table with accessories, located in a
room which is adequately lighted and ventilated and meets all other environmental standards for surgical procedures"); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 2. A doctor's examining room should contain instruments for vaginal
examinations, supplies for obtaining cultures and smears, and equipment
for diagnostic studies and operative procedures. ACOG Standards 57.
Cf. Planned Parenthood Guidelines 2. When local anesthesia is used, the
clinic or doctor's office should have emergency resuscitation equipment, including positive pressure oxygen, intravenous equipment and fluids, suction, and a cardiac monitor. ACOG Standards 57. Ambulatory surgical
centers should, in addition to oxygen, suction, and resuscitation equipment, provide for emergency lighting and intercommunications. I d., at
61. Cf. APHA Guide 655 (requiring oxygen, and equipment for artificial
ventilation and resuscitation); NAF Standards 9 (requiring all facilities
performing second-trimester abortions to have resuscitation bag, oxygen,
and defibrillator if general anesthesia is administered); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 2 (even first-trimester abortion clinics should have parenteral fluids, resuscitation equipment, and oxygen).
24
ACOG provides that both clinics and ambulatory facilities should meet
all state and local building, safety, and fire codes. ACOG Standards 58,
61. Specific plans should be developed to evacuate patients in case of an
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sonnel than the ACOG and APHA standards,
with generally accepted medical standards.
Our concern centers on whether the patient services requirements of the Virginia regulations further the State's interest in the health and safety of the pregnant woman. We
think they clearly do. Again, we have compared them to the
standards used by ACOG and APHA, and we are impressed
with the scrupulousness with which Virginia has drawn regulations reasonably related to its interest in protecting the
pregnant woman's health. The sanitation 25 and recordkeeping standards 26 are typical and not unreasonable in detail.
emergency. /d., at 59, 62. Cf. NAF Standards 8, 11; Planned Parenthood Guidelines 10.
25
Infection can be a serious complication with any abortion procedure.
See n. 12, supra. Significant portions of the Virginia regulations are designed to assure that outpatient surgical clinics take appropriate steps to
control infection, including sterile processing, appropriate waste-disposal
and laundry practices, isolation of nonpotable water, and protection of the
integrity of the operating suite. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§§ 41.2.5, 43.2.1, 43.2.2, 43.10.1, 43.11, 43.12.3, 43.12.5, 52.2.5, 52.2.6,
52.2. 7 & 52.2.13. ACOG recommends that all facilities develop procedures
for controlling and disposing of needles, syringes, glass, knife blades, and
contaminated waste supplies. ACOG Standards 58, 62. APHA Guide
655; NAF Standards 7 ("Surgical instruments must be sufficient in number
to permit individual sterilization of the instruments used for each procedure .... ").
26
The Virginia recordkeeping requirements are similar to those detailed
by ACOG for a physician's office, ACOG Standards 54-55, 59--60, which require at the initial visit a comprehensive data base including information on
reason for visit, menstrual history, obstetric history, gynecologic history,
sexual history, past medical and surgical history, current medications, allergies, social history, and family history. For ambulatory surgical facilities, ACOG recommends that the patient's record contain sufficient information to justify the preoperative diagnosis and the operative
procedure, and should at least contain patient identification data, history
and physical examination, provisional diagnosis, diagnostic and therapeutic
orders, surgeons' and nurses' notes, laboratory data, operative consent,
operative report, anesthesia report, tissue report, medications record, and
discharge summary and instructions. Id., at 59. See also id., at 60 ("On
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The laboratory services '1:1 support-and often are essential
to--the direct medical services 28 performed by the physician 29 and nurse. 30 The post-operative recovery standards 31 also comport with accepted medical practice, 32 and the
the day of surgery a preanesthetic evaluation, including an interval history, medical record review, and a heart and lung examination should be
performed by a physician and the findings should be noted in the record.").
We have found that such requirements, "if not abused or overdone," impose a legally insignificant burden on the Roe right. See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 81 (1976). We do not think
Virginia's requirements are excessive. Cf. APHA Guide 655--656 (recommended reporting requirements); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 13
(recordkeeping and reporting requirements).
'n The risk of hemorrhage is reduced by requiring an outpatient surgical
clinic to make hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations before initiating
instillation. See ACOG Standards 59 ("The laboratory data should include
hemoglobin or hematocrit, urinalysis, and, in certain selected patients,
other studies such as a chest x-ray, electrocardiogram, and electrolytes.").
See also APHA Guide 654 ("Appropriate laboratory procedures must include determination of hematocrit and Rh factor in every case. The value
of other laboratory procedures will depend upon the population served;
may include sickle cell testing; endocervical and anal culture for gonorrhea;
urinalysis; serologic testing for syphilis; and, when indicated cytologic
screening for cancer."); NAF Standards 7 ("Rh-immune globulin must be
explained and administered to Rh-negative patients."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 8 (requiring lab facilities to be available on premises for
pregnancy tests, urine protein and sugar, hematocrit or hemoglobin determination, and Rh typing).
28
See ACOG Standards 59 ("The appropriate records should be completed and laboratory data recorded prior to surgery.") (emphasis added).
ACOG also recommends that "[t]he physician should strive to identify preexisting or concurrent illness, medications, and adverse drug reactions that
may have a bearing on the operative procedure or anesthesia. All records
should be reviewed before any surgery is performed." !d., at 60 (emphasis
added). APHA Guide 654; Planned Parenthood Guidelines 8.
29
For example, the ACOG requires careful laboratory work before anesthesia is administered, and even then, it must be given only by or under
the supervision of a doctor: "Any ambulatory surgical unit that utilizes general, epidural, or spinal anesthesia should do so under the direction of an
anesthesiologist. These anesthetics should be administered by a qualified
[Footnotes 30, 31, and 32 are on p. 19]
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equipment requirements for emergency services are
minimal. 33
We do not suggest that all of the Virginia requirements are
necessary for every second-trimester abortion. But a State
simply cannot adopt regulations that serve every case with
anesthesiologist, another qualified physician, or a certified nurse-anesthetist under the supervision of an anesthesiologist. When any form of anesthesia is used, trained personnel and proper equipment for cardiopulmonary resuscitation must be available." ACOG Standards 53. Cf. APHA
Guide 655; Planned Parenthood Guidelines 10.
30
The ACOG Standards do not specifically require nurses for physicians'
offices or for ambulatory surgical facilities, but note: "The efficient operation of an ambulatory surgical facility requires adequate staffing with administrative and professional personnel. The assignment of personnel
should be based on the number of patients, patient profiles, type of procedures, and facility design." ACOG Standards 60. Cf. id., at 56 ("Administrative and professional personnel requirements will vary considerably in
each physician's office and outpatient clinic depending on the patient load,
pattern of practice, and type of facility."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines
7-8 (head laboratory technician); id., at 9 ("It is strongly recommended
that three staff persons be present in the procedure room: the operating
physician, the physician's assistant and a counselor to assist the patient.").
31
See n. 20, supra.
32
Complications resulting from anesthesia are alleviated by requiring a
physician to be present during the recovery period. See ACOG Standards
53 ("The supervising anesthesiologist, or another physician qualified in cardiopulmonary resuscitation, should be present in the ambulatory surgical
facility until all surgical patients have been discharged. This physician
should oversee the postanesthetic recovery area and should share with the
surgeon responsibility for discharging patients or transferring them to the
back-up hospital."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 11; see also APHA
Guide 655 ("[I]t will be necessary to periodically observe the temperature,
pulse rate, blood pressure, and the amount of bleeding. In addition, the
abdomen should be examined for evidence of intra-abdominal bleeding or
injury."). Less serious compli,cations can be monitored by the registered
nurse on duty. See ACOG Standards 53 ("During the recovery period, the
patient should be under continuous observation by a qualified member of
the health care team. This person should maintain a complete record of
the patient's general condition including vital signs, blood loss, and occurrence of complications."); NAF Standards 6 ("The recovery area must be
[Footnote 33

is on p. 20]
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the same degree of relevance; "[a] State necessarily must
have some latitude in adopting regulations of general applicability in this sensitive area." City of Akron, ante, at 15-16.
Although a State's general licensing regulations must be
drawn to further the State's interests in women's health for
all reasonable periods of time within the second-trimester, a
particular requirement "is not unconstitutional simply because it does not correspond perfectly in all cases to the asserted state interest." City of Akron, ante, at 20.
We therefore conclude, at least on the record before us in
this case, that Virginia's regulations concerning second-trimester abortions are reasonably related to and further the
State's compelling interest in "protecting the woman's own
health and safety." Roe, 410 U. S., at 150. 34 As we emphasupervised by a licensed nurse or physician who is immediately available to
the recovery area."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 11. The required
one-hour recovery period is intended to permit detection of these complications. See APHA Guide 655 (requiring post-operative observations "over
a period of two or more hours, depending upon the type of anesthesia
used"); Kerenyi, Mandelman & Sherman, Five Thousand Consecutive Saline Inductions, 116 Am. J. Obstet. & Gynecol. 593, 597 (1973); ACOG
Standards 53; App. 37 (defense expert witness concedes waiting period
desirable).
83
The arrangements for emergency transfer to an acute-care, general
hospital are clearly reasonable. See APHA Guide 655; ACOG Standards
52 ("There should be a written policy requiring the medical staff to provide
for prompt emergency treatment or hospitalization in the event of an unanticipated complication."); id., at 58, 62; NAF Standards 7; Planned Parenthood Guidelines 10 ("Each facility must have a functioni!}g arrangement for
emergency transport to a local accredited hospital.").
S4 Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-trimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as Part
II. In fact, part Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 63.1.1(b), § 63.3,
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more technological support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however,
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements reasonably related to the State's compelling interest.

I
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sized in Roe, "[t]he State has a legitimate interest in seeing to
it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for
the patient." Ibid. Unlike Akron in City of Akron or Missouri in Ashcroft, Virginia does not require that the patient
be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be performed in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the
State's requirements-the statutes and the regulations-accommodate accepted medical practice, and leave the method
and timing of the abortion precisely where they belong-between the physician and the patient.
IV
We hold that Virginia's requirement that second-trimester
abortions be performed in properly equipped outpatient clinics is constitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court of
Virginia is
Affirmed.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
[April - , 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization requirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - ,
and Planned Parenthood As5. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, ante, p. - - . The principal issue here is whether
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitutional.
I
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In
.November, 19791.\he practiced at his office in Woodbridge,
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room
and facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs firsttrimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant
sought any license for it.
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmarried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that

~
1
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimester. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but
never advised her parents of her decision.
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course.
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also advised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began.
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet.
Id., at 200.
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home.
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investigation.1
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of
'Except as pennitted by statute, persons perfonning an abortion are
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d).
2
The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which
provides:
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person administer to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony."
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the convicti~ Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probaofe jurisdiction,-- U.S.--, and now affirm.
II
Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, addressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders~e~ict9
0 ment unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977).
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Columbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, reThe Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester,
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester,
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain circumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life,
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and expressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however,
rebut the other defenses.
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quired the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of going forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107,
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684,
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975).
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 1069-1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201.

III
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' . . . at approximately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410
~u. ~o£' ~
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). This interest embraces the facilities
_ , ~ \o ~
and circumstances in which abortions are performed. See
id., at 150. Appellant argues, however, that Virginia\;. stat g.
)- utory hospitalisation requiFeffieHt- prohibits all non-hospital
second-trimester abortions and that such a requirement imposes an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In
City of Akron and Ashcroft, we t.eea~' have found this ar~
f""'""~
made ia constitutional challen etTa"
the acute-car ge~lleli hospital reqmrements at issue there.
)- The State of Virgmia argues here that its hospitalization rel d..~.{fus) quirementQO§\significantly diff8ri~from the hospitalization
"
requirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests.

,

_ ):AI""'
·y

''§iii)

A

In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under

..,.IJ.l ~...0.. ...,)
~
·
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Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to
perform an abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in
Va. Code §32.1-123.1, 4 ~-defines "hospital" to include

~

A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). ~Surgeti:is not defined. Appellant
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a question of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id.,
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hospitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus,
the issue before us is the validity of those requirements, not whether appellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with them. -see-e..
.a. 8, i1t1~ 01 (aatiRg State's interpretatiGR af U1:e Vh ginia t egula1:iefls).
e._
'The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in § 18.2-73
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Virginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health
laws:
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for
.different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical procedures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospitals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling interest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075,
3

..

I

...

.
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"outpatient .
hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 defines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "(i]nstitutions
277 S. E. 2d, at 204.
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifically in § 32.1-123.1. Seen. 5, infra.
5
Section 32.1-123.1 provides:
" 'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provision of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgical or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospitals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums,
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and
maternity hospitals."
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711).
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing
surgery)."
6
The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing minimum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and requirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter,
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due regard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene,
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profession and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assistants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711)
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code§§ 32.1-12
and 32.1-127 (1979)).
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regulations that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I,
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that therequirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-

1
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. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that second-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may
tient facilities in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the

:~~~~t:h·afi!!:~~=!:: ;::::;:a::!Z!~;:::~::~;!~
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The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January
26, 1977. Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at this
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services.
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the
-tux:, ~\-~~ t...\;,.,~t." State; representatives of he Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest
L~~~~~~===~!!·~;:a~Ft*~ii*i~\;:_3a~
~professor from Eastern Virginia Medical School
representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the Tidewater OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial
Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and a
representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and
have our support." !d., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, however, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] procedure in the interest of maternal health." I d., at 7. But the clinics specifically "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the
Board should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient
surgical hospitals in order to include these out atient abortion clinics
within the same set of regulations. See id., at 30. Following t e earmg,
the Board added Part III, the regulations of which apply only to clinics do[Footnotes 7 and 8 are on p. 8]

'l'
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be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic provided that
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State.
The Virginia regulations applicable to the performance of
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to
ing first-trimester abortions.

See nn. 8, 23, infra.

It therefore is clear
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egulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for
'----"w..,_...Ic....-appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979,
_.---t---11~-some two years and five months later. lfl view ef tl:!.e pYalie hell:f'iflg alP J
.Jaflttttey 2e, 1~77, atte~dQc,l aii IJ.oted aBQ'W hJ' representati"Qii of variawo
--ePgttnillstioHB Sfleeifiettlly eafleemefi with abortion!!, it ettflflat B9 illiid and:>
iiJ.deQd appella~t dees flat ttPgtte tJotst he ~a!! not ftdl) ft n ftPe afthe reg:altt'<.
~iOil.ii aiJ.d the catatntory re'!lol.ire~Heflt t!otat his clinic be lieeFtseP
We note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations
in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prosecuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were
' Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital ... unless
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va.
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically governing outpatient surgical clinics).
8
Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgical hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpretation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3,
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and
by the history of Part III, see n. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the regulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., §62.1.2 ("Any procedure performed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic]
shall be performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week
amenorrhea).").

1
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all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be
grouped for purposes of discussion into three · main
categories.
The first grouping relates to organization, management,
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 40.3;
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures
manuaV § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed
physician who must supervise clinical services and perform
surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to be on
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The second category of requirements outlines construction standards
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be approved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also
construction requirements that set forth standards for the
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology serv<::\.
. ices, 10 and general building. 11 cl~ f~
,.-,~~-m~7-H
· ~QI:l&af:!iigroup o regulations -ieF QUr pnrpoiH~.iY
1 relates to patient care services. Most of these set the requirements for various services that the facility may offer,
9
The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used,
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4;
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and
infection control, § 41.2.5.
10
These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical hospital
if the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities.
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1.
11
The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 50.6.1, 50. 7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4.
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such as anesthesia, 12 laboratory, 13 and pathology. 14 Some of
the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 15 and postoperative recovery. 16 Finally, the regulations mandate some
emergency services and evacuation planning. 17
12
See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for anesthesia must be present for administration and recovery).
13
Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§ 43.6.1. Outpatient surgical hospitals providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy
testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing,
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and albumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically indicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4.
14
Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11.
15
Section 43. 8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of laboratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of
any procedure. I d., § 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical hospital providing
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the
performing physician, i d., § 43.8.4, andY
C::: the facility "shall offer each patient appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion procedure and in birth control methods,~d. , § 43.85."
16
Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation techniques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§43.9.1 , 43.9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d.,
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4.
17
See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation
plan); i d. , §43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus,
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemor-

1\
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tis readily apparent t a Irg:tma's second-trimester hospitalization requirement ~significantly "tiiffepe~ from those
at issue in City of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft,
ante at 4-5. In those cases ~he regulationst required that lct~t ·
\.owwel'\ )
"all second-trimester abortions must be performed in gen~'
'
eral acute-care facilities." A
ante at 5.

'

tieR aHa O¥aeyatioH IlUiltHOQ (D&E) ofperformiRg abortiORS iR .IZ..
app~;:op~;:iate HOB fios~ital settiHgs, "imposea a :Heavy, aHa YR .s:z
Heeessary, bYPtkR oR womeH's aeeess to a l'elatively iHexp9R o
...sive, ot:Rervlise aeeessible, aRd :~afe abortioR p~;:oeeauPe .'l<
-Gity efAk' tm, d1tttl, a:t 20. Tee Co1:1rt iRvaliaatea tfie!5e la:ws ~
b'i!Gause they did not reasonably further the state iRterest iH e
matemal :Realt:kc.

rhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a licensed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides:
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory,
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all
times."

•'
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The remainin question is the constitutionality of Virgin- ,
· 's re lations. V trhe American Public Health Association CII'YIIM-Iat'(APHA), although recognizing "that greater use oft e ilatation and evacuation procedure make[s] it possible to perform
the vast majority of second trimester abortions during or
prior to the 16th [w]eek after the last menstrual period," still
"[u]rges endorsement of the provision of second trimester
abortion in free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state
standards required for certification." APHA, The Right to
Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2 (1979~~ffiJ3H~~i~ aelelee+Jl.
The medical profession has not thought ~standards need L"'-cd:,. ~ '=r.J
be relaxed merely because the facility performs abortions:
"
"Ambulatory care facilities providing abortion services
should meet the same standards of care as those recommended for other surgical procedures performed in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the free-standing and
hospital-based ambulatory setting." American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 1982). See also id.,
at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical
facilities should be licensed to conform to requirements of
state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facilities are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recommended for
hos itals." Ibid.
·- 'P~ .\b ~
In view of its mteres , the State necessarily has consider~ .~: \
lN\oC)
able discretion in determining standards for the licensin of
medical facilitie~ ~its discretion does not· ermit it to
adopt abortion regulations that depart from ~,..medical ( ~-!)

I

~:=~~i~i:r:!fel::~:~r=a=:t~7J:!::C:r::f ~ ·~~:_ 'u\·~~tiofts eltuing [the second trimester], the he~ltfi st~nel~td ~
aEleflteel an1st be 'le~tiffiately Felated to t:Re ebj eetive t:Re o

~~ ~'~ ~

~r~

~~~
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.gtate seeks to aeeomplish.' DfJe, 410 U. 8., at 1Q5," City o.fc;:>
A~rfJn, ante, at 1~
n their face, the Virginia regu atwns
appear to be generally compatible with accepted medical
standards
· out atient second-trimester abortions. 18

.....,_..,---r-r~..--....,--L ~ ~ ~J

I

18

See American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Standards
for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52-54 (5th ed. 1982); APHA Recommended Program Guide for Abortion Services, 70 Am. J. Pub. Health 652,
655 (1980). See also National Abortion Federation, National Abortion
Federation Standards (1981). Cf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae
29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities
as consitituting "minimum standards").
19
See nn. 3, 6, supra; Record Vol. 5, pp. 55-56 (appellant acknowledging
existence of the outpatient hospital_,(egYleth~~; stating that he was seeking a license; but denying that he knew of the :~=egYlatieRs when the abor"'
tion was performed).
20
Appellant has presented no evidence challenging the validity of the
regulations as distinguished from his attack on the hospitalization requirement in§ 18.2-73. Indeed, appellant does not attack these regulations expressly in his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief, instead argu~ompara e to t ose
ing that the Virginia hospitalization requirement
we have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus also invalid.
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations, but not individually or on specific grounds, instead making only facial challenges in the
broadest language and in conclusory terms: ~he record is silent on the
applicability of those regulations to his facility; that the record does not
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Pegulatic;n:~s do uot further the gtate's egmpellillg interest ~
the health aad safety of the pregnant vv omas..
We therefore conclude, on the record before us in this case,
that appellant has not shown the Virginia :regalatieH~ concerning second-trimester abortions to be an unreasonable
means of furthering the State's compelling interest in "protecting the woman's own health and safety." Roe, 410
U. S., at 150. 21 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a
legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other
medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. Unlike -AlrPo~
show whether any outpatient surgical hospitals exist in Virginia or
whether, if they exist, they allow second-trimester abortions; that the
record is silent on the reasonableness of the regulations; that he had no
opportunity to defend against the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain
whether, if he had applied for an outpatient hospital license, it would have
been granted; that obtaining a license is an arduous process; that Virginia
courts have had no opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and
regulations"; and that Part II of the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical hospital where second-trimester abortions are· performed.
Some of these arguments are simply meritless, see n. 8, supra, and others
are irrelevant, see n. 3, supra. And certainly appellant cannot argue that
the State has no right to require appellant to meet reasonable facility and
equipment standards merely because they impose some costs and burdens.
As City of Akron makes clear, see ante, at 12, in view of the State's compelling interest in the pregnant woman's health, it may adopt reasonable
regulations. Compliance with the State's requirements certainly will entail costs, but this can be said of ~,regulations adopted by governments
to protect the health and safety of people.
21
Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering firsttrimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as
Part II. In fact, Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 63.l.l(b), § 63.3,
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more technological support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however,
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements reasonably related to the State's compelling interest.
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~ City of Akro~
require that the patie
the abortion be peri

do~
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· Ashcroft, Virginia{
not
be hospitalized as an inpatient or that
edina full-service, acute-care hospi-

l ~ Ol'<l

L~~;jf~~~~~f,:;it~ali.tl!fiR~a~t;h;er~t~h~e~SJfct~e~'s :reqliiFemeats tiM! statYtes a:Rd theO..

's

~egt~lations 2 . @I IH to ~HUR:QQ~~ acceptea medical prac-

I

tice..,. and leave tne method and timmg of the abortion precisely where they belong-with the physician and the
patient.

I

v

We hold that, on the record before us, Virginia's hospitalization requirement for second-trimester abortions is constitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia
is
Affirmed.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-185

CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, APPELLANT v. VIRGINIA
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
[April - , 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization requirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - ,
and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, ante, p. - - . The principal issue here is whether
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitutional.
I
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In
November, 1979, he practiced at his office in Woodbridge,
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room and
facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs firsttrimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant
sought any license for it.
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmarried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimester. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but
never advised her parents of her decision.
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course.
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic. and a
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also advised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began.
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet.
Id., at 200.
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home.
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investigation.1
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of
Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-lO(d).
2
The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, · which
provides:
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person administer to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or
1
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S.E. 2d 194
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdiction, - - U. S. - - , and now affirm.
II
Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, addressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders his conviction unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977).
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Comiscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony."
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester,
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester,
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain circumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life,
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and expressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however,
rebut the other defenses.
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lumbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, required the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of going forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107,
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684,
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975).
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 10691070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201.

III
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' . . . at approximately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). See City of Akron, ante, at 10. This
interest embraces the facilities and circumstances in which
abortions are performed. See id., at 150. Appellant argues, however, that Virginia prohibits all non-hospital second-trimester abortions and that such a requirement imposes
an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In City
of Akron and Ashcroft, we upheld such a constitutional challenge to the acute-care hospital requirements at issue there.
The State of Virginia argues here that its hospitalization requirement differs significantly from the hospitalization requirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests.
A
In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under
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Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to
perform an abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1, 4 that defines "hospital" to include
A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). "Surgery" is not defined. Appellant
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a question of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id.,
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hospitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus,
the issue before us is the validity of those requirements, not whether appellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with them.
' The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in § 18.2-73
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Virginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health
laws:
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical procedures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospitals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling interest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075,
277 S. E. 2d, at 204.
3
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"outpatient .
hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 defines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifically in § 32.1-123.1. See n. 5, infra.
• Section 32.1-123.1 provides:
" 'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provision of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgical or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospitals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums,
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and
maternity hospitals."
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711).
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing
surgery)."
6
The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing minimum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and requirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter,
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due regard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene,
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profession and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assistants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711)
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12
and 32.1-127 (1979)).
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regulations that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I,
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that therequirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-
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. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that second-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may
tient facilities in which abortions ,could be performed, regardless of the
trimester.
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January
26, 1977. Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at this
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services.
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the
State; representatives of two abortion clinics, the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest Clinic; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical
School representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the
Tidewater OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and
a representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and
have our support." ld., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, however, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that
during the second trimester ''the State may regulate the [abortion] procedure in the interest of maternal health." I d., at 7. But the clinics specifically "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the
Board should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient
surgical hospitals in order to include these first-trimester outpatient abortion clinics within the same set of regulations. See id., at 30. Following
the hearing, the Board added Part III, the regulations of which apply only
to clinics doing first-trimester abortions. See nn. 8, 23, infra. It there[Footnotes 7 and 8 are on p. 8]
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be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic provided that
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State.
The Virginia regulations applicable to the performance of
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to
all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main
categories.
The first grouping relates to organization, management,
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations refore is clear that Virginia has recognized the need for discrete and different
sets of regulations for the two periods. The Board gave its final approval,
and the regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979,
some two years and five months later.
We note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations
in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prosecuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were
promulgated pursuant to Va. Code §§ 32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979.
7
Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital ... unless
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va.
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically governing outpatient surgical clinics).
8
Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgical hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpretation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3,
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and
by the history of Part III, seen. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the regulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure performed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] shall be
performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week
amenorrhea).").
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quire personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §40.3;
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures
manuaV § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed
physician who must supervise clinical services and perform
surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to be on
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The second category of requirements outlines construction standards
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be approved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also
construction requirements that set forth standards for the
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology services, 10 and general building. 11 The final group of regulations
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the requirements for various services that the facility may offer,
such as anesthesia, 12 laboratory, 13 and pathology. 14 Some of
9
The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used,
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4;
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and
infectio~ control, § 41.2.5.
tQThese services may be provided within the outpatient surgical hospital
if the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities.
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1.
11
The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§50.6.1, 50.7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4.
12
See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for anesthesia must be present for administration and recovery).
13
Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.6.1. Outpatient surgical hospitals providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy
testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing,
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and al-
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the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 15 and postoperative recovery. 16 Finally, the regulations mandate some
emergency services and evacuation planning. 17
humin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically indicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4.
"Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11.
"Section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of laboratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of
any procedure. I d.,§ 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical hospital providing
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the
performing physician, id., § 43.8.4, and the facility "shall offer each patient
appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion procedure and in
birth control methods," M., § 43.85.
16
Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation techniques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§43.9.1, 43.9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d.,
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4.
17
See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus,
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemorrhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a licensed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides:
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory,
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all
times."
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B
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester
hospitaliztion requirement differs from those at issue in City
of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Association
of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, at 4-5. In those
cases, we recognized the medical fact that, "at least during
the early weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions
may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a fullservice hospital." City of Akron, ante, at 19. The requirements at issue, however, mandated that "all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, acute-care
facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. In contrast, the Virginia
statutes and regulations do not require that second-trimester
abortions be performed exclusively in full-service hospitals.
Under Virginia's hospitalization requirement, outpatient surgical hospitals may qualify for licensing as "hospitals" in
which second-trimester abortions lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in City of Akron and Ashcroft
are not controlling here.
The remaining question is the constitutionality of Virginia's regulations. In view of its interest in protecting the
health of its citizens, the State necessarily has considerable
discretion in determining standards for the licensing of medical facilities. Although its discretion does not permit it to
adopt abortion regulations that depart from accepted medical
practice, it does have a legitimate interest in regulating second-trimester abortions and setting forth the standards for
facilities in which such abortions are performed.
On their face, the Virginia regulations appear to be generally compatible with accepted medical standards governing
outpatient second-trimester abortions. 18 The American Pub18
See American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Standards
for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52-54 (5th ed. 1982); APHA Recommended Program Guide for Abortion Services, 70 Am. J. Pub. Health 652,
655 (1980). See also National Abortion Federation, National Abortion
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lie Health Association (APHA), although recognizing "that
greater use of the dilatation and evacuation procedure
make[s] it possible to perform the vast majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the 16th [w]eek after the
last menstrual period," still "[u]rges endorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in free-standing qualified
clinics that meet the state standards required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2
(1979). The medical profession has not thought that a
State's standards need be relaxed merely because the facility
performs abortions: "Ambulatory care facilities providing
abortion services should meet the same standards of care as
those recommended for· other surgical procedures performed
in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the freestanding and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (AGOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 1982).
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to requirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facilities are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recommended for hospitals." Ibid.
We need not consider each of the regulations separately.
Despite personal knowledge of the regulations at least by the
time of his trial, 19 appellant introduced no medical evidence
questioning the reasonableness of any of them. This is to be
contrasted with the evidence in City of Akron and Ashcroft,
Federation Standards (1981). Cf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae
29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities
as consitituting "minimum standards").
19
See nn. 3, 6, supra; Record Vol. 5, pp. 5&-56 (appellant acknowledging
existence of the outpatient hospital license; stating that he was seeking a
license; but denying that he knew of the licensing program when the abortion was performed).
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where the plaintiffs sought at great length to show that particular requirements as to equipment and services were unreasonable restraints on women seeking second-trimester
abortions. Appellant persisted in arguing broadly that Virginia's hospitalization requirements are no different in substance from those we reviewed in the City of Akron and
Ashcroft cases. 20 Indeed, not until his reply brief in this
Court did appellant criticize the regulations apart from Virginia's statutory hospitalization requirement.
We therefore conclude, on the record before us in this case,
that appellant has not shown the Virginia hospitalization re20

Appellant has presented no evidence challenging the validity of the
regulations as distinguished from his attack on the hospitalization requirement in§ 18.2-73. Indeed, appellant does not attack these regulations expressly in his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief, instead arguing that the Virginia hospitalization requirement is comparable to those we
have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus also invalid. Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations, but not individually or on specific grounds, instead making only facial challenges in the
broadest language and in conclusory terms: the record is silent on the applicability of those regulations to his facility; that the record does not show
whether any outpatient surgical hospitals exist in Virginia or whether, if
they exist, they allow second-trimester abortions; that the record is silent
on the reasonableness of the regulations; that he had no opportunity to defend against the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain whether, if he had
applied for an outpatient hospital license, it would have been granted; that
obtaining a license is an arduous process; that Virginia courts have had no
opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and regulations"; and that
Part II of the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical hospital
where second-trimester abortions are performed. Some of these arguments are simply meritless, see n. 8, supra, and others are irrelevant, see
n. 3, supra. And certainly appellant cannot argue that the State has no
right to require appellant to meet reasonable facility and equipment standards merely because they impose some costs and burdens. As City of Akron makes clear, see ante, at 12, in view of the State's compelling interest
in the pregnant woman's health, it may adopt reasonable regulations.
Compliance with the State's requirements certainly will entail costs, but
this can be said of all regulations adopted by governments to protect the
health and safety of people.
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quirement concerning second-trimester abortions to be an
unreasonable means of furthering the State's compelling interest in "protecting the woman's own health and safety."
Roe, 410 U. S., at 150. 21 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he
State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion,
like any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid.
Unlike the provisions at issue in City of Akron and Ashcroft,
Virginia's statute and regulations do not require that the patient be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be
performed in a full-service, acute-care hos~tal. Rather, the
State's hospitalization requirement appearol\comport with accepted medical practice and leav{ the method and timing of
the abortion precisely where they belong-with the physician
and the patient.

v

We hold that, on the record before us, Virginia's hospitalization requirement for second-trimester abortions is constitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia
lS

Affirmed.

21
Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering firsttrimester abortion clinics, requires the' same services and equipment as
Part II. In fact, Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§§ 63.l.l(b), § 63.3,
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more technological support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however,
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements reasonably related to the State's compelling interest.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization requirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - ,
and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, ante, p. - - . The principal issue here is whether
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitutional.
I
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In
November, 1979, he practiced at his office in Woodbridge,
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room and
facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs firsttrimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant
sought any license for it.
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmarried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that

13 -It!/- - 07<
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimester. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but
never advised her parents of her decision.
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course.
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also advised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began.
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet.
Id., at 200.
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home.
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investigation.1
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of
'Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2--71, 54--316(3), 54--317(1), 54.321.2
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in
prison. Va. Code § 18.2--10(d).
2
The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2--71, which
provides:
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person administer to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S~E. 2d 194
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdiction, - - U. S. - - , and now affirm.
II
Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, addressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders his conviction unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977).
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Comiscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony."
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester,
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester,
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain circumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life,
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and expressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however,
rebut the other defenses.
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lumbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, required the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of going forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107,
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684,
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975).
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 10691070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201.

III
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' ... at approximately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, .410
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). See City of Akron, ante, at 10. This
interest embraces the facilities and circumstances in which
abortions are performed. See id., at 150. Appellant argues, however, that Virginia prohibits all non-hospital second-trimester abortions and that such a requirement imposes
an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In City
of Akron and Ashcroft, we upheld such a constitutional challenge to the acute-care hospital requirements at issue there.
The State of Virginia argues here that its hospitalization requirement differs significantly from the hospitalization requirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests.
A
In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under
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Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to
perform an abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1/ that defines "hospital" to include
3
A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). "Surgery" is not defined. Appellant
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a question of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id.,
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, bwld a hospital to do
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hospitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus,
·
whether apthe issue before us ·
pellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with th-en-1.
'The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in § 18.2-73
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Virginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health
laws:
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical procedures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospitals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling interest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075,
277 S. E. 2d, at 204.

/
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"outpatient .
hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 defines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifically in § 32.1-123.1. Seen. 5, infra.
5
Section 32.1-123.1 provides:
"'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provision of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgical or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospitals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums,
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and
maternity hospitals."
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711).
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing
surgery). "
6
The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing minimum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and requirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter,
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due regard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene,
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profession ana by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assistants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711)
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12
and 32.1-127 (1979)).
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regulations that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I,
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that therequirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-
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. whlch primarily provide facilities for the performance of
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that second-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may
tient facilities in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the
trimester.
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January
26, 1977. Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at this
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services.
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the
State; representatives of two abortion clinics, the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest Clinic; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical
School representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the
Tidewater OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and
a representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and
have our support." !d., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, however, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] procedure in the interest of maternal health." !d., at 7. But the clinics specifically "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." !d., at
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the
Board should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient
surgical hospitals in order to include these first-trimester outpatient abortion clinics within the same set of regulations. See id., at 30. Following
the hearing, the Board added Part III, the regulations of which apply only
to clinics doing first-trimester abortions. See nn. 8, 23, infra. It there[Foot?Wtes 7 and 8 are on p. 8]
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be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic provided that
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State.
The Virginia regulations applicable to the performance of
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to
all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main
categories.
The first grouping relates to organization, management,
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations refore is clear that Virginia has recognized the need for discrete and different
sets of regulations for the two periods. The Board gave its final approval,
and the regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979,
some two years and five months later.
We note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations
in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prosecuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virgirua, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were
promulgated pursuant to Va. Code §§32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979.
7
Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital ... unless
such hospital ... is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va.
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically governing outpatient surgical clinics).
8
Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgical hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpretation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i.e., §§43.6.2, 43.6.3,
43.7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and
by the history of Part III, see n. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the regulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure performed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] shall be
performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week
amenorrhea).").
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quire personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 40.3;
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures
manual, 9 §43.2, an administrative officer, §40.6, a licensed
physician who must supervise clinical services and perform
surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to be on
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The second category of requirements outlines construction standards
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be approved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also
construction requirements that set forth standards for the
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology services,'0 and general building. 11 The final group of regulations
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the requirements for various services that the facility may offer,
such as anesthesia,' 2 laboratory, 13 and pathology.' 4 Some of
'The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures t
may
performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may
sed,
§ 41.2.2; e criteria and procedures for admissions and dischar , § 41.2.4;
'Written info ed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for ho ekeeping and ·
infectio~ contr
§ 41.2.5.
10
These service
ay be provided within the out 1ent surgical hospital
if the services comp with applicable require
ts of the Department of
Health's Rules and Re lations for the Li
sure of General and Special
Hospitals or through a c tractual
gement with nearby facilities .
Va. Regs . (Outpatient Hospi s) §- . . 1.
11
The regulations contain cust ary provisions with respect to meeting
building codes, zoning ordin ces,
d the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 50.6.1
. 7.1, 50.8. 50.8.4.
12
See, e. g., Va. Re . (Outpatient Ho "tals) §43.1.1 (service must be
directed by licens physician); id., § 43.1.2
sician responsible for anesthesia must
present for administration and
very).
13
Each p ent admitted must receive "appropriate utine laboratory
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43. 6.1.
atient surancy
gical ospitals providing abortion services also must conduct p
te mg, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh t ·
oomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and a
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the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 15 and postoperative recovery. 16 Finally, the regulations mandate some
emergency services and evacuation planning. 17
bumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically i
·cated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1 fi.
ection 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a path ogy
exa · ation, with pathology services for abortion patients meet" g the
m1mmu requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for hi ological
examinati by a pathologist in all cases where gross examin on by the
attending p sician does not confirm presence of fetal
rts"). See
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11.
15
Section 43.8. provides for a medical history and phY, Jcal examination
before initiating a procedure. Sufficient time to p
it review of laboratory tests must b allowed between initial exam· tion and initiation of
any procedure. !d.,§ 3.8.3. In an outpatients gical hospital providing
abortion services, the · gnosis of pregnancy i the responsibility of the
performing physician, id., 43.8.4, and the fa · ity "shall offer each patient
appropriate counseling an ·nstruction in e abortion procedure and in
birth control methods," id., § .85.
16
Each patient shall be observ for ost-operative complications for one
hour under the direct supervision
nurse trained in resuscitation techniques and other emergency pro d es. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 43.9.1, 43.9.2~ A lie 1sed p sician must be present on the
premises until the patient · discharge on his written orders. !d.,
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4.
17
See Va. Regs. (Ou atient Hospitals) § 3.4.1 (written evacuation
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("a equate monitoring equip ent, suction apparatus,
oxygen, and related· ems necessary for resuscitati and control of hemorrhage and other mplications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambu ce service to a licensed general spital). Section 43.5.3 provides:
"A written a eement shall be executed with a general ho "tal to ensure
that any p ient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall rec ·ve needed
emergen treatment. The agreement shall be with a license
eneral
hospit capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical !abo ory,
and agnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and w · h
ha a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at a
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B
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester
hospitaliztion requirement differs from those at issue in City
of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Association
of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, at 4--5. In those
cases, we recognized the medical fact that, "at least during
the early weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions
may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a fullservice hospital." City of Akron, ante, at 19. The requirements at issue, however, mandated that "all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, acute-care
facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. In contrast, the Virginia
statutes and regulations do not require that second-trimester
abortions be performed exclusively in full-service hospitals.
Under Virginia's hospitalization requirement, outpatient surgical hospitals may qualify for licensing as "hospitals" in
which second-trimester abortions lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in City of Akron and Ashcroft
are not controlling here.
. ;l~e ; :i:~ ques~ion is ~he ~onstituti.onalit;y of _Yir gin/
1a' ~
. In view of Its mterest m protectmg the
health of its citizens, the State necessarily has considerable
discretion in determining standards for the licensing of medical facilities. Although its discretion does not permit it to
adopt abortion regulations that depart from accepted medical
practice, it does have a legitimate interest in regulating second-trimester abortions and setting forth the standards for
facilities in which such abortions are performed.
(fl.f}j\)
en their face, the Virginia regulations appear to be gener .,_
J- F f/ ally eompatible ,,vith accepted medical standards governing>
<mtpatient second trimester abortions.# The American Pub-
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lie Health Association (APHA), although recognizing "that
greater use of the dilatation and evacuation procedure
make[s] it possible to perform the vast majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the 16th [w]eek after the
last menstrual period," still "[u]rges endorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in free-standing qualified
clinics that meet the state standards required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2
(1979). The medical profession has not thought that a
State's standards need be relaxed merely because the facility
performs abortions: "Ambulatory care facilities providing
abortion services should meet the same standards of care as
those recommended for other surgical procedures performed
in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the freestanding and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 1982).
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to requirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facilities are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recom--,~~~d for hospitals." Ibid.
e need not conside~ of the regulation~:fifim~~::'
trJ~E-R..,.
Despite personal knowledge of the r
lations a east by the
A1me o 1s tria /"" appellant introduced no medical evidence4(o..:tkM)
EjtieStioning the r€lasonableness o

)r - /H~~e~:,~~:~:~,:~::~d~:~li~th~t~h~s~s~'~'isd;e~n~ee~in~c~~~·ty~'~o~f~A.~k~ro~n~a~n~d~2~4~s~h~cr~ofi~,

-..--

''•

5

29, n. 6 (supporti
an ar .,..,..,->Ln,,n
as
1 uting "minimum standards").
19
ee nn. 3, 6, supra; Record Vol. 5, pp. 55--56 (appellant acknowledging
existence of the outpatient hospital license; stating that he was seeking a
license; but denying that he knew of the licensing program when the abortion was performed).

g.

Insert A (p. 12)
"appellant has not attacked them as being insufficient!¥ related
to the State's interest in protecting maternal health.
His
challenge throughout this litigation has been limited to an
assertion that the State cannot require all second-trimester
abortions to be performed in full-service general hospitals.
I ndeed, appellant has taken the position, both before the lower
courts and before this Court, that a state licensing requirement
for outpatient abortion facilities would be constitutional. See
9 Record 196a, 214a; Brief for Appellant in No. 801107
(Va.S.Ct.), p.35; Juris. Statement 16; Brief for Appellant 32,
43, n. 75, 46.
In essence, appellant has argue ~
Insert B (p. 13)
"Given the plain language of the Virginia regulations and
the history of their adoption, see notes
, supra, we see no
reason to doubt that an adequately equipped clinic could, upon
proper application, obtain an outpatient hospital license
permitting the performance of second-trimester abortions.
ppellant has thus challenged a statutory scheme that does not
exist in Virginia: a requirement that second-trimester abortion
be performed in full-service hospitals. Since appellant has
declined to challenge the constitutionality of the Virginia
egulations, we have no occasion to pass on them."

Jj

-~
~

~

__
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( #ta:J- J

quirement~"'-ISecond-trimester

abortions.J6 be an
unreasonable means of furthering the State's compelling mterest in "protecting the woman's own health and safety."
Roe, 410 U. S., at 150. 21 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he
State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion,
like any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid.
Unlike the provisions at issue in City of Akron and Ashcroft,
Virginia's statute and regulations do not require that the patient be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be
performed in a full-service, acute-care hos ital. Rather, the
State's~~ requirement appea:g omp
W1
cepted medical practice and leavest e method and timing of
the abortion precisely w~ere they belong-with the physician
and the patient.

v
We hold-tR~ecurd-before us,

Vii ginia's hospital->-

·
·
rimest-€r abo~ is coiY--'
Bt~ The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia

is

Affirmed.

21

Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering firsttrimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as
Part II. In fact, Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 63.l.l(b), § 63.3,
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more technological support for second-trimester abortions would be restrict them to
~care, general hospitals.
The only~gulations before us, however,
\:::/
re1aL,"'{ to second-trimester abortio~:: ~ :;:ose rEJqYirements l'ea.R
S'6Hably related to tl:i€l St:JtQ'S com h;o.g mtel'e,st. ,._

~aj ~GJ~
*~~ 5 f.v- ahor ~'ch5
let_ p-u4i;~ ,'"
l,'~o;,ul r.L'/\/c_;,

I ._ .

·'.:A.

A

~k

~ 1:...:.::..:..~
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-185
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, APPELLANT v. VIRGINIA
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
[May - , 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization requirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - ,
and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, ante, p. - - . The principal issue here is whether
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitutional.
I
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In
November, 1979, he practiced at his office in Woodbridge,
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls
Church. The Falls Church clihic has an operating room and
facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs firsttrimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant
sought any license for it.
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmarried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that

''
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimester. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but
never advised her parents of her decision.
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course.
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also advised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began.
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet.
Id., at 200.
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home.
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investigation.1
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of
Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia Jaw and subject to mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d).
2
The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which
provides:
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person administer to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or
1

, ..
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdiction, - - U. S. - - , and now affirm.
II

Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, addressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders his conviction unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to
meet its burden ofalleging necessity in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977).
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Comiscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony."
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester,
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester,
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain circumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life,
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and expressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however,
rebut the other defenses.
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lumbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, required the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of going forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107,
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684,
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975).
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 1069-1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201.

III
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' . . . at approximately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). See City of Akron, ante, at 10. This
interest embraces the facilities and circumstances in which
abortions are performed. See id., at 150. Appellant argues, however, that Virginia prohibits all non-hospital second-trimester abortions and that such a requirement imposes
an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In City
of Akron and Ashcroft, we upheld such a constitutional challenge to the acute-care hospital requirements at issue there.
The State of Virginia argues here that its hospitalization requirement differs significantly from the hospitalization requirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests.
A

In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under
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Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to
perform an abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1, 4 that defines "hospital" to include
3

A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). "Surgery" is not defined. Appellant
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a question of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id.,
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hospitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus,
the issue before us is the validity of those requirements, not whether appellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with them.
•The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in§ 18.2-73
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Virginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health
laws:
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical procedures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospitals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling interest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075,
277 S. E. 2d, at 204.
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"outpatient.
hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 defines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifically in § 32.1-123.1. Seen. 5, infra.
5
Section 32.1-123.1 provides:
"'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provision of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgical or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospitals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums,
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and
maternity hospitals."
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711).
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing
surgery)."
' The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing minimum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and requirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter,
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due regard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene,
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profession and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assistants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711)
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12
and 32.1-127 (1979)).
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regulations that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I,
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that therequirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-
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. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that second-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may
tient facilities in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the
trimester.
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January
26, 1977. Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at this
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services.
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital Association; a representa:tive of five outpatient abortion clinics in the
State; representatives of two abortion clinics, the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest Clinic; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical
School representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the
Tidewater OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and
a representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and
have our support." !d., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, however, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] procedure in the interest of maternal health." I d., at 7. But the clinics specifically "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the
Board should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient
surgical hospitals in order to include these first-trimester outpatient abortion clinics within the same set of regulations. See id., at 30. Following
the hearing, the Board added Part III, the regulations of which apply only
to clinics doing first-trimester abortions. See nn. 8, 23, infra. It there[Footnotes 7 and 8 are on p. 8]
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be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic provided that
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State.
The Virginia regulations applicable to the performance of
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to
all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main categories. The first grouping relates to organization, management, policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations
fore is clear that Virginia has recognized the need for discrete and different
sets of regulations for the two periods. The Board gave its final approval,
and the regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979,
some two years and five months later.
We note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations
in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prosecuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were
promulgated pursuant to Va. Code §§32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979.
7
Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital ... unless
such hospital ... is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va.
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically governing outpatient surgical clinics).
8
Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgical hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpretation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3,
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and
by the history of Part III, seen. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II
legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the regulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the
first trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure
performed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] shall
be performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week
amenorrhea).").
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require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient
and program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§ 40.3; see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures manual,S § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed physician who must supervise clinical services and
perform surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to
be on duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The
second category of requirements outlines construction standards for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that
"deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be
approved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are
also construction requirements that set forth standards for
the public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology services, 10 and general building. 11 The final group of regulations
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the requirements for various services that the facility may offer,
such as anesthesia, 12 laboratory, 13 and pathology. 14 Some of
9
The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that
inay be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used,
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4;
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and
infection control, § 41.2.5.
10
These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical hospital
if the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities.
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1.
11
The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§50.6.1, 50.7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4.
12
See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for anesthesia must be present for administration and recovery).
13
Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.6.1. Outpatient surgical hospitals providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy
testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing,

...
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the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 15 and postoperative recovery. 16 Finally, the regulations mandate some
emergency services and evacuation planning. 17
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for sugar and albumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically indicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4.
"Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11.
15
Section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of laboratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of
any procedure. !d., § 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical hospital providing
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the
performing physician, id., § 43.8.4, and the facility "shall offer each patient
appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion procedure and in
birth control methods," id., § 43.8.5.
16
Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation techniques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 43. 9.1, 43. 9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d.,
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4.
17
See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus,
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemorrhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a licensed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides:
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory,
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all
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It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hospitalization requirement differs from those at issue in City of
Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Assoc. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, at 4-5. In those cases,
we recognized the medical fact that, "at least during the early
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital." City of Akron, ante, at 19. The requirements at
issue, however, mandated that "all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, acute-care facilities."
Ashcroft, ante, at 5. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Virginia's hospitalization requirement, outpatient surgical hospitals may qualify for licensing as "hospitals" in which secondtrimester abortions lawfully may be performed. Thus, our
decisions in City of Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling
here.
The remaining question is the constitutionality of Virginia's regulations. In view of its interest in protecting the
health of its citizens, the State necessarily has considerable
discretion in determining standards for the licensing of medical facilities. Although its discretion does not permit it to
adopt abortion regulations that depart from accepted medical
practice, it does have a legitimate interest in regulating second-trimester abortions and setting forth the standards for
facilities in which such abortions are performed.
On their face, the Virginia regulations appear to be generally compatible with accepted medical standards governing
outpatient second-trimester abortions. 18 The American Pubtimes."
18
See American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Standards
for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 51-62 (5th ed. 1982); APHA Recommended Program Guide for Abortion Services, 70 Am. J . Pub. Health 652,
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lie Health Association (APHA), although recognizing "that
greater use of the dilatation and evacuation procedure
make[s] it possible to perform the vast majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the 16th [w]eek after the
last menstrual period," still "[u]rges endorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in free-standing qualified
clinics that meet the state standards required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2
(1979). The medical profession has not thought that a
State's standards need be relaxed merely because the facility
performs abortions: "Ambulatory care facilities providing
abortion services should meet the same standards of care as
those recommended for other surgical procedures performed
in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the freestanding and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 1982).
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to requirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facilities are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recommended for hospitals." Ibid.
We need not consider each of the regulations separately.
Despite personal knowledge of the regulations at least by the
time of his trial, 19 appellant introduced no medical evidence
questioning the reasonableness of any of them. This is to be
contrasted with the evidence in City of Akron and Ashcroft,
655 (1980). See also National Abortion Federation, National Abortion
Federation Standards (1981). Cf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae
29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities
as consitituting "minimum standards").
19
See nn. 3, 6, supra; Record Vol. 5, pp. 55-56 (appellant acknowledging
existence of the outpatient hospital license; stating that he was seeking a
license; but denying that he knew of the licensing program when the abortion was performed).

81-185-0PINION
SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA

13

where the plaintiffs sought at great length to show that particular requirements as to equipment and services were unreasonable restraints on women seeking second-trimester
abortions. Appellant persisted in arguing broadly that Virginia's hospitalization requirements are no different in substance from those we reviewed in the City of Akron and
Ashcroft cases. 20 Indeed, not until his reply brief in this
Court did appellant criticize the regulations apart from Virginia's statutory hospitalization requirement.
We therefore conclude, on the record before us in this case,
that appellant has not shown the Virginia hospitalization requirement concerning second-trimester abortions to be an
Appellant has presented no evidence challenging the validity of the
regulations as distinguished from his attack on the hospitalization requirement in§ 18.2-73. Indeed, appellant does not attack these regulations expressly in his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief, instead arguing that the Virginia hospitalization requirement is comparable to those we
have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus also invalid. Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations, but not individually or on specific grounds, instead making only facial challenges in the
broadest language and in conclusory terms: the record is silent on the applicability of those regulations to his facility; that the record does not show
whether any outpatient surgical hospitals exist in Virginia or whether, if
they exist, they allow second-trimester abortions; that the record is silent
on the reasonableness of the regulations; that he had no opportunity to defend against the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain whether, if he had
applied for an outpatient hospital license, it would have been granted; that
obtaining a license is an arduous process; that Virginia courts have had no
opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and regulations"; and that
Part II of the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical hospital
where second-trimester abortions are performed. Some of these arguments are simply meritless, see n. 8, supra, and others are irrelevant, see
n. 3, supra. And certainly appellant cannot argue that the State has no
right to require appellant to meet reasonable facility and equipment standards merely because they impose some costs and burdens. As City of Akron makes clear, see ante, at 12, in view of the State's compelling interest
in the pregnant woman's health, it may adopt reasonable regulations.
Compliance with the State's requirements certainly will entail costs, but
this can be said of all regulations adopted by governments to protect the
health and safety of people.
20
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unreasonable means of furthering the State's compelling interest in "protecting the woman's own health and safety."
Roe, 410 U. S., at 150. 21 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he
State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion,
like any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid.
Unlike the provisions at issue in City of Akron and Ashcroft,
Virginia's statute and regulations do not require that the patient be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be
performed in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the
State's hospitalization requirement appears to comport with
accepted medical practice and leave the method and timing of
the abortion precisely where they belong-with the physician
and the patient.

v

We hold that, on the record before us, Virginia's hospitalization requirement for second-trimester abortions is constitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia
is
Affirmed.

' Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering firsttrimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as
Part II. In fact, Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 63.l.l(b), § 63.3,
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more techno•
logical support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however,
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements reasonably related to the State's compelling interest.
2
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization requirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - ,
and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, ante, p. - - . The principal issue here is whether
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitutional.
I
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In
November, 1979, he practiced at his office in Woodbridge,
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room and
facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs firsttrimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant
sought any license for it.
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmarried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimester. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer
with her parents and discussed with her the · alternative of
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but
never advised her parents of her decision.
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course.
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also advised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began.
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet.
Id., at 200.
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home.
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investigation.1
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of
'Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d).
2
The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which
provides:
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person administer to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or

.,..,
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdiction, - - U. S. - - , and now affirm.
II

Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, addressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders his conviction unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977).
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Comiscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony."
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester,
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester,
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain circumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life,
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and expressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however,
rebut the other defenses.
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lumbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, required the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of going forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107,
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684,
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975).
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 10691070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201.

III
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' . . . at approximately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). See City of Akron, ante, at 10. This
interest embraces the facilities and circumstances in which
abortions are performed. See id., at 150. Appellant argues, however, that Virginia prohibits all non-hospital second-trimester abortions and that such a requirement imposes
an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In City
of Akron and Ashcroft, we upheld such a constitutional challenge to the acute-care hospital requirements at issue there.
The State of Virginia argues here that its hospitalization requirement differs significantly from the hospitalization requirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests.
A

In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under

81-18&-0PINION
SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA

5

Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to
perform an abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1/ that defines "hospital" to include
3

A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). "Surgery" is not defined. Appellant
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a question of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id.,
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hospitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus,
it is irrelevant to the issue before us whether appellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with the Virginia regulations.
4
The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in § 18.2-73
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Virginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health
laws:
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical procedures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospitals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling interest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075,
277 S. E. 2d, at 204.
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"outpatient .
hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 defines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifically in § 32.1-123.1. See n. 5, infra.
• Section 32.1-123.1 provides:
" 'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provision of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgical or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospitals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums,
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and
maternity hospitals."
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711).
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing
surgery)."
6
The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing minimum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards andrequirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter,
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due regard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene,
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profession and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assistants , and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711)
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12
and 32.1-127 (1979)).
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regulations that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I,
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that therequirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-
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. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that second-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may
tient facilities in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the
trimester.
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January
26, 1977. Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at this
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services.
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the
State; representatives of two abortion clinics, the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest Clinic; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical
School representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the
Tidewater OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and
a representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and
have our support." Id., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, however, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] procedure in the interest of maternal health." Id., at 7. But the clinics specifically "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the
Board should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient
surgical hospitals in order to include these first-trimester outpatient abortion clinics within the same set of regulations. See id., at 30. Following
the hearing, the Board added Part III, the regulations of which apply only
to clinics doing first-trimester abortions. See nn. 8, 23, infra. It there[Footnotes 7 and 8 are on p. 8]
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be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic provided that
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State.
The Virginia regulations applicable to the performance of
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to
all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main categories. The first grouping relates to organization, management, policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations
fore is clear that Virginia has recognized the need for discrete and different
sets of regulations for the two periods. The Board gave its final approval,
and the regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979,
some two years and five months later.
We note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations
in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prosecuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were
promulgated pursuant to Va. Code §§ 32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979.
7
Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital .. . unless
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va.
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically governing outpatient surgical clinics).
8
Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgical hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpretation is confirmed by several sections in Part II , i. e. , §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3,
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and
by the history of Part III, see n. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II
legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the regulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the
first trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure
performed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] shall
be performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week
amenorrhea).") .

• -r..,
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require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient
and program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§ 40.3; see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures manuaV § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed physician who must supervise clinical services and
perform surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to
be on duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The
second category of requirements outlines construction standards for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that
"deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be
approved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are
also construction requirements that set forth standards for
the public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology services, 10 and general building. 11 The final group of regulations
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the requirements for various services that the facility may offer,
such as anesthesia, 12 laboratory, 13 and pathology. 14 Some of
• The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used,
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures fo!'admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4;
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and
infection control, § 41.2.5.
10
These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical hospital
if the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities.
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1.
11
The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§§ 50.6.1 , 50.7.1 , 50.8.1, 50.8.4.
12
See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for anesthesia must be present for administration and recovery).
13
Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory
esting." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.6.1. Outpatient surgical hospitals providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy
esting, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing,

·" <
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the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on
medical records, § 43.7, pre-operative admission, 15 and postoperative recovery. 16 Finally, the regulations mandate some
emergency services and evacuation planning. 17
6oomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for sugar and albumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically indicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4.
"Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11.
15
Section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of laboratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of
any procedure. I d., § 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical hospital providing
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the
performing physician, id., § 43.8.4, and the facility "shall offer each patient
appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion procedure and in
birth control methods," id., § 43.8.5.
16
Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation techniques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 43.9.1, 43.9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d.,
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4.
17
See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus,
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemorrhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a licensed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides:
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory,
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all
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It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hospitalization requirement differs from those at issue in City of
Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, at 4-5. In those cases,
we recognized the medical fact that, "at least during the early
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital." City of Akron, ante, at 19. The requirements at
issue, however, mandated that "all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, acute-care facilities."
Ashcroft, ante, at 5. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Virginia's hospitalization requirement, outpatient surgical hospitals may qualify for licensing as "hospitals" in which secondtrimester abortions lawfully may be performed. Thus, our
decisions in City of Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling
lo~
here.
In view of its interest in protecting the health of its citizens, the State necessarily has considerable discretion in
determining standards for the licensing of medical facilities.
Although its discretion does not permit it to adopt abortion~
regulations that depart from accepted medical practice, it
does have a legitimate interest in regulating second-trimester abortions and setting forth the standards for facilities in
which such abortions are performed.
On their face, the Virginia regulations appear to be gener-1
/ _____.ally compatible with accepted medical standards governing
~
outpatient second-trimester abortions. The American Pub- I 0~
lie Health Association (APHA), although recognizing "that
greater use of the dilatation and evacuation procedure
make[s] it possible to perform the vast majority of second tritimes. "

I •
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mester abortions during or prior to the 16th [w]eek after the
last menstrual period," still "[u]rges endorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in free-standing qualified
clinics that meet the state standards required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2
(1979). The medical profession has not thought that a
State's standards need be relaxed merely because the facility
performs abortions: "Ambulatory care facilities providing
abortion services should meet the same standards of care as
those recommended for other surgical procedures performed
in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the freestanding and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 1982).
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to requirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facilities are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recommended for hospitals." Ibid.
We need not consider whether Virginia's regulations are
constitutional in every particular. Despite personal knowledge of the regulations at least by the time of trial, appellant
has not attacked them as being insufficiently related to the
State's interest in protecting health. 18 His challenge
throughout this litigation appears to have been limited to an
assertion that the State cannot require all second-trimester
abortions to be performed in full-service general hospitals.
In essence, appellant has argued that Virginia's hospitalization requirements are no different in substance from those
18
See nn. 3, 6, supra; Record Vol. 5, pp. 55-56 (appellant acknowledging
existence of the outpatient hospital license; stating that he was seeking a
license; but denying that he knew of the licensing program when the abortion was performed).

..."If·
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reviewed in the City of Akrpn and Ashcroft cases. 19 At the
same time, however, appellant took the position-bot~ before the Virginia courts and this Court-that a state licensing
requirement for outpatient abortion facilities would be constitutional. 20 We can only assume that by continuing to challenge the Virginia hospitalization requirement petitioner either views the Virginia regulations in some unspecified way
as unconstitutional or challenges a hospitalization requirement that does not exist in Virginia. Yet, not until his reply
brief in this Court did he elect to criticize the regulations
apart from his broadside attack on the entire Virginia hospitalization requirement.
Given the plain language of the Virginia regulations and
the history of their adoption, see n. 6, supra, we see no reason to doubt that an adequately equipped clinic could, upon
proper application, obtain an outpatient hospital license permitting the performance of second-trimester abortions.
We conclude that Virginia's reguirement that second-trimester abortions be performed in licensed clinics is not an unreasonable means of furthering the State's compelling interest in
19
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations, but not
individually or on specific grounds, instead making only facial challenges in
the broadest language and in conclusory terms: the record is silent on the
applicability of those regulations to his facility; that the record does not
show whether any outpatient surgical hospitals exist in Virginia or
whether, if they exist, they allow second-trimester abortions; that the
record is silent on the reasonableness of the regulations; that he had no
opportunity to defend against the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain
whether, if he had applied for an outpatient hospital license, it would have
been granted; that obtaining a license is an arduous process; that Virginia
courts have had no opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and
regulations"; and that Part II of the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical hospital where second-trimester abortions are performed.
Some of these arguments are simply meritless, see n. 8, supra, and others
are irrelevant, see n. 3, supra, and none has been raised below.
20
See 8 Record 196a, 214a; Brief for Appellant in No. 801107 (Va. S.
Ct.), p. 35; Juris. Statement 16; Brief for Appellant 32, 43 n. 75, 46.
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"protecting the woman's own health and safety." Roe, 410
U. S., at 150. 21 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a
legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other
medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. Unlike the
provisions at issue in City of Akron and Ashcroft, Virginia's
statute and regt1lation.s do not require that the patienrlJe
hospit aliZed as an inpatient or that the abortion be performed
in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the State's requirement that second-trimester abortions be performed in
licensed clinics appears to comport with accepted medical
practice, and leaves the method and timing of the abortion
precisely where they belong-with the physician and the
patient.
IV
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is
Affirmed.

21
Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering firsttrimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as
Part II. In fact, Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§§ 63.l.l(b), § 63.3,
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more technological support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to
acute-care, general hospitals. The only issue before us, however, relates
to second-trimester abortions.
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JUSTICE PoWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization requirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron
v. Akron Center for R epToductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - -,
and Planned Pa1·enthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, ante, p. - - . The principal issue here is whether
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitutional.
I

Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In
November, 1979, he practiced at his office in Woodbridge,
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room and
facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs firsttrimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant
sought any license for it.
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmarried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimester. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but
never advised her parents of her decision.
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course.
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also advised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began.
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet.
!d., at 200.
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home.
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investigation.1
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of
1
Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d).
' The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which
provides:
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person administer to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or
mi scarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdiction, - - U. S. - - , and now affirm.
II

Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, addressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders his conviction unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977).
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Comiscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony."
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the f1rst trimester,
§ 18.2-72; (il) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester,
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain circumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life,
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and expressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any
fust-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however,
rebut the other defenses.

'

.
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lumbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, required the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of going forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107,
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684,
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975) .
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus . In
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 10691070, 277 S. E . 2d, at 200-201.

II I
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' . . . at approximately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). See City of Akron, ante, at 10. This
interest embraces the facilities and circumstances in which
abortions are performed. See id., at 150. Appellant argues, however, that Virginia prohibits all non-hospital second-trimester abortions and that such a requirement imposes
an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In City
of Akron and Ashcroft, we upheld such a constitutional challenge to the acute-care hospital requirements at issue there.
The State of Virginia argues here that its hospitalization requirement differs significantly from the hospitalization requirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests.
A
In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under
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Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to
perform an abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in
Va. Code §32.1-123.1, 4 that defines "hospital" to include
3

A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). "Surgery" is not defined. Appellant
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a question of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id.,
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hospitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus,
it is irrelevant to the issue before us whether appellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with the Virginia regulations.
'The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in § 18.2--73
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Virginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health
laws:
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32. 1
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical procedures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospitals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling interest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075,
277 S. E. 2d, at 204 .

..

.
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"outpatient .
hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 defines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifically in § 32.1-123.1. See n. 5, infra.
• Section 32.1-123.1 provides:
"'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provision of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgical or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospitals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums,
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and
maternity hospitals."
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711).
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing
surgery)."
6
The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing minimum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and requirements for each class in conformity \vith provisions of this chapter,
\vith the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due regard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene,
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profession and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assistants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711)
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12
and 32.1-127 (1979)).
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regulations that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I,
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that therequirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-

81-185-0PINION
SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA

7

which primarily provide facilities for the performance of
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that second-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may
tient facilities in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the
trimester.
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January
26, 1977. Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at this
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services.
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the
State; representatives of two abortion clinics, the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest Clinic; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical
School representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the
Tidewater OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and
a representative of th.e Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed
· Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and
have our support." Id., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, however, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] procedure in the interest of maternal health." Id., at 7. But the clinics specifically "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the
Board should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient
surgical hospitals in order to include these first-trimester outpatient abortion clinics within the same set of regulations. See id., at 30. Following
the hearing, the Board added Part III, the regulations of which apply only
to clinics doing first-trimester abortions . See nn. 8, 23, infra . It there[Footnotes 7 and 8 are on p. 8]
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be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic provided that
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State.
The Virginia regulations applicable to the performance of
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to
all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main categories. The first grouping relates to organization, management, policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations
fore is clear that Virginia has recognized the need for discrete and different
sets of regulations for the two periods. The Board gave its final approval,
and the regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979,
some two years and five months later.
We note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations
in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prosecuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were
promulgated pursuant to Va. Code §§ 32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979.
7
Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital ... unless
such hospital ... is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va.
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically governing outpatient surgical clinics).
'Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgical hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpretation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3,
43.7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and
by the history of Part III, see n. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II
legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the regulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the
first trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure
performed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outp~tient abortion clinic] shall
be performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week
amenorrhea).").

!f.'
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require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient
and program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§ 40.3; see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures manuai,S § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed physician who must supervise clinical services and
perform surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to
be on duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The
second category of requirements outlines construction standards for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that
"deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be
approved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are
also construction requirements that set forth standards for
the public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology services, 10 and general building. 11 The final group of regulations
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the requirements for various services that the facility may offer,
such as anesthesia, 12 laboratory, 13 and pathology. 14 Some of
The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used,
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures fol" admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4;
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and
infection control, § 41.2.5.
10
These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical hospital
if the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities .
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1.
"The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§§ 50.6.1, 50.7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4.
12
See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for anesthesia must be present for administration and recovery).
"Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43. 6.1. Outpatient surgical hospitals providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy
testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing,
9
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the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§§ 43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission/ 5 and postoperative recovery. 16 Finally, the regulations mandate some
emergency services and evacuation planning. 17
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for sugar and albumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically indicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4.
"Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11.
"Section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of laboratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of
any procedure. !d., § 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical hospital providing
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the
performing physician, id., § 43.8.4, and the facility "shall offer each patient
appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion procedure and in
birth control methods," id ., § 43.8.5.
16
Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation techniques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 43.9.1, 43.9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. !d.,
§§ 43. 9.3, 43. 9.4.
17
See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus,
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemorrhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a licensed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides:
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory,
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all
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B

It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hospitalization requirement differs from those at issue in City of
Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, at 4-5. In those cases,
we recognized the medical fact that, "at least during the early
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital." City of Akron, ante, at 19. The requirements at
issue, however, mandated that "all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, acute-care facilities."
Ashcroft, ante, at 5. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Virginia's hospitalization requirement, outpatient surgical hospitals may qualify for licensing as "hospitals" in which secondtrimester abortions lawfully may be performed. Thus, our
decisions in City of Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling
here.
In view of its interest in protecting the health of its citizens, the State necessarily has considerable discretion in
determining standards for the licensing of medical facilities.
Although its discretion does not permit it to adopt abortion
regulations that depart from accepted medical practice, it
does have a legitimate interest in regulating second-trimester abortions and setting forth the standards for facilities in
which such abortions are performed.
On their face, the Virginia regulations appear to be generally compatible with accepted medical standards governing
outpatient second-trimester abortions. The American Public Health Association (APHA), although recognizing "that
greater use of the dilatation and evacuation procedure
make[s] it possible to perform the vast majority of second tritimes."

,,
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mester abortions during or prior to the 16th [w]eek after the
last menstrual period," still "[u]rges endorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in free-standing qualified
clinics that meet the state standards required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2
(1979). The medical profession has not thought that a
State's standards need be relaxed merely because the facility
performs abortions: "Ambulatory care facilities providing
abortion services should meet the same standards of care as
those recommended for other surgical procedures performed
in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the freestanding and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (AGOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 1982).
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to requirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facilities are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recommended for hospitals." Ibid.
We need not consider whether Virginia's regulations are
constitutional in every particular. Despite personal knowledge· of the regulations at least by the time of trial, appellant
has not attacked them as being insufficiently related to the
State's interest in protecting health. 18
His challenge
throughout this litigation appears to have been limited to an
assertion that the State cannot require all second-trimester
abortions to be performed in full-service general hospitals.
In essence, appellant has argued that Virginia's hospitalization requirements are no different in substance from those
8

See nn. 3, 6, supra; Record Vol. 5, pp. 55-56 (appellant acknowledging
existence of the outpatient hospital license; stating that he was seeking a
license; but denying that he knew of the licensing program when the abortion was performed).
'
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reviewed in the City of Akron and Ashcroft cases. 19 At the
same time, however, appeliant ·took the position-both before the Virginia courts and this Court-that a state licensing
requirement for outpatient abortion facilities would be constitutional. 20 We can only assume that by continuing to challenge the Virginia hospitalization requirement petitioner either views the Virginia regulations in some unspecified way
as unconstitutional or challenges a hospitalization requirement that does not exist in Virginia. Yet, not until his reply
brief in this Court did he elect to criticize the regulations
apart from his broadside attack on the entire Virginia hospitalization requirement.
Given the plain language of the Virginia regulations and
the history of their adoption, see n. 6, supra, we see no reason to doubt that an adequately equipped clinic could, upon
proper application, obtain an outpatient hospital license permitting the performance of second-trimester abortions.
We conclude that Virginia's requirement that second-trimester abortions be performed in licensed clinics is not an unreasonable means of furthering the State's compelling interest in
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations, but not
individually or on specific grounds, instead making only facial challenges in
the broadest language and in conclusory terms: the record is silent on the
applicability of those regulations to his facility; that the record does not
show whether any outpatient surgical hospitals exist in Virginia or
whether, if they exist, they allow second-trimester abortions; that the
record is silent on the reasonableness of the regulations; that he had no
opportunity to defend against the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain
whether, if he had applied for an outpatient hospital license, it would have
been granted; that obtaining a license is an arduous process; that Virginia
courts have had no opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and
regulations"; and that Part II of the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical hospital where second-trimester abortions are performed.
Some of these arguments are simply meritless, see n. 8, supra, and others
are irrelevant, see n. 3, supra, and none has been raised below.
20
See 8 Record 196a, 214a; Brief for Appellant in No. 801107 (Va. S.
Ct.), p. 35; Juris. Statement 16; Brief for Appellant 32, 43 n. 75, 46.
19
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"protecting the woman's own health and safety." Roe, 410
U. S., at 150. 21 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a
legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other
medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. Unlike the
provisions at issue in City of Akron and Ashcroft, Virginia's
statute and regulations do not require that the patient be
hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be performed
in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the State's requirement that second-trimester abortions be performed in
licensed clinics appears to comport with accepted medical
practice, and leaves the method and tinung of the abortion
precisely where they belong-with the physician and the
patient.
IV
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is

Affirmed.

•
21

Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering firsttrimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as
Part II. In fact, Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 63.1.1(b), § 63.3,
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more technological support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to
acute-care, general hospitals. The only issue before us, however, relates
to second-trimester abortions.

,;

I

...

MAY

)

-

.l.

'

.c::

t

,.._..

I

'1• -

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

l -::-:7

From:

J::;u J

Justice Powell

_8_8_3_ __
Circulated: _ _ _i__3_ 1
Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

4th DRAFT
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CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, APPELLANT v. VIRGINIA
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
[May - , 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization requirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - ,
and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, ante, p. - - . The principal issue here is whether
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitutional.
I
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In
November, 1979, he practiced at his office in Woodbridge,
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls
Church, Virginia. The Falls Church clinic has an operating
room and facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time
relevant to this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant sought any license for it.
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmarried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimester. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but
never advised her parents of her decision.
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course.
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also advised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began.
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet.
Id., at 200.
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home.
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investigation.1
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of
Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d).
2
The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which
provides:
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person administer to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or
1
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdiction, - - U. S. - - , and now affirm.
II
Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, addressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders his conviction unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977).
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Comiscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony."
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester,
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester,
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain circumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life,
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and expressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however,
rebut the other defenses.
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lumbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, required the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of going forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107,
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684,
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975).
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to
· prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus . In
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 10691070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201.

III
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' ... at approximately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). See City of Akron, ante, at 10. This
interest embraces the facilities and circumstances in which
abortions are performed. See id., at 150. Appellant argues, however, that Virginia prohibits all non-hospital second-trimester abortions and that such a requirement imposes
an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In City
of Akron and Ashcroft, we upheld such a constitutional challenge to the acute-care hospital requirements at issue there.
The State of Virginia argues here that its hospitalization requirement differs significantly from the hospitalization requirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests.
A
In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under

'.
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Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to
perform an abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1, 4 that defines "hospital" to include
A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). "Surgery" is not defined. Appellant
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a question of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see id.,
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hospitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus,
it is irrelevant to the issue before us whether appellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with the Virginia regulations.
'The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in§ 18.2-73
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Virginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health
laws:
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical procedures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospitals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling interest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075,
277 S. E. 2d, at 204.
3
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"outpatient .
hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 defines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifically in §32.1-123.1. Seen. 5, infra.
' Section 32.1-123.1 provides:
" 'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provision of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgical or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospitals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums,
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and
maternity hospitals."
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711).
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing
surgery)."
'The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing minimum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and requirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter,
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due regard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene,
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profession and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assistants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711)
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12
and 32.1-127 (1979)).
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regulations that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I,
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that therequirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-

..
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. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that second-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may
tient facilities in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the
trimester.
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January
26, 1977. Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at this
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services.
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the
State; representatives of two abortion clinics, the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest Clinic; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical
· School representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the
Tidewater OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and
a representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and
have our support." Id., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, however, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] procedure in the interest of maternal health." I d., at 7. But the clinics specifically "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the
Board should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient
surgical hospitals in order to include these first-trimester outpatient abortion clinics within the same set of regulations. See id., at 30. Following
the hearing, the Board added Part III, the regulations of which apply only
to clinics doing first-trimester abortions. See nn. 8, 12, infra. It there[Footnotes 7 and 8 are on p. 8}
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be perfonned in an outpatient surgical hospital provided that
facility has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State.
The Virginia regulations applicable to the perfonnance of
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to
all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main categories. The first groupipg relates to organization, management, policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations
fore is clear that Virginia has recognized the need for discrete and different
sets of regulations for the two periods. The Board gave its final approval,
and the regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979,
some two years and five months later.
We note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations
in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prosecuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were
promulgated pursuant to Va. Code §§ 32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979.
'Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital ... unless
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va.
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically governing outpatient surgical hospitals).
8
Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgical hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpretation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3,
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and
by the history of Part III, see n. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II
legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the regulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the
first trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure
performed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] shall
be performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week
amenorrhea).").
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require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient
and program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§ 40.3; see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures manual, § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed physician who must supervise clinical services and
perform surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to
be on duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The
second category of requirements outlines construction standards for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that
"deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be
approved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are
also construction requirements that set forth standards for
the public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology services, §§ 52.1, 52.2, 52.3, and general building, §§ 50.6.1,
50.7.1, 50.8.1, 52.4. The final group of regulations relates to
patient care services. Most of these set the requirements
for various services that the facility may offer, such as anesthesia, §43.1, laboratory, §§43.6.1, 64.1.3, 64.1.4, and pathology, §§ 43.6.3, 64.2.4. Some of the requirements relate
to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. §§ 43.2, 43.10,
43.11, 43.12. 6. There are also guidelines on medical records,
§ 43. 7, pre-operative admission, § 43.8, and post-operative recovery, § 43.9. Finally, the regulations mandate some emergency services and evacuation planning. §§ 43.4.1, 43.5.
B
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hospitalization requirement differs from those at issue in City of
Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, at 4-5. In those cases,
we recognized the medical fact that, "at least during the early
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital." City of Akron, ante, at 19. The requirements at
issue, however, mandated that "all second-trimester abor-
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tions must be performed in general, acute-care facilities."
Ashcroft, ante, at 5. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Virginia's hospitalization requirement, outpatient surgical hospitals may qualify for licensing as "hospitals" in which secondtrimester abortions lawfully may be performed. Thus, our
decisions in City of Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling
here.
In view of its interest in protecting the health of its citizens, the State necessarily has considerable discretion in
determining standards for the licensing of medical facilities.
Although its discretion does not permit it to adopt abortion
regulations that depart from accepted medical practice, it
does have a legitimate interest in regulating second-trimester abortions and setting forth the standards for facilities in
which such abortions are performed.
On their face, the Virginia regulations appear to be generally compatible with accepted medical standards governing
outpatient second-trimester abortions. The American Public Health Association (APHA), although recognizing "that
greater use of the dilatation and evacuation procedure
make[s] it possible to perform the vast majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the 16th [w]eek after the
last menstrual period," still "(u]rges endorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in free-standing qualified
clinics that meet the state standards required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2
(1979). The medical profession has not thought that a
State's standards need be relaxed merely because the facility
performs abortions: "Ambulatory care facilities providing
abortion services should meet the same standards of care as
those recommended for other surgical procedures performed
in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the freestanding and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Stand-
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ards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 1982).
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to requirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facilities are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recommended for hospitals." Ibid.
We need not consider whether Virginia's regulations are
constitutional in every particular. Despite personal knowledge of the regulations at least by the time of trial, appellant
has not attacked them as being insufficiently related to the
State's interest in protecting health. 9 His challenge
throughout this litigation appears to have been limited to an
assertion that the State cannot require all second-trimester
abortions to be performed in full-service general hospitals.
In essence, appellant has argued that Virginia's hospitalization requirements are no different in substance from those
reviewed in the City of Akron and Ashcroft cases. 10 At the
See nn. 3, 6, supra; 5 Record 5i>-56 (appellant acknowledging existence of the outpatient hospital license; stating that he was seeking a license; but denying that he knew of the licensing program when the abortion was performed).
w Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations, but not
individually or on specific grounds, instead making only facial challenges in
the broadest language and in conclusory terms: that the record is silent on
the applicability of those regulations to his facility; that the record does not
show whether any outpatient surgical hospitals exist in Virginia or
whether, if they exist, they allow second-trimester abortions; that the
record is silent on the reasonableness of the regulations; that he had no
opportunity to defend against the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain
whether, if he had applied for an outpatient hospital license, it would have
been granted; that obtaining a license is an arduous process; that Virginia
courts have had no opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and
regulations"; and that Part II of the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical hospital where second-trimester abortions are performed.
Some of these arguments are simply meritless, see n. 8, supra, and others
9

1.

~---
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same time, however, appellant took the position-both before the Virginia courts and this Court-that a state licensing
requirement for outpatient abortion facilities would be constitutional. 11 We can only assume that by continuing to challenge the Virginia hospitalization requirement petitioner either views the Virginia regulations in some unspecified way
as unconstitutional or challenges a hospitalization requirement that does not exist in Virginia. Yet, not until his reply
brief in this Court did he elect to criticize the regulations
apart from his broadside attack on the entire Virginia hospitalization requirement.
Given the plain language of the Virginia regulations and
the history of their adoption, see n. 6, supra, we see no reason to doubt that an adequately equipped clinic could, upon
proper application, obtain an outpatient hospital license permitting the performance of second-trimester abortions.
We conclude that Virginia's requirement that second-trimester abortions be performed in licensed clinics is not an unreasonable means of furthering the State's compelling interest in
"protecting the woman's own health and safety." Roe, 410
U. S., at 150. 12 As w~ emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a
legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other
medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. Unlike the
are irrelevant, see n. 3, supra, and none has been raised below.
11
See 8 Record 196a, 214a; Brief for Appellant in No. 801107 (Va. S.
Ct.), p. 35; Juris. Statement 16; Brief for Appellant 32, 43 n. 75, 46.
12
Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering firsttrimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as
Part II. In fact, Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 63.l.l(b), § 63.3,
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more technological support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to
acute-care, general hospitals. The only issue before us, however, relates
to second-trimester abortions.
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provisions at issue in City of Akron and Ashcroft, Virginia's
statute and regulations do not require that the patient be
hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be performed
in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the State's requirement that second-trimester abortions be performed in
licensed clinics appears to comport with accepted medical
practice, and leaves the method and timing of the abortion
precisely where they belong-with the physician and the
patient.
IV
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is
Affirmed.
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Appellant, an obstetrician-gynecologist, was convicted after a Virginia
state-court trial for violating Virginia statutory provisions make it unlawful to perform an abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy
outside of a licensed hospital. "Hospital" is defined to include outpatient hospitals, and State Department of Health regulations define "outpatient hospital" as including institutions that primarily furnish facilities
for the performance of surgical procedures on outpatients. The regulations also provide that second-trimester abortions may be performed in
an outpatient surgical clinic licensed as a "hospital" by the State. The
evidence at appellant's trial established, inter alia, that he performed a
second-trimester abortion on an unmarried minor by an injection of saline solution at his unlicensed clinic; that the minor understood appellant
to agree to her plan to deliver the fetus in a motel and did not recall
being advised to go to a hospital when labor began, although such advice
was included in an instruction sheet provided her by appellant; and that
the minor, alone in a motel, aborted her fetus 48 hours after the saline
affirmed appellant's conviction.
injection. The \Giog4Ria Supreme Co
Held:
'I;~ j_,; ~'
1. The Virginia abortion statute was not unconstitutionally applied to
appellant on the asserted ground that the State failed to allege in the indictment and to prove lack of medical necessity for the abortion. Under
the authoritative construction of the statute by the V:iPg:iJ:~itl Supreme
~I· . .
Cow1( the prosecution was no~·ated to prove lack of medical neces~ '''\'"'~1--sitylj'~yond a reasonable doub unti appellant invoked medical necessity
as a defense. Placing upon the efendant the burden of going forward
with evidence on an affirmative defense is normally permissible. And
appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove that his acts in
fact caused the fetus' death is meritless, in view of the undisputed facts
proved at trial. Pp. 3--4.
A

-II

SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA
Syllabus

2. Virginia's requirement that second-trimester abortions be performed in licensed outpatient clinics is not an unreasonable means of furthering the State's important and legitimate interest in protecting the
woman's health, which interest becomes "compelling" at approximately
the end of the first trimester. In Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. --,and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, ante, p. - - , constitutional challenges were upheld
with regard to requirements mandating that all second-trimester abortions be performed in "general, acute-care facilities." In contrast, the
Virginia statutes and regulations do not require that such abortions be
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals, but permit their performance at licensed outpatient clinics. Thus, the decisions in Akron and
Ashcroft, are not controlling here. Although a State's discretion in
determining standards for the licensing of medical facilities does not permit it to adopt abortion regulations that depart from accepted medical
practice, the Virginia regulations on their face are compatible with accepted medical standards governing outpatient second-trimester abortions. Pp. 4-13.
221 Va. 1059, 227 S. E. 2d 194, affirmed .
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization requirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc ., ante, p. - - ,
and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo ., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, ante, p. - - . The principal issue here is whether
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitutional.
I
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In
November, 1979, he practiced at his office in Woodbridge,
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls
Church, Virginia. The Falls Church clinic has an operating
room and facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time
relevant to this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant sought any license for it.
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmarried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimester. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but
never advised her parents of her decision.
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course.
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also advised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began.
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet.
ld., at 200.
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home.
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investigation.1
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of
Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54--317(1), 54.321.2
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d).
2
The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which
provides:
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person administer to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or
1
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdiction, 456 U. S. 988, and now affirm.
II

Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, addressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders his conviction unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977).
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Comiscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony."
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester,
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester,
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain circumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life,
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and expressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however,
rebut the other defenses.

l
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lumbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by _this Court, required the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of going forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107,
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684,
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975).
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 10691070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201.

III
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' . . . at approximately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). See City of Akron, ante, at 10. This
interest embraces the facilities and circumstances in which
abortions are performed. See id., at 150. Appellant argues, however, that Virginia prohibits all non-hospital second-trimester abortions and that such a requirement imposes
an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In City
of Akron and Ashcroft, we upheld such a constitutional challenge to the acute-care hospital requirements at issue there.
The State of Virginia argues here that its hospitalization requirement differs significantly from the hospitalization requirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests.
A
In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under

81-185---0PINION
SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA

5

Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to
perform an abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1, 4 that defines "hospital" to include
3
A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing
surgery. Va. Code §32.1-124(5). "Surgery" is not defined. Appellant
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a question of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see id.,
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hospitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus,
it is irrelevant to the issue before us whether appellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with the Virginia regulations.
4
The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in§ 18.2-73
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Virginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health
laws:
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical procedures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospitals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling interest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075,
277 S. E. 2d, at 204.
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"outpatient .
hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 defines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifically in § 32.1-123.1. Seen. 5, infra.
5
Section 32.1-123.1 provides:
"'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provision of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgical or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospitals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums,
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and
maternity hospitals."
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711).
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing
surgery)."
6
The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing minimum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and requirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter,
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due regard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene,
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profession and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assistants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711)
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12
and 32.1-127 (1979)).
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regulations that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I,
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that therequirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-

~ '
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. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that second-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may
tient facilities in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the
trimester.
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January
26, 1977. Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at this
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services.
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the
State; representatives of two abortion clinics, the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest Clinic; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical
School representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the
Tidewater OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and
a representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and
have our support." !d., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, however, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] procedure in the interest of maternal health." !d., at 7. But the clinics specifically "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the
Board should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient
surgical hospitals in order to include these first-trimester outpatient abortion clinics within the same set of regulations. See id., at 30. Following
the hearing, the Board added Part III, the regulations of which apply only
to clinics doing first-trimester abortions. See nn. 8, 12, infra. It there-
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be performed in an outpatient surgical hospital provided that
facility has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State.
The Virginia regulations applicable to the performance of
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to
all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main categories. The first grouping relates to organization, management, policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations
fore is clear that Virginia has recognized the need for discrete and different
sets of regulations for the two periods. The Board gave its final approval,
and the regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979,
some two years and five months later.
We note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations
in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prosecuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were
promulgated pursuant to Va. Code §§ 32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979.
'Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital ... unless
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va.
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically governing outpatient surgical hospitals).
8
Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgical hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpretation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3,
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and
by the history of Part III, see n. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II
legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the regulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the
first trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure
performed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] shall
be performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week
amenorrhea).").
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require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient
and program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§ 40.3; see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures manual, § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed physician who must supervise clinical services and
perform surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to
be on duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The
second category of requirements outlines construction standards for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that
"deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be
approved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are
also construction requirements that set forth standards for
the public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology services, §§ 52.1, 52.2, 52.3, and general building, §§ 50.6.1,
50. 7.1, 50.8.1, 52.4. The final group of regulations relates to
patient care services. Most of these set the requirements
for various services that the facility may offer, such as anesthesia, §43.1, laboratory, §§43.6.1, 64.1.3, 64.1.4, and pathology, §§ 43.6.3, 64.2.4. Some of the requirements relate
to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. §§43.2, 43.10,
43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on medical records,
§ 43. 7, pre-operative admission, § 43.8, and post-operative recovery, § 43.9. Finally, the regulations mandate some emergency services and evacuation planning. §§ 43.4.1, 43.5.
B
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hospitalization requirement differs from those at issue in City of
Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, at 4-5. In those cases,
we recognized the medical fact that, "at least during the early
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital." City of Akron, ante, at 19. The requirements at
issue, however, mandated that "all second-trimester abor-
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tions must be performed in general, acute-care facilities."
Ashcroft, ante, at 5. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Virginia's hospitalization requirement, outpatient surgical hospitals may qualify for licensing as "hospitals" in which secondtrimester abortions lawfully may be performed. Thus, our
decisions in City of Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling
here.
In view of its interest in protecting the health of its citizens, the State necessarily has considerable discretion in
determining standards for the licensing of medical facilities.
Although its discretion does not permit it to adopt abortion
regulations that depart from accepted medical practice, it
does have a legitimate interest in regulating second-trimester abortions and setting forth the standards for facilities in
which such abortions are performed.
On their face, the Virginia regulations appear to be generally compatible with accepted medical standards governing
outpatient second-trimester abortions. The American Public Health Association (APHA), although recognizing "that
greater use of the dilatation and evacuation procedure
make[s] it possible to perform the vast majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the 16th [w]eek after the
last menstrual period," still "[u]rges endorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in free-standing qualified
clinics that meet the state standards required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2
(1979). The medical profession has not thought that a
State's standards need be relaxed merely because the facility
performs abortions: "Ambulatory care facilities providing
abortion services should meet the same standards of care as
those recommended for other surgical procedures performed
in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the freestanding and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Stand-
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ards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 1982).
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to requirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facilities are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recommended for hospitals." Ibid.
We need not consider whether Virginia's regulations are
constitutional in every particular. Despite personal knowledge of the regulations at least by the time of trial, appellant
has not attacked them as being insufficiently related to the
State's interest in protecting health. 9 His challenge
throughout this litigation appears to have been limited to an
assertion that the State cannot require all second-trimester
abortions to be performed in full-service general hospitals.
In essence, appellant has argued that Virginia's hospitalization requirements are no different in substance from those
reviewed in the City of Akron and Ashcroft cases. 10 At the
9
See nn. 3, 6, supra; 5 Record 55-56 (appellant acknowledging existence of the outpatient hospital license; stating that he was seeking a license; but denying that he knew of the licensing program when the abortion was performed).
10
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations, but not
individually or on specific grounds, instead making only facial challenges in
the broadest language and in conclusory terms: that the record is silent on
the applicability of those regulations to his facility; that the record does not
show whether any outpatient surgical hospitals exist in Virginia or
whether, if they exist, they allow second-trimester abortions; that the
record is silent on the reasonableness of the regulations; that he had no
opportunity to defend against the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain
whether, if he had applied for an outpatient hospital license, it would have
been granted; that obtaining a license is an arduous process; that Virginia
courts have had no opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and
regulations"; and that Part II of the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical hospital where second-trimester abortions are performed.
Some of these arguments are simply meritless, see n. 8, supra, and others
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same time, however, appellant took the position-both before the Virginia courts and this Court-that a state licensing
requirement for outpatient abortion facilities would be constitutional. 11 We can only assume that by continuing to challenge the Virginia hospitalization requirement petitioner either views the Virginia regulations in some unspecified way
as unconstitutional or challenges a hospitalization requirement that does not exist in Virginia. Yet, not until his reply
brief in this Court did he elect to criticize the regulations
apart from his broadside attack on the entire Virginia hospitalization requirement.
Given the plain language of the Virginia regulations and
the history of their adoption, see n. 6, supra, we see no reason to doubt that an adequately equipped clinic could, upon
proper application, obtain an outpatient hospital license permitting the performance of second-trimester abortions.
We conclude that Virginia's requirement that second-trimester abortions be performed in licensed clinics is not an unreasonable means of furthering the State's compelling interest in
"protecting the woman's own health and safety." Roe, 410
U.S., at 150. 12 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a
legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other
medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. Unlike the
are irrelevant, see n. 3, supra, and none has been raised below.
n See 8 Record 196a, 214a; Brief for Appellant in No. 801107 (Va. S.
Ct.), p. 35; Juris. Statement 16; Brief for Appellant 32, 43 n. 75, 46.
12
Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering firsttrimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as
Part II. In fact, Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§63.1.1(b), §63.3,
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more technological support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to
acute-care, general hospitals. The only issue before us, however, relates
to second-trimester abortions.
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provisions at issue in City of Akron and Ashcroft, Virginia's
statute and regulations do not require that the patient be
hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be performed
in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the State's requirement that second-trimester abortions be performed in
licensed clinics appears to comport with accepted medical
practice, and leaves the method and timing of the abortion
precisely where they belong-with the physician and the
patient.
IV
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is
Affirmed.
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